Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Baroness Finlay of Llandaff and Lord Pannick

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support this amendment, which would have been avoided if we had been able to have proper regulation of psychotherapy professionals. The problem is that the voluntary registration through the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy, the UK Council for Psychotherapy or the National Counselling & Psychotherapy Society requires people to be appropriately trained and have ethical standards. But if there is a serious complaint against them and they are removed from there, they can still carry on seeing clients and practising in a completely unethical way. There is absolutely no recourse for people who are seriously harmed by whatever activities are undertaken.

There are times in people’s lives when they are particularly vulnerable. One of those is when they are bereaved. Some older people, when they are bereaved, may be in what you could call that pre-dementia phase of being particularly emotionally vulnerable. They may have people who recommend in good faith that they go to see somebody who has some counselling label up, but who then goes on to exploit them tremendously to create dependency, charge huge fees and make the person emotionally dependent on them, which results in coercive behaviour to carry on seeing this person and carry on handing over money. They may also, in the process, implant the idea that their family are being unsupportive and that the best thing they could do would be to cut off contact with their family.

I have seen this first hand, when a family, who were well-meaning and wanting to provide support, had the most awful acrimonious correspondence sent to them by the person who was being advised for their own good in their counselling to have no contact whatever with these family members, and the counselling service that this person was accessing drained many thousands of pounds from their personal account. The problem is that, at the moment, there is no recourse for the public. They can complain and try to take a legal process against the person, but they are very vulnerable people. This amendment would provide a route to having some control, if you like, over some of these quack practitioners who should not be out there, putting up nameplates and calling themselves counsellors.

It is worth remembering that, particularly in primary care, we have talking therapies that have very good outcomes, such as cognitive behavioural therapy, delivered by people who are properly trained, subject to ethical standards and have appropriate diplomas. They provide non-judgmental, confidential, professional assistance and guidance to help people find a solution to their problems. It has become popular in primary care and in the community, but the backlash against it is that an unsuspecting person and their friends may not realise, or have any way of knowing, that somebody who claims to be a counsellor is completely bogus.

In 2024, Alastair Campbell campaigned hard against this, and there was a very good article in the i newspaper about it—I do not think it is advertising for me to name the paper. I recall the discussions we had about trying to get the registration of professionals, so that those who are providing a valuable service can carry on doing so and are not tainted in the minds of the public by those who are completely bogus. This amendment seems to be essential to protect the public.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned the reservations which I expressed in Committee. I have thought further about this matter since Committee. Indeed, the purpose of the gap between Committee and Report is precisely so that all noble Lords—not only noble Lords on the Cross Benches and Back Benches but Ministers—can reflect on what was said in Committee.

I have looked in particular at the provision which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned, Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which creates an offence of:

“Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship”.


It uses, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, rightly said, the same concepts that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, seeks to implement in the law in the present context. It seems to me that there is a very close analogy between that existing criminal offence and the present context, which is not in the same intimate or family relationship but in the relationship between the psychotherapist or counsellor and the patient.

For my part, I cannot see why the mischief—and it is a mischief—which the amendment seeks to identify should not be a criminal offence. Why should it be that persons who carry out conduct that is defined in this provision should not be subject to the criminal law? Regulation is important, but it is not the answer. The mischief defined in Amendment 358 should be a criminal offence. I have changed my mind.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Finlay of Llandaff and Lord Pannick

Committee stage
Friday 5th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am sure that the legal advice the noble Baroness has been given is absolutely correct. My point is that surely this problem arises now. This Bill does not change the position in any way.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

With all due respect, I am not aware that the legislation has actually been enacted in either the Isle of Man or Jersey.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Until it is enacted, there is not a problem. When it is enacted, the problem arises, whether or not this Bill is enacted.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

We are discussing the wording of this Bill, with due respect. I raise this as a concern for clarification. It needs clarification because, if noble Lords are anticipating that this Bill and the legislation in the other jurisdictions will pass, we cannot leave a legal loophole or difficulty that might jeopardise the care of patients coming to England from the Crown dependencies. That is why I have raised it.

I turn to Amendment 11. Currently, the Bill speaks of the person being “ordinarily resident” in England and Wales, but there is a problem with “ordinarily”. In 1983, Lord Scarman stated in a House of Lords judgment that

“‘ordinarily resident’ refers to a man’s abode in a particular place or country which he has adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes as part of the regular order of his life for the time being”.

So far, so good. However, in the healthcare context, the 2012 Review of Overseas Visitors Charging Policy said:

“The vagueness of the definition means that OR”—


ordinary residence—

“is difficult to interpret and apply on an individual case basis”.

People fell through the gaps and the NHS was not recovering its costs. Then, during his time as Immigration Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Harper, pointed out that

“we need to do a better job of making sure that front-line professionals have a simpler system”.—[Official Report, Commons, Immigration Bill Committee, 7/11/13; col. 290.]

The problem with the definition in the Bill is that it could cover someone who is now living in another country but has an address of convenience in England and Wales for whatever reason. We know that there are thousands of empty properties owned by people who are not living permanently in this country. Apart from the more than 187,000 homes that are owned by people living permanently abroad, there are 5.5 million people who are British passport holders or have residency visas to live in the UK but are living abroad permanently. What will be the position of these people if they wish to access an assisted death here? Currently, they would not be eligible for NHS treatment if it were to be funded by the NHS. If they came to live in the UK for a year, they would then become eligible for the NHS, but, with the prognosis of six months or less, they would be expected to be dead within that time. Of course, this assumes that there is any accuracy in prognostication, which there is not.

Let me put to your Lordships a scenario that is, sadly, not infrequent. A person working for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in an embassy abroad becomes seriously and terminally ill and is repatriated to the UK. Their house is rented out and they have to give notice, so they go to live in a different area—one, they hope, with good specialist palliative care services that can provide them with support. However, not being able to be in their own home and surrounded by their own things, and without contact with people who would otherwise have a role in their lives, they easily become very depressed.

Let us look at that scenario under this Bill. Suppose they decide that they want an assisted death. They will not have been resident for 12 months prior to making a first declaration to request an assisted death. Will that person, who may have worked all their life in service of this country, now be ineligible? I see that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is nodding that they would. I believe that, under the wording of the Bill—

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Finlay of Llandaff and Lord Pannick

Committee stage
Friday 21st November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, this has clearly been a long debate, and I think for good reason. As one noble Lord said, coercion and pressure are a major concern for many people about the way the Bill is written. I will very briefly respond. I am well aware of the time, but a lot of points have been made. Noble Lords will all be relieved to know that I am not going to go through them all.

First, the word “encouragement” is taken from the Director of Public Prosecutions guidelines, and for good reason, because the Director of Public Prosecutions recognised the power of a person in authority over a person who is vulnerable. That is why it tends towards the prosecution of assistance coming from a person in authority. I would include doctors in that, but it was also thought to include prison staff, nurses and others employed in that role.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am sorry to interrupt. There have been a number of references to the DPP’s guidelines. For accuracy, will the noble Baroness accept that paragraph 45.5 of the guidelines says:

“A prosecution is less likely to be required if … the actions of the suspect may be characterised as reluctant encouragement … in the face of a determined wish on the part of the victim to commit suicide”?

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

For the sake of accuracy, I completely accept that. Perhaps the noble Lord might also see, while I am speaking, whether I am correct that the guidelines would tend towards prosecution if a person in authority was encouraging. That was my understanding.

I will raise a few points. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, absolutely hit the nail on the head when he pointed out that, if we had had a royal commission and went through the processes and so on fully, we might be in a different place now. One of the big problems we have encountered in looking at this Bill is what has been deemed to be in or out of scope. If you do not have the services available, you do not have true choice. That is a real problem, yet those of us who have tried to table amendments to bring specialist palliative care provision into scope to match and stay parallel with any developments in assisted dying services have repeatedly been told—I have checked, and it is in the Companion that we cannot extend scope—that this was deemed out of scope. Therefore, we feel a bit stuck about how we can make sure that people get the services they need.

The Minister pointed out something in the Bill that has been a concern to a lot of us: that the family do not have to be informed. Behind that is the concern about grief. Let us take a 19 year-old with an osteosarcoma with metastases. The parents have been looking after him from childhood through to all his treatment, doing all they can to enhance his quality of life. He says that he now wants to go for an assisted death, and he does not want his parents told. The first thing that the parents hear is a phone call to say that he is now dead, having had lethal drugs. They may be aware of a whole lot of issues that have been going on in that 19 year-old’s life, which they would have shared with those involved in his care. This is pretty close to some patients whom I have looked after, because someone developing into an adult when terminally ill is very difficult, as are the transition issues.

There is another aspect to that. Having spoken to and heard from people who have a relative who has gone for euthanasia—it is usually euthanasia rather than assisted suicide—they often feel devastated that their love was not enough to support the person. They feel that they have failed, and they ask why they could not have helped the person find ways forward or access the services they need. I will quote from the commission chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, with Demos, on the lack of services. It states:

“The Commission does not accept that any of these forms of pressure could be a legitimate motivation for a terminally ill individual to seek an assisted death. Therefore, it is essential that any future system should contain safeguards designed to ensure, as much as possible, that any decision to seek an assisted suicide is a genuinely voluntary and autonomous choice, not influenced by another person’s wishes, or by constrained social circumstances, such as lack of access to adequate end of life care and support”.


The motivation behind many of the amendments discussed today has been precisely to deal with that problem.

I will address two more things, beginning with the concept of how sure someone has to be. The civil standard of proof of 51% seems remarkably low when determining the eligibility of someone having lethal drugs. The implication in the debate in the other place was that the doctor should not ask the person, “Why is it that you want to end your life?” Yet in clinical practice, whenever patients say, “I’ve had enough; I do not want to go on”, you answer that with one question, another question and then another question. It feels like an onion: you take layer after layer off, and you find out what is happening. You find many remediable aspects to their situation—they might often seem trivial to some people, but they have been wearing the patient down.

I am horrified, frankly, whenever I hear of inadequate care and of people not getting the pain relief that they need. Morphine does not kill you; it is a good drug for pain relief, given appropriately in the right dose at the right time for the right reason. That is what prescribing analgesia is about. That is completely different to giving a massive overdose of lethal drugs—and, as we know, not all the ones in the world have been fully assessed.

Assisted Dying Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Finlay of Llandaff and Lord Pannick

Friday 7th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have put to me pleas, begging—or however it is put—and I do take them very seriously indeed. However, it seems to me that after two hours we have had a very considerable debate on an issue of principle relating to the Bill. There is widespread agreement that there should be a judicial protection included in the Bill. As I understand it, only two real concerns have been expressed. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has suggested that the protections in my amendment are not sufficiently robust. With great respect, I do not accept that. The other objection raised is that it should not be judges of the Family Division who hear this. I think that this is so grave an issue that it is right and appropriate that the judicial protection is at that level. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, will confirm from her experience, there is nothing formal about the Family Division in appropriate cases. Judges hear the disputes around the bedside of the patient when necessary.

The noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, in his moving speech, was concerned about wrongdoing. I say that if the judge is satisfied on hearing evidence that the decision is,

“voluntary, clear, settled and informed”,

by a person who has capacity, then the noble Lord’s concerns about wrongdoing will be met. It is time that we came to decision on this matter of principle, encouraged as I am by what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, says. I willingly give way.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for giving way. We have had a wide-ranging discussion. I felt that we were at the point of getting people to come round a table to find a solution. Like others, I am concerned about this process, but I respectfully state that I do not believe that we have heard the full debate. Other amendments in the next group in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, will expand on what he has proposed, and they have not had a fair hearing. I fear that to vote now may force the House to amend the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, at Report. If that is what he wants, I am concerned about that. The House’s debate to date has been balanced and careful. I do not understand what is to be gained by having a vote now, rather than going through the issues, because we agreed that a lot in the Bill needs to be debated and sorted out. I state clearly that I am not aware of any wrecking amendments; the debate has been extremely informed.

[Lord Pannick]

I am not suggesting for a moment that anyone has proposed wrecking amendments, but I certainly do not accept that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has not had a fair hearing. He made a speech of 15 minutes or so—most appropriately—in which he set out his case, and the House has heard the arguments for and against. I do not think that there is anything unfair or unbalanced about putting to the opinion of the House an issue of principle so that we can make progress. I wish to test the opinion of the House.