Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Baroness Featherstone Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 1st March 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Featherstone]

7: Clause 1, page 2, leave out lines 41 to 45 and insert—
“(9) Before making any regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must—(a) consult —(i) the ONR,(ii) the International Atomic Energy Agency,(iii) the National Audit Office,(iv) such other persons, if any, as the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to consult, and(b) lay before Parliament a written statement declaring that, after consultation with the above parties, the Secretary of State is satisfied that the ONR—(i) has sufficient staffing and financial resources to implement nuclear safeguards regulations, and(ii) is sufficiently independent to implement nuclear safeguards regulations.(9A) The statement under subsection 9(b) must be laid before both Houses of Parliament.”

[Baroness Featherstone (LD)]

My Lords, there is ongoing concern over nuclear safeguard regulations—more accurately, both Houses are generally concerned at the deluge of regulations resulting from the Brexit legislation—and there has rightly been a great deal of criticism. This amendment seeks to put further protection around the regulations to give assurance. That assurance needs to take two forms. First, in advance of any regulations, the Secretary of State must seek the views on said regulations of interested parties and responsible bodies, such as the ONR, the Atomic Energy Agency and the National Audit Office among others.

Secondly, after that consultation, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a Written Statement that assures that the ONR has sufficient staffing and financial resources to implement nuclear safeguard regulations. That begets a question which I hope the Minister will answer when he responds. At the beginning of this process we need to set the benchmarks for staffing and resourcing. To do that, we need to understand, on the record, what both the IAEA standard and the Euratom standard of implementing nuclear safeguarding will require in the way of staffing and resourcing.

At Second Reading in this House and in the other place, concern was expressed about what would be achievable by 29 March 2019, and the view was expressed that the ONR would not be ready on day one. Can the Minister confirm that, on day one, the standard that the Government are expecting is that of the IAEA? Can he also put on record what the IAEA standards of nuclear safeguarding are, what staffing is needed to deliver those standards and what resource has or will be made available to the ONR to deliver those standards?

Can the Minister then confirm how long after reaching the IAEA standards he would expect the ONR to reach the Euratom standard of implementing nuclear safeguarding? Given that Euratom holds to a higher standard than the IAEA, can the Minister tell us how many more staff the Euratom standard will require? Can he also put on record what level of extra resource that will require, and can he assure the House that the extra funding between the two standards will be available on demand? The Government have made clear that Euratom is their intended standard, if not on day one then on a later date.

In his letter of 20 February the Minister makes it clear that there are currently 11 safeguards officers in post who are training to become inspectors by 29 March 2019. He also states that the ONR estimates that it will take 20 safeguard inspectors to deliver its functions to a standard equivalent in effectiveness and coverage to Euratom. As I have said, the Government have been clear that their intent is to reach the Euratom standard—but, worryingly, the Minister goes on to say in his letter that reaching the equivalent Euratom standard is dependent on a wide variety of factors. That seems very loose. Can the Minister enumerate what the “wide variety of factors” is, as it cannot be left open-ended?

Moving beyond the nuclear standard regulations and their resourcing, we are concerned that the ONR must be wholly independent of its paymasters. We cannot have a situation where the Government can influence or hold any sway over this organisation. It must be unfettered in its implementation of nuclear safeguard regulations, and the reporting structure must ensure that the Secretary of State cannot direct the ONR. Can the Minister reassure us on that point?

Finally, can the Minister assure us that the statement on these issues, as amended, will be laid before both Houses of Parliament? I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, we have discovered email. I can use all possible methods.

I have given the assurance that I will ensure that noble Lords are kept informed. As I think I have made clear, I do not think the amendments are necessary or, for that matter, particularly helpful, and I hope the noble Lord will accept that we will do our bit to keep all noble Lords appropriately informed of these matters and will make the precise Written Statements that are necessary at the appropriate moment. With that, I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Featherstone]

Having listened to the debate across the House, I think it appropriate that I ponder what the Minister has said. For the moment, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 7 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, in moving this amendment, I want to explore the status and independence of the ONR. I have great respect for the ONR and its work, and I wish to enhance its status.

In this crucial area of nuclear safeguards, the ONR will replace Euratom in overseeing the UK’s obligations to meet international nuclear safeguard standards, ensuring that civil nuclear material is not diverted into military or weapons use. This is a distinct responsibility and is separate from the ONR’s current role in relation to nuclear safety. Essentially, the ONR will be policing the UK in respect of its international commitments, and on that basis its independent status needs to be enhanced.

A Cabinet Office memorandum of 2014 made the situation clear:

“Non-ministerial departments do not have direct ministerial accountability. Their need for independence from ministers is … greater than for NDPBs, and includes regulators and tax authorities”.


They are government departments in their own right. The memorandum continued:

“There will be a ‘sponsor minister’ who has residual policy responsibility for the continued existence of the non-ministerial department, the overall policy and statutory framework within which it operates, and represents the non-ministerial department in Parliament. However, a non-ministerial department operates independently of ministers, generally receiving funding directly from Parliament”,


negotiating with Her Majesty’s Treasury,

“and is accountable directly to Parliament”.

My argument is that the ONR should be established as a non-ministerial government department to recognise the important new responsibilities that it has been given. Some of the bodies that have that status—the Competition and Markets Authority, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Food Standards Agency, HMRC, Ofsted and Ofgem—have been considered by one Government or another to have needed that status to show that they are robustly independent. Looking at nuclear safeguard responsibilities, there is a very strong case for enhancing the status of the ONR in that way, and I hope that the Minister will be sympathetic. I beg to move.

[Baroness Featherstone]

I support Amendment 11. Part of Amendment 7 said something similar. It is very important that we are satisfied on this point so that we know for sure that there can be no interference and no misdoings—if that is the right word.