Ukraine

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Wednesday 28th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, we are right to mark this anniversary, sad though it is, but I must say I am dismayed by the Minister’s complacency in his lack of recognition of two other important anniversaries. It is 10 years ago this month since Russia invaded Crimea, and 30 years now since the United Kingdom offered security guarantees to Ukraine through the Budapest memorandum. We failed to deliver on that commitment 10 years ago when Russia invaded Crimea, and it is because of that that the past two years have happened. I am afraid the Minister has shown smugness in not understanding that Emmanuel Macron in France is trying to make us appreciate that the words of the Statement may well come true:

“The tyrant of the Kremlin is determined … to wait out the West”.


The Minister talks of diplomacy. One rule of diplomacy is that, once you rule out options, you soon run out of options. I am very sorry to hear that he thinks having some strategic autonomy in the West might be a mistake. We have to tell the public what the dangers are here.

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

My Lords, I could not be less smug about the situation in Ukraine, and I apologise profusely if that was the impression I gave. I am commenting on the Statement that was issued last week, which was an update on the current situation. I am fully aware that the world did not respond sufficiently to the challenge that the Russian Federation laid down when it moved into Ukraine 10 years ago. As President Zelensky says, it is all Ukrainian soil that he wishes to get back, not just what has been taken in the last two years. I assure all noble Lords that the Government are far from complacent about the situation that we face now, but diplomacy must constantly have a role to play, now and in the future. The role of NATO is one of defence, and that needs to be adhered to very clearly.

Ukraine

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Thursday 21st September 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, it is instructive that the philosopher John Gray’s new book is called The New Leviathans: Thoughts After Liberalism. The reference, of course, is to Thomas Hobbes describing the breakdown of society into anarchy in the 17th century. In Chapter 13, Hobbes tells us:

“During the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man”.


The passage ends with a description of the condition that ensues, leading to, as he puts it,

“continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”.

Russia and China are our modern leviathans, and it is here in the West—the liberal, democratic, freedom-loving, life-improving, rights-respecting West—that we have to secure for all today that common power, whether you call it democracy, the rule of law, or, more simply, the best human condition that man can obtain while living within society.

I turn to the here and now. It is five months short of 10 years since we saw the invasion of Crimea by Russia in February 2014. That was a signal of a tale foretold: the invasion of a sovereign state, not as an act of self-defence or humanitarian intervention but as a naked power grab. It was little different from those earlier acts of aggression which eventually led to the adoption of the UN Charter and its clear, unambiguous wording in Article 2.4 that:

“All Members shall refrain … from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity … of any State”.


But in 2014, we did little. A few sanctions surely signalled a frown on the face, but as I said in a debate that April:

“Should that situation be accepted unchallenged, it presages similar attempts across the world. There will be few countries with minority populations across borders which cannot but worry”—[Official Report, 3/4/2014; col. GC 310]


about their own integrity.

We are seeing actual wars, proxy wars, wars fought by militias and wars funded by the extraction of natural resources, or simply aggression on the part of large and dominant neighbours. Those threaten more states than just Ukraine and involve despotic dictators. Russia is in good company with China, North Korea and Iran, among others. The consequences which have flowed from Crimea, and the road which started in Sevastopol, may well lead to Taipei.

Ukraine has experienced much support in the UK, and we should be proud of playing our part, but warm words, albeit with some limited hardware, are not sufficient of themselves to sustain Ukraine in what will be a long-drawn-out war. We see the implications of nervousness in the US about an open cheque book. We ourselves know what every household in the country has learned: that foreign events hit our daily lives through the cost of living and energy shortages. However, the sacrifices we make currently will appear as minor if we allow Russia to prevail in its aggression.

Asia is slowly awakening to the triad of threats that it faces. In witness to the warning from the US for months about a North Korea-Russia deal, last week’s visit by Kim Jong-un cannot have been a surprise to anyone who is observing these events. Now, whether it is artillery shells from North Korea, or, more threateningly, ballistic missiles from Russia flowing south, perhaps advanced arms, military know-how or, as is speculated in some circles, co-operation on building nuclear submarines, pacts between the two are being forged as we speak. As the Economist described it, we have a convocation of “desperate despots”, impervious to our sanctions regime, including our long-standing ones against North Korea, if Russia becomes the main sanctions breaker, which seems to be its intention with regard to North Korea and Iran.

My question—my exhortation—to the Minister is simply this: to what extent are His Majesty’s Government preparing for a long-drawn-out conventional conflict? To what extent are our own arms stockpiles and our defence manufacturers capable of ramping up production? Are we putting them on alert to do so, and to what extent? I acknowledge we have a good record in Ukraine. Are we preparing to ramp up our own military preparedness, including by a realistic increase of GDP, which surely must reach 3% given the dangers that we face?

I want to end on a personal note. I read international relations at the London School of Economics under two brilliant thinkers of war and peace. The first was Philip Windsor, who made us understand the theory of détente at the height of the Cold War when we needed to see through the fog. The second was Christopher Coker, who recently passed away. He was one of the finest strategic thinkers of our generation. In reading his obituary in the Times yesterday, I was reminded of Professor Coker’s warning against our easy assumption that increasing globalisation and trading with each other would make war between the US and China unlikely. He told us that we are unwise to presume that leaders such as Putin and Xi make rational choices. Rather, they frame them in a narrative of national purpose, with us, the West, as the new imperialists. The lens that they deploy mobilises against us. The question for us, then, is whether our confidence in our values of prosperity, liberty and autonomy will be sufficient for us to defend those values with the tenacity that will be required. Ukraine gives us a powerful lesson in this regard.

Defence Policy (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Friday 30th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to be able to speak in the gap on this incredibly important, comprehensive and wide-ranging report. I shall not detain the House very long but will just make a few brief points which I hope will contribute to other distinguished noble Lords’ thoughts today.

First, I start by joining other noble Lords in raising the issue of insufficient foreign affairs and security debates taking place in this House. I note a new tendency here in recent months, even when we have Statements to the House on matters of the utmost urgency, such as the events in Russia over the past week. The Statement we got on Monday evening was held in the dinner hour, when the House is necessarily thin on the ground, usually because you do not even know that a Statement will be made that day. I had applied by chance for an urgent Private Notice Question, but I was told that it would not be taken because there would be a debate. I then had to readjust my diary entirely to be able to come here for the Statement in the dinner hour. I address that criticism to the Opposition as well, because there is consensus between the two sides as to when Statements are taken, and it would be better for the whole House if we could take them as we used to, after Questions but before the dinner hour, so that more people can participate.

My second point is about the report itself. I want to pick up on just one issue in it. I agree with almost everything that was said, but I want to talk about the shift of emphasis: the tilt from the Middle East to Indochina. In 2020, I had the privilege to be part of the working group for the think tank Policy Exchange on the precursor to the 2021 integrated review. All of us in that expert working group felt that we should concentrate on tilting to Indochina, because that was clearly where our future security threats would come from. As a veteran of the period 2010 to 2015, I recall that in this House we debated five almost simultaneous wars: Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, the intervention in Libya and, occasionally, the Russian invasion of Crimea. Which one has come back to bite us and will sustain our concerted efforts over the next decade at least? It is the Russian invasion of Crimea.

I am sorry to say that the report, even in its comprehensiveness, refers to the Russian invasion of Ukraine as having happened in February 2022. Most Ukrainians would profoundly disagree with that. It did not happen in 2022; it happened in February 2014 and had we been more vigilant about the impact of that, we would perhaps have found ourselves better prepared to deal with it.

That brings me, in the few seconds I have left, to my third point on the relationship between Russia and China. The noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, who has briefly left his place, rightly said that the new world order will be written in China and supported by Russia. In March, Xi Jinping made a state visit to Russia, where he said to Putin, “Right now, there are changes the likes of which we have not seen for 100 years, and we should drive these changes together”. The current and persistent strategic challenge that we will face as a country is that of Russia and China acting in concert, and we need to be extremely vigilant about that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Strictly, this is not a matter for the MoD, as the noble Lord will be aware; it is, essentially, a matter for the Cabinet Office. These matters are not discussed; that is for another forum of discussion. I had a look at some organisations that have been proscribed, and I was not entirely clear what the benefit was. Yes, you nail them as people to have nothing to do with, but, actually, the more effective undermining of their position is to try to get at their financial wallets with sanctions. But I cannot give any advance on the Government’s positions already articulated.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, I do not want to detain the House, but this is a profoundly important point. For nearly a year now, the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has been asking this question from the Lib Dem Benches of any Minister who will listen. All I say, respectfully, to the Minister is that she speaks for the whole of the Government, not just the Ministry of Defence, of course.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Yes, and I cannot add to the position I articulated. I have no further position to share with the House.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, raised some interesting points about shipbuilding. I remind him that, for the first time in 30 years, two UK shipyards are building two types of frigate—that is something to fly the flag about. In the refreshed national shipbuilding strategy, we set out the shipbuilding pipeline.

The noble Lord made an important point about our people, and he is absolutely correct: they are our most vital asset. We support them, and we shall respond to the Haythornthwaite review and, imminently, to the independent pay review board’s recommendations. I undertake to make further inquiries about his comment on the “zig-zag” career process and see whether I can obtain further information for him.

I am conscious of time, but I realise that what noble Lords want is to talk about this, to hold the Government to account and to hear from them, so, with noble Lords’ indulgence, I will keep going until I reach the end of my notes. My noble friend Lord Howell made a number of important and perceptive points, but I slightly disagree with him in one area. He said that the IR and the Defence Command Paper were in silos, but I do not see that; in this hybrid world of global threat, I see a very fast-changing and fluid set of imperatives, and it is about how we try to harness these in some strategic sense and then bring some intelligent specifics about how we will deal with them.

I agreed with my noble friend’s point about the Commonwealth, for which there is an important role. That is always worth exploring, and I would not disagree with that at all. I dealt with the position on China, but I was struck by my noble friend’s phrase about putting “autocracies on the defensive”. I have a lot of sympathy with doing that, and I share his analysis of these concerns. But I hope that the imminent Defence Command Paper refresh will reassure my noble friend that this is an active matter under current consideration.

The noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, raised Russia, China and the new world order, which are important points. That is why the integrated review refresh is shaped as it is and why the Defence Command Paper refresh will be shaped as I have indicated in general terms.

The noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury—informally, he is my noble friend—raised important issues about the Army and, in particular, our NATO obligations. We will have a combined Army strength, regular and reserve, of over 100,000. It is important to put that in the context of what we are now dealing with. If we have learned anything from Ukraine, we have learned that, although land conflict might look unchanged in some respects, it is absolutely transformed in other respects because of how warfare is now conducted, with the deployment of various aspects of information technology and artificial intelligence.

I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Collins, that the UK contributes to every NATO mission. We did so in Iraq, in Kosovo and in the Med with Operation Sea Guardian, and the UK is making a very ambitious offer of forces to NATO’s force model. Our approach to the NATO force model has been “NATO by default and national by exception”, which means that almost all our forces across all domains will be made available to support NATO tasking and the deterrence and defence of the Euro-Atlantic. For 2024-25, we will transition from the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force to the inaugural allied land reaction force. We already contribute heavily to NATO deterrence activity.

The noble Lord, Lord Collins, also raised climate change, which is very dear to my heart. It might interest your Lordships—it may sound improbable, but it is absolutely the case—that within the MoD we have a director for climate change and sustainability. There is a Minister responsible for pursuing our policy in that sphere—me. I take a keen interest in what is going on and have been utterly bowled over by the innovation within our single services in devising how they adapt to climate change and, with their own ingenuity, make their contribution to reducing our emissions. We have had some extraordinary innovatory activity by the RAF, which leads the field in sustainable aviation fuel. It is incredible. I have been speaking to some think tanks in the RAF—geniuses at work in basements—and even if only one of their plans comes to fruition, it will be a major contribution.

I commend to your Lordships a wonderful magazine called Sanctuary. It is an MoD product, produced once a year; it looks great and it reads like a treat. I am sure the House of Lords Library will give your Lordships a copy to look at and I guarantee that it will cheer you up.

I apologise for running over time, but I detect that noble Lords genuinely want to hear about this. Work to resolve the issues that have been identified is either happening or currently under way. A number of noble Lords mentioned defence spending. The Defence Equipment Plan is public and lays out an exciting combination of spend and equipment, whether that is UK shipyards, Lossiemouth as a showcase for RAF potent power or an Army equipment plan of £41 billion over the next 10 years. I go back to something that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond, said in the Chamber just last week. He very astutely pointed out that we need to get away from becoming fixating on a single force or a particular part of a capability. The trick now is to know how we amalgamate this holistically, to deliver the capability effect that we need to address threat.

Noble Lords are aware of the financial settlements that have been available in the last few years for defence. The Prime Minister has pledged, when economic circumstances improve, to raise our defence spending to 2.5% of GDP. I reassure the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, that this is a welcome boost in very difficult economic circumstances. Times are challenging but I think noble Lords can expect to see us accelerating our modernisation and mobilisation plans, investing in critical partnerships such as AUKUS and GCAP, the global combat air programme, restocking our munitions and upgrading our digital infrastructure.

The Command Paper is currently at write-round for clearance with other National Security Council members and will be published in the coming weeks. I think its recognition and release will bring with it a new reality. When Putin’s troops crossed the Dnieper at the start of 2022, they also crossed the Rubicon, because we now live in a completely transformed world. We cannot go back. We have to adapt rapidly and enhance our readiness. We must strengthen our resilience and reinforce our relationships to secure the peace and prosperity that our country and our allies deserve.

I say to those who might have been tempted to adopt a slightly depressive note that I regard it as a privilege to be a Minister in defence. I see at first hand uniformed and civilian staff of stellar calibre delivering every day on our UK strategic objectives, focused and with an effectiveness and professionalism that is second to none. It is a department that is dynamic in character, pulsating with energy and proud, with state-of-the-art equipment and underpinned by funding, to do the vital job we ask of it.

I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Collins, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, for specifically seeking that out, commenting on it and paying their tribute to our Armed Forces, because I am very proud of all the people who contribute to our defence capability. I pay tribute to them and, on behalf of us all, I say to them: thank you.

Defence Spending Priorities: NATO Summit

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord King of Bridgwater (Con)]

In looking at the priorities for the NATO summit and the longer-term considerations for defence spending, what consideration was given to the urgent need for collaboration on further supplies of ammunition for various weapons? That could otherwise threaten to completely undermine the efforts to defend Ukraine.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords—

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As my noble friend Lord Howe explained so eloquently last week in response to a Question specifically about this, we have explained our approach. We are very clear that the Army will be more agile. It will have a greater speed of response. It will be remodelled around brigade combat teams, which means more self-sufficient tactical units with the ability to integrate the full range of capabilities at the lowest possible level. In addition, every part of the Army Reserve will have a clear war-fighting role and will stand ready to fight as part of the whole force in time of war.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

I first apologise to the Minister for my enthusiastic earlier attempt at intervention. I assure her that the last thing I would seek to do at the moment is to expect to speak on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government. Turning to the substantive question from the noble Lord, Lord West, will she accept that in a declining or stagflating economy a GDP target several years out is almost meaningless once inflation is taken account of? Will they at least attempt to set an immediate target for where they expect to get to within a reasonable—I should say “prompt”—period in terms of real funding?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The Prime Minister has made it clear that the investments we propose to embark on, such as AUKUS and FCAS, will mean that defence spending will reach 2.5% of GDP by the end of the decade. It is currently projected to reach 2.3% of GDP this year. We constantly assess the threat and our ability to respond to it, which is a responsible way to proceed.

Armed Forces: Racism and Diversity

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Wednesday 17th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie [V]]

The noble Baroness is correct to focus on results. I share her interest in doing that and, within my ministerial role, I will endeavour to ensure that that happens. I reassure her by saying that just this week departmental-wide communications have been released by the Permanent Secretary and the Chief Operating Officer. Indeed, the Chief Operating Officer proposed a step-by-step plan to diversify the organisation, starting immediately. On Monday this week, I briefed my Secretary of State and ministerial colleagues on diversity and inclusion, and this very afternoon I shall be part of the MoD all-staff dial-in in respect of diversity and inclusion. I shall certainly reiterate the message of inclusion, try to reassure staff that concerns will be listened to and, in particular, invite the input of staff from minority backgrounds to get involved. I want to hear from them.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (Non-Afl) [V]]

My Lords, the target for female representation at 15%, as set out in the biannual diversity report, seems to me too low. Why are they not being more ambitious, with a higher target? Nearly half the BAME staff are of non-UK nationality. Why are they not succeeding in recruiting people from United Kingdom BAME communities, and what lessons can be learned from the recruitment for Future Forces 2020, which seems to have a much better record with both women and BAME communities?

[Baroness Goldie [V]]

We are anxious to learn from any source about how we might improve our approach, but it would be wrong to imagine that no good things are happening. A number of very good things are happening and very positive developments are taking place. However, particularly having regard to the events of recent weeks, it is critical that we reassure staff within the MoD that this is not some transient focus of attention. There is now an ongoing serious conversation that will continue. It is being driven by the senior levels of management and personnel and at the ministerial level within the MoD.

Brexit: Financial Services Sector

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd January 2018 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they still intend to publish a position paper setting out their priorities and preferred trading relationship for the financial services sector after the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, and if so when.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (LD)]

My Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given private notice. In doing so, I declare an interest as chairman of your Lordships’ EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, the Government have set out their objectives for financial services. The Secretary of State and the Chancellor have each done so in recent speeches. We are engaging extensively with both industry and EU partners to hear their views and set out our arguments. In any negotiation there is a careful judgment and a delicate balance about when and how to set things out in public, and we will keep under review the best way of doing this.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

The noble Baroness will be aware that I have been engaged in correspondence with the Chancellor, on behalf of the sub-committee, about the need for a transition period. The Government have, indeed, set out their position in that regard. What is lacking is a position paper telling the financial services sector what it should expect to get at the end of the transition period; in other words, what it should implement and plan for when the transition period is over. There are more than 1 million jobs at stake in this industry, which has huge strategic importance for the United Kingdom. Seven position papers have been published so far, but not the long-promised one on the financial services sector. When do the Government expect to do so?

[Baroness Goldie]

I have to correct a misapprehension on the part of the noble Baroness. She will be aware of the reply that my honourable friend the Minister, Robin Walker, gave to the other place in November. He made it clear that there was extensive engagement with a number of sectors. There had been numerous round-table and bilateral meetings. In particular, he said that, at that point, there was no position paper and that we shall continue to review the situation to determine how best to set out our position, which we will do as appropriate. That continues to be the Government’s position.

Armed Forces: Investment

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Monday 22nd January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, as I have made clear in this House, there is no question of this country abandoning its amphibious capability or cyber, quite the opposite: there is a £1.9 billion programme across government to boost our cyber capabilities. However, as I said last Thursday, the NSCR may result in our reprioritising how we allocate our resources to emphasise the most effective capabilities for the world in which we operate.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (LD)]

My Lords, I think the Minister implied that the results of the review may be made public. Will he tell the House why they might not be made public? We are asking not for the evidence but for the results of the review to be made public, so the rest of us can see how the Government have arrived at their conclusions.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the Government always wish their decisions to have maximum transparency but national security considerations may override that.

Defence: Continuous At-Sea Deterrent

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (LD)]

My Lords, I should declare that I am a member of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, that I take comfort from the fact that the debate on replacing Vanguard has been going on since 2006, when his Government were in power. As for the Liberal Democrats, our thinking about Trident has been an almost continuous feature of Lib Dem angst for the 25 years in which I have been involved in the party’s policy dimension. Perhaps because I am an outlier in that debate, I am not involved in it any longer. However, let me set out my thoughts.

It was because of our appreciation that the political and security environment as well as technology were changing apace that on joining the coalition one of our red lines was that the country should have an independent analysis of the merits of the proposal to renew the Trident submarines. The result was the Trident Alternatives Review, which was the first to be undertaken in this country in the 60-year history of the UK being a nuclear power. It is to the credit of the coalition that its conclusions were made public so that the country at large could appreciate the reasoning behind the conclusions. The main objective of TAR was to assess the viability of different options open to the UK beyond like-for-like replacement of the Vanguard-Trident system, and particularly to look at credible alternatives. TAR concluded, as I think we all agree across this House, that to use nuclear weapons will be a failure of the entire edifice on which our policy of nuclear deterrence rests. The review said that nuclear weapons are,

“a political tool of last resort rather than a war fighting capability”.

Effectively this reiterated that the UK ruled out the actual use of a weapon unless as a final resort under existential threat, and uses its nuclear capability as a deterrent to potential aggressors in a limited fashion, as the noble Earl, Lord Howe, set out.

However, I do not see an independent nuclear deterrent solely as part of our own national security architecture. We also use it to fulfil our international obligations. TAR states that,

“the UK’s deterrent is made available to NATO as a contribution to the Alliance’s collective deterrence”.

That is even more relevant in the week after the 60th anniversary of founding of the Warsaw Pact. This is relevant in that the brave new world of hope for an absence of war has not come to pass. NATO has had to deploy along its eastern frontier again, and faces challenges that we did not contemplate when it established its open-door policy of accepting into membership all those states that were ready. In a world where NATO, in my view, has extended its Article 5 collective defence umbrella too far and fast, it is we, alongside France and the US, who carry the most credible deterrence capability through being nuclear weapons states.

I turn to the arguments for continuous at-sea deterrence, CASD, or the proposal for a like-for-like replacement. TAR looked at alternative systems and alternative postures—continuous at-sea deterrence or reduced levels of patrol. CASD, in order for the UK’s nuclear deterrent to be credible, is the form that we have had all these years. However, credibility is the foundational pillar on which deterrence strategy rests, whether nuclear or non-nuclear. To retain credibility you need to consider five things: readiness, reach, resolve, survivability and destructive power. Alternative systems and alternative postures are interlinked because the former affects the latter. When looking at postures, the criterion for credibility was important. The current CASD posture is capable of delivering high readiness and reach, in the sense that submarines can patrol very far from UK shores. These capabilities demonstrate our resolve. The successor submarines’ ability to be detected only when they launch a weapon means that they would survive an attack and be able to attack again. The Trident warhead was deemed to have sufficient destructive power. All five criteria known to adversaries fulfilled the whole point of deterrence, and it is accepted widely that these capabilities would not be duplicated in the short term by other powers, particularly not by those there is so much talk about which are deemed to be rogue states.

However, I am aware that even in the short space of time since 2013, the political and technological environment has changed. In political terms, we have a more belligerent posture adopted by traditional nuclear weapon states. On the other hand, we know that growing numbers of our citizens are concerned about the threats of the use of force and nuclear proliferation. We also have technological advances such as more advanced ballistic missile defences and antisubmarine warfare. I therefore accept that missile defence shields, cyberwarfare and stealth systems inter alia could potentially render successor systems and missiles redundant. I also accept that in time we may have to move beyond reliance on a single delivery system.

I would have wanted also to consider the arguments about costs because they are very much part of the political debate but time does not permit that and I need to conclude. Suffice it to say that an in-service running cost of around 6% of the annual defence budget, or of 0.13% of total government spending, may be a significant sum but it should be seen as a worthwhile insurance policy. For those reasons I have to say that I am for the Motion.

Armed Forces Deployment (Royal Prerogative) Bill [HL]

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Friday 8th July 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

That the Bill be now read a second time.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (LD)]

My Lords, I will start with a figure: 179 men and women, who proudly wore the uniform of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces. They are the 179 casualties of the war in Iraq, whose families expected the Government and Parliament to do the right thing by them at the time and to take the right decisions. Through the Chilcot report they now know more of what happened but find themselves listening to Mr Blair saying that he takes responsibility for the actions which led to their deaths, but no more, no less. Where, then, does democracy stand when no one is culpable and all were acting in an institutional capacity? Democracy stands diminished, but so too do the people’s elected representatives. The country expects the House of Commons, their representatives, to be the place where the buck stops, not a single powerful individual, who himself was never held accountable for his judgments through a general election after the facts were revealed. However, democracy stands diminished too when MPs are misled or are simply given inadequate information or inadequate time to reflect on the most serious decision they will ever take, of committing the Armed Forces to conflict overseas and potentially to death and injury.

We live in an age where public trust in those who govern us is so low and causality between action and accountability so ephemeral that we need to rely on rules more than ever before. I wish it were not so, but we are at a place where the Government need the security of knowing that there is a mechanism for individual accountability for decisions, albeit through a general election. This is what I seek to do in formalising the role of the House of Commons in what is effectively a war powers Act, but one set squarely within the United Kingdom’s own special constitutional arrangements.

The convention of referring to Parliament to authorise taking the country to war is relatively new, having first been used by Mr Blair in 2003. Nevertheless, the constitutional position is still that the Prime Minister acts under royal prerogative. This means that the commitment of British forces to military action is authorised by the Prime Minister on behalf of the Crown. In constitutional terms Parliament has no legally established role and the Government are under no legal obligation with respect to their conduct, including keeping Parliament informed.

Since 2003, Parliament has been consulted on the deployment on Iraq, where it was misled, on Libya, when it was assured that its role in consenting would be formalised, and on Syria, when it was recalled in the middle of the August break with inadequate time for information or consultation. It was also consulted on action against Islamic State, but where the parameters were tightly drawn. However, we know through the practice of embedding that the reality on the ground is that UK troops and materiel are possibly deployed in Syria too, although we are told that we cannot know.

Ever since the convention was introduced, Parliament has not been consulted in other key situations where considerable loss of life has happened. It was not consulted in the expansion of the Afghan mission to Helmand. This is relevant, as British military forces were initially deployed to Afghanistan in 2001 in a post-conflict, building and regional reconstruction role, whereas their deployment to Helmand put them very directly in the line of fire, some would say disastrously, as that is where the vast majority of the loss of life was incurred. Moreover, at the time of the Libya intervention the then Foreign Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Hague, made his commitment in March 2011 that the Government would move to,

“enshrine in law for the future the necessity of consulting Parliament on military action”.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/3/11; col. 799.]

Yet there has been stasis.

In the meantime, there have been deployments to Mali, albeit in a non-combat role, and we know now that there are 550 military personnel in Iraq, including soldiers. While they too may not be in a formal combat role, were they to be involved in firefights resulting in death and destruction, that would not be construed by the public as anything other than combat, irrespective of the technical description. So we are in a place where we can neither rely solely on the exercise of the royal prerogative—where we might be able to see that the buck stops with the PM—nor we do we have a war powers Act whereby we might hold elected representatives and/or the Executive responsible.

I turn to my Bill. The greatest objections I have heard to formalising the House of Commons role in giving consent is that it is hard to define what combat is, that the action might be justiciable and the courts would be involved, and that Parliament would be a constraint on operational freedom for the military. I come to the definition. While the generals erect arguments to say that it is impossible to define armed conflict overseas, referring to technological advances such as the use of unmanned and/or autonomous weapon systems, I do not go for that level of sophistication in the Bill, although I accept that international law will have to change to acknowledge those advances and the ethical dilemmas they pose.

I am concerned with what the man or woman in the street might define as combat. When the House of Lords Constitution Committee took evidence on this point, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie, held the view that the definition was key. However, Professor Michael Clarke, the director of RUSI—our foremost think tank on these matters—put it plainly. He said that it is defined as where “death and destruction” occur. Others, such as the former Lord Chancellor, Mr Jack Straw, agreed, as did a number of other lawyers.

In this House we have passed some four counterterrorism Acts in my time here. We have had arguments as to what constitutes terrorism or the glorification of terrorism or extremism, and we have always found a way forward. I note that these laws are being used in the courts today without any controversy over those definitions, so I will not linger on that point.

The second, more substantive issue—that of tying up more powers in the courts—is unfounded. We know from just these past few days that, even without this Bill, the families of those who lost their lives in Iraq are contemplating both criminal and civil remedies through the courts, so legislation will not affect judicial intervention one way or another.

However, I turn to the findings of the Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee. It took evidence on these powers and its constitutional experts have repeatedly looked at the position of the courts. Rosara Joseph, in her book The War Prerogative, stated that courts do not consider this issue as they see it as axiomatic, and as a matter where they should properly defer to the Crown. If you substituted “Crown” for “Parliament”, the same exception would apply. Moreover, Professor Nigel White argued in his evidence that, while the courts would be concerned with a clear abuse of the process of the exercise of war powers, including as they currently stand, they would not be concerned with,

“detailed arguments about the legality of going to war under international norms”.

He went on to say:

“The Courts already recognise that these are decisions for the political organs making difficult judgements in constantly changing international security situations”.

Further, he said:

“Such an approach would continue under a War Powers Act given the rationale is that it is the type of governmental decision that is not reviewable whether it is derived from prerogative powers or not”.

Another professor, Dr David Jenkins, shares the view that a war powers Act will not open up the possibility of judicial review. He says that it is not a danger, for,

“as the American example shows, American courts, even under the constitution, will not involve themselves in these questions”.

But let us go beyond that and look at the actual jurisprudence. Two court cases in 2010—Regina (on the Application of Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Office and CND v the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom—both considered that such matters were non-justiciable. In the latter case, CND sought a ruling on the legality of military action against Iraq without a further UN resolution. Ruling on the case, Mr Justice Richards stated that,

“it seems clear that the legal issue cannot in practice be divorced from the conduct of international relations and that by entertaining the present claim and ruling on the interpretation of Resolution 1441 the court would be interfering with, indeed damaging, the Government’s conduct of international relations. That would be to enter a forbidden area”.

He went on to say:

“In my view it is unthinkable that the national courts would entertain a challenge to a Government decision to declare war or to authorise the use of armed force against a third country. That is a classic example of a non-justiciable decision”.

So it is clear that both constitutional experts, as well as the courts, have themselves ruled out judicial intervention in the area of war powers.

I turn to the other main objection—that parliamentary consent for going to war will imply interference with operational decisions. It blatantly will not. I arrived here in 2004, when the failure of Snatch vehicles was becoming evident. We questioned the Government about that and about insufficient helicopter support. It was right that we did so, and this was never construed as interference in operational decisions. In the myriad interventions we have taken under royal prerogative or under the new convention, parliamentary interference has never been an issue, and there is no reason why it will underformalise the role of the House of Commons. We are told that the success of military operations relies on three things: secrecy, security and surprise. I accept that and take account of it in my Bill.

Furthermore, Conservative Government Ministers who echo the military in saying that they support the new convention of seeking parliamentary approval nevertheless go on to say “except in emergencies”. I agree. My Bill goes beyond that and makes exceptions not only for emergencies but for conditions where it will be imperative to have an element of secrecy—hence my emergency exception and security exception.

In Clause 3, those exceptions provide for the PM expressly not to seek the approval of Parliament and it clearly defines an emergency in Clause (3)(2)(a) and (b). It then goes further and says in subsection (3) that Parliament will have no role where public disclosure of information would prejudice operations and if the Prime Minister therefore decided that he did not wish to put this into the public domain by consulting Parliament. In those circumstances, all the Prime Minister has to do is to lay a report before the House of Commons within 30 days after his decision to deploy, telling us why he decided to engage in military action under the emergency or security condition and what objectives, locations and legal issues he thinks are appropriate in the circumstances. The Bill gives almost complete discretion to the PM in terms of emergencies or for the purposes of secrecy to tell us what he thinks is appropriate. Moreover, he can decide not to lay a report before the House of Commons at all if he believes that national security concerns are still a risk.

So some might ask: if my Bill is so flexible, why bother? The answer is: for a very simple reason, which is that we currently have a situation where we simply do not know where we stand. Those in the House of Commons do not know; the public do not know; and the military does not know. We know that the Government of the day now consult in most circumstances, but we also know from the examples that I have given—pace Helmand; some would say Yemen and Syria—that sometimes they do not. We have situations where individual MPs try to hold the Government’s feet to the fire. This type of ad hoc process is bound to misfire, as it did in late August 2013. Then, under Back-Bench pressure, the Prime Minister had to recall Parliament in late August when MPs were on holiday and lost the vote by 13—not because the merits of the argument had been exhaustively considered but because it happened under pressure and the Government were not able to prepare the ground sufficiently both with the Opposition and with their own Members of Parliament. Under my Bill, such a situation would be covered by the emergency condition whereby the Prime Minister would have 30 days to explain his decision to the Commons. In that particular case, the Commons was due to return just about two weeks later, so there would have been considered reflection before the Commons debated and voted on the matter if it had so wished. We would not have had the unedifying sight of MPs getting off flights and going into Commons Divisions without information. I would argue that the failure of the 2013 vote exacerbated the war in Syria. Presidents Assad and Putin knew that they would be unchallenged from that point, which has led to the refugee crisis among other things.

It is clear that the present situation is unsatisfactory because of the uncertainty it creates. We know, for example, that Mr Jesse Norman MP, the biographer of Edmund Burke, that great Conservative political philosopher, believes that the current convention is not fit for purpose, because once the Commons gives its consent it cannot do proper scrutiny of the aftermath. My Bill would deal with that, as Clause 2 would require the PM to set out the terms of approval, the objectives, the locations and the legal matters that he or she considered relevant. Mr Norman’s objection to the current situation would be dealt with.

Let me reiterate: this is a simple and straightforward Bill. It contains four substantive clauses, but it is cleverly crafted—here I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill, who I believe was the originator of the draft Bill. It has been scrutinised by the Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee and recommended as the basis of its resolution. The Lords Constitution Committee looked at it in relation to its brief inquiry. While it did not change its mind, it did not find the Bill to be wanting. If there are gaping omissions, they can be corrected as the Bill goes into Committee. My motivation and that of the Liberal Democrats in seeking to enshrine a statutory basis for parliamentary approval for war powers is to give the country in whose name our Armed Forces deploy in the face of death and destruction constitutional security. After Chilcot, they need to know that one lesson of the Iraq war has been heeded and that never again should the country shed blood and treasure on the basis of sofa government and inadequate, hurried information and processes. This Bill is an attempt to ensure greater deliberation by all. That is the least we can do as a debt of gratitude to those who have given their lives. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, I start by thanking all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate on a Friday. It has been a long week, and I genuinely appreciate that their interest and their concern for our country, and the situation in which these things can go wrong, is heartfelt.

I will start by going very briefly through some of the arguments that were put. I have great affection and respect for the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. We have known each other over many years and I have always listened to not just his wise words but his practical experience in these matters very carefully. He made the point that the House of Commons would not have access to the level of intelligence that these days the National Security Council obviously provides to the Prime Minister and that the full Cabinet would have.

That is of course true—except for two things. My Bill provides in Clause 3(6) for the Prime Minister to consult any of the existing committees of the House of Commons that he so chooses. Of course, the Intelligence Committee of the House of Commons would be one that one would expect the Prime Minister necessarily to brief, consult and provide assurances to. We also know that there is a convention that Her Majesty's Opposition are always briefed on Privy Council terms. In the past, it has not just been Her Majesty’s Official Opposition; I know that my party was briefed on Privy Council terms before being in government. That would continue to be the case; my Bill does not do anything in that regard.

The noble Lord, Lord Framlingham, said that our opponents would know what we were up to if we debated this openly in Parliament. Of course, to some extent that is right—but they would not have access to the intel or any of our strategic or operational details. The noble Lord sits behind the Minister on the Conservative Benches but may not be aware of how committed the current Government: indeed, the Prime Minister, speaking only two days ago on the Chilcot report, gave an assurance that he believes in consulting the House of Commons. He upholds this convention. So the noble Lord seems to want Parliament not to know anything about it at all and simply for the royal prerogative to be exercised. I respect his position. It is a perfectly fair position to say that we should be either there or there, and that when we find ourselves somewhere in the middle that he might not like—

[Lord Framlingham]

I do not know as much about this subject as the noble Baroness; I am just concerned that in warfare the element of surprise is often very important. That comes into the kind of things that we are talking about.

[Earl Attlee]

And I am just as naughty because I oppose the convention as well.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

I say to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that his problem is one for the noble Earl, Lord Howe, to deal with—not me. But I completely accept the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Framlingham, which were voiced by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, as well. But, ultimately, either we trust MPs to do a job and have access to the information or we do not.

The concern expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Robathan—I am grateful to him; I know that he was a Minister for the Armed Forces and is therefore very knowledgeable and has huge experience in these matters—was that if the wrong decision was taken, parliamentary approval would not negate that. That is right; I completely agree with him. But the point that I am making is that although Parliament might not negate that, the country would not need to listen, as it did three days ago, to someone saying, “I take complete responsibility, but that is it, and I would not have changed anything that I did”. If the House of Commons was consulted, and if the country moved away from that decision, the country would have the ability to kick those people out at the next general election. In that sense, there is a direct line of accountability—the golden thread.

I am so grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for having spoken—I count her as a friend, as well as somebody for whose legal prowess I have huge admiration. She supports the Lords Constitution Committee but she does not like the current convention of Parliament being consulted. But the Lords Constitution Committee supports the status quo ante. It wants Parliament to be consulted along the current method; it just does not want codification in the Bill. But of course these are details that we can move to in Committee, should that come to pass. I do not intend to detain the House very much longer.

I express huge gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, and the Labour Party for their support. In public life, a lot of decisions are not straightforward and all of us, on all sides, sometimes take the wrong decisions. Sometimes we were culpable, sometimes the information was not accurate, and sometimes the imperative to move quickly took us to that potentially wrong decision. But what is really important, and what the country needs to hear from us now, is that we are learning from decisions that we have taken in the past. I think that the position of the Labour Party, which is so very welcome, is that there is an indication that things went wrong and that it has learned, as we all have. One of the things Mr Cameron said in the Chilcot debate was that he took responsibility for his own vote. I thought that was important.

The most important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, was that the reason the Labour Party supports this small, modest measure is that it recognises that this underpins the need for the Government to show that they draw their powers from the people. That is terribly important.

The Minister has been incredibly gracious and kind to me in having engaged in some discussion. We did not agree. We come from different positions. I come from a party that is internationalist in its outlook, trusts the people to the nth degree and takes its responsibilities as parliamentarians extremely seriously—which is not to suggest that other parties do not. Indeed, I mentioned Edmund Burke, and the Minister will know how important he was for Conservative Governments in historical times. The Minister raised some exceptions that are entirely valid, and I look forward to engaging with him privately, as he has invited me to come to talk to him, and as we move into Committee. But the point I do not understand is how this Bill ties the Government’s hands. The contrary criticism I am getting from NGOs—38 Degrees was mentioned, along with others—is that the Bill is too flexible and does not tie the Government’s hands enough. There are people who want to hold the Government’s feet to the fire and think that this Bill is too grown-up, too considered and too reflective to do that.

I do not wish to weary the House any more. We hope to move on. I beg to move.

Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

Syria: Military Involvement by Canada

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Wednesday 28th October 2015 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what discussions they have had with the new Government of Canada regarding the intention of that Government to withdraw their combat mission from the bombing campaign against ISIL.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, we have not had any discussions with the new Canadian Government, who take office on 4 November, about their intention to withdraw from air strikes against ISIL in Iraq and Syria. We welcome the new Government’s manifesto commitment to continue to focus on the training of local forces in the region and to provide more humanitarian support, including for refugees from Syria.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (LD)]

I am extremely glad that the noble Earl welcomes the election of the new Liberal Government who are delivering on their manifesto commitment to withdraw combat forces from the campaign in Iraq and Syria. Will he accept that this is a recognition by the Canadian people that the facts on the ground have changed? Russia is in Syria now; Iran is more constructively engaged. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary is in Saudi Arabia today. Will the Government accept that it is time for a peace process to stabilise Syria and to desist from continuing on an open-ended campaign which even the Americans say will last for years and years?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I agree that the facts in Syria have changed by reason of the Russian intervention. That is undeniable. What has not changed is that ISIL represents a direct threat to this country as much as ever it did, if not more, and it is very much in our national interests to see that threat eliminated. However, I take the noble Baroness’s point that ultimately the end of this conflict can be reached only by political means, and we are engaging as strenuously as we can through diplomatic and political circles to see that satisfactory conclusion.