European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Evans of Bowes Park Excerpts

Committee: 8th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 19th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

I understand the point the noble Lord makes, but if we remember the reasons it was brought forward, this is not the process we have at present.

The other point about stating the reasons, as set out in Amendment 239B, for why an SI is urgent is very helpful in this regard. All of these amendments are trying to bring some order to the process which at the moment seems to be complicated and difficult and raises concerns about accuracy.

I hope that the noble Baroness can respond positively to these amendments. I will not go into further detail because that has been provided by the noble Lords who have spoken to these amendments, but this is a serious issue and I suspect that if we do not receive an appropriate response from the Minister, we will return to it as the Bill proceeds.

[The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Evans of Bowes Park) (Con)]

My Lords, before responding to these amendments in turn, I should like to take this opportunity to expand on the remarks I made at Second Reading. As I said then, I wanted to find a way to build any new sifting procedure into the existing scrutiny structures which this House has developed so successfully over the years. On 5 March, as the noble Baroness has said, the Procedure Committee agreed to my proposal to incorporate the same powers as those of the new Commons sifting committee into the terms of reference of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee as well as conferring the power to appoint sub-committees. This will allow the sub-committees to recommend within 10 sitting days that the House’s consideration of specific negative instruments related to this Bill should follow the affirmative procedure.

As the House will expect, the SLSC’s existing role in scrutinising the merits of all instruments will continue as before, with the sub-committees fulfilling this function alongside their new sifting role in relation to the SIs flowing from this Bill. The main committee will have responsibility for determining the allocation of policy areas between the two sub-committees as well as maintaining oversight of the scrutiny process in general terms. If it wishes to do so, this will allow it to meet as a whole to conduct its own inquiries into the overall management of secondary legislation, as it has done in the past. The 10-day period for allowing the sifting committee to make a recommendation was originally suggested by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of this House and was endorsed by the Procedure Committee in the Commons. The Government are content to agree to this timeframe, and that is why the sub-committee will have the power to report directly to the House, to award it greater agility in conducting its sifting role without unrealistic constraints on the time to report.

The agreement reached regarding the SLSC’s new role is, I believe, an example of the House coming together on a constructive basis to strengthen our important scrutiny role, and I am grateful to other members of the Procedure Committee, including the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for their support in reaching this decision. I am also grateful to the chairman of the SLSC, my noble friend Lord Trefgarne, his clerk and advisers for their constructive engagement in the development of this proposal. I am pleased to confirm that the SLSC will receive additional resources both in terms of expert advice and additional members, including the ability to form two sub-committees, in order to fulfil its new sifting role. I know that noble Lords on all sides will want to ensure that the new arrangements are a success. The House will be invited to agree the proposed arrangement when the Procedure Committee presents its report. That is expected to be when the passage of this Bill is nearing completion, as of course the report may have to reflect any relevant changes to the Bill that are agreed by both Houses.

In the meantime, and as the Bill progresses, I am clear that both Houses must be treated equally regarding the proposed sifting arrangements under the Bill. In this respect, the Bill, as introduced to this House, only makes reference to the House of Commons in the relevant paragraphs of Schedule 7. The Government will therefore introduce amendments to incorporate equivalent references to the House of Lords where appropriate.

I hope I have explained to noble Lords the new proposed arrangement, so I will now turn to Amendment 237, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Tyler and Lord Lisvane. Noble Lords will know that the sifting committees, as currently provided for in the Bill, cover only the main powers in the Bill, rather than any consequential and transitional provisions made under Clause 17 where the negative procedure is stipulated. Making such consequential provisions through SIs is already a standard approach in legislation—even in significant constitutional legislation, such as the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, the Scotland and Northern Ireland Acts and the Government of Wales Acts. We have already published a draft example of consequential provision that we will need to make under the Bill—the European Communities (Designation Orders) (Revocation) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018—but we intend to publish further such examples before Report. I hope these will reassure noble Lords that the negative procedure is being used appropriately. In relation to the comments of the noble Baroness about draft SIs, we intend to publish them where possible and appropriate. As I have mentioned—I will mention a few more—we have already published some illustrative drafts and will continue to do so to support the debate in this House.

The proposed powers of the SLSC, as the Bill stands, will not allow it to make the sort of binding decision proposed by noble Lords. We believe that this is consistent with how this House’s committees conduct their scrutiny work in other areas. Ultimately, it is up to both Houses to decide whether a Government are using appropriately the delegated powers Parliament has given them when they come to consider an SI. It is right for this House to consider these instruments in the light of the expert advice of its committees, but we do not believe that it would be right for those committees to make binding decisions about the use of delegated powers independent of the whole House. The amendment, as proposed, would also see the Government bound by a decision of the sifting committee of one House, even when the other disagrees, and only the recommending House would be able to reject the recommendation. Currently, no mechanism for the resolution of such disagreement is provided in the amendment.

The noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, mentioned the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act, the Public Bodies Act and the Localism Act. All of those Acts combine a sifting mechanism with the form of the super-affirmative procedure. We do not believe that the super-affirmative procedures are suitable for the instruments to come, particularly given that they can take up to six months, but as I hope I have set out, we have taken steps to create a sifting process in the Bill.

I understand noble Lords’ concerns that, as Ministers are not bound to accept the committee’s recommendations, they may choose to exercise discretion; however, if both sifting committees were to reach the same—well-considered, no doubt—and persuasive recommendation, I assure your Lordships that the Government’s expectation is that such recommendations are likely to be accepted. Where the two committees disagree, the situation would of course need to be carefully considered on its merits. On the occasions—hopefully, very rare—when the Government did not agree to a recommendation to use the affirmative procedure, we would expect to justify fully our reasons to the committee concerned.

Furthermore, when the House chooses to delegate a scrutiny role to its committees—as is the case in other important policy areas—it is important for it to have confidence in the committee’s expertise and judgment to make a persuasive recommendation for the House to consider. I fear that making the committee’s recommendation binding, then building in an explicit provision to allow the House to reject such a decision, as the amendment seeks to do, could undermine the well-established confidence that the House has in its committee structure.

The amendment would also—unnecessarily, in my view—increase the sifting period from 10 to 15 days. As noble Lords have already said, we expect time to be in short supply as we prepare to exit the EU. As I have already stated, the changes to the SLSC’s powers, agreed to by the Procedure Committee, will seek to maximise the sub-committee’s ability to conduct its important scrutiny work within that 10-day period.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park]

I did say that it would indeed be for the Government to justify their position in that situation, although I also hope that I have made it clear that where both committees agree and both Houses put forward—I have no doubt—strongly argued reasons for a change in the procedure to be used, our expectation is that the Government would accept such a recommendation. The noble Lord is absolutely right: it would be for the Government to have to justify their position if that is not the case.

Moving on to Amendment 237A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, I believe that, despite its well-intentioned deference to this House, it is unnecessary. If either House were to feel especially strongly that a particular instrument should use the affirmative procedure, they could choose to table a Motion to that effect and make a recommendation to the Minister regardless. As with the sifting committees’ recommendations, I am sure that the Government would respond to such a resolution with the weight it deserved.

For similar reasons, I believe that Amendment 239A in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey and Lord Lisvane, is also unnecessary. The Bill adheres to the House’s established procedures for the scrutiny of statutory instruments and the proposed change would mark a significant departure from the standard SI procedure. The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, pointed out the similarity of the system proposed in the amendment to that proposed for all SIs by my noble friend Lord Strathclyde. We believe that making such a change would represent a significant change to the balance of the relationship on SIs between the two Houses.

We also feel this would be insufficiently sensitive about the time constraints that I have already articulated. As noble Lords know, the task at hand of correcting the statute book must largely be completed before exit day. The majority of SIs that will be made to address deficiencies and make corrections, barring potentially some relating to provisions which have no practical application and can be addressed in the period after exit day, must be passed and ready to come into force on exit day to ensure the continuity of the UK’s legal system.

The Government therefore expect to be laying and ensuring a steady flow of statutory instruments before Parliament for scrutiny by this House from when the Bill receives Royal Assent until shortly before exit day. As noble Lords have rightly alluded to, we estimate that between 800 and 1,000 SIs will be introduced during that period relating to our exit from the EU. As I explained in my evidence to the Constitution Committee in December, and, indeed, as my noble friend Lady Goldie outlined in the last debate, the Parliamentary Business and Legislation Committee is now overseeing secondary legislation in much the same way as it manages primary legislation. This is partly because we want to improve the quality of SIs—indeed, the noble Baronesses highlighted the importance of that—but we also want to ensure that the flow of SIs is steady, rather than in peaks and troughs, to allow Parliament to do its job more effectively by allowing adequate time for scrutiny.

I can reassure noble Lords that we absolutely understand what is coming before us. We as a Government are making every effort to ensure we are working effectively to try to make sure this House and the other place have the time to deal with the SIs that will come before us effectively. I will continue to work with my parliamentary colleagues to make sure we do our very best on this.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 239B from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, which seeks to require the Minister to make a statement of the grounds for urgency in the case of urgent SIs made under the “made affirmative” procedure. “Urgent” is a term without definition in the Bill, but I hope that the requirement for each “urgent” SI to contain a declaration of urgency in the body of the instrument will reassure noble Lords on that point. The Government have already promised that Explanatory Memoranda will contain an explanation by the Minister as to why they considered the SI to merit the urgent procedure. Nevertheless, I promise that the Government will consider this issue further before Report to see whether we can provide further assurances to your Lordships on it.

I hope my response to these amendments demonstrates that the Government continue to take this House’s scrutiny role seriously and that we do not consider it—

[Lord Sharkey]

On the urgent procedures, why in the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill is there a 60-day period, whereas for SIs generated urgently by this Bill there is a 28-day period? The Minister has talked about the necessity for speed. I do not understand why one Bill has 60 days and the other has 28.

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park]

The procedure, including in EU exit-related legislation such as the customs Bill, must reflect the specificities of the Act. Where certainty and the nature of tax legislation require provisions to come into force rapidly, it is important that there is time to arrange for debate and scrutiny, so there will be different timings relating to different legislation. I am happy to seek further information and write to the noble Lord if that would be helpful.

I hope that I have managed to allay some of your Lordships’ concerns and that I have explained the process that we are setting out. I hope, too, that noble Lords will understand that we are taking this matter seriously. We will obviously reflect on the debate; there are a couple of issues in particular that I have said we will take back, but I hope that, at this point, noble Lords will feel able to withdraw their amendments.

[Lord Sharkey]

Yes, I feel able to withdraw my amendment, but want to make one comment before I do so. The Minister has pointed out that the proposal for a reconsideration period marks a major change. She is quite right about that, because the circumstances seem to require exactly that change. I think that we will come to discuss this matter again, but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Prisons: Staff

Baroness Evans of Bowes Park Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall (Lab)]

My Lords—

[The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Evans of Bowes Park) (Con)]

My Lords, we will hear from the Labour Benches and then the Liberal Democrats.

[Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall]

My Lords, can the Minister tell the House how long prison officers are trained for and what are the core skills and competences which they are expected to have at the end of that training?

Judiciary: Independence

Baroness Evans of Bowes Park Excerpts

Tuesday 15th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab)]

My Lords—

[The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Evans of Bowes Park) (Con)]

My Lords, it is the turn of the Conservative Benches.

[Lord Lang of Monkton]

My Lords, does my noble and learned friend recall that in the report referred to by my noble friend Lord Lexden the Constitution Committee recognised that every member of the Government has a duty to uphold the law but that the Lord Chancellor has a special position, in that he or she has a duty to ensure that the Government as a whole uphold respect for the law, and that included in that is the independence of the judiciary? Would my noble and learned friend be willing to revisit the committee’s recommendation that the oath of the Lord Chancellor, as enshrined in the 2005 Act, should be revisited and strengthened?