Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 14th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

My Lords, this is a big and important Bill with much to commend it but, regrettably, also some ambiguous provisions that will undoubtedly infringe civil liberties. While there are welcome clauses on, for example, increased penalties for assaults on emergency workers, Part 3 of the Bill, which deals with police powers to prevent, limit and/or curtail public protest, gives cause for concern. I am aware that many Lords in this debate so far have addressed this, and I have to forewarn noble Lords that I will be doing so as well.

Freedom of expression and assembly is a crucial democratic right, and some might say the cornerstone of the democratic process. It enables citizens to express views, call decision-makers to account, participate in decisions affecting their lives and livelihoods and alerts the wider public to the potential dangers of statutory limitations. Public demonstrations are an expression of civic concerns and are addressed at legislators who not only represent the people but have the power to change legislation. The cessation of fracking is a much-cited recent example of demo power. Clearly, such freedom is not an unfettered right, public order being an equally important civil liberty but, as again Members of the other place and Peers today have argued, a balance must be sought. In the Bill before us, the balance has inexorably tipped towards the Government and their agents being the arbiters of what constitutes allowable demonstrations based on criteria which are themselves vague and subjective.

Experience tells us that, once on the statute book, a law such as this is likely to be enforced more strictly than is necessary, if only to justify the play-safe concerns that the police might have about public order and safety. It could well become the thin edge of the censorship wedge, infringing both the ICCPR and the European Convention on Human Rights. Included among the consequences of this legislation is the real possibility that an individual or individuals could be sentenced to new custodial terms for inadvertently infringing the new noise-trigger conditions. Which organiser of a procession or demonstration is able to precisely predict the level of noise a crowd will reach? However, the senior police officer in charge is free to stop a demonstration on the basis of a reasonable expectation that noise may reach a social disruption level. Who determines acceptable or unacceptable noise levels? What constitutes a “significant” impact on bystanders? Clause 56 adds to the existing police limitations on the duration, location and size of public assemblies, by allowing more general powers to impose

“such conditions as appear to the officer necessary to prevent the disorder, damage, disruption, impact or intimidation mentioned in subsection (1).”

These are very wide powers.

Clause 61 criminalises children for taking part in non-violent protest and creates harsh sentencing for children who “ought to know” that restrictions were in place. This is especially confusing since the restrictions are themselves uncertain and arbitrary, depending on the judgment of the existing officer in charge. Former senior policeman have themselves seriously questioned these clauses as pitting the police against the communities that they serve.

The vague conditions of many clauses will have a chilling effect on legitimate protest because severe restrictions can be imposed in anticipation of undue noise having an impact on those in the vicinity. Furthermore, the organisers could face an 11-month sentence for any breaches of police conditions, conditions which henceforth can be provoked by a one-person protest. By way of mollification, the Bill offers a fatuous sentence which states that the police will need to consider the human rights of protesters before using these powers. I wonder how this will be achieved.

These are disproportionate measures to deal with an issue that is not, as yet, a major public order problem. The longer-term result is that Governments and other decision-makers will be more able to avoid scrutiny or being held to account, and ordinary citizens will be silenced for expressing opposition to policies that affect them adversely. What I think this Bill will do, if enacted in its present form, is force protest of whatever kind into a far more dangerous underground channel.

I will be supporting amendments that either remove Part 3 of the Bill entirely or alter these clauses radically, by upholding the fundamental right to assemble and protest publicly.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 3rd December 2020 Lords Chamber

The Committee so far has explored CCAs working within the geographical confines of the United Kingdom. Once one moves to different countries, with different time zones and different patterns of law and custom, the potential problems and challenges to their proper supervision becomes greater, and that is why I have tabled Amendment 45.

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 55 in my name is in this group. The amendment seeks to place on the face of the Bill a clear prohibition on three grave criminal acts, namely murder, torture and sexual violations. It is narrower in its application than other amendments in this group, to avoid any confusion about the scope of these prohibitions. Therefore, references to “too broad” and “too open to interpretation”, such as threats to economic well-being and damage to property, are omitted. An added clause, referring to the discretion of the state not to prosecute the commission of even these major crimes, provides a further lack of restriction in exceptional cases.

Of course, there is no doubt of the need for the Bill to protect informants in their often dangerous but vital work. But the Bill as it stands puts the executive authorities and their agents above the law, a concern widely expressed at Second Reading. No state should authorise serious crime without limits. The Government’s justifications for allowing these grave crimes have still not been fully dealt with—for example, why the Human Rights Act, according to previous statements on the part of the Government, would not apply to informants’ criminal actions, or why listing prohibitions would somehow expose informants to additional danger. These are among the remaining ambiguities in the Bill.

We might learn from the original RIPA legislation, which necessitated later additional amendments to prevent its scope inexorably increasing over the years. The law must be accessible and clear. There is an opportunity here and now to make this Bill fit for purpose by incorporating the three main prohibitions limiting the sanctioning of grave crimes which are themselves contrary to the terms of the ECHR, to which the UK is party. To omit these limits, the Bill damages the integrity of criminal law and suggests that the state may tolerate, or even encourage, the most serious offences in the UK law.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

My Lords, these amendments have at their heart the question of whether there should be a list of offences which can never be authorised. The Government say not, claiming that countries which have such lists do not experience the same type of criminality that we do, especially in Northern Ireland; that to have such a list would mean that CHIS were tested against it; and that the Human Rights Act provides sufficient protection in any event. Despite the briefings which the Minister and the Security Minister have kindly arranged for me, I am afraid that I am yet to be fully convinced.

First, I wonder whether the nature of serious crime in this country is really so different from that in Canada, Australia or the US, each of which has some sort of list. Northern Ireland is mentioned, but given historical experience, it might be thought that the public reassurance given by a list would be of particular value in Northern Ireland. The principled objection to a list is rather diminished by the fact that the new Section 29B(10)(a) will empower the Secretary of State to create just such a list in secondary legislation. This, however, is no merely technical or topical concern, such as might justify the Government in reacting on the hoof to some future scandal. The content of the list is surely something that Parliament should consider coolly in advance, and not just to debate but to amend.

As for the Human Rights Act, it is unfortunate that there seems to be no easy way for the police or anyone else to translate what the Government characterise as its protections into clear and comprehensible operational advice. I have a good deal of sympathy with each of the various points made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in chapter 4 of its report, some of which have already been echoed in this debate. Though I do not repeat them here, I very much hope that, before Report, we will see a detailed and convincing response to all of them. Included in that, I suggest, should be a fuller explanation of paragraphs 14 to 16 of the ECHR memorandum, which has, perhaps understandably, generated a degree of concern.

What of the argument based on the testing of CHIS? The more I think about this, the less I understand it. Suppose that we amend the Bill to say, “CHIS cannot be authorised to rape.” Suppose then that the gang asks an individual to rape and that the individual refuses. What does that tell the gang? One possibility is that the individual simply has scruples that he is unwilling to set aside. Another is that he may be a CHIS whose authorisation does not stretch as far as rape or who has been advised by his handler not to rape. Whether or not the crime of rape features on a prohibited list has no bearing on the issue, unless one assumes, absurdly, that every CHIS will be authorised to commit all types of crime not on the prohibited list and will make full use of that authorisation whenever the opportunity presents itself. The reality surely is that CHIS will continue to be authorised in only limited respects, no doubt falling far short of sexual crime, and that a refusal to rape, murder and torture cannot, therefore, be a meaningful indicator of CHIS status.

It is hard to understand why a short list, bearing no relation to the types of crime that will routinely be authorised, should increase the risk to a CHIS or make it more likely that he will be successfully outed as a CHIS by the criminal group in which he is embedded. If public reassurance requires it to be known that undercover police may not form intimate relationships, as it evidently does, then why should it not be known that CHIS cannot be authorised to commit—at least—the trio of torture, murder or rape mentioned in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack? I look forward to any guidance that the Minister can give on this point. This is important stuff, and if the Government are right, we really need to understand why.

I venture to suggest that the extensive powers in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 were endorsed by Parliament because they were accompanied by equally strong safeguards, and also because the agencies and others were prepared to go to unprecedented lengths to explain why they were needed. They explained their case fully and frankly, at a detailed operational level, to trusted interlocutors such as the team that produced the bulk powers review in 2016 under my leadership. They also explained it as fully as they properly could to Parliament and the public as a whole. I hope that that lesson has been fully learned, because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, has already indicated, it may be needed on this Bill too.

Hate Crime: Misogyny

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Monday 23rd November 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Speaker (Lord Fowler)]

With apologies, I think I will move on. I call the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza.

[Baroness D’Souza (CB) [V]]

My Lords, hate speech that results in criminal actions such as incitement to violence is to be both deplored and subject to legislation. That said, I am concerned that one of our most precious democratic freedoms—freedom of expression—might be hampered if this is widely applied to include any offensive or misogynistic speech. The distinction between unpleasant, even hateful, speech and criminal incitement is often determined by the context in which it occurs. Does the Minister agree that each hate speech incident should be considered on a case-by-case basis rather than by means of broad legal sanctions?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I certainly agree that freedom of speech is one of the most precious things we preserve in this country, but it comes with responsibility. Where freedom of speech is used as an excuse to inflict a hate crime on someone else, that line has been crossed.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 11th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D’Souza (CB) [V]]

Most of what I wanted to say has been said, and eloquently said. I will merely emphasise two points before I metaphorically sit down. The Government justify the absence of limits on the potential criminal activity that the Bill enables by saying that to do so might serve to expose active agents. Furthermore, HMG argue that there is no need to include such limitations in the Bill, as has been the case in similar legislation in Canada and the USA, on the basis that the UK is party to the European Convention on Human Rights, which is incorporated in the Human Rights Act 1998, and is therefore bound by the terms of the convention. However, at the same time and in almost the same breath, the Government said, in legal filings, that they do not believe that covert agents should be bound by the terms of the Human Rights Act. Additionally, since the Human Rights Act specifically precludes murder, torture or other degrading behaviour, which surely covers sexual violence, the argument that naming limits might endanger agents rather falls to the ground. Will the Minister clear up these ambiguities?

Secondly, the Bill relies heavily on oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, the right to lodge any complaint with the tribunal and additional oversight —oh, I fear I have lost my text. Forgive me. What I was going to say is basically that dependence on the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, when there are no fewer than 14 authorising authorities bound to ensure that any criminal activity undertaken must be proportionate, necessary and at the lowest level possible to achieve the aims of the particular operation, is surely too much to ask. One could rely on the ISC, but we all know that too often the ISC has not received full or timely information to fulfil its function, and the tribunal itself will obviously take place after the criminal act has been committed. For that reason, I ask the Minister to clear up what seem to me to be ambiguities.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)]

We are going to make a final attempt to return to the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker. We hope that, on this occasion, the gremlins have finally been removed from the system.

Immigration Bill

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Tuesday 10th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Speaker (Baroness D’Souza)]

The original Question was that Motion A be agreed to, since when Amendment A1 has been moved to,

“leave out from ‘House’ to end and insert …‘do insist on its Amendment 84’”.

The Question, therefore, is that Amendment A1 be agreed to. I should inform the House that if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment A2 by reason of pre-emption.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, many of your Lordships will have negotiated a variety of agreements and arrangements, been involved in the toing and froing of proposals and counterproposals, and experienced the feeling of, “Okay, enough, let us move on”.

I do not equate that with this issue. I am realistic enough to understand where the Government have got to, but it is not far enough. From my privileged, comfortable position, compared with the asylum seekers, the subject of these amendments, I cannot leave it there. I do not feel, in the words of the noble and learned Lord, that I have done my job and done more.

I want to make it clear that I support the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. To deprive an individual of liberty for the purposes of immigration control should be an absolute last resort. It should be comparatively rare and for the shortest possible time. At the last stage but one of this Bill, the Government introduced their amendment for automatic judicial oversight. We heard then references to detainees still being able to apply for bail and to access legal advice at any time, and so on. That painted a picture which, though technically correct, did not accord with the realities described to me over the years.

The noble and learned Lord introduced the automatic hearing after six months as a “proportionate response”, and said that earlier referral might result in work for both the tribunal and the Home Office at a time when an individual’s removal from the country was planned and imminent. So I was pleased last night that the Minister in the Commons, “after careful consideration”, moved a reduction from six months to four months to reflect the fact that the vast majority are detained for fewer than four months.

At the end of last December, on the latest figures that we have, 2,607 people were detained. Of these, 530—roughly 20% of the detainee population—had been detained for less than four months but longer than two months. Those are the numbers that my amendment is about, although they are 530 individuals, not just faceless numbers.

The impact of immigration detention, which is not a sanction—it is not punishment for wrongdoing—is considerable and reference has rightly been made to the particular impact on mental health. I look forward to Stephen Shaw’s further work and hope that it will ameliorate conditions, but there must always be a significant impact. I do not know, though I can speculate on, the Government’s reason for moving from the proportionate six months to four months, but if they can move, I suggest they can move further. In the mix of assessing what is proportionate, the impact of administrative detention must be a significant factor. Let us reduce it as much as possible. That is why I propose two months.

I take this opportunity to say, too, that in all this I do not want to lose sight of the objective of improving the whole returns process. Alternatives to detention with case managers who are not decision-makers would be more humane, less costly and more efficient. There is plenty of experience of that in other countries. An improved returns system would reduce the burden on tribunals and the Home Office. It may be trite but it is true that efficiency is much of the answer. I hope noble Lords will be sympathetic to my proposal to reduce it still more, and take us further on the journey that the Government have led us on with regard to the period when there must be an automatic judicial oversight of each individual’s position.

Modern Slavery Bill

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Monday 8th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Warner (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 66 and speak to Amendment 68 in this group. I am pleased to see that the noble Lord, Lord Bates, has been in his place for some time. No doubt he will have noted the warm words given to his colleagues from another department about the concessions granted during consideration of the Consumer Rights Bill in this House. I am sure that he will want to be no less able to receive such tributes from us all at the end of this particular Bill.

Amendment 66 would remove subsections (1) and (2) of Clause 41 and replace them with a broader, more ambitious and clearer description of the functions of the anti-slavery commissioner. These changes are more in keeping with the advice in the report of the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, of which I was a member, based on the evidence that we received. We received a very large amount of evidence on this issue, particularly from those rapporteurs and quasi-commissioners in other countries with long experience of working in this sphere.

My Amendment 66 proposes that the wording of the Joint Committee’s own draft Bill, at Clause 33(1) on page 28 of the Joint Committee’s report, should be used in place of the Government’s approach. Amendment 68 elaborates that role internationally and in terms of partnership working. There is a fundamental difference between the Joint Committee’s view of the anti-slavery commissioner’s role and that of the Government. As the Home Office Minister told us rather graphically in oral evidence—captured in paragraph 156 of the committee’s report for those who wish to see it in all its glory—the commissioner was intended to be,

“the person who put the rocket up the law enforcement agencies”.

Thankfully, she did not go into more detail on how that might be done.

The Joint Committee’s approach was to define the role rather less colourfully but more broadly. Based on the evidence from overseas, particularly that from the highly effective Dutch and Finnish national rapporteurs, we saw the commisioner’s role as covering what we called the three Ps of combating modern slavery: prevention, protection and prosecution. To these we added a fourth P: partnership. As we said on page 84 of our report:

“It is essential that the Commissioner is empowered to work with national and international partners and to promote and facilitate domestic and international collaboration on the part of others”.

My Amendment 66 is broadly drawn and enables the commissioner to undertake the four Ps that I have mentioned. My Amendment 68 makes the international dimension explicit and makes clear that the commissioner is not restricted to the enforcement agencies as to where he distributes his “rockets”, to borrow Karen Bradley’s terminology.

I recognise that this more widely drawn role may well not commend itself to Home Office Ministers and officials. However, I would ask them to go back and read, or reread, the evidence given to the Joint Committee from experienced overseas equivalent commissioners. The unanimity of view among those witnesses was astonishing. Perhaps I may give the House a few examples from that evidence specifically on the importance of the role of embracing protection of victims. The US Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Luis CdeBaca, emphasised the indivisibility of protection, prosecution and prevention. The Dutch rapporteur said:

“Protecting victims and prosecuting criminals are two sides of the same coin”.

These witnesses found it strange that we should be going to all the trouble of fashioning a Modern Slavery Bill and then appointing an anti-slavery commissioner with such a narrow remit. The Modern Slavery Bill evidence review has recommended that the commissioner should,

“represent and give a voice to the concerns and best interests of victims and survivors of modern slavery”.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees concurred.

Despite this evidence, the Home Secretary has chosen to draw the remit narrowly in the present draft of Clause 41. Even though the victims are mentioned in Clause 41(1)(b), it is only in terms of “identification”. There is nothing about their protection in the commissioner’s role, as the Joint Committee clearly recommended in paragraph 160 of its report. As we said there: this,

“is fundamental to achieving the Government’s aim of improved law enforcement”.

If the commissioner is to be given a wider role, as the amendments in this group all propose, he clearly has to have the freedom to decide the priority for his work within the budget available to him and to expect his reports to be available promptly to Parliament. That is why we had what I suggest was the forceful discussion on his independence during our previous Committee day, and why I and others will be challenging the Home Secretary’s control in the next group of amendments. These groups of amendments are all of a piece; they are all about the independence of this commissioner including a wide brief that will enable him to help the country to combat trafficking and exploitation of victims, both here and abroad. The Home Secretary really has to think again on these issues if she wants the kind of world-class Act which she claims will result from this Bill to be a reality. I beg to move.

[The Lord Speaker (Baroness D’Souza)]

If this amendment is agreed to, Amendments 66A to 67ZAA cannot be called by reason of pre-emption.

Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Speaker (Baroness D’Souza)]

My Lords, I should perhaps remind your Lordships that if the amendment is agreed to I cannot call Amendment 40BZC by reason of pre-emption.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, to a considerable extent I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, but want to go rather further. I thank the Government for, and indeed welcome, Clause 62 as far as it goes. I should like to give particular thanks to the previous Minister of Justice in the other place, Damian Green MP, who has always been open to listening to Action for Children, for which I am largely speaking; I am also speaking for the NSPCC. He has been extremely helpful in giving us an opportunity to put our points of view to him. It is largely due to his diligence that the clause is in the Bill, so I thank him very much.

Clause 62, as far as it goes, is good but does not go far enough. The purpose of my Amendment 40BZB—supported particularly by Action for Children, and warmly supported by the NSPCC—is to update and bring into the 21st century Section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. I have to tell noble Lords that 1933 was the year in which I was born, and it really is about time that we had 21st-century legislation. I am a relic of that period but the law should not be. I am supported in this amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, whom I thank very much.

The purpose is to identify in criminal terms serious neglect and emotional abuse. “Neglect” is in the 1933 Act but does not include the effect of neglect on children and all sorts of emotional abuse that children suffer. Neglect is the most widespread and potentially most serious of all forms of abuse because it is, in itself, largely neglected. It is not seen. There are appalling stories where the police have identified a problem and discovered that they could not take any action by, for instance, threatening the family with some sort of criminal proceedings because the abuse and neglect that they see does not include the emotional abuse of things such as frozen awareness. Some noble Lords may know what I mean by that—for example, a child aged two sitting in a corner, not moving because of the way in which they have been treated. The police, who may come into a family, see and understand this but have to go away and tell the social workers, who may or may not take family proceedings in the magistrates’ court but are not obliged to do so. The police cannot warn the family that if they do not mend their ways they may become the subject of criminal proceedings.

The purpose of this updated legislation is not to put families in the criminal court but to try to push them, by a combination of threat and cajoling, into behaviour that will save the children who are in their care. My amendment, therefore, puts in modern wording such as,

“physically or emotionally ill-treats, physically or emotionally neglects”,

and removes altogether the words “unnecessary suffering”. I totally agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, that “unnecessary” should not be there, but “suffering” is not the word we use nowadays. In the Children Acts and other adoption and child-related legislation we talk about “serious harm”, “substantial harm” or some such phrase. One should get rid of “unnecessary suffering” and get this legislation to join the rest of legislation on children by using “serious harm”. As regards the criminal side of this matter, we then need to explain what “serious harm” means. Proposed new subsection (6) in my amendment sets that out.

It is with some hesitation that I do not entirely agree with the noble Baroness on proposed new subsection (6)(b). I have to say that having battled with the Minister in the other place over inserting “recklessly” instead of “wilfully”, and being told that there was a firm view against doing that, Action for Children, the NSPCC and I, together with some MPs from the Commons, believed that we should explain what “wilfully” means. That is why we have put in,

“that a person with responsibility for a child foresaw that an act or omission regarding that child would be likely to result in harm, but nonetheless unreasonably took that risk”.

That allows the word “wilful” to remain, since the Government seem to want it, but also explains it so that everyone—particularly the police, and indeed people who ill treat their children—understand exactly what it is about.

I very much hope that the Government will now listen to what is being said in this House, although they failed to do so in the other place. I very much urge that this should be looked at again.

Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Tuesday 8th July 2014 Lords Chamber

Amendment 31C withdrawn.

[The Lord Speaker (Baroness D'Souza)]

The Question is that Clause 37 stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37 agreed.

[The Lord Speaker]

The Question is that Clause 38 stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

Should we not be debating whether Clause 37 should stand part?

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Wednesday 8th January 2014 Lords Chamber

As it stands, the Bill will certainly expand the business of law. That should not be our aim today; our aim should be a search for precision, clarity and certainty. I beg to move.

[The Lord Speaker (Baroness D'Souza)]

I should perhaps remind your Lordships that if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 2 by reason of pre-emption.

[Baroness Mallalieu (Lab)]

My Lords, my name has been added to this amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Dear, moved it with his customary reason and calm; I fear that I shall not be following in quite the same vein.

Whoever thought up Clause 1 and managed to slip it under the radar of the other place is a strong contender for some kind of award. Perhaps it should be a citation for attempting to increase the power of the state to interfere in people’s lives; perhaps a golden globe for providing the authorities with a new and easy-to-discharge weapon in the war against inconvenient and annoying expressions of dissent; or perhaps even an Oscar for thinking up a way to take out those who are a nuisance or annoyance in any one of a thousand unspecified ways—and doing it in a manner that admits virtually no defence or safeguard and that requires the minimum of evidence.

Those on whom the Government propose to confer this extraordinary power are fully set out in Clause 4. Apart from the housing providers, to whom I will come shortly, they include the Environment Agency, all local authorities, British Transport Police, Transport for London, the Secretary of State for Health—and, of course, the police themselves. In other words, they are in every single case an arm of the state. The proposed definition in Clause 1(2), that the respondent must be someone who,

“has engaged or threatens to engage in conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to any person”,

has been adopted, as we have just been told, from a very limited provision, carefully restricted to conduct affecting the housing management functions of the relevant landlord. Both the applicant and the respondent are carefully defined. It is intended to assist a housing provider to control the behaviour of neighbours—tenants—living in close proximity who, as has been said, cannot simply look the other way, pay no attention or move easily—and in a situation where, because of fear, evidence may be hard to obtain.

The Government propose to take this particular power, designed for the particular problem of anti-social neighbours, and give it to a wide range of state bodies for use without restriction against absolutely anyone. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Dear, recognises the force with which many housing providers have lobbied us between Committee and today. They wish to retain that power in their own very limited and special context. Under this amendment, they would do so.

In Committee—and I anticipate more of the same later when the Minister replies—the response of the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, to my similar amendment on the ASBO definition that this amendment seeks to retain, was, “You are not thinking about the victims”. By that he clearly means those who are on the receiving end of anti-social behaviour. I have to say that he is wholly wrong in that. It is precisely because we are concerned about those who are harassed in our hospitals, caused alarm on public transport, or distressed by the conduct of others in the street that we want to see this legislation targeted at that behaviour.

In reality, most anti-social behaviour that the public worry about is already covered by existing criminal law offences under criminal damage, public order and harassment laws. There are unquestionably problems of court delays at present—and not just with ASBO applications. Inadequate resources for police, prosecuting authorities and courts are all factors. Ironically, by making IPNAs so much easier to obtain than ASBOs, for a far wider range of behaviour, and with a lower evidential burden, there is a real prospect that Clause 1 will slow down the courts by clogging them with myriad IPNA applications and will be of little help to real victims in need of urgent help.

I also remind the Minister that there are other victims of whom he appeared to take no account. They include those against whom an allegation is made that is unfair, unwarranted or untrue, or without any proper evidential basis. There is no defence of necessity or lack of intent in the Bill. I see no compensation provisions for a wrongful injunction, or any of the safeguards that normally attach to a civil injunction, especially when the defendant is not present at the initial hearing. This is all worrying, but particularly worrying for me is the lower burden of proof that is now proposed. However, my main concern is the extent to which lowering the threshold to behaviour,

“capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to any person”,

has the potential to undermine our fundamental freedoms, and in particular the way in which the proposed law might be used to curb protest and freedom of expression.

In exercising my personal right to protest in the past, I readily accept that I have on a number of occasions been guilty of conduct capable of annoying someone. Every march that delays traffic, every rally that overcrowds public transport or pavements, and every demonstration with loudspeakers, whistles and horns is no doubt capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to someone, and is usually a headache for the authorities, too. I suppose that there are Members of your Lordships’ House who have never attended a rally, demonstration or protest march, but I would place a small wager that they are in the minority. In a lifetime of attending protests, from Aldermaston as a child to the countryside march and many in between, if I have caused annoyance or nuisance, I hope that I have never caused harassment, alarm or distress to anyone.

Quite simply, the Bill currently sets the barrier too low. It threatens fundamental freedoms and, importantly, it undermines tolerance, which is surely an essential quality for living happily in an overcrowded island such as ours. Speaking in a rather different context but saying what I think is appropriate, Lord Justice Sedley some years ago put it rather well. He said:

“Free speech includes not only the inoffensive but the irritating, the contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative provided it does not tend to provoke violence. Freedom only to speak inoffensively is not worth having”.

To try to prohibit behaviour that is capable of annoying someone is a step far too far, and I hope that this House will do what the other place overlooked and stop it.

Protection of Freedoms Bill

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Monday 6th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bichard]

My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendments 53 and 54 in my name and in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, who has kindly allowed me to lead on this issue. Everyone in this House understands that one of the most difficult responsibilities for any Government is to manage risk, whether that risk is the security of our nation or the safety of the most vulnerable members of our society. It is one of the most difficult responsibilities because very few risks of any significance can be entirely eliminated, and decisions must therefore be made about what is an acceptable—sometimes an unavoidable—level of risk, and what action is proportionate in seeking to minimise that risk.

That is why I emphasised two things when I published my report on the deaths of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman at the hands of Ian Huntley in Soham: first, that we cannot create a risk-free society; secondly, that the steps we take to minimise risk should be proportionate. For those reasons, I very much sympathise with and support the Government in seeking to strike the right balance in this very difficult area. Some reduction in the level of bureaucracy associated with vetting and barring is necessary and achievable, and I welcome the Government’s attempts to do so. However, I cannot agree that these clauses strike the right balance, even with the amendments tabled by the Minister or by other noble Lords in this House. That is why I am moving this amendment.

To be clear, these clauses relate to those who train, supervise, teach or instruct children outside a specified place, such as a school or a children’s home, or to those who are unpaid volunteers in whatever setting. In such circumstances, a person will not in future need to be CRB checked if they are under the supervision of another person who is engaging in a regulated activity and is therefore subject to CRB checks. We can, and probably will, debate how close or intensive that supervision should be. My contention, inconvenient though it may be for those of us who want to reduce the level of bureaucracy, is that no amount or quality of supervision can be sufficient to prevent someone developing a bond of trust with a child that he or she can then exploit at a time when they are free of that supervision. That is how grooming takes place.

The internet provides enhanced opportunities for the bond of trust, once established, to be inappropriately exploited. Therefore, the focus of our concerns should be not on the quality, intensity or nature of the supervision but on whether the person involved in training, instruction, teaching or supervision presents a risk to the child. They should therefore continue to be subject to checks that can help establish whether they are a risk to children. This will hold out some hope that we can prevent them gaining privileged access to children.

We know that checks cannot be foolproof, but surely we owe it to our children to take reasonable and quite simple steps to prevent those whom we know are a risk from gaining privileged access to children, even if they are subject to supervision. They must do that because children assume that adults who are trusted to offer guidance or instruction to them can be trusted—not just in limited circumstances such as the youth centre or playing field but wherever they are encountered. That is why supervision can never be enough, and why sometimes we have to place the safety of our children before our desire to minimise regulation and bureaucracy. I hope that that is what we will do this evening. If we do not, I fear that we will very quickly find that dangerous adults will realise that there are some settings and some ways in which it will be easier in future for them to gain access to vulnerable children. The people we are talking about are manipulative and clever. They will take advantage of those opportunities.

Finally, I hope that the Minister will at least be able to confirm this evening that the Act will do nothing to prevent organisations, with their local knowledge, making checks where they think they are required. For example, a school with its local knowledge will be able to carry on checking volunteers if it believes that that is necessary and good practice. I beg to move.

[The Lord Speaker (Baroness D'Souza)]

My Lords, I should advise the House that if Amendment 50 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 50A and 51 for reasons of pre-emption.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, the amendments in this group remove the distinction that the Bill makes between supervised and unsupervised work with children in regulated activities. The Bill would restrict the definition of roles that fall under “regulated activity” and would mean that employers would not be required to do CRB checks for many employees working with, and in close proximity to, children.

Furthermore, employers would not be able to access information on whether that individual had been barred from working with children and vulnerable adults. I note the further safeguards that the Government have introduced following Committee, which amend the definition of “supervised” as specifically that which is reasonable for the protection of the children concerned. That is a step forward and clarifies that organisations and employers in regulated activity are under a statutory duty to provide adequate supervision for the safety of those children. However, without the ability to access information as to whether an individual had been barred from working with children, it is not clear how the Government expect organisations to discharge such a responsibility adequately. They appear, in effect, to be placing the burden of responsibility wholly on to organisations for the protection of children while denying them access to key information.

Perhaps more seriously, the Government’s proposed amendment to the definition of supervision fails to recognise the serious issue of secondary access, which has been raised by numerous children’s charities and voluntary organisations. Many cases of child abuse do not occur in a place of regulated activity such as a school or sports club but in other unregulated, unsupervised places, as a result of the trust they forge with both the child and the parent through their position of authority and as a result of the assumption that that individual has been adequately vetted by the organisation. The case of Barry Bennell demonstrates just how such relationships can develop over many years, outside the supervision of a regulated activity. That individual received a long jail sentence for the serial abuse of young boys over a period of years when he was a scout for north-west and midlands junior football teams. He gained secondary access to players through his position and invited the boys to stay with him at his home or took them on tours to various places where he sexually abused them.

Revising and re-revising the definition of supervision through guidelines and amendments is not enough and will not stop men like that from gaining the trust of children and their parents by working without any checks in close and sustained contact with children. I know the Government are determined to remove what they regard as unnecessary regulation, but regulation is often about protecting and safeguarding people—often vulnerable people—from the potentially careless, irresponsible or criminal acts of others. The Government should think hard about the words of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, and the potential consequences of the exemption of supervised workers and volunteers, which means that not all those working in regular contact with children and vulnerable adults are regulated.