Rules-based International Order

Baroness D'Souza Excerpts

Thursday 16th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, for her comprehensive introduction to this important debate. I think many of us will be emphasising the many points that she made.

That there is a threat to the system of political, legal and economic rules which have governed international relations since the end of World War II is in no doubt. A new feudal order is emerging. The question becomes: should this, if not be accepted, at least remain unchallenged or should there be new international norms and treaties taking into account current realities such as environmental conditions, international commitments, and principles of national sovereignty and self-determination? If the latter, what might these new norms look like and who would draft them? Perhaps it is preferable to go for a middle way and focus on reforms to the existing order. The task is to salvage an international order that is now gravely weakened.

cthe last almost 80 years underpinned the principles of sovereignty, democracy and human rights. More recently, international rules have resulted in trade liberalisation through economic governance, the advent of a number of new peacekeeping missions, the International Criminal Court, as we have heard, and the insistence on women’s and LGBT rights. But there remains suspicion and departure from these accepted norms because they are perceived as imposing a system invented by liberal democracies for the benefit of western diplomatic, military and economic agendas.

These growing views of western manipulation have given rise to a gradual but quickening departure from these rules. Egregious examples abound. They include the distaste for multilateralism, with Trump—I nearly said “chump”—insisting on the unimpeded exercise of American power in pursuit of defined national interests; China’s preference for bilateral diplomatic transactions, together with a newfound assertiveness in the UN, as well as its unbending approach where its interests are threatened, an example of which is its refusal to abide by the court of arbitration decision concerning disputes with the Philippines over the South China Sea; and, of course, Russia’s subversion of international rules.

We have the continuing fragmentation of the system brought about by new centres of world power, increasing populist and nationalist pressures, new and empowered centres of political dissent, international crime and terror networks, and the rise of non-state actors, among other 21st-century developments. This democratic backsliding and the accompanying rise in authoritarianism threatens international peace and stability by undermining the democratic political process—for example, by using technology supply chains as a means of repression.

Last September, the United Nations adopted a resolution, a “pact for the future”, which called for a recommitment to international co-operation based on respect for international law and the strengthening of multilateral institutions. The actions pledged included sustainable development, peace and security, digital co-operation, and a focus on youth and future generations. Subsequent suggestions concerned amplifying these actions—for example, strengthening the International Criminal Court, establishing global conduct for outer space, further embracing soft power, trade policies that better protect human rights, and a recalibration of the “responsibility to protect” principle. At the same time, it was acknowledged that this was no easy task, assuming, as these actions do, a common standardised definition that would enjoy legitimacy, reward investment in co-operation, reconcile clashing interests and deter conflict.

Another major theme was the necessity of engaging with a far wider range of constituencies, from citizens and civil society to the private sector and even local political actors. Above all, there has been a consensus among reformers that preventive mechanisms are key. The UN enjoins states to facilitate more sustainable and robust frameworks for prevention, again working with local knowledge and skills, especially with NGOs.

This is a task that has scale and complexity. The responsibility to protect is a failing norm, codified by all UN member states in 2005 but too often seen by some states as intervention by the backdoor. The three main pillars of R2P are: the primary responsibility of the state to guarantee the safety and security of citizens; the responsibility of the international community to support states to implement this norm; and the responsibility of the international community to ensure protection of civilians where the state has failed to do so and when the state targets its own citizens.

It is not unfair to question the relevance of this principle in the face of ever-growing challenges. What strategies might work? Should R2P be recalibrated, defining more closely the second pillar to reflect the increasingly multifaceted nature of governance? Should the UN promote capacity building as its main plank, developing joint response mechanisms with regional organisations in collaboration with civil society organisations? Surely broadening the base of actors to provide evidence would help to embed R2P. It is encouraging to note that ASEAN is beginning to develop and integrate the R2P curriculum into its training courses for police and justice agencies. We cannot allow this crucial principle to die. Everyone with an interest in peace and security should be working to make it more agile, widespread and effective.

Finally, recent UK Foreign Secretaries have given support to a modernised rules-based international order that benefits everyone and holds to account those who infringe it. It has been pointed out that defending the rules-based order will require multi-pronged strategies. I hope that the UK Government will be closely involved in helping to achieve this.