Baroness D'Souza
Main Page: Baroness D'Souza (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness D'Souza's debates with the Leader of the House
(3 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the tragedy that is Afghanistan today is the consequence of many miscalculations, assumptions, faulty intelligence—or perhaps political decisions to disregard intelligence reports—and hubris. The fact is that 20 years of largely successful endeavours in building democratic institutions, and above all in educating girls, may be lost.
On the face of it, regardless of the policies the UK may have wished to implement in Afghanistan, the fact is that there was no room for manoeuvre at all once the USA had decided to withdraw its troops. The UK was hemmed in and had no alternatives to pursue other than US policy and action. It is therefore fair to say that UK foreign policy is now so firmly tied to that of the USA that independent action is virtually ruled out.
Post 9/11, the UK Government at the time agreed with the US that the onslaught in October 2001 was aimed at getting rid of al-Qaeda and preventing further terrorist attacks targeting the USA, and that a stable democracy with a trained army would be the best insurance for both these goals. Billions of dollars were then spent on a wide range of programmes aimed at building the institutions of democracy. President Biden’s most recent claim that there was no intention to impose any kind of western model is, to my mind, wrong. There clearly was: the US ODA programmes went far beyond rendering al-Qaeda impotent.
Then, for domestic electoral reasons, the Americans wanted their forces out. That was understandable but the mechanisms employed, as set out in the US-Taliban Doha agreement in 2020, flew in the face of any democratic process. Enormous concessions were granted to the Taliban with few, if any, guarantees. The talks began with a refusal to include either the legitimate Afghan Government or major allies among other interested parties. The demands set out at the beginning of the talks were the result not of any negotiation but of Taliban diktat—for example, the withdrawal of not only troops but all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private security contractors, trainers, advisers and supporting service personnel, and the release of Taliban prisoners.
The talks were not about achieving any kind of peace but promoted the reputation and political influence of the Taliban. The Taliban’s insistence on removing all counterterrorism operations does not bode well for the future. Despite the many serious flaws, the talks were agreed without amendment by other NATO allies so the “war” was in fact settled in February 2020, and the carnage between then and now has merely been a Taliban way of keeping the upper hand at the Doha talks. Why were there no objections to, for example, the absence of any protections for human rights or the rights of women? Why did Pakistan get off so lightly that it could continue to enable Taliban atrocities?
Why is the world so surprised by the success of the Taliban in gaining complete control? It was given to them in the interests of satisfying an American electorate by those very nations that sought to eliminate them. Can the Government now assure the House that lessons have been learned and that an independent foreign policy might well follow?