Trade Union Bill

Debate between Baroness Drake and Viscount Hailsham

Wednesday 16th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 9 and 10. Clause 10 has raised much concern and strength of feeling, and the debate has been binary: on the one hand, the view confirmed by the Select Committee that the Bill would have a significant and negative impact on Labour Party funding; on the other side, the Government’s adherence to their manifesto commitment to introduce opt-in to union political funds. The Select Committee attempted,

“to reconcile these two issues by setting out a proposed compromise”.

It identified a way forward, which, put at its simplest, means introducing the principle of opt-in for new members while seeking to mitigate the worst of the impact on union political funds and the Labour Party through changes to the provisions in Clause 10.

The principle of opt-in is in the manifesto, but the detailed process for implementing it is not. Amendment 9 captures the unanimous view on the desirable changes to Clause 10 and the majority view on the position of existing members. As the Select Committee observed, Clause 10 is very far from commanding a consensus, not only because of the impact on the Labour Party but because of the obstacles the Bill presents to the successful implementation of opt-in—what I would call the double-jeopardy effect.

The amendment would require new members to contribute to the political fund only if they have opted in, in writing or electronically. To restrict the opt-in system to an in-writing, on-paper process is an obstacle to successful implementation and is much less likely to achieve a good response rate. Doing something through the post can be harder than doing it online. People can mislay their form. It provides what in behavioural terms are points of friction, which encourage inertia and will discourage opt-in. Members do not make a decision on whether to opt in or not; rather, they make no decision.

The Government, in arguing for opt-in, refer to the shift in the market where consumers purchasing products or services are increasingly being asked to give active consent when entering a new commitment. But increasingly those opt-in decisions can be made electronically—indeed, that is at the very heart of our e-commerce world. Allowing opt-in to political funds electronically goes with the market shift. The amendment contains no requirement for members to renew their opt-in decision every five years, but would provide greater transparency in that all members, existing and new, must be reminded every year of their right to opt out and cease paying into the political fund. The Certification Officer must, in a code of practice, set out the annual reminder communications that unions must issue, monitor unions’ compliance and report.

The arguments against a five-year renewal are several. Regulated annual reminders to members of their right to cease paying is a more proportionate approach and is consistent with market practice. In the market, where an initial opt-in decision is required for membership, services or financial products, there are many instances where consumers are not required to renew their decision, although it is not unusual to send an annual reminder. The default is that the policy agreement or service continues. This can be compatible with Financial Conduct Authority requirements. It is reasonable for the provisions of Clause 10 to take a similar approach, given that other products in the market are normally of much greater value than a 9p political levy.

The Bill is disproportionate as, every five years, a member’s opt-in decision expires unless they have renewed it—so every five years, the union would have to contact all members to ask them to renew. The Select Committee reported that the administrative and financial burdens on unions arising from this requirement would be considerable and disproportionate against the size of the 9p contribution. The exercise would cost a union one year of political fund contributions every five years.

Depending on when a union last held its last political fund ballot, which it is required to do every 10 years, it could face the tasks of initially contacting or persuading all existing contributing members to opt in; contacting and persuading all contributing members to renew their decision to opt in five years later; then conducting a full postal ballot of all members to secure a renewed authority to have a political fund—all in the space of about six years, and all expensive.

The amendment increases the transition period to at least 12 months, to be set following consultation with the Certification Officer and the trade unions. Most witnesses agreed that a three-month transition period is far too short. Retailers were granted two years to prepare for charges on plastic bags. Following the Health Act 2009, which banned cigarette displays, the coalition brought the provisions into force in 2012 for larger shops and 2013 for smaller shops. The right-to-rent landlord checks in the Immigration Act 2014 came into force in 2016. Three months appears to be very mean-spirited when compared with the two or three or four-year transition periods allowed under other legislation on issues of considerable moment.

The Certification Officer advised that Clause 10 would require unions to revise their rulebooks and secure his approval. Many unions need to get member approval at an annual or special conference. This will take time and expenditure. Rules revisions, developing guidance on training for union staff and reps and other changes are too great a task to be completed in three months. It is setting unions up to fail. Moving to opt-in is not the only demand on union resources coming out of this Bill. Dealing with the abolition of check-off will be a major priority, too.

Finally, the amendment does not extend the opt-in requirement to existing members as part of the Bill. But it does require them to be covered by the transparency requirements to annually notify members of their right to opt out. This gives effect to the majority view in the report. Not extending the opt-in to existing members as part of the Bill is fairer and more even-handed. Human behaviour is such that persuading existing members to make an active choice is much more difficult. They are more likely to make no choice. As the noble Lord, Lord Burns, said, there is no trigger point such as joining the union. Response rates will be lower and greater expenditure will be incurred in prompting, chasing and following up. Not extending to existing members, but providing them with regulated annual notification of their right to opt out, increases transparency.

The noble Lord asked what the principle was here. The principle is that when you introduce a new regime for future members, you should have a protection regime for existing people. There are precedents. The principal protection for the existing members under this amendment is a compulsorily regulated regime of notifying members of their right to opt out, which will be monitored and reported on by the Certification Officer.

As the Select Committee observed, even without some of the onerous provisions in Clause 10, there will still be “a sizeable negative effect” on members contributing to political funds. The Select Committee’s overarching proposal was that the Government should implement their other manifesto commitment: to convene cross-party talks and make an urgent effort to reach agreement on party funding. The majority view was that the question of extending the opt-in to existing union members should not be part of the Bill but should be considered as part of those talks. As the Select Committee observed:

“The further danger of proceeding down a non-consensual route is that any cut in the Labour Party’s funding will simultaneously reduce the incentives for the other parties to make concessions with a view to achieving comprehensive reform”.

The amendment strengthens transparency considerably. It introduces opt-in going forward, but it also introduces fairness, proportionality and, even more important, what has been missing—a level of even-handedness.

[Viscount Hailsham]

Notwithstanding my considerable respect for the noble Lord, Lord Burns, and my noble friend Lord Cormack, now my near neighbour, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, I am not with them on the amendment.

The amendment is in paragraph 142 of the Select Committee report. I am an advocate of the alternative view: a generous transitional period for existing members. I should like to think that the Minister will offer a more generous transitional period than she is presently contemplating. I cannot help feeling that, if she did, she would attract considerable support.

My reasons are very simple and can be briefly expressed. First, as a matter of principle, existing members should be covered by the opt-in provisions. The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, referred to the amendment as fair and even-handed. It is nothing of the kind. It actually deprives existing members of the greater ability to opt out, if they want to. There is nothing fair or even-handed about the amendment; it has a contrary effect.

However, I agree with another point made by the noble Lord, Lord Burns, and, incidentally, my noble friend Lord Cormack: that it would unbalance party funding. That is not in the general interests of the country or, therefore, within the general consent of this House. I therefore think that the alternative approach formulated in paragraph 142(b) of the Select Committee report is the way forward. A more generous transitional period for existing members seems to me to catch the sense of the House.