(6 years ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, before the debate begins, it may be helpful if I explain that the rather quaint little hats sitting on the ends of some of the microphones are an indication that they are not working.
Thank you. On the assumption that I do not have a little hat on my microphone, I should say that when I read through these two sets of draft regulations and their Explanatory Memoranda, they were a depressing reminder of the consequences of leaving the EU with no Brexit deal in place.
The regulations allow the Treasury and relevant regulators to take steps to ensure that, in the event of no deal, the UK has a functioning financial services regulatory regime, can protect consumers and ensure financial stability. At the heart of that stability are the prudential standards developed in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, measuring and mitigating risk through maintaining adequate capital reserves and establishing an effective recovery and resolution framework. No one who can recall the vivid fear of a financial meltdown in 2008 can fail to understand the importance of a robust system of prudential regulation. The capital adequacy and resolution regime for banks and other financial institutions was the subject of considerable debate and scrutiny post 2008.
These SIs make amendments to certain aspects of the capital requirements regulation, to ensure that it continues to operate effectively after Brexit day, and to certain other statutory instruments that implement the capital requirements directive. Key changes for when the UK leaves the EU include: amending the geographical scope of supervisory consolidation of capital and liquidity reporting processes to restrict it to the UK; transferring functions from the European supervisory authorities to the UK regulators; transferring responsibility for all binding technical standards from those European authorities to the UK regulators; and macroprudential measures that ensure that the tools available to national regulators in the event of systemic risk, for example an asset bubble, remain available to the UK regulators.
The draft SI which addresses the onshoring of the bank recovery and resolution framework post Brexit aims to ensure that the UK special resolution regime is,
“legally and practically workable on a standalone basis”,
when the UK leaves the EU. The draft regulations also make further provisions on contractual recognition of bail-in, with new Bank of England powers to make technical standards on requirements for recognition. The Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the FCA are expected to consult on changes to their rules affected by these regulations, and the special resolution regime code of practice will be updated. These are matters of significance that will have to be addressed with urgency.
Obviously, if the UK were to crash out of the EU with no deal, I would certainly want the Treasury and regulators to take action to protect the UK’s financial stability. Any Government faced with a no-deal exit will have to firefight and move quickly to protect the national interest. Those would be exceptional times. However, it is 12 December 2018, and we are due to leave on 29 March 2019. Ignoring Christmas, that gives us about 12 weeks to introduce measures to ensure continuing confidence in the UK financial services regulatory regime. Delivering such a challenge in such a tight timetable requires a great deal of assurance.
I therefore want to ask the Minister four questions. Will the Treasury, the PRA and the FCA have sufficient staffing resources with the necessary level of skill and expertise to deliver what is needed by 29 March? The Bank of England, the FCA and the PRA will update their rules and relevant binding technical standards to mirror the changes introduced by these SIs and consult on their proposed changes. Is there sufficient time to identify and make all the necessary changes required by 29 March, as well as fit in the promised consultation? What happens if there is not sufficient time? Finally, under these regulations, to what extent will the PRA and the FCA have the authority to weaken the binding technical standards currently required to be met by firms to a standard below those currently applied?