Trade Union Bill

Baroness Donaghy Excerpts

Wednesday 10th February 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Donaghy]

33: Clause 7, page 4, line 4, at end insert—
“( ) At the end of section 234A(4)(b) of the 1992 Act (notice to employers of industrial action) insert—
“, unless the employer and union have reached an agreement in respect of the industrial action, in which case the appropriate period is the period ending with the seventh day before the day, or before the first of the days, specified in the relevant notice.””

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[Baroness Donaghy (Lab)]

My Lords, one of the difficulties about moving an amendment on employment relations in a Bill which some of us consider is not about employment relations is finding a context where employer and employee have a mutual relationship which works most of the time but occasionally breaks down—and the extent to which the state intends to help or hinder on those occasions.

A senior civil servant, who shall be nameless, was once asked, “Why is there always an anti-trade union Bill when the Conservative Party wins an election?”. The civil servant replied: “There are two reasons. First, it will delight the local Conservative associations and, secondly, it does not cost anything”—unlike building a motorway or lowering taxes. My Amendment 33 does not cost anything either. Its purpose is to highlight the importance of the relationship between the employer and the trade union and its members, and to recognise the benefits of mutuality in the timing of industrial action. Its objective is to give some flexibility in what can be a very fraught atmosphere.

The existing requirement of seven days’ notice of industrial action once a ballot mandate is achieved is not, in itself, a problem. It is extremely rare for employment relations to be so bad that the lines of communication between management and trade union are completely severed, and notice of intention to hold the ballot will already have been given. During the ballot period, the union will campaign for a successful outcome, and management will inform employees why industrial action is unnecessary. The seven days’ notice only kicks in when the ballot is successful from the trade union angle; it is not relevant if the ballot fails. The employer and union will then know where they stand. If the intention is to hold, say, a one-day demonstrative strike, it is in the interests of the employer to be allowed to agree the timing of the strike with the union—not because it will agree with the strike, but because it recognises the reality of the situation and wants to lance the boil as soon as possible. I am not arguing that two weeks’ notice, in isolation, is a bad thing, but in the context of the total package of this Bill, it is patronising. It is also damaging to take certain judgments away from management and unions in this situation.

The impact assessment talks about “contingency arrangements” and then goes on about,

“more cost effective contingency arrangements”.

I would be interested to know what these are and what the difference is between them. For instance, is it hiring agency staff to cover, which, of course, is more expensive? I do not believe any respectable agency will get involved with this anyway. Will it be hiring people at 4 am from the car park near B&Q on the Old Kent Road—similar car parks are available—which is what the construction industry does? That would certainly be more cost effective as a contingency plan.

The impact assessment refers to both parties seeking,

“to reach a mutually acceptable”,

that word mutual,

“conclusion to the dispute without resorting to a ballot for industrial action”.

That is language I understand and anyone involved in employment relations understands. However, everything in this section of the Bill reveals a mindset that is just the opposite of good employment relations. This mindset wants to maximise bureaucracy for trade unions and make any strike open to legal challenge. It puts so much on the ballot paper that the exit strategy becomes impossible, takes away any flexibility to manage a difficult situation and implicitly encourages strike breaking. The TUC has said that the proposal for 14 days’ notice,

“is designed to reduce the momentum in union campaigns”.

My amendment would allow management and unions some control over events. It recognises that mutuality is important even in times of strife and keeps the channels of communication open. I hope the Minister feels able to support it.

[Lord Stoneham of Droxford]

My Lords, I want to make a couple of points on this group. Why it is necessary to change the notice? What is the significance? On the face of it you might say, “What is the difference between one or two weeks?”. In the context of our suspicion as to where the Government are coming from on this, I think there needs to be suitable due diligence to look at what really is necessary. The Committee ought to be reminded that it will not be one week. To give notice that you are going to have a ballot, to have a ballot and then to have another week or two after it to give notice for industrial action gives the employer quite a lot of notice already of what could happen.

I accept that the Government are changing the need for action within four weeks of the ballot, so if this was a quid pro quo for that requirement—I do not see the Government arguing that—that might be more understandable. With all the detail that is going to go on the ballot paper, if the date of the industrial action is specified on the ballot paper is that going to act as notice? Is that going to be adequate? Have the Government thought of that?

The amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, recognises reality, and where there is agreement between an employer and the trade union it makes sense to recognise that and exclude it from this provision. We question the essential nature of this section of the Bill but we also understand that whether it is one or two weeks will not make a huge difference in the context of the notice that the employer already has of industrial action.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

My Lords, I should like to look into that and revert, either under a later amendment or in writing, on the point that has been raised.

[Baroness Donaghy]

I thank the Minister for her response and echo what she said about taking every opportunity to avoid disruption. I thought that that was the purpose of my amendment—that employers and trade unions can take advantage of certain opportunities for two-way communication to accept the inevitable but minimise damage. I entirely sympathise with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, about disruption to the public. It is very difficult to have any strike action—you could argue that there was no point in such action—that does not disrupt anybody. We are all here hoping that we can avoid strike action. The suspicion that some of us have is that the purpose of the Bill is to prevent strike action. I am trying to find a small shaft of light to recognise that management and unions find themselves in a difficult position, after a clear mandate, and give them every opportunity of arranging the date so that it is mutually beneficial—if there is such a thing—during a period of strike action. In the light of the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 33 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Donaghy]

My Lords, I will make a couple of brief points. There is an irony in this debate, because most of the time in opposition we are asking for things to be in the Bill, and it is the Government who say, “Oh no, there is a very good reason why it should not be in the Bill, it can come in a regulation”—or, dare I say it, in a code of practice. So I am aware of that dilemma. The first thing that I want to say after that is that I do not think that anybody here is going to say that violence and intimidation are acceptable, whether on a picket line or elsewhere in pursuit of a certain point of view. But I will say that up to now the code of practice has been adequate. I do not agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, that just because a few people might disregard it, the tail should be allowed to wag the dog and that somehow or other things need to be tightened up because there is a very small minority determined in some cases to cause that confrontation and take on the establishment.

My final point might seem trivial, but I do not think that it has been raised since my noble friend Lady Gould of Potternewton raised it at Second Reading. It is about the feminisation of the workforce. To a large extent, the trade union movement has not caught up with that as much as I would have liked, but we are now talking about a workforce, particularly in the public services, the majority of whom are women and people from ethnic minorities. As often as not, when you see pictures of pickets in the newspapers, the vast majority of them are women. I think that they have a slightly different understanding of employment relations; they might feel passionately about a particular dispute, but I would like to see one instance where women on a picket line have caused these difficulties. So I urge a bit of caution and that in any attempt to tighten up or change the code of practice into a law we should have regard to the fact that the industrial relations scene is very different from how it was 35 years or so ago, which some noble Lords were talking about.

[Lord Collins of Highbury]

My Lords, we have had a very effective discussion on these clauses—effective because we are challenging why we need a particular proposal. The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, hit the nail on the head. These things often require careful consideration. My fear is that we have not had careful consideration; what we have had is a response to particular headlines and newspaper stories. As my noble friend Lord Monks said, where there are failings it is often because the law has not been properly applied or has not been dealt with. Many noble Lords are acutely aware that we should not rush to statute or invent new laws to address a problem that could be properly resolved under existing laws.

As we have heard, picketing is heavily regulated; unions must comply with statutory requirements for peaceful picketing. Section 220 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 requires that they must act in accordance with the code. It is not a choice or an option—it is not voluntary but a requirement. As my noble friend Lord Monks said, “What is the problem?”

As other noble Lords indicated, and as the noble Lord, Lord Oates, said, it is clear from the impact assessment that the real target is the so-called leverage campaigns that we have seen. Yet these provisions and clauses are targeted at picketing itself, particularly after the wider consultation proposals were dropped. The problem that I have is that the impact assessment refers to allegations of intimidatory behaviour “not limited to picketing”. That is the key phrase: “not limited to”. The impact assessment and evidence that the Government are using for these proposals relate to matters that are not about picketing.

They are, of course, about actions that are already covered in law. The impact assessment refers to unsubstantiated allegations in the media and, of course, to the Bruce Carr review, which focused on leverage. But we must not forget that unions and their members are subject to laws on public order, such as protection from harassment and criminal damage. They are all existing laws. It is also a criminal offence for pickets to use violence or to intimidate individuals and their families. Hence the police go on the picket line, and they soon return if there is any problem, and action is taken. So why do we have these additional requirements?

We have heard that we should have a voluntary code—well, it is not voluntary; it must be complied with—on the face of the Bill. As my noble friend said, we want clarity in the Bill, but this is not going to add to clarity. Potentially, again, it is going to increase the involvement of the legal profession, and it might lead to challenges that are unintended. I shall come to the details of that in the Bill. I am disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is not in his place, because he wrote a very good article in the Times specifically highlighting these clauses. It is about coming back to this House with proper evidence about why this is required and why existing statutory provisions are not enough.

The clause will introduce significant additional restrictions on the ability of unions to organise peaceful pickets at or near a place of work. If the Bill becomes law, picketing will be lawful only if unions appoint a picket supervisor and notify the police of their name and contact details. The supervisors will be required to carry a letter of approval, which must be shown; they will be required to wear armbands and badges to identify them. As we have heard, on Report in the Commons the Government introduced amendments that removed the requirement on picket supervisors to show the letter of approval on demand to the police or any member of the public.

Ministers also clarified that it was not the Government’s intention that the letter of approval should include the name or contact details of the picket supervisor. The Government went further and announced that they did not plan to go ahead with additional restrictions, including the requirement on unions to publish protest plans 14 days in advance and to detail whether they proposed to use social media. They also decided not to require all pickets to wear armbands, and will not introduce additional criminal offences. While those developments are incredibly welcome, Clause 9 still violates the basic democratic rights of working people.

In our opinion, it is unreasonable for the state to require picket supervisors to undertake the requirements about understanding the full code. It is our opinion that a lot of these requirements are disproportionate and are also discriminatory measures, as they apply only to unions. As we have heard, the proposals have been roundly criticised by lawyers and civil liberties groups—and, of course, the Equality and Human Rights Commission has suggested that Clause 9, even as amended, may be in breach of Articles 11 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

My noble friend has also picked up the point that Clause 9 may substantially change the role of the police in relation to pickets and the union’s requirement to report the name of the supervisor. This becomes an issue where we have responsible action, with the union ensuring that peaceful protest and legitimate process to explain the reasons, and suddenly responsible people hear that their name has to be reported to the police and that the police will hold their name. They will ask what that means. We hear the Government talk about data protection, and say that this will happen and that will happen. A lot of responsible people will say that they are not sure. They will ask whether they should carry out this task in this proper way if it will result in these things being reported to the police. It increases the potential for responsible picketing not taking place. We will have to look into that seriously.

In the evidence session in the House of Commons, the National Police Chiefs’ Council has indicated that the new duties for unions to notify the police of the picket supervisor and the location of the picket would be unnecessary and could waste police resources. Deputy Chief Constable Charles Hall said:

“I do not see that as absolutely necessary, simply because we would expect those picket lines to be self-policing as far as possible. Involvement of police beyond that should be the exception, rather than the rule”.––[Official Report, Commons, Trade Union Public Bill Committee, 15/10/15; col. 93.]

Again, this was a point that my noble friend Lord Monks made: namely, that you are ensuring increased intervention and that resources are wasted. Police are there to ensure that the existing law is properly maintained. I know that the police would not hesitate to go in there.

We have put down a series of amendments, particularly in relation to those reporting requirements. They are matters that need careful consideration. Putting these requirements in the Bill again increases the propensity for legal challenge. If the letter of the law is not met, we will end up with lawyers intervening, legal challenges and the unions devoting resources to deal with that, instead of matters being properly resolved in the way that they are now.

I come back to the point: what is the problem that we are seeking to address? If it is about compliance with the law, let us ensure that we address that properly. If people are breaking the law they should suffer the consequences. We should not simply go back to the statute book and introduce laws that are not necessary and could potentially hinder good conduct, because good people will be put off doing a responsible job.