Trade Union Bill

Baroness Neville-Rolfe Excerpts

Wednesday 10th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and Department for Culture, Media and Sport (Baroness Neville-Rolfe) (Con)]

My Lords, these clauses are about making sure that union members have clearer information on the voting paper about what action is proposed, when and why. They also ensure that members, and the certification officer, know about the outcome of the ballot. The increased clarity is an important part of our package of trade union reforms. In some sense having the right information defines everything we are about, and I think there is some common ground on this issue.I am grateful to the Lord Speaker for clarifying which amendments we are addressing. I will try to answer the points made amendment by amendment.

Noble Lords expressed concern about the new information that the Bill requires a trade union to provide on the voting paper. They want to keep the status quo, or at least reduce the amount of information that the Bill requires. There is also a worry about the risk to a union of a legal challenge for failing to comply with the requirements, and about increasing burdens and bureaucracy on trade unions. We do need some change because the law does not provide enough transparency.

In response to the noble Lords, Lord Lea of Crondall and Lord Oates, I say that it is more useful, for both the union members and the employer, if the voting paper is clear and transparent about what issues are in dispute. This will aid negotiations as they will be able to focus on exactly which aspects of—for example—pay remain unresolved. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on this. The aim is to provide more certainty about the issues in dispute, thereby reducing the risk of legal challenge to the validity of the mandate, which would be costly for both parties, as other noble Lords have hinted.

We used the words “reasonably detailed indication” of the matter or matters at issue in the trade dispute, because if there is any more detail that a union could reasonably give on the voting paper then it has not complied with the requirement.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

I have listened very carefully. Would it not meet the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, if we said a “clear indication” rather than a “reasonably detailed” one?

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

I thank my noble friend. That is certainly something we can look at.

I was asked for an example. In a trade dispute about pay, it would be reasonable to expect the union to state which year’s pay offer is in dispute, and which employees are covered by the offer. This may be done in some cases but in others it may not. I am concerned about a trade union simply stating the trade dispute, as proposed in Amendments 23 and 24. This would not ensure that the voting paper was sufficiently clear. Members need to know exactly what they are voting for—if there is a strike they lose money.

[Lord Stoneham of Droxford (LD)]

Is it not a reality that any ballot paper would have accompanying documents setting out the case for the vote. Surely that is where the detail should be, not on the ballot paper.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

We do need clarity. I have listened to what has been said in relation to the reasonably detailed indication. We have heard from the noble Lords, Lord Collins, Lord Oates and Lord Pannick, about what that might mean in practice. I would like to reflect on whether we have got that right. Probably what everybody wants is a balance, so that there is sufficient detail and members can make an informed decision without unnecessary burdens being put on unions by asking them to include a long and detailed account of the trade dispute.

I turn to Amendment 25. Terms such as “action short of a strike” are too wide. The type of industrial action proposed will depend on the circumstances of each dispute and the industry concerned. It is important that members know which type they are voting on because of the different impacts on people’s lives. I reassure noble Lords that we have considered that there might be a degree of uncertainty when a union is drawing up its plans about what action it might subsequently take. But it must surely have in mind a plan for such action. All we are asking is that that plan is made available to members.

I am concerned that Amendment 26 would mean that there was no requirement to provide any information on the voting paper about the timing of industrial action, which is a key point. We want to avoid the situation where a member might have made a different decision had he or she realised when the strike would take place. For example, Unite conducted a ballot where British Airways staff voted to strike, but it is not clear that they would have supported the strike action had they known they would have been called out for 12 days over Christmas. We want to avoid that sort of thing.

[Lord Dykes]

I will be brief. Coming back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, made earlier, and allowing for the fact that the example the Minister gave about the airline dispute over Christmas was a very esoteric example and not a generalised one, why can the Government not be more benevolent and consider that in the background and the immediate run-up to the ballot being launched there would have been plenty of explanation in the union’s communications to its paid-up members? Presumably, the intentions of the trade union and details of the dispute would have been reported in the press so that the public would be well-informed as well. Everybody would know about it. Why does the ballot paper itself have to be sullied with further extraneous detail of that kind?

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

My Lords, I am afraid I do not agree with the noble Lord. Having the necessary information on the ballot paper is important. You cannot always rely on the press to give you all the information you need to know.

[Lord Collins of Highbury]

The Minister has referred to a specific case. One of the problems with the impact assessment is that it does not detail what the impact of these proposals will be, particularly in the private sector. The problem with the measures being proposed is that they seem to stem from specific actions in the public sector. But if she does take the British Airways situation, has she assessed what the unintended consequences could be of a union specifying such things in the ballot? She has failed to mention that in the private sector the vast majority of industrial action ballots result in speedy negotiations and a speedy settlement. The problem with putting this information on the ballot paper is that it becomes so specific and public before those speedy negotiations can take place.

I wonder what British Airways would think of the Minister’s proposal that Unite puts on an industrial action ballot, “We will close British Airways down over Christmas”. I wonder what British Airways would say to the Minister—because I know what it would think. Even before the result of the ballot is known and even before there is any suggestion of industrial action, most people will be cancelling their bookings, costing British Airways a substantial sum of money. Is that what she is proposing?

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

I think that the noble Lord makes the argument for the Bill: trying to bring in a greater degree of clarity. I have given an example, which I think is a good one. Perhaps I might proceed.

The approach proposed in Amendment 27, which puzzled the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, requires agreement with the employer and could result in too much time and effort being spent on trying to agree the wording on the voting paper, instead of trying to resolve the dispute. I think that this is common ground. Trade unions will generally want to maximise the possibility of achieving the proposed thresholds and to have clarity and certainty about who is entitled to vote, which is the subject of Amendments 29 and 30. I reassure noble Lords that the law already protects trade unions against challenge over insignificant breaches of the balloting rules.

For example, many of the provisions in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 on balloting are subject to a “reasonableness” requirement. A union cannot be held to account for trifling errors when it conducts a ballot. Sections 226A and 234A require that the lists and figures supplied in the ballot and strike notices must be,

“as accurate as is reasonably practicable in the light of the information in the possession of the union at the time when it complies”.

Section 227 confers entitlement to vote,

“to all the members … who it is reasonable at the time of the ballot for the union to believe will be induced”,

to strike.

In addition, Section 232B provides that a union still complies with the requirements on balloting, even if it has made some error in the process, if,

“the failure is accidental and on a scale which is unlikely to affect the result”.

There is also the case of RMT v Serco, which established the margin of error on which trade unions can rely, thereby adding clarity and certainty around the statutory reasonableness requirement. All of this means that the obligations are not intended to be unduly onerous for unions.

Amendments 29 and 30 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, go further by allowing the union to import a “reasonable belief” into what is a trade dispute, so removing the current objective test to determine whether a matter constitutes a trade dispute. This would allow the issue to be opened up to uncertainty, according to what the union believed.

Amendment 31 addresses concerns about unions complying with the requirements to ballot those who are entitled to vote. I draw noble Lords’ attention to the fact that, in future, unions will have more certainty that those who are entitled to vote receive a postal ballot paper. This is because the previous Government introduced a requirement for unions to submit membership audit certificates. This enables unions to demonstrate that they are complying with their duty to keep membership records accurate and up-to-date.

Amendment 32 is duplicative. Section 231 of the 1992 Act already states:

“As soon as is reasonably practicable after the holding of the ballot, the trade union shall take such steps as are reasonably necessary to ensure that all persons entitled to vote”,

are told the result of the ballot. Members and employers will therefore know the number of votes cast and the numbers of individuals answering yes and no. It would not be fair to leave them to work out whether the thresholds were met, especially as the union will have calculated the result in order to know whether it has secured a mandate.

On Clause 6, I agree that it is not sensible under this amendment to go into too much detail on the Certification Officer, since we shall come to that on day 4. But this clause is important because timely provision of good quality information is a key component of ensuring effective regulation and it gives confidence to those affected by disputes. The need to provide such confidence is why annual returns—

[Lord Oates]

With regard to Clause 6, can the Minister tell us more about the regulatory impact? Under the coalition Government we introduced a rule of one regulation in, one out, and later we made that one in, two out. Which two regulations will be removed from trade unions as a result of this clause?

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

I shall look at what the noble Lord has said. The way one in, two out works is that where a new burden is brought in, equivalent burdens in pounds million are reduced. Obviously we produced an impact assessment for this and we shall be ensuring that when regulations are totted up, double the resulting amount is deregulated elsewhere. Under the system, one Bill is not linked with another but the totals are totted up. The noble Lord makes a good point about the importance of deregulation—and impact assessments are important for the same reason.

I have pretty well finished on this point, but the noble Lord, Lord Collins, asked about the secondary legislation that the Government would be making in relation to these clauses. There is no power to make secondary legislation in respect of Clauses 4 to 8. The provisions are set out in the Bill, which is why it was right to take the trouble to spend a little time setting out what was intended.

We have had a constructive discussion. There is a little further work in terms of scrutiny on this particular section. I am grateful for the points that were made, particularly on the issue of reasonably detailed indication. I should like to reflect further and in the mean time I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, for her amendments and for the contribution she made to industrial relations as chair of ACAS. I always listen very carefully to what she says because she knows so much about this important area. We also recognise the important part that negotiations play in reaching a resolution in disputes between unions and employers. One wants to avoid these where one can. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, for reminding me of the good partnership we had between unions and management when I was at Tesco.

Serving notice of an intention to take industrial action is the last stage in the process before a union may actually take such action. This is when continuing dialogue between the parties becomes even more important. This is why we are moving from seven to 14 days, thereby providing a longer period during which trade union and employer can discuss and strive to reach agreement on how best to resolve the dispute without recourse to industrial action. There is, of course, nothing to prevent a union and an employer continuing to negotiate after the notice has been served. Indeed, this happens already. Having a longer statutory notice period should not affect this.

We fully appreciate that a negotiated settlement is best for all concerned. It is better for the employer, the union and its members and—crucially—for the public. Those whose lives can be so affected should be confident that the law provides every opportunity to avoid such disruption.

The noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, asked about ballot paper dates. My understanding is that we will not require unions, when balloting, to provide a specific date. It is an indication of the time period; it does not have to be a specific date.

[Lord Stoneham of Droxford]

I thank the Minister for giving way. The point I was making was that, if unions put the date on the ballot paper, will that provide a defence that they have given notice?

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

We will come back to that. In the mean time, I will deal with a different point. I have a serious concern about removing the notice and instead relying on the indicated period from the voting paper, as suggested in Amendment 34. An indication is a much vaguer concept. People must have notice of the days when industrial action will take place, or they cannot make the contingency plans that we have been discussing. These can, of course, help to reduce costs on both sides.

The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, most eloquently made the point that strikes can have a wider effect and cause a huge amount of disruption—not only for businesses but for the public. The public need an appropriate amount of time to make contingency arrangements. My concern is that the noble Baroness’s amendment does not address this. Nevertheless, the noble Baroness has made some good and interesting points, on which I would like to reflect.

Finally, to return to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, on whether a specific date on the voting paper would constitute notice, our answer is no.

[Lord Collins of Highbury]

Could the Minister give me a specific answer about the issue of contingency plans? The impact assessment talks about agency workers. If she is going to reassure the Committee that there is no intention to bring forward amendments or provide for secondary legislation, I shall be very happy.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

My Lords, I should like to look into that and revert, either under a later amendment or in writing, on the point that has been raised.

[Baroness Donaghy]

I thank the Minister for her response and echo what she said about taking every opportunity to avoid disruption. I thought that that was the purpose of my amendment—that employers and trade unions can take advantage of certain opportunities for two-way communication to accept the inevitable but minimise damage. I entirely sympathise with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, about disruption to the public. It is very difficult to have any strike action—you could argue that there was no point in such action—that does not disrupt anybody. We are all here hoping that we can avoid strike action. The suspicion that some of us have is that the purpose of the Bill is to prevent strike action. I am trying to find a small shaft of light to recognise that management and unions find themselves in a difficult position, after a clear mandate, and give them every opportunity of arranging the date so that it is mutually beneficial—if there is such a thing—during a period of strike action. In the light of the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

My Lords, we have discussed at length the problems that are caused by old ballot mandates. For public credibility we must move away from having an indefinite period, with or without the agreement of the employer. As an example, the NASUWT took industrial action on 17 October 2013 based on a mandate secured in November 2011, almost two years earlier. The PCS held a strike on 15 October 2014 based on a mandate from March 2013.

My noble friend Lord Deben made the important point about the three sets of people affected. He rightly emphasised the customer—the passenger, in my first example—and the public, who are affected as a result of disruption on an out-of-date mandate. That is why Clause 8 specifies that a ballot mandate must have an expiry date. This means that there will no longer be a prolonged period of uncertainty. That will benefit everyone.

In deciding how long a mandate should last, we have sought to provide a balance. On the one hand we have removed the uncertainty that can hang over employers’ heads for years. On the other hand we have provided a reasonable amount of time for constructive negotiations. The question then is what period would be appropriate to deliver that balance.

We have proposed four months. I have listened carefully and with great interest to the arguments put forward by noble Lords on all sides of the House. I have heard some good arguments for a period of longer than four months. Some are resistant to that. Nevertheless I remain concerned that a period of 12 months would tip the balance far too far in favour of unions, to the detriment of others. That would mean that employers would still have the threat of a strike hanging over them for a considerable length of time. That does not help to create a stable and certain environment for business. Nor is it good for union members. They need certainty about the period during which they may be asked to take industrial action, particularly given the consequential effect on their pay and their families.

Another important point on which my noble friend Lord Deben also touched is that people’s views about a dispute can change over time. It is only right that the union checks back with its members to see whether they still support the industrial action. This is why I have a concern about Amendments 38 and 39. They suggest that the union and employer could agree between themselves to extend the mandate, either indefinitely or for, say, three months, without reballoting members to see whether they agree. My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay commented on this. Such a rolling and continuing mandate would also affect the wider public, and we should think about that in the balance as well.

Finally, in relation to Amendment 36, I am pleased to assure the House that it is not necessary to make it clear that the four-month time period begins on the last day of voting. The date of the ballot is already defined in Section 246 of the 1992 Act as the last day of voting in the ballot.

The noble Lord, Lord Collins, asked why we should remove the 28-day initial action period. It is no longer necessary—I think that he came to this conclusion himself—because the ballot mandate will be limited to four months and this will increase the time available for dialogue so that strike action is averted where possible. We want strikes to be a matter of last resort. I hope that I have understood his point correctly.

[Lord Collins of Highbury]

Just for clarity, the purpose of the 28 days is to ensure—whatever the rights and wrongs—that industrial action ballots are a matter of last resort. My point was that industrial action ballots, as the noble and learned Lord noted, themselves become the leverage. They strengthen the union’s position. Unions were quite quick to learn that the bad old days did not produce results. The reforms—and I shall call them reforms—ensured that mandates were far more secure. They have more authority and are, therefore, far more effective. My problem with the proposition in this clause is that they become a regular thing. By removing the 28 days, they are no longer the precursor to industrial action, while inserting every four months leads to the situation where unions will have to get their members to vote for the mandate not just at the end of four months but clearly before that. This will prolong the uncertainty and make matters worse.

I come back to the point that this is about how we support two sides in negotiations. I am not ignoring the impact of disputes, but at the end of the day what will stop a dispute is the two sides reaching an agreement. The current situation is far better, and I fear that the proposals in this clause will potentially lead to uncertainty for a much longer period. The noble and learned Lord made the extremely good point that the strike ballot mandate can become an important element in reaching an agreement. Is it not then appropriate and sensible that the two sides, instead of being forced to come apart again and ballot, can agree mutually to extend that period so that the focus is on negotiations rather than on a strike?

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

I thank the noble Lord for his measured response. I agree with the point that was made about trade unions doing good things. It was good to see the noble Lord, Lord Jordan, joining the debate and reminding us of all the workers who never go on strike and to hear the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, talking about the importance of consultation. We discussed some of the positives about unions in our very good curtain-raising debate last November, which I certainly found extremely useful for getting me into the subject.

We still need to tackle the question of out-of-date ballots, however, which can lead to industrial action long after people have made up their minds. That is a problem we are seeking to address in this legislation and in this clause. However, this has been an important debate this evening, and I would like to take some time to reflect on the points that have been made. The length of the mandate and extension by agreement seem to be the two things that have come through in the discussion.

[Lord Collins of Highbury]

It is important, before we come back to these issues, to note that when we make legislation, it should be evidence-based. I know that we have these four cases that are often quoted, and the impact assessment, but has the Minister’s department properly examined what goes on in the private sector? Is there a difference between the private sector and the public sector? What is the norm for industrial action ballots? I think the vast majority of industrial action ballots in the private sector result in negotiations without industrial action. If that is the case, could the department do a proper assessment? The unintended consequence of this measure could be that the process of negotiations is interrupted, to have a strike ballot to ensure that the negotiations continue. Strike ballots are not a neutral process: they are about members winding themselves up and saying, “We have a strong case and we’re going to resist it”. The constant referral to a strike ballot will, in my opinion, harden views not soften them. It will not aid negotiations.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

My Lords, I have listened to what has been said and, as your Lordships know, have already wound up. We have some information on what has happened in the private sector and I am very happy to have a conversation with the noble Lord before we get to the next stage. We also have some very good examples, mainly in the public sector, as the noble Lord says, where these out-of-date strike ballots have been enormously damaging. That remains the case, but of course we can talk further. My door is always open, as I have said so many times.

[Lord Collins of Highbury]

I assume the Minister is asking me to withdraw my amendment, but I repeat that this is an issue we will have to come back to. As we have heard in this debate, there is a consensus across the board, from all sides, that we have to be careful here not to hinder the process of negotiation. We need to ensure that it is supported. However, in the light of the assurances about having further discussions, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, for his amendment and for bringing up his experience as a manager involved in a dispute.

The Government recognise that peaceful picketing is legitimate and lawful. We are not changing that. Equally, we believe that people have the right to go into work or about their daily lives without fear or risk of being intimidated. This is what we committed to in our manifesto. Picketing in Britain is governed by a framework of civil and criminal law, and is further guided by the provisions, as some have said, set out in the code of practice on picketing. I am pleased to say that most picketing is peaceful and, as the noble Lord, Lord Dykes, reminded the Committee, I said at Second Reading that most unions observe the provisions set out in the code. I say “most” as, regrettably, this is not so in every case.

A number of noble Lords have mentioned the Carr review, including my noble friend Lord De Mauley, and have gone through some of the submissions that were made to that review, which I will not repeat. The review was set up because of the intimidating tactics at Grangemouth, which I think shocked us all in 2013.

Furthermore, in response to a government consultation on this issue in July, nearly half of the 177 respondents stated that they had observed intimidating behaviour, either during picketing or more generally as a result of strike action. This included following staff from the picketing line, strikers bringing dogs to a picket line outside a school and alcohol being consumed on the picket line, leading to heightened incidences of intimidation. One union stated that more than half of its members had experienced intimidation of its non-striking union members.

Even more concerning was the increasing prevalence of intimidation online. Cameras are being used to take images of people crossing picket lines that are then posted online to name and shame them. These photographs are often accompanied by derogatory comments, images and innuendo. Another union, which similarly consulted its members, concluded that the current legal protections are not effective, particularly where low-level intimidation was involved. The CBI has also stated that its members have witnessed trade union activity that falls foul of current guidelines.

The Government are clear that this type of behaviour must be tackled, but it must be done in an effective and proportionate way. Therefore, while our recent consultation also sought views on other proposals, including a new criminal offence of unlawful picketing, we listened. The Government will not be taking these forward. Instead, we have committed to the fair and proportionate provisions of Clause 9. We will also update the code of practice, making clear what is expected in relation to social media, which on occasion has been subject to misunderstanding.

The provisions of Clause 9 are not new and unions will be familiar with them. They reflect the key aspects of the code on picketing, which has been around since 1992. Where they have been followed by most unions, these provisions have not raised concerns or prevented unions picketing. They are targeted at the activities of the minority of unions that do not follow the code. The CBI is equally of the view that while the code has encouraged positive behaviour, its current voluntary status does not ensure that all trade union members follow its guidelines. As we have heard, it has said that it would like to go further and that we should transpose the entire code into a statute. However, we are being proportionate and enacting only the relevant parts that will tackle the intimidation of non-striking workers. There has been a lot of interest in this area and I hope the Committee will bear with me as I go through the amendments briefly.

As the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, said, we have discussed on many occasions whether we should have “may” or “must”. Neither of us has been entirely consistent. These reforms are preventive measures that should stop unacceptable and intimidating behaviour. They are directed at those unions that currently do not observe the guidance set out in the code. Making compliance with these requirements voluntary would completely undermine their effectiveness. It would also result in confusion with the guidance of the code of practice on picketing that should complement Clause 9.

The noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, asked me three questions, which I will seek to answer. He asked whether I accepted that the co-operation of unions is critical for peaceful picketing. I agree that it is. However, we want to ensure that it is easy for all those attending a picket line to identify who the responsible union official is and that is why we are asking for a picket supervisor to be clearly identifiable.

[Lord Stoneham of Droxford]

They already are, so why does that need to be statutory?

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

It is in the code, of course, but it is not in the legislation and it is not legally enforceable in the same way. As I have sought to explain, we have put the key provisions in the Bill so that they are observed. These are provisions that the vast majority of unions, as we have heard this evening, feel are entirely reasonable.

The second question related to concern that further legal action would mean that unions would distance themselves from picketing—I think I understood that correctly. The provisions in Clause 9 are perfectly reasonable and proportionate. The appointment of the picket organiser is already in the code and is well known to unions. I see no reason why unions should not comply with those provisions.

[Lord Monks]

The current relationship of the law to the code is important. The code is taken into account in any legal proceedings. For example, if there is intimidation, and there is nobody in charge of the picket line, that makes it a more serious offence than if somebody was there trying to stop it, as is often the case with a picket supervisor. It is not just a matter of wishy-washy voluntarism. A criminal offence is being committed, and the provisions of the code are taken into account. It is quite a powerful weapon. To make it rigid statute law that there should be, say, six pickets but there are seven there and the police are supposed to do something about that, seems to be asking for trouble rather than calming it down.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

I note what the noble Lord says. In a sense, I think he is making the same point as the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, made with his third question about why the code is not adequate. Examples from the Carr review and elsewhere, which I went through earlier, reveal that the code is not always followed. By putting elements of the code on a statutory footing in the Bill we will ensure consistency across all picketing activity, which will improve union accountability and public confidence.

The noble Lord, Lord Collins, mentioned human rights. I think the allegation is that the legal obligation to appoint a picket supervisor and to show credentials to the police is discriminatory. Unfortunately, as the Carr review heard last year, there is concerning evidence that pickets organised by unions can and do lead to unacceptable levels of intimidation. In the circumstances, the Government consider it important that unions take all the steps they reasonably can to co-operate with police and ensure that pickets pass off peacefully. These provisions are not disproportionate and are justified under Article 11 and the ILO conventions. Rather than delay the Committee on this issue, I should say that following the debate at Second Reading I wrote to the chairman of the EHRC on the various human rights aspects of the Bill.

Amendment 42 limits the provisions of Clause 9 only to picketing that is directly organised by the union and will create unhelpful distinctions between union-organised picketing and picketing that is encouraged by the union. It would lead to unnecessary confusion between what will be perceived as different types of picketing. The law should apply to all picketing.

On Amendment 45, the Bill sets out a number of requirements which, combined, make the provisions in Clause 9 work effectively. The key to achieving this is the appointment of the picket supervisor, who needs to be familiar with the code so that he or she can act as a source of knowledge and advice.

[Lord Collins of Highbury]

This returns to the point about reasonable people. How will the requirement that the person be familiar with the code be tested? What knowledge is required? As my noble friend said, the person may think seven people rather than six is reasonable. What will the person be judged on there?

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

That is a good question, but my understanding is that provisions relating to familiarity are not new. They have been in the code of practice on picketing since 1992. Familiarity with the code is not an onerous requirement; it is a necessity for the person who is going about their business.

I turn to interaction with the police. It is important that the police know who the picket supervisor is, how to contact him or her and where the picket is taking place. The supervisor does not have to be on the picket line all the time, provided they can return at short notice. It provides an extra safeguard where the police will be able to contact the supervisor should an issue arise on the picket line that does not require police intervention but would benefit from the picket supervisor’s advice.

The advance notice of such details, in particular the location of the picketing, should help the police to plan their resources in the event that something happens on the picket line which requires their attention. The provision to inform the police reflects the language of the code, which has not given cause for concern. The police are, of course, bound by the Data Protection Act and any complaints about the mishandling of personal data can be brought before the independent Police Complaints Commissioner and/or the Information Commissioner. I am not aware of any complaints of this nature related to picketing.

I move on to Amendments 48 and 49 and the letter of approval. As the noble Lord, Lord Collins, said, this has been the cause of significant misunderstanding and concern. We have listened and made amendments. There is now no requirement for any of the picket supervisor’s personal details to be in the letter. Following consultation, the Government tabled an amendment so that the letter seeks only to approve the picketing activity. We further fine-tuned Clause 9 to clarify that only the employer to which the trade dispute relates and at whose workplace picketing occurs will be entitled to see this letter.

I fear that removing this requirement for a letter would result in confusion on the picket line about whether the union has endorsed the picketing and appointed a picket supervisor. I am not sure whether that was the intention, but the substituted wording in Amendment 49 removes the words,

“as soon as reasonably practicable”,

and would make the provision to see the letter more onerous.

On Amendments 51 and 52, the appointed picket supervisor will be the main point of contact during picketing and will act as a source of knowledge so that picketing remains peaceful. That is in everyone’s interest.

Finally, I come to the matter brought forward in the other place by the honourable member for Haltemprice and Howden. The media portrayal of this issue of armbands has been frankly mischievous. The key part is that the picket supervisor must be identifiable. The reference to an armband already sits in the code and is, of course, an indicative example. There are other ways of being identifiable, for example, wearing a badge or having blue hair. However, it is clear that there are concerns. I will therefore reflect further on this matter before Report.

Clause 9 seeks to tackle the intimidation of non-striking workers in a fair and proportionate way. It will result in picketing that is peaceful and consistent in the way it is conducted. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Stoneham of Droxford]

I thank the Minister for her reply to these amendments. I welcome the support my amendments had from the noble Lords, Lord Monks and Lord Collins, and the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy. I shall pick up one point the Minister made. She said that by making the code statutory we are going to get consistency of approach to picketing because there will be a statutory obligation. Frankly, if she believes that, I will believe anything because you do not get enforcement or consistency just by making something statutory.

I shall pick up one point made by the noble Lords, Lord De Mauley and Lord Callanan, in relation to the Carr report. I read the Carr report, and I was amazed that there were not more instances of bad behaviour because this is a very difficult area to control and discipline. Unions play a very important part in exerting discipline and control in these situations. I shall take up one example because a lot of the examples they gave were examples of criminal behaviour that could have been prosecuted. Let us take the example of a person who is under the influence of alcohol on a picket line. Do we want the police to go in and pull that guy out, in quite an inflamed situation? I am sure they would not do that as their first option. They would want a responsible union representative who is the supervisor of the picket line—which is provided for in the code—to go in and deal with that person and quietly persuade him to leave the picket line. If he is unable to do that and the person does not leave, there is a difficulty either way.

The problem will be if that individual, having tried to do that, is then prosecuted because he has not fulfilled the statutory duty that is now laid down for picketing. Who in the union movement is going to take on the job of picket line supervisor when they could risk being taken through the courts? I have seen it happen to an individual from the shop floor. It destroys their life because they are not used to it, and it is irresponsible. Anybody who has seen that will know that nobody in their right mind in the union movement would easily take on that responsibility. The point that we are trying to make is that the code, by being voluntary, encourages people like that to help enforce consistency and order in the picket line, and if you make it statutory you will complicate the situation and deter that sort of behaviour. That is the problem. However, I withdraw my amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

My Lords, I propose that we adjourn and that I answer the questions that have been raised by the noble Lords, Lord Collins and Lord Stoneham, when we discuss the amendment after next.

[Lord Collins of Highbury]

Okay. In the light of those comments, I will withdraw the amendment, as long as I can then interrupt the Minister in the next group.