European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill

Debate between Baroness Deech and Lord Pannick

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 8th April 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, I tabled Amendment 6.

[Lord Pannick]

It is not grouped with this one.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness Deech and Lord Pannick

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Deech (CB)]

My Lords, it does the opposite of what my brilliant former pupil the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said. The inclusion of the charter brings with it uncertainty. It is a Trojan horse because if you carry on applying it, its meaning depends on the evolving case law of the ECJ, which has an objective of bringing further integration and other objectives to do with Europe that are not our objectives. Our judges have said that they want certainty after Brexit, but to include the charter, which is evolving all the time, without our scrutiny will give our judges sleepless nights because they will have to follow the twists and turns in EU law. I come back to the fact that the nub of this is that it will plainly give our judges the right to set aside and invalidate UK law. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, mentioned with approval the Benkharbouche case, where part of our sovereign immunity law was set aside by the Supreme Court on the basis of charter supremacy. That was actually dangerous because if other countries start setting aside immunity law when dealing with our diplomats, we will be in a very difficult situation indeed. I would not assess the Supreme Court by the outcome of what it says; we assess courts by the way they are appointed and the integrity of our judges. The retention of the charter is a recipe for confusion, uncertainty and the setting aside of British law according to ECJ judgments.

[Lord Pannick]

I am sorry to say to the noble Baroness that that is exactly what this Bill achieves in relation to all other retained EU law which is read across. This will be under the control of British judges. Under the Bill it is entirely a matter for them what weight, if any, they choose to give to judgments of the European Court of Justice. The charter of rights is no different from any other provision of EU law in that respect. The noble Baroness mentioned certainty. What I think provokes uncertainty for judges is the approach in this Bill. It is not simply that the charter of rights is excluded by Clause 5; the clause goes on to say that undefined,

“fundamental rights or principles which exist irrespective of the Charter”,

are retained. There is a conflict in the approach taken on this issue. I suggest to noble Lords that the correct approach is that which has been recommended to the Committee and to the House by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee: that there is no justification whatever for distinguishing between the charter of rights and all other aspects of retained EU law. I support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, in what he said.

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 35 standing in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, which would leave out subsections (4) and (5) and insert the words as set out in the amendment. The objective of Amendment 35 is to retain the charter rights in UK law and afford them the same level of protection as those in the Human Rights Act. It has similar objectives to some of the other amendments that have been proposed. I must admit that I address the House on these issues with some trepidation because I am not a lawyer, although I have taken the advice of lawyers in drafting this amendment.

The amendment provides for what I hope is a sensible and responsible approach to Brexit that respects the referendum decision but does not sacrifice rights and protections on the altar of ideology. Removing the European Charter of Fundamental Rights from EU retained law runs counter to the stated purpose of the Bill, which is to facilitate the wholesale transfer of EU law into the domestic statute book. It also contradicts the Government’s assurances that the same rules will apply on the day before exit as on the day after. The Government’s justification for this anomaly is to claim that the charter is unnecessary and that its omission will not result in any loss of substantive rights protections.

In an attempt to support their public assurances to that effect, the Government have since published a right-by-right analysis that they say demonstrates that each right can be found in domestic law. The analysis is unpersuasive. According to Liberty and Amnesty International, it is perfectly possible to retain the charter and deal with any redundant sections after exit just as with the rest of retained EU law, as has already been mentioned. The Equality and Human Rights Commission has obtained the opinion of senior counsel Jason Coppel QC on the Government’s analysis of the charter. His advice is that the loss of the charter will lead to a significant weakening of human rights protection in the UK. This is because, first, there will be gaps in protection, for example in relation to children’s rights, data protection and non-discrimination. Secondly, many rights will no longer be directly enforceable, leading to further gaps in protection. Thirdly, many remaining rights could be removed by Ministers exercising delegated powers.

A particular concern that I would like to highlight is that Brexit will remove any children’s rights and safeguards currently offered by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which imposes a constitutional obligation on member states to adhere to children’s rights standards when implementing EU law. The EU’s Court of Justice now routinely refers to the charter when adjudicating on cases involving children.

Civil Legal Aid (Financial Resources and Payment for Services) Regulations 2013

Debate between Baroness Deech and Lord Pannick

Wednesday 17th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for moving this Motion. Over the past three years he has played an essential role in identifying with forensic skill and great eloquence the defects in the series of measures that this Government have brought forward to limit legal aid in our society. The noble Lord has repeatedly pointed out, accurately and with some degree of force, that legal aid is a vital cement in our civil society. There is no point whatever in this place conferring rights unless people have the opportunity to vindicate them. It would be a great shame if there were further reductions in the ability of persons other than the wealthy to vindicate their rights by legal process.

The essential defect in these regulations is their treatment of the capital sums owned by persons who are otherwise eligible for legal aid. I cannot understand why the regulations apply different criteria to capital from the criteria that are applicable in welfare law. Regulation 8(2) provides that any person with more than £8,000 in capital will be denied legal aid, even though welfare benefits law provides that persons qualify for means-tested benefits even though they have up to £16,000 of capital.

There is a further discrepancy in that the welfare benefits system ignores the value of a person’s home. These legal aid regulations will disregard only £100,000 of equity in property, under Regulation 39; and £100,000 of any mortgage, under Regulation 37. The inevitable result is that many people who own their own homes will be excluded from legal aid, even though they cannot in practice access the capital.

All this is very unfortunate, given that the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act has already reduced the scope of legal aid so that it is now skeletal. I am very concerned that even within the much reduced scope of legal aid under that Act, people who have no income and who are therefore eligible for welfare benefits will be unable to obtain legal advice and assistance. As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said, there is a vital need in the regulations for more flexibility.

The Minister will no doubt tell us, as he usually does, that funds are limited and that economies are needed, but to adopt criteria, as the regulations do, which are more onerous than the criteria applied to welfare benefits is simply irrational and fails to understand the vital function of legal aid itself as a welfare benefit for the needy in our society. My essential question for the Minister is this: why are the criteria for capital in these regulations different from, and more onerous than, the criteria for welfare benefit law?

[Baroness Deech]

My Lords, I shall speak in support of my noble friend Lord Pannick and the noble Lord, Lord Bach, who is also my friend but not technically my noble friend. I want to put the regulations in perspective and to inquire whether the Government realise the pressure that these calculations will place on other parts of our society. I will mention just two issues.

This Government and their predecessors have pushed very hard to widen house ownership in the past 20 or 30 years. It has been successful. Ownership, of modest homes, has spread to all corners of society. To include their value in the assessment of legal aid places an unfair burden on a modest number of the population who have striven to own their own home. Not only that, but having owned one’s own home one now finds that it has to be sold to pay for one’s care in old age. It may have to be sold to raise money if one has the misfortune to be involved in expensive litigation. Not only that but, heaven forbid, it might even come to a mansion tax. In other words, one is putting much too much pressure on that wide swathe of population that owns a home of relatively modest value. They might have bought it for a five-figure sum years ago, but they will now find their house in that more than £100,000, and then £8,000, asset rank, depriving them of legal aid. The assessment costs will bite into the limited funds that are available for legal aid, because given the way in which the legislation is drafted, assessing whether someone is eligible for legal aid will involve quite a complicated process.

Marriages and Civil Partnerships (Approved Premises) (Amendment) Regulations 2011

Debate between Baroness Deech and Lord Pannick

Thursday 15th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My answer to the noble and learned Lord is that in 2010, when the noble Lord, Lord Alli, was seeking to persuade the House to create for the first time, contrary to what had been decided in 2004, a power for religious bodies to conduct civil partnership ceremonies, it was perfectly understandable that it should be made clear that this was a power but not a duty. We had that debate and resolved the matter. There is no ambiguity and we really do not need to revisit it.

[Baroness Deech]

Given the protection for religious freedom that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has just described, why did the Equality Act and the Human Rights Act not permit a Jewish school to continue its religious freedom in maintaining the definition of Judaism that had prevailed in the Jewish religion for thousands of years?

[Lord Pannick]

As the noble Baroness knows very well, that case raised completely different issues. No specific provision in the Equality Act addressed that question. I have to declare an interest. As the noble Baroness well knows, I was the counsel who acted for the JFS, the Jewish Free School, in that litigation, and the problem was that there was no specific provision. By contrast, the Equality Act addresses this very question and it does so in the clearest possible terms.