Miscarriages of Justice
Baroness Deech Excerpts(1 year, 4 months ago)
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Lord Bellamy (Con)
Discrimination in the criminal justice system is not acceptable to the Government. The Government are conscious that there are concerns about the way that ethnic minority persons are treated within the system and are determined to ensure that those problems are ameliorated and addressed in the longer run.
Baroness Deech (CB)
My Lords, what justice can there be in retaining on the statute book sections of a statute of 1861, whereby a mother can be sent to prison for procuring an abortion? Surely it is time that we consider the lack of benefit to society, to her family and indeed to all women in retaining such an outdated and barbaric method of punishment.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
My Lords, all women have access to safe and legal abortions on the NHS up to 24 weeks of pregnancy. It is not appropriate for the Government to comment on any particular case, although your Lordships will no doubt be aware of the case to which the noble Baroness is referring. This is a contentious issue and the Government maintain a neutral position on possible changes to the relevant criminal law.
Nuptial Agreements
Baroness Deech Excerpts(1 year, 6 months ago)
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Lord Bellamy (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Shackleton for her question. The answer is twofold: first, the Government consider that the present root-and-branch review of financial provision is better than looking at a particular outcrop within that landscape. Secondly, any Government have to prioritise. In recent years, priority has been given, for example, to the Domestic Abuse Act 2021; the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2022, which introduced no-fault divorce; and the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Minimum Age) Act 2022, which made it illegal to marry under the age of 18. These are all fundamental reforms and I make no apology for prioritising those measures.
Baroness Deech (CB)
My Lords, may I start by wishing the Minister a happy birthday—and ask him whether there is any prospect of this Bill being enacted in his lifetime and mine? He has mentioned all these other statutes, which are not really relevant. The failure to enact this Bill undermines the no-fault divorce law, because the failure to have binding nuptial agreements leaves couples in as antagonistic and expensive a situation as before. Will he please get on with it?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for those birthday wishes. It is often said that life begins at 40 but experience shows that it is very much later than that. I very much hope that we will be able to legislate in her lifetime, if not my own. Prenups are undoubtedly an important issue. Since 2010, the law has been that there is a presumption in favour of enforcing prenuptial agreements unless it is unfair to do so. Secondly, although this is an important question, it affects a relatively small and privileged cohort, and it must take its place in the queue on that basis.
Divorce: Financial Provision
Baroness Deech Excerpts(1 year, 8 months ago)
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Baroness Deech
To ask His Majesty’s Government what progress they have made with their three-year review of the law governing financial provision on divorce since the commitment made by the then Advocate General for Scotland Lord Keen of Elie in his letter dated 16 March 2020 (DEP2020-0150) to gather evidence, consult and develop recommendations on this matter.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)
My Lords, the letter to which the noble Baroness refers was sent during the passage of the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020. Since then, we have prioritised the implementation of that Act and the digital systems that go with it, the court recovery programme during and after the pandemic, the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Minimum Age) Act 2022 and further work on the family courts. I hope to announce a review of financial provision very shortly.
Baroness Deech (CB)
My Lords, I fear that the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, and I were misled when, three years ago, we were guaranteed a review of the financial elements of divorce. Relying on that, we refrained from pressing amendments. The law that relates to splitting money on divorce is so antagonistic and unreformed that it undermines the alleged good points of the no-fault divorce law. We are lagging 50 years behind nearly every other country in the western world, including Australia. The amount of discretion in our law makes it very hard for unrepresented parties. Money that should go to the children is being spent on legal costs. Even judges have called this law “apocalyptic” —accessible only to the rich. When will the Government reform this very bad law?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
My Lords, I pay warm tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, my noble friend Lady Shackleton and many others for their work in this area. Respectfully, I do not accept the characterisation that the Government have misled everybody; we have had our hands somewhat full in recent times. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 reaches its 50th anniversary this year and a review of financial provision is indeed opportune. The Government are in close consultation with the Law Commission, which we consider the most appropriate body to carry out that review.
No-fault Divorce
Baroness Deech Excerpts(2 years, 7 months ago)
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Baroness Deech
To ask Her Majesty’s Government, further to the letter from Lord Keen of Elie to Baroness Deech on 16 March 2020, what progress they have made on reforming the law governing financial provision on divorce to align with the introduction of no fault divorce.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
My Lords, the letter from my noble and learned friend Lord Keen was sent at the conclusion of the parliamentary process for the divorce Act. In the intervening two years, we have prioritised the implementation of the fundamental reforms of that Act, which will commence on 6 April. Following that commencement, we will consider how best to proceed with the commitment in that letter, and we will announce our intentions in due course.
Baroness Deech (CB)
My Lords, the new no-fault divorce law is coming into force in three weeks’ time, but the most miserable and litigious part of it will remain: the law about splitting assets and paying maintenance. That law is so bad that the ministry is paying couples £500 each to mediate and avoid it. The promise was made two years ago to review it; where is that review? Gathering evidence is no excuse for not formulating principle, and I can offer this piece of evidence right away: legal costs eat up chunks of the assets. Unless it is reformed, the no-fault divorce law will fail to achieve its aims. Will the Minister assure the House that vested interests are not blocking reform, and will he give a timetable for completion of the financial provision project?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I do not make any apology for the mediation voucher scheme; it is important to encourage mediation in family law, as indeed across the civil justice system more generally. However, we have committed to exploring the financial provision aspects of divorce after the Act comes into effect. I cannot give the noble Baroness a timetable, but I assure her that we will look at this as a matter of principle and will not be bowed down by vested interests, whether legal or otherwise.
Marriage and Religious Weddings
Baroness Deech Excerpts(3 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I think my noble friend will have seen my letter to various groups on that point. Marriage at 16 and 17 has the significant risk of people being forced into marriages and their life chances reducing. Therefore, my noble friend can take it from me that we will be looking very carefully at the Bill introduced by the Member for Bromsgrove, who now appears to be otherwise occupied.
Baroness Deech (CB) [V]
My Lords, I am sure the Minister believes that there should be equality among religions in relation to divorce, and that the law should bring justice to women who are mistreated by religious husbands and religious courts. So will he ensure changes to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, so that the court can refuse to finalise a civil divorce until an Islamic religious divorce has been obtained, if unfair pressure is being used in the religious proceedings? This would bring Islamic divorce in line with the Jewish get.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, the premise behind the question of the noble Baroness is that the bars to effective relief are the same in Judaism and Islam, but that is not in fact the case. As I understand it, it is significantly easier for a woman to obtain a divorce in Islam than it is for a woman to facilitate or obtain a divorce in Orthodox Judaism. Therefore, the Act that the noble Baroness refers to—I believe it is Section 10A—would not have the same advantageous effect in Islamic marriages as it does in Orthodox Jewish marriages.
Anti-Semitism: University Campus Incidents
Baroness Deech Excerpts(3 years, 9 months ago)
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Baroness Deech
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the report by the Community Security Trust Campus Antisemitism in Britain 2018–2020, published on 17 December, and in particular, the finding that the number of anti-Semitic incidents in universities has increased.
Baroness Deech (CB) [V]
My Lords, I am particularly pleased to welcome the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, to his new post in the Ministry of Justice. The noble Lord comes to us garlanded with the highest praises that the Bar can bestow. Like other well-known public figures, he was once a prolific Twitterer, and showed a great sense of humour and a rare knack for conciliating different points of view. All those qualities will stand him in good stead here. We wish him well and look forward to meeting in person.
I have spoken about campus anti-Semitism on previous occasions and sadly there is a great deal more to report. It is equally sad that an organisation such as the Community Security Trust, whose report we are debating, should have to exist at all. It is a charity that protects British Jews from anti-Semitism and provides security. How regrettable it is that every Jewish building and every Jewish gathering has to be protected by CST guards. I take this opportunity to thank the Government for the funding they provide to help the CST to continue to provide safeguards for the Jewish community.
The CST report uncovered the highest number of university anti-Semitic incidents ever recorded, notably online. Shockingly, they included anti-Semitic action by university staff—the very people who should be teaching students to reason and tolerate. Nothing leaves a Jewish student more unprotected than to find that the anti-Semitism he or she faces is from his or her lecturer, and that the panel set up by the authorities to investigate it is peopled by colleagues and devoid of Jewish members.
The treatment meted out, the failure to discipline and the reaction would not be tolerated for a moment by other ethnic minorities. But somehow racist and religious prejudice against Jews is given short shrift, and its specific nature glossed over. Just as Jeremy Corbyn’s response to allegations of anti-Semitism was that he was anti-racist, ergo could not be guilty, so the university authorities and Universities UK are trying to disguise this prejudice by folding it up into other racisms. In November, UUK put out a report on anti-racism in universities, but relegated anti-Semitism to a passing mention in a footnote.
The situation is not all bad. There is light at the end of the tunnel, as under the exceptional leadership of the noble Lord, Lord Mann, more universities—about 51—are adopting the IHRA definition of anti-Semitism, which has the effect of concentrating minds on its expression as well as its definition. But first I will give noble Lords just a very few examples of the sort of behaviour taking place in our universities. These are the young people who will be our leaders in due course.
At Warwick University a student complained about a lecturer who dismissed the notion that the Labour Party could be anti-Semitic as an attempt to discredit it by the so-called Israel lobby. That lecturer emailed the whole class to suggest that claims of anti-Semitism against Labour are orchestrated. Amazingly, it was the student who was then investigated by the university at length. Although that came to nothing, what a deterrent effect that will have on any other Jewish student thinking of complaining. It was the victim who was put on the stand.
The School of Oriental and African Studies maintains its poisonous reputation for Jewish students. A Canadian student was forced to abandon his studies there because of the toxic atmosphere. He was branded a Nazi supremacist for disclosing his support for Israel and was refunded his £15,000 fees. At SOAS, others complained, being Jewish means you are called fascist. The Malaysian Prime Minister was invited to speak at both the Oxford and Cambridge Unions, was openly anti-Semitic and was greeted with laughter.
Lecturers have spontaneously called the Holocaust “too Jewish” or indulged in the old slander of over-powerful conspiring Zionists. How ironic that the practice of no-platforming is so acceptable in universities but not when it comes to anti-Semitic speech. What an indictment of the failure to deal with the problem, that some Jewish students choose a university not by the course content or the quality of teaching but by the extent of anti-Semitism that they might encounter. Some academic staff have been shown to work together to foster an atmosphere inimical to Jewish students and teach and supervise others handing on the same antagonism to the next generation.
The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of anti-Semitism helpfully draws the distinction between legitimate criticism of the Israeli Government, like any other Government, and anti-Semitic calls for Israel to be destroyed or compared to a Nazi regime. Legitimate criticism of Israel is to anti-Zionism what literary criticism is to book burning. I mention the Israel element because of the wise observations of the late Lord Sacks. Antisemitism, he said, mutates like a virus. It used to manifest itself as religious discrimination, then it was racial, and now it focuses on attacking the self-determination of the Jews in their only, tiny, state.
The IHRA definition is not intended to be legally binding but to help perception and eradication of anti-Semitic activity. Why then is it not more widely adopted and why have some academics pushed back at it in a way that undermines their students’ protection? Notable among those is University College London. An academic board was set up there to try to reverse the college’s adoption of the definition which did not even include a Jewish student; can one imagine today a panel about campus racism without a black student? It argued against protection of Jewish students by saying that to define anti-Semitism is exceptionalism and blocks free speech. But anti-Semitism is exceptional in its length and breadth. As for blocking free speech about Israel, there are no examples ever of the definition having resulted in any reduction in academic freedom or research. Hardly any other country is so widely discussed. The definition is unequivocal about free speech. The irony is that the rejectionists are the ones seeking to stop Israel-connected speakers and to block academic research co-operation. What is to be done about this?
Holocaust education, which is compulsory for schoolchildren, sadly has not worked. How is it possible that an entire generation who has studied the holocaust can arrive at university and behave in the ways I have outlined? It is because they have studied the Holocaust in a vacuum, as an example of generalised hate, and have resigned it to history. They have learned nothing about the contribution of Jews to civilisation, about the millennia of persecution, and how that, and religious teaching, led to genocide; they have not learned of the overwhelming need for a safe haven and how Jewish self-determination in Israel is the best protection against genocide in the modern world. All they learn is that Jews were killed in their millions and all they see is pictures of death camps and bodies. It is not surprising that the brute reaction of some is to replicate Nazi slogans when they vent their hatred at universities. There is a need to widen Holocaust education into education about Jewish history. That is why the planned Holocaust memorial in Victoria Tower Gardens, at a cost of over £100 million and a destroyed park, is such a wasted effort. It will present the Holocaust again as something in the past, something over there, not here. It will enable alleged anti-Semites to continue to pay their respects to 6 million dead Jews, badge themselves as anti-racist and then carry on attacking Jews of today and their only state, Israel. How much easier it is to mourn the lost generation than to respect the living Jews of today. It will give the impression of “job done”.
So will the Minister take steps to ensure that more universities adopt the IHRA definition and incorporate it in their codes of conduct? Will he also promote a complete overhaul of Holocaust education so that students learn about Jewish history, why Jews were persecuted and how unwarranted are attacks on today’s community?
Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill [HL]
Baroness Deech Excerpts(9 years ago)
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Baroness Deech (CB)
My Lords, as I did three years ago, I welcome the Bill and congratulate my noble friend Lady Cox on her persistence and her unflinching exposure of the evidence that necessitates these provisions. Equality is what the Bill is all about: it is about closing any loopholes that might remain, or might be picked, in the Equality Act 2010. All religions have had to rethink certain practices as a result of decades of addressing equality and non-discrimination: Roman Catholic adoption agencies have had to close; a registrar who was unable to preside over same-sex weddings had to give up; and the JFS school was held to have discriminated when applying the age-old Jewish definition of who is a Jew. It applies all round.
In this era of legal aid cuts, it is right and proper that arbitration and mediation should be permitted—but all arbitrations have to comply with the overarching equality provisions of this country’s secular law. Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights promises freedom of religion, but there may be such limits as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
The Bill raises the enormously significant issue of the relationship between democracy and religious beliefs. The issue is more acute than ever, not only because of the forcible way it was brought to our attention by the Charlie Hebdo massacres but because of the mass movement of people of different religions and practices across Europe at the moment and the consequent need for integration and for many substantial minorities to live together in peace and harmony.
There has been much talk of British values. There is one simple token of all of them, which is Magna Carta. I am well aware that Magna Carta was based on a sexist, classist and unfree society, and the way we see it now as an ideal and a symbol of the rule of law took centuries to unfold. But it if means anything today, it is that all of us should be subject to the same system of law, have equal rights to access it and be treated equally by it. All across Europe there is debate about the place that sharia courts should occupy, if at all, in the national system. Some places across the world are more forbidding than others, including several American states and Greece.
I will focus on the family law aspects of the Bill. One problem is marriages that are not valid under English law because they have completely avoided the recognised methods of marrying. The solution is not to treat women who are not married as if they were wives, it is to press for every mosque to register as a legal wedding venue by getting a licence. Nothing could be easier, and then the couple need only have a wedding in the mosque and not have go to a register office. Maybe this could be made a condition of planning permission in the case of new buildings. The information that the women need may be extended by use of the public sector equality duty. As far as religious divorce goes, it needs to be preceded by a secular one, and every effort must be made to promote the welfare of the children, for their welfare may be seriously compromised if women are forced to accept conditions about their upbringing as the price of a religious divorce. Domestic abuse is another area where it is reported that jurisdiction creep by sharia courts has taken place. English law recognises rape within marriage as a crime: it does not accept that women must subject themselves to men physically, and we must not tolerate the sweeping of violence against women or children under the carpet by any religion in the name of faith.
When the Bill was introduced in 2011, there was a response to it in a booklet published by the Islamic Sharia Council. Inter alia, in relation to family law, it claimed that the English legal system should not intrude into private lives and that if it did, we would end up with Big Brother watching the bedrooms of citizens. In relation to concerns about unequal inheritance laws, the pamphlet said that the law has no business telling individuals how to dispose of their property. These comments show such ignorance of the rule of law and the function that legal systems serve. The law most certainly reaches into allegations of violence no matter where it happens, whether within marriage or any other context, for the physical protection of its citizens. A religious marriage is not to be treated as the creation of a free-for-all zone immune from the reach of the law where violence and exploitation may have occurred, any more than in any other relationship. As for the denial that the law affects the disposition of property, there is no area where greater legal control exists—especially for inheritance—for the good of individuals and society.
In the end, the clash between national and religious law, the prevention of poor treatment of women, comes down to education from the earliest age in the legal rights and duties of UK citizens. Give women the information to free them. If they are denied the use of the English language and that information, they cannot know the security and proper concern for them and their children that English family law is offering.
FIFA
Baroness Deech Excerpts(9 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Faulks
It will be a question of fact in relation to each allegation as to whether it comes within the jurisdiction. As the noble Lord may well be aware, the Bribery Act 2010 came into force in July 2011, which has to some extent extended criminal jurisdiction. The timing of any alleged offence will be crucial, but if there are any offences we are not going to be restrained if there is a prima facie case of infringement of criminal law within this jurisdiction.
Baroness Deech (CB)
My Lords, will the Minister take this opportunity to acknowledge the fearless part played in this by British investigative journalism, and the importance of a fearless and not overregulated British press?
Lord Faulks
I have absolutely no difficulty in acknowledging that, particularly the contributions by the Sunday Times and “Panorama”.
Divorce: Effect on Children
Baroness Deech Excerpts(9 years, 11 months ago)
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Baroness Deech
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is their assessment of the survey findings reported by Resolution on the adverse effects of divorce on children.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)
My Lords, the Government agree with Resolution that parents need to minimise conflict when separating or divorcing to reduce adverse impacts on children. We encourage the use of mediation rather than litigation to resolve disputes about children and finances. Court processes now require consideration of mediation in such cases.
Baroness Deech (CB)
Does the Minister appreciate that mediation cannot work if the law is as uncertain as it is, especially now that legal aid has been removed and more than 50% of the money cases involve at least one litigant in person? Will he undertake to do an impact assessment on the removal of legal aid from the family courts, which has resulted in the strain that Resolution has pointed out? Will the Government commit to reforming the law on financial remedies on divorce to save money and remove some of that strain from the families and the children?
Lord Faulks
The noble Baroness is, of course, taking through this House her own Private Member’s Bill, which makes various recommendations for giving greater clarity to the arrangements on divorce. The Government are considering that, together with the Law Commission’s report on prenuptial agreements and financial arrangements after divorce. Certainty is of course desirable, but at the same time flexibility may be necessary to deal with difficult cases. The Government have already made it clear that they do not propose to bring forward legislation in this Session. The next Parliament will have an opportunity to consider not only the Law Commission’s thorough consultation but all the good work that the noble Baroness is doing in respect of her Bill.
Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill [HL]
Baroness Deech Excerpts(9 years, 11 months ago)
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Baroness Deech
Baroness Deech (CB)
My Lords, I will speak also to the question of whether Clause 6 stand part of the Bill. All these amendments, starting with this one, have at their heart the protection of children and assistance to middling and lower income families, who are facing terrible problems now that legal aid has been removed from assistance in divorce law, and with the exceedingly high number of divorces that we have every year.
The law needed reform anyway, but the urgency that now arises comes from the removal of legal aid. Only this week, the Bar Council reported an 88% increase in the number of people having to represent themselves in the courts. Throughout the Bill, I am trying to provide a framework that is just but which also promotes autonomy, clarity and entitlement. Given that legal aid has been removed—and I do not envisage an improvement in that situation for years to come—we have to help the poor families who are struggling at one of the worst moments in their lives with something expensive and complicated. Noble Lords will all have seen the accounts of cases in which couples have assets of, let us say, £1 million—not so difficult if you have a house—half or three-quarters of which goes on lawyers’ costs because they cannot reach an agreement; they have no firm framework within which to do so.
This first amendment emphasises what was implicit—it would now make it clearer—that the Bill is not meant to affect the existing provision for children, let alone make it worse. This amendment has the effect of retaining untouched Section 25(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973—note that this House has not revisited that law since 1973—and retains a provision that in dealing with finance after divorce the interests of children under 18 are the first consideration for the court. They are not “paramount”, which is an even stronger word that is used as regards decisions about their residence.
There is of course scope in the Bill, as there has been previously, for the matrimonial home to be preserved for the use of, let us say, the mother and young children until they reach majority, even if a half share has already been allocated to the father but its realisation or liquidation postponed. From that follows the deletion of Clause 6, which spelt that out in a different way. This amendment also serves to preserve Section 25A of the Matrimonial Causes Act—the desirability of the clean break.
We are not talking about child maintenance as such, because there is a new Child Maintenance Service, successor to the Child Support Agency, and that law will continue as ever. I might also add at the beginning for clarification that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who cannot be in her place today, supports this, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has specifically authorised me to give his view to the House. He says:
“I support your Bill and support the amendments. I think it vital that the law should contain a provision setting out a generally suitable formula for the division of the assets of a divorcing couple that would guide them without recourse to the courts. It would not harm this concept that a discretion should be available to the court to depart from it on cause shown”.
In fact, a general consensus is building up through the courts that something must be done about this law. It is for the run-of-the-mill divorcing couple who can no longer afford legal representation. I beg to move.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
My Lords, I am sure that the House is very grateful to the noble Baroness for bringing forward this Bill for consideration, and I hope that we can make progress today through the Committee stage. I am supportive of what the Bill seeks to do. It is a fact that relationships break down, and proposals to make financial settlements between parties as simple as possible, enabling both parties to retain a greater proportion of their assets, are to be welcomed. As the noble Baroness has explained, this group of amendments seeks to leave untouched Section 25(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, which makes it clear that the interests of the children are the first consideration when dealing with finances after divorce. It is also proposed in this group, as a consequence of that amendment, that Clause 6, which dealt with children, should no longer stand part of the Bill, as it would be confusing and could conflict with provisions already in place. These are very sensible amendments, which I hope will find favour with the Government.
Baroness Deech
Baroness Deech
My Lords, in moving Amendment 2, I speak also to Amendments 3, 4, 20A, 21, 22 and 26. What the amendments in this group have in common is that they are minor and technical. I had great assistance with the drafting of this Bill over the summer, as your Lordships will have noticed, and these amendments arise from the refinement of the drafting as it took place in reaching the final state of the amendments.
Amendment 2 is simply a correction, while Amendment 3 is a clarification. Amendment 4 ensures that this law, as I hope it will turn out to be, applies equally to civil partnerships and same-sex couple marriages. Clearly, a new law must apply to all different sorts of couples, whoever they are, who may go through the courts. Amendment 20A has come about simply because there has been a redraft. Amendments 21, 22 and 26 arose from the fact that there has been a preservation of flexibility of lump sums in distribution of property. This entire group is technical. I beg to move.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, this is an important technical group of amendments, which follow on from the previous group in clarifying that the provisions of Section 25(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act remains in force and that we are referring only to subsection (2), for all the reasons that noble Lords gave in the previous debate, along with Amendment 3, which again makes it clear that we are referring to the Act in the amended form. The addition and clarification of the 2004 and 2013 Acts, as the noble Baroness advised the House, will clarify that the new law will apply to civil partnerships and same-sex couples, but not to cohabiting couples, who are the subject of a different Bill, to be introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which will have a Second Reading shortly.
The second part of the group removes subsections 5(1) and (2), which deal with the issue of periodical payments, discussed during the Second Reading debate in your Lordships’ House. They seek to address an issue that everyone recognises needs to be looked at; on these Benches we were concerned that there appeared to be a one-size-fits-all approach. In a later group, we will look at amendments that seek to take on board concerns expressed in the Second Reading debate and elsewhere.
Amendments 21, 22 and 26 make clear the divide between lump sum payments and ongoing periodical payments.
Baroness Deech
Baroness Deech
““relevant financial order” means—
(a) an order for lump sum provision in favour of a party to a marriage under section 23(1)(c) of the 1973 Act,(b) a property adjustment order in favour of a party to a marriage under section 24(1) of that Act,(c) a pension sharing order under section 24B of that Act,(d) a pension compensation sharing order under section 24E of that Act,and also includes any order under the corresponding provisions of the 2004 Act and the 2013 Act.”
Baroness Deech
My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 5. Consequent on it is whether Clause 2 stands part of the Bill. This provision, as amended, is rather more technical, but also flexible. It brings together the definitions of the relevant financial order—the sort of things that the court may deal with—and defines and spells out what was implicit in the original draft, the various types of order that the court may make. After some discussion, lump sum orders are included, as they may assist flexibility in dividing up the total assets. This will assist the court in achieving maximum flexibility. My aim throughout is to promote sufficient clarity to enable people to arbitrate and mediate and yet preserve a little bit of discretion, which is a good hallmark of our law. I beg to move.
Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe
My Lords, this amendment, as the noble Baroness said, introduces a definition of a new expression, “relevant financial order”. The most significant feature of the new definition is that it does not include an order for periodical payments, but to leave it there would perhaps be a rather meagre explanation. In the long run, it might be helpful to considering some later amendments if I speak very briefly about the terminology and structure of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.
Many of your Lordships will recall that the concept of no-fault divorce was introduced in England and Wales by the Divorce Reform Act 1969. Scotland followed suit in 1976. The 1969 Act did not contain any provisions altering what was then, in the old-fashioned phrase, called ancillary relief. New provisions were brought in by the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970, which for the first time gave the court power to direct the transfer of specific assets, rather than dealing simply with sums of money. The 1969 and 1970 Acts were consolidated in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. My noble friend Lady Deech, with great respect, is not quite right in saying that the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 has not since been revisited by Parliament. On the contrary, it has been amended at least 12 times. I may have got that number wrong, but it is a very much amended Act. However, the noble Baroness is quite right in saying that what Parliament has not revisited is the essential provision in Section 25(2), the guidance as to how judges are to exercise their very wide discretion. As the supporters of the Bill say, that is the provision that cries out for a simpler and more workable test.
The 1973 Act, unusually for a consolidating Act, introduced two entirely new definitions: first, a financial provision order, which was either an order for periodical payments or an order for a lump sum; and secondly, a property adjustment order, which reflected the introduction by the 1970 Act of a power to direct the transfer of particular identifiable assets. The difference between those two forms of order is essentially that between orders for a sum of money and orders relating to identifiable assets. The powers of the court were extended further in 1999 by the introduction of pension sharing orders, and in 2008 by pension compensation sharing orders following the introduction of the pensions compensation Act. That is the range of powers open to the court at present. The new definition of “relevant financial order” includes all the types of order—that is, property adjustment orders, pension orders and lump sum orders, but not orders for periodical payments. The shape of the Bill as we seek to remould it reflects that. Clauses 2 and 4 are concerned primarily with the scope of “relevant financial orders”, as they now would be defined. Clause 5 would be concerned with periodical payments orders, which are treated and stand on their own and to which the Bill adopts the attitude of discouraging them as a long-term measure except when they are essential.
The Bill seeks to amend what is by now a very complex situation. I hope that this definition adds a little clarity to that. Perhaps I may add that if the Bill does go through, it certainly would be high time for there to be a further consolidating Act to replace the much amended 1973 Act.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, this next group of amendments, or one amendment and one clause stand part, seeks to improve the Bill from its original form, taking into account matters brought out on Second Reading. I think that all noble Lords who spoke in that debate thought that the Bill was seeking to address issues that had not been addressed for far too long, so what we are seeking to do here today is very welcome. Amendment 5 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, my noble friend Lord Grantchester and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, sets out clearly what a relevant financial order is so that there can be no ambiguity about it. As the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, said, lump sum orders are also included as they may assist in providing flexibility in dividing up total assets. The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, is opposing that Clause 2 stand part of the Bill, as there are amendments down that better define what is sought to be achieved here. If agreed, those amendments will be an improvement to the Bill as it is presently drafted. I can see the logic here and the clarification that that brings.
Baroness Deech
My Lords, I wish to say simply that of course the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker, is right—that is why he is learned and I am just a noble Baroness and not learned. However, my point is that this House has not revisited the principles of financial provision on divorce in more than 40 years, despite all the changes in society and all the things that have happened—the changes in the position of women, women going out to work and the rise in divorce. It is really crucial to do so now because of the removal of legal aid and the need to help those who mediate and arbitrate and give them a starting point. The Government favour mediation yet there has been a decrease in the use of mediation. How can people mediate if they do not know what the starting point is? To mediate means to find a middle way, and therefore we need a parameter. That is why we are trying to clarify this law.
Lord Faulks
I am sure that all noble Lords realise that what the noble Baroness meant by saying that the 1973 Act had not been revisited was that the approach that was set out in that Act has not been changed since that date. Although there have in fact been a considerable number of amendments to the Act, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker, pointed out, the overall thrust of the noble Baroness’s point remains the same. Amendment 5 moves, in amended form, the list of financial orders in Clause 2 so that they now form the definition of “relevant financial orders” in Clause 1, which deals with interpretation. This amendment goes with the proposal that Clause 2 does not stand part of the Bill, as the provisions for financial orders would as a result be dealt with elsewhere in the Bill.
The Bill as amended will limit the court to making relevant financial orders only to the extent that a binding prenuptial or post-nuptial agreement did not “deal with the matter”, and only in relation to matrimonial property, as defined by the Bill.
Baroness Deech
“Orders limited to matrimonial property
(1) In this Act “matrimonial property” means all property and interests in property, including any pension rights, which could be the subject of a pension sharing order or a pension compensation sharing order, belonging to the parties or either of them at the date of the relevant financial order which—
(a) was acquired—(i) during the marriage; and(ii) otherwise than by gift, inheritance or succession from a third party; and(b) does not directly or indirectly represent property acquired by them or either of them before the marriage.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b)—
(a) any premises and household goods acquired before the marriage for use by them as or in their home shall be treated as acquired during the marriage;(b) if any property that would otherwise fall within subsection (1)(b) is used and applied so as to increase the value of any matrimonial property the property so used or applied shall be treated as matrimonial property;(c) if any matrimonial property belonging to one party is used or applied so as to increase the value of an asset which belongs to the other party, and is not matrimonial property, a proportionate share (by value) of that asset shall be treated as matrimonial property; and(d) paragraph (c) shall also apply if by exceptional personal skill or effort a party to the marriage increases the value of an asset which belongs to the other party, and is not matrimonial property.(3) Subsections (2)(b) to (d) do not apply in relation to any asset if it appears that the costs of investigation and valuation required for the application of the relevant paragraph in subsection (2) would be likely to exceed one-fifth of the amount of the proportionate part or adjustment.
(4) Except as provided in section 3 (pre-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements), no relevant financial order shall be made otherwise than in relation to matrimonial property.”
Baroness Deech
My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 6 and in so doing I propose to speak to Amendments 14, 15, 15A, 16, 18 and 19. They all stand together, forming one of the great pillars of the Bill, which is to seek to bring the law into line with what the Supreme Court in its judgments has more or less inched its way towards—to bring our law into line with Scottish law and the law applying in most of North America and the continent of Europe. In brief, it is that when the court is dividing up the matrimonial property, it should divide only the property acquired after the marriage by the couple. That would aid greatly simplicity and negotiation. Of course, it is not absolutely rigid. The family home will always be treated as matrimonial. I assure your Lordships that there are many provisions and precedents in the law for manoeuvring that situation to ensure that children, and usually their mother, stay in the home until they leave for university or careers. Incidentally, it is an interesting question whether one should treat children as ending their childhood at 18 or whether, as it is now so common for school-leavers to go to university or college, one should say that they need the protection of the law in that respect until they are 21.
There is, however, room for manoeuvre in this amendment. It is modelled on New Zealand and Scottish law and makes provision for how to treat property that was separate but has been increased in value by the assets or efforts of the other party. It is not the case that selfishness will be promoted. If one spouse works on the premarital property of the other, a proportion would be regarded as reverting to the ownership of the one who has put in the effort.
Again, this is a law, and this is an amendment, for the average couple. Very wealthy couples will always be able to afford lawyers and may make prenups and sort out the property between them. This is for the hundreds of thousands of couples who get divorced every year and are clogging up the courts and having to face each other in court without representation and with no clear guidance on what would be a fair and equitable settlement. If this Bill is passed, this provision in particular would give them a steer.
Noble Lords may have seen the report last week that a couple spent £1 million on lawyers and experts while fighting over the division of assets worth £2.9 million. There was a call to cut excess litigation costs and for cost caps. However, you cannot cut unless you make the law simpler and clearer and give couples a starting point for mediation. A cartoon in the Times yesterday showed two lawyers expressing shock and horror over the case I mentioned and at the fact that one-third of the assets was used up in costs. A final box in the cartoon says, “Absolutely shocking! When I did a divorce case, we used up half the assets”. This situation cannot be allowed to continue. It would be better to have broad-brush justice to help those struggling without legal aid and lawyers. I mean no criticism of the Supreme Court. Its judgments have been sophisticated and compassionate. But only the richest people reach the Supreme Court and the level of detail and sophistication that its judgments have provided does not help the man or woman in the high street battling over how to divide up their sparse assets, and where every penny spent on costs takes money away from the children.
Amendment 14 would simply change the date on which the valuation of the assets is calculated. I was advised by judges that I should make this change, which would change the date on which the financial order is made. Amendment 15 is consequential drafting. Amendment 15A would provide maximum flexibility by allowing people to carve up their assets by using lump sums, not necessarily chopping the house in half or having to sell it but using such assets as they have to reach a 50:50 settlement in their negotiations. Amendments 16, 18 and 19 spell out the ways I mentioned earlier of departing from a 50:50 split in certain circumstances, mostly where one party has put in extra effort or, indeed, for the protection of the children. Flexibility would be maintained but couples who know nothing about the law would be able to start with the presumption that whatever they acquire after they get married should be divided in half. I used to run an all-party parliamentary group on family law in this House and members of the public attended its proceedings. They did not always understand the niceties but one message came through from the hundreds of people who attended the proceedings. They said, “Please, can’t we have a booklet when we get married to tell us what our rights and duties are and what’s going to happen to us—what we will owe—when we get divorced? We ask people and nobody can tell us”. This is what I am trying to provide. Here is a guide to what will happen in the unfortunate event of people getting divorced. I beg to move.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for her great efforts to allow the courts to bring certainty to this situation. As regards her last comment, I hasten to add that I do not think people enter marriage with the idea that they are going to get a divorce. Similarly, I do not believe that anybody turns up to work with the intention of fouling up, but these things happen. I support the amendment as it would bring certainty and enable couples facing divorce to be given clear advice on what their future situation will be and how the matrimonial assets will be divided. The starting point for this process should be that of defining what the matrimonial assets are.
Baroness Deech
I completely appreciate the Government’s concerns on this. We are united in wanting to ensure that the costs of litigation are removed or reduced and that people get fair shares. It is a very difficult issue. I do not want to withdraw the amendment at this stage, but given that the Bill will have many more stages to go through—including, I hope, in the House of Commons—I and others would be happy to enter into discussion with the Government on this very tricky issue of how to define what should be shared, bearing in mind that the Supreme Court has already indicated, in a number of judgments, that sharing matrimonial property is the way forward. That has to be our starting point, even if we try to refine it in the many stages that lie ahead of us before the Bill becomes law.
Baroness Deech
Baroness Deech
My Lords, in moving Amendment 7, I will speak to Amendments 8 to 13 as well. What binds them together is that they concern prenuptial and post-nuptial agreements.
First, let me counter criticisms I have heard. Unfortunately, it is no good saying that nobody ever contemplates the end of their marriage. Only too sadly, it is unavoidable to think of it. There cannot be anyone in this House who has not had a member of their family go through divorce—or, indeed, has not been divorced themselves. It is a very current feature of life. I know the arguments that the Bishops might have put forward, had they been here: that having a prenuptial agreement somehow undermines marriage. That is not so. Such agreements are common in every country in Europe and in North America. In all those places the divorce rate is lower than it is here, except possibly in the United States. I do not think it can be argued that they in any way undermine marriage. Moreover, the Supreme Court swept away the public policy issue that there is somehow something wrong with making an agreement about the end of a marriage in the famous case of Granatino v Radmacher, which was unusual in that it was the wife who was very wealthy and the husband, although comfortable, was not quite so wealthy.
First in this group, I took account of what was a glaring omission in the first draft. The prenuptial or post-nuptial agreement must of course be in writing. That is covered by Amendment 7. This was a mere oversight. It follows the recommendation of the Law Commission in its report on matrimonial property agreements and it follows practice abroad. There can be hardly any dissent from that. Amendment 8 is an improved draft: a way of saying that prenuptial and post-nuptial agreements are binding.
Amendment 9 is about disclosure. Obviously, if people are making a prenuptial or post-nuptial agreement they ought to tell each other what their assets are before they sign it. This amendment seeks to deter legal challenges to an agreement if a small or unimportant asset was overlooked and not declared. For example, if a wife omitted to mention in her list of assets her second-hand car kept somewhere else in the country, one would not want the agreement voided for that unimportant failure to disclose. How many of us could at any time make a completely comprehensive and accurate list of everything we own? Therefore, the amendment provides that a failure to disclose will not ruin the prenup or post-nuptial agreement provided that the asset is not of great significance. I have been advised by judges that there is no need to make any fresh statutory rules about disclosure—hence Amendment 12.
Amendment 11 is meant to prevent someone who would not be damaged taking advantage of non-disclosure. Others will give more substantial examples of that. For instance, if a wife failed to disclose her second-hand car, she could not rely on that to destroy the prenuptial agreement so as to give her an advantage. The idea is that, set against a background of clarity in dividing up assets, the court will accept the prenuptial or post-nuptial agreement as binding.
The Supreme Court has already almost worked into that position, but it attached so many conditions in the well known case of Granatino v Radmacher that about a dozen other cases followed where couples argued simply over whether the prenuptial agreement was binding. If they start going to court to argue about that, the very point of the agreement is undermined and costs accumulate.
The provisions in this group of amendments cumulatively will give very strong, although not complete, force to the binding nature of a prenuptial or post-nuptial agreement. Because the normal laws of contract will apply, if there is a mistake, duress or fraud, it will be possible to undermine a prenup. Section 35 of the Matrimonial Causes Act provides, in limited circumstances, a way to attack a post-nuptial agreement, so that is already quite common.
The great advantage of this provision is the encouragement that it will give people to get married. The noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, who apologises for not being in her place today as she has been called abroad on urgent business, told me enthusiastically about her feelings and those of other Members of this House of riper years who might contemplate a second marriage. People who do so, having once been widowed or divorced, may well say to themselves, “But if I get married again, all the property that I inherited from my first husband or everything I have worked for might, in the event of a second breakdown, go to the second spouse and his family”. I think that most people of a riper age who are thinking of getting remarried would prefer to keep their property for their original family, and the existence of a prenuptial agreement would encourage and help them.
The prenuptial agreement is very common in other countries. Of course, as your Lordships know, there is many a transnational marriage these days. People who were married abroad get divorced here and vice versa. An English person marries someone from abroad who takes it as a matter of course that there should be a prenuptial agreement. Years ago, I had a student at my college in Oxford who got engaged. She came bouncing in to see me and said, “I’m engaged, Mrs Deech. I’m engaged. Who do I go to? Which lawyer do I see about my prenup?”. That was about 20 or 30 years ago, and one can well imagine how my jaw dropped. However, she was Canadian, from Quebec, and that is what they do in Quebec, in France, and in other places. Having decided to get married, the young couple go off and see a lawyer to discuss what they call the “matrimonial regime”, where they talk about what sort of property ownership will apply. It does not undermine their marriages in those countries. As I have said, their divorce rate is lower than ours.
I find it very curious that when the average couple in this country spend £20,000 on arranging a wedding, and spend years doing it—we all know just how complicated these things are—they do not spend just a few pounds on going to see a lawyer to decide who is going to own the property and how things are going to be sorted out. It runs contrary to our nature—or at least it used to. However, I think, and hope, that the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, will explain to us that these prenups and post-nups are catching on, because, sadly, none of us can be unaware of how these things can go wrong and what it will cost us. As I said, the Supreme Court has already pretty much worked itself into this position.
Therefore, I very much hope that your Lordships will accept this group of amendments, which will make prenups and post-nups binding against a background of dividing up assets fairly on divorce and will give couples a clue as to what is fair when drawing up a prenup. Alternatively, they might say, “No, I’m not going to draw up a prenup. Don’t you love me? We don’t need a prenup”. I am sorry to say that that would be a bit naive these days but this group of amendments would greatly improve the situation for couples with a foreign element, older couples embarking on a second marriage and couples where there is a great disparity of wealth: the model who marries the footballer, the singer who marries the Russian oligarch and so on. It is perfectly understandable that they might want to discuss how those assets should be owned and divided up. It is too late for me, I am afraid, but not necessary anyway. However, I very much hope that this House and the Government will recognise that that is modern society and that the amendments would greatly help a number of couples. I beg to move.
Baroness Shackleton of Belgravia
My Lords, I support the concept behind this pillar of the Bill. It is vital that there is more clarity as to when, why and where prenuptial agreements should be binding. If they are made de rigueur in this country, as they are in other countries, there will not be any romance in it; it will just be like trotting along to get your marriage licence. There will be WH Smith forms and, if the couples do not take legal advice, they will be protected.
There are problems because the current law does not provide for binding prenuptial agreements but there is a lot of travel within the European Community. People come to this country having signed a prenuptial agreement which is not a prenuptial agreement: it is a property regime which, with no legal advice, is translated into a prenuptial agreement in this country, and it causes a lot of problems. If people know in clear terms that those are not going to work, then they will know where they stand. They will know what will work and they can be given appropriate advice before they arrive here if they are intending to come to this country.
My noble friend Lady Wilcox believes that this proposal will positively encourage marriage, and I support that wholeheartedly. Unfortunately, I see a cottage industry in my profession of stepchildren encouraging divorce. It is forced upon a parent so that the parent can, putting it crudely, collect the money before they die because there is no prenuptial agreement. Therefore, divorce is being promoted by stepchildren so that assets on one side of the balance sheet can be collected and they can profit by inheritance. That is ugly. A prenuptial agreement would avoid such circumstances.
Also, second marriages are often broken by stepchildren. If those stepchildren know that their financial security is intact and protected by law, there is every chance that the marriages will survive. Speaking in my other capacity as a patron of the Marriage Foundation, I believe that everything should be done to enhance the prospect of people remaining married. Prenuptial agreements protect people because they know what will happen to them should the ghastly event of divorce happen. It is very important that people get independent legal advice because at the time they get married they are, in my experience, concentrating on the dress, bridesmaids, venue and canapés and not what may go wrong. To have people in love not being properly shown the horrors of divorce is a mistake.
I wholly agree with this measure becoming part of the statute. I was the lawyer for Mr Granatino and it was an ugly shock when the Supreme Court decided to apply contractual measures to something that had hitherto, as part of the Matrimonial Causes Act, not been legally enforceable.
Baroness Deech
My Lords, it might surprise the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, to know that I am absolutely with him on the importance of marriage. I have spent much of my academic career writing about it in an atmosphere where I was almost a lone voice. I am with him all the way. I wish there was more we could do about it without being accused of claiming the moral high ground and so forth.
Nevertheless, I have studied the situation and realised, as the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, pointed out, that this is going on. The Supreme Court has recognised it. It is for this House to grab a hold of it. We should grab hold of all this law, which has been interpreted and elasticised and twisted around by the judges for 40 years without this House getting a grip on the principles. Now is an opportunity to recognise that we are where we are with 100,000 couples divorcing every year, leaving aside the many more breakdowns of cohabitation—and possibly in the future, civil partnerships and the relationships of same-sex couples who have not turned up in the statistics yet. My heart is absolutely with the noble Lord.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, this group of amendments starting with Amendment 7 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Deech and Lady Wilcox, and my noble friend Lord Grantchester are all to Clause 3, which concerns prenuptial and post-nuptial agreements.
I see the arguments made that these agreements, which were not very common a few years ago, are on the increase and can provide certainty to both parties as to the division of assets in the result of a breakdown of the relationship. I recall the comments of the noble Lord, Lord St John of Bletso, when he told us at Second Reading that these agreements had in no way encouraged the breakdown of marriage. Also, the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, spoke about people who had been widowed or divorced and were afraid to marry again where there were assets they wished to protect and who were reluctant to commit again, fearing a potentially financially disadvantaged position at a time of life when starting again would be almost impossible. The noble Lord and other noble Lords spoke about this again today.
The amendments themselves seek to provide further clarity as to what this Bill seeks to do in respect of pre and post-nuptial agreements and build on the comments and points raised both inside and outside your Lordships’ House.
Lord Faulks
The noble Lord makes an important point. What I did say was that the Government had not yet concluded how they proposed to respond to the Law Commission’s recommendations. The Law Commission has said that it considers it appropriate to override an agreement in some cases. I take entirely his point that if, as it were, the court is going to have a free rein to override an agreement simply because it thinks it fairer in the circumstances to come to a different conclusion, that would significantly undermine the degree of certainty which can be obtained by a prenuptial agreement. However, at the heart of what the Government will have to decide on this is to respect all the advantages that one can obtain from having a prenuptial agreement for the reasons that have already been outlined in the debate, yet not making it iniquitous in some circumstances—limited circumstances, I would imagine—where it is manifestly unfair for a party to be restricted by the scope of that agreement.
Baroness Deech
My Lords, I am sure that the Minister will agree that the best should not be the enemy of what is workable and good going forward. I am also sure that the Minister and I are united in the deep concern I have about the unfortunate couples who are wasting their money as they go through the process at the moment. I am willing to try almost anything because this has been a concern of mine for the past 40 years. We need a framework for couples that is more in line with what is tried and tested in New Zealand, Australia, Scotland, North America and Europe. While appreciating that this is an issue in flux and the fact that the legislation I am proposing would still have to go through the Commons, I hope very much that the noble Lord will be open to discussion with me and other concerned parties about how to get exactly the right wording in relation to proper disclosure—I absolutely understand his concerns—and the flexibility that is necessary. I am convinced that we must do this and I believe that the Minister shares that concern.
Baroness Deech
Baroness Deech
Baroness Deech
Baroness Deech
Baroness Deech
Baroness Deech
My Lords, Amendments 23 to 25 are all about what we specialists call periodical payments, which, I ought to explain to the House, are ongoing maintenance payments that many people are familiar with, whereby usually a husband, although not always, is ordered to pay his ex-wife a monthly or annual sum, year in, year out. A Member of this House has told me that he is still paying maintenance to his ex-wife after 30 years and many intervening marriages.
In fact, only about 12,000 such orders are made every year, although, as I have said more than once, there are more than 100,000 divorces every year. Not many of these orders are made, which must mean that people are reaching their own agreement: they are settling the matter once and for all by a lump sum, or, very likely, there simply is not any money to go around. As I have said before, the law that I am trying to reform affects largely lower and middle-income people. Of course, as we know, in the lower income bracket, people may well be living on benefits with a great deal of state subsidy; there simply is no money to go around and no order is made.
Noble Lords will recall the great difficulty there has been over the decades in trying to extract from fathers, who have no reason to object, ongoing maintenance for their children after a divorce. It has been like trying to get blood out of a stone, and so it remains. I suspect that in many of these divorces no order is made because one or both of the couple are living on benefits.
In many ways, the current law is regressive. Reverting to an analogy I have used before, were I or any other noble Baroness in this House so fortunate as to marry a footballer for a brief period, we could expect at the end of the marriage, which undoubtedly would come about, to be kept in that particular style for ever and ever—it really is not that amusing; that is the law at the moment—whereas if a noble Baroness in her youth was so altruistic as to marry a vicar she would get absolutely nothing, or next to nothing, on divorce. I have said for many years—and I have been involved in educating women all my career—that the message that goes out is, “Find that footballer and sit back”.
The Law Commission has said that periodical payments—maintenance—should be a transition. In an era when women, mothers included, are expected by the Government not to claim benefits once their child is six, it is very hard to argue that once a woman has children she should always be kept after the end of the marriage, let alone if she has no children or those children have grown up. I am sure that noble Lords know from their acquaintances the inequity and rather arbitrary nature of what goes on.
The Law Commission has said that maintenance should be a period of transition to full independence. We know that this may be hard on the older woman but it may very well be that there are lump sums and a division of assets. Moreover, I have shown in these amendments that I am listening to the concerns of the Government. At Second Reading they said that this may be hard. These amendments therefore say that maintenance should last in the first instance for five years—which represents the average period between the end of one marriage and the beginning of another—and that they may continue where there is evidence of “serious financial hardship”.
To change the law in this way would be only to bring us into line with what goes on, as I have said before, in North America, the rest of Europe, Scandinavia, Australia and New Zealand. It is very hard to argue, when our divorce law, rightly or wrongly, is no longer based on fault but on irretrievable breakdown—“This marriage has come to an end; it is nobody’s fault”—that a man should continue to keep his ex-wife in the style to which she became accustomed for ever and ever until the end of their joint lives. It does not actually happen—as I said, there are only 12,000 cases.
I will quote briefly from some of the blogs. Whenever I mention this in public, the public come back and say things such as,
“desperately needed reform of financial proceedings on divorce … The financial interests vested in the current lawlessness are colossal … all that comes out of court is injustice, direct/indirect discrimination … It is fundamentally unfair and an affront to the rule of law that the outcome of cases should vary randomly to such a degree”.
Even the Law Commission reported that its consultees said that operating financial provision in divorce for a judge is like a bus driver being given a bus and told to drive it but not being told where that bus is to end up.
What is the objective of maintenance at the end of divorce? The House has not really got to grips with this ever since the change in the divorce law in 1969. Actually, periodical payments are withering on the vine. It is time for us to give a steer. I absolutely understand that the Government have concerns and think that people will end up on benefits, but the people who are likely to do so are living on benefits already.
I have provided in Amendment 24 that the period may be extended. Again, I quote from some of the consultees:
“Many people going through divorce have grown sick and tired of hearing that the legal profession has spent the decades since the Matrimonial Causes Act was enacted failing to develop a coherent set of straightforward principles to govern division of income and assets on divorce”.
Another says:
“ The Scottish system”—
which I am copying here—
“is by no means perfect, but it does at least provide a framework for dealing with financial provision. Legislation will always be open to interpretation by lawyers … The public should however be able to rely on and understand a basic set of provisions regulating the division of matrimonial property on separation and divorce”.
Another said:
“Nobody knows where they stand. The judge you get on the day can do virtually anything based on a whim”.
That is how it seems—a point made strongly by the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, at Second Reading.
Moreover, one must remember that many women now, especially younger women, are earning more than their husbands. Men somehow seem to take it on the chin when they have to pay maintenance to their ex-wives, but there is nothing like the fury of an ex-wife who already feels that she has been betrayed by the man she married who is earning less than her when she realises that she is going to have to keep him for the rest of his life. I beg to move.
Baroness Deech