(2 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we have heard a great deal about the situation in Ukraine and how that has affected the military, diplomatic and development assumptions on which current policy decisions have been made. I want to talk particularly about the military aspect and a specific strain within it. The noble Lord, Lord West, spoke about the size of the Navy; I want to talk about the Army.
Last year, we had an Army review called Future Soldier. The promotional spiel was all about increasing force “agility”, but the substance was about cutting numbers—again. We have been here before, from Options for Change in 1990, which cut force strength by 18%; to the 1998 strategic defence review, which shaved a quarter off the Territorial Army, reducing it to 42,000; and the Army 2020 restructuring, brought out in 2010, with regulars cut again, down to 82,000, and another quarter off the reserves, reducing that strength to 30,000. Now we are heading for a standing Regular Army of just 73,000 troops, and the MoD’s current quarterly personnel statistics on its website tell us that the trained strength of the Army Reserve is down to 26,350 soldiers.
I am not standing here to dump on the review. Indeed, there is much in it to be recommended, such as adapting to the use of technology. There is a recognition that, as tempting as it might be for Ministers, simply sending Special Forces to do everything is not sustainable and, therefore, that—despite the highly dubious Americanism of calling them Rangers regiments—having an all-arms force that is trained and retained in a state of high readiness for deployment is logical, just as the ability of soldiers to progress their careers by moving between their own corps and such a force has obvious benefits for professional development and troop retention. There is still a huge question over numbers and stretch. To be a good ally and world power, we need at all times to be able to deploy an expeditionary force of brigade strength at minimum.
Four years ago, the US Defense Secretary, General Jim Mattis, warned of his concern that Britain’s
“ability to continue to provide this critical military foundation for diplomatic success is at risk of erosion”.
He continued:
“A global nation like the UK, with interests and commitments around the world, will require a level of defense spending beyond what we would expect from allies with only regional interests.”
The occupants of the White House and No. 10 may have changed in the past four years, but we still need to be able to show that we are a reliable and capable partner on the world stage. That is why it matters less, frankly, what we here think of the planned troop reductions but more what those military commanders and international partners think.
That is why the intervention from the outgoing Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith, needs to be listened to. We need to listen when the man charged with leading the Army says that he is
“not comfortable with an Army of just 73,000. It’s too small.”
It is the smallest standing Army we have had since Charles II established one in the 1660s. What I found more worrying about General Carleton-Smith’s intervention was not just the admission that it was sprung on him and Army chiefs because it was never their plan, but when he revealed the rationale for it. He says that
“it’s a bit of an arbitrary figure because it’s just a price point.”
We must be better than that. We must treat our service personnel better than that. We must live up to our international obligations with a fighting force big enough to be worthy of the name.
I know that a much-needed equipment update is happening and that that is expensive, and I agree with the Secretary of State for Defence when he says that the Army’s land fleet is “woefully behind its peers” and needs a serious upgrade. As it happens, I think Ben Wallace is one of the shining lights in this Cabinet—clear-eyed and getting on with the job. Indeed, I also praise the Prime Minister for setting and embodying our approach in supporting Ukraine in deed as well as in word. But it strikes me that part of the Future Soldier review was predicated on an assumption that large-scale conventional force invasion of a European ally—such as we have seen by Russia in Ukraine—was low on our risk register. Indeed, General Carleton-Smith confirmed that
“the surprise was that Putin went all-in at very significant scale”
and in a very crude, conventional, old-style manner, whereas the intelligence had suggested a more hybrid, disruptive approach of
“bots as well as boots”.
We come back to my first point, that the situation in Ukraine has changed everything. It has altered the military, diplomatic and development assumptions on which current policy decisions—many of them brought forward in the Loyal Address—have been made. It has redrawn the map and we need to respond the world as it is now, not as it was when decisions that already seem out of date were made. I contend that shaving nearly 10,000 troops from our military roll and reducing our army to its lowest number for more than 350 years is one of those decisions that needs to be revisited.