Elections Bill

Debate between Baroness Chakrabarti and Baroness Meacher

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 17th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I rise in support of Amendments 56 to 60 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, to which I have added my name. As I said at Second Reading, one of my biggest concerns about the whole Bill—though it is not the only one—is that the ID requirements could, when an election is closely fought, lead to an entirely different outcome of the election from that which would have been achieved without this ID process. In some cases it could result in a change in the MP elected in particular constituencies where, again, the result is close. Although there are obviously problems about individuals and groups, my biggest concern is that this could tip over or interferes with and distort the result of an election. That is a very serious matter.

The requirement in paragraph 8 of Schedule 1 that the electoral identity document

“must … contain a photograph of the person”

risks excluding various groups. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, went through those groups in some detail, and I certainly do not want to repeat her remarks. A differential turnout in these groups and constituencies will therefore determine to what extend the ID system affects the outcome of elections. I have no doubt that the ID system will affect election results and outcomes, and therefore, in my view, the ID provision should not be included in this Bill at all. However, I do understand that the Government had the election ID proposal in their manifesto. Nevertheless, I think I am completely convinced, certainly by the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, who did not get to speak on it, that the manifesto did not refer to photographic evidence. I hope the Minister will, therefore, while hanging on to his ID scheme no doubt, agree that these amendments are very important to keep the impact on elections to a minimum. We need the information required by these amendments. It will be difficult to estimate the impact on various groups, and I would be grateful if the Minister in his response would explain how that data will be obtained—assuming of course that he accepts the vital importance of impact assessments, and I am sure he does—before the ID system is introduced.

The noble Baroness, Lady Scott, referred to various countries that have electoral ID documents, but it would be very helpful if the Minister would make clear which countries have electoral ID systems that do not have general national ID documentation. I think it was indicated that it would not make any difference; of course, it would make an enormous difference if everybody was automatically required to carry their ID in their pocket or bag. Of course, they would roll up at the polling station with their ID—so I have to say I do not accept that it does not matter. It does; and it would be very helpful if the Minister could give some kind of evidence about efficacy and about the impact on elections in those countries that have electoral ID but not national ID.

A very different concern relates to the delegated powers in relation to the registration officer’s power to issue the relevant electoral identity document. For noble Lords not involved in the earlier debate, perhaps I should again declare my interest as a member of the Delegated Powers Committee. The registration officer is under a duty to determine the application “in accordance with regulations”. That is a very wide power, which leaves it open to Ministers to determine the conditions that must be met before an applicant is entitled to receive an electoral identity document. We are not going to know that; that will be a ministerial decision under delegated powers. It also allows for the possibility of the registration officer being given discretion in deciding whether or not to issue an electoral identity document to a person. Again, on what grounds? What is actually going to go on here?

The Delegated Powers Committee is wanting an explanation from the Minister about why these provisions are not on the face of the Bill, and it is quite difficult to think why they are not. If the Minister cannot give an adequate explanation, the committee’s view is that the delegation in this case is inappropriate. I bring that to the Committee because I think it is relevant, and it is important for people involved in these discussions. I do not know whether the Minister is in a position to respond to this, but, if he is not, maybe he can respond in writing, not just to the Delegated Powers Committee but to Members of this Committee. I hope the Minister will be able to respond, though, to this concern.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, to vote is a fundamental right. It is not a new-age right invented the other day; it is a fundamental civil and political right. It is also, for many of us, an ethical duty. If the Government took that view, they would not judge the balance of risk in the way that they currently are. That is where this group relates to the debate foreshadowed in the previous group on financial cost. In that debate, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said that it is worth it to have integrity in the system, but the noble Lord, Lord Woolley, asked whether just one conviction really justified the risk. Now we are closer to the crux of the debate.

Different groups of people have fought for the right to vote over many centuries, all over the world. It is one of the first-order civil rights in a democracy, and an ethical duty. If the Government agreed with me, they would judge the balance of risk rather differently from the way they are currently doing with this one conviction as evidence of a problem. Although it is always hard to prove a negative, any evidence produced for it—whether in pilots or from well-established civil society research organisations—is batted away and the Minister in the other place says, “Let’s lock the house before the burglary happens”.

If I am right that it is a first-order civil right, like the right to liberty, you have to judge the balance of risk and put the presumption in a slightly different place. With the right of presumption of innocence and the right to liberty, we put the presumption in a particular direction. We say that it is more important—many Conservatives not in their places would agree with me—that one innocent person does not lose their right to liberty than that even a few more who are guilty go free. If that is how we judge the presumption of innocence in relation to liberty, and if we take participation in free and fair elections as a first-order right of that kind, why do the Government judge the balance of risk in the way they do? Why are they not doing everything possible not just to ensure that those with the right to vote can do so but to encourage the behavioural change we want so that people get the habit of voting and discharge what I think is an ethical duty?

Some other countries say that voting should be compulsory—that it is not just an ethical duty but a legal one. That is a step too far for my libertarian instincts; speaking of which, I fought for many years with many who are not in their places on the Benches opposite, and the current Prime Minister, against the principle of compulsory identification cards for people in this country. Conservatives were some of the most eloquent participants in that debate and the Conservative Party fought elections on manifestos against it, on the basis that this is the kind of free country in which free-born English men and women should not have to carry compulsory ID.

It did not make me many friends among those who are now my noble friends, but that was the argument and principle that united the Conservatives with the Liberal Democrats in 2010—repealing compulsory identity legislation was their flagship policy—and I welcomed it. It seems a little odd now to say that there will not be universal compulsory identity cards for everyone but we will take your vote off you if you cannot afford ID such as a passport or a driving licence. Ministers are shaking their heads on the basis that they will make it possible for all sorts of other kinds of free and cheap ID to be available. We have to take that on trust.

That does not deal with the principled concern—why we require it at all, given that we blew all those trumpets about free-born Englishmen not requiring compulsory ID in the first place—or solve my practical concern about discouraging people who are already discouraged from getting into the habit of voting. The noble Lord, Lord Woolley, made that point so eloquently in the previous debate.

With all the comings and goings and the vivid nature of the debate, I never heard from either of the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes or Lady Verma, in what way they think fraud is of a significant enough degree in this country at the moment to justify their points about people being shut out of the process by it.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Chakrabarti and Baroness Meacher

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 27th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

I rise to explore whether Clause 17 should in fact stand part of the Bill. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his support. He knows a great deal more about all this than I do. I will focus my remarks on Clause 17(1)(a), which refers to Clause 16(4). That subsection makes clear that a person employed by any specified authority who is requested to supply information to a policing body must comply with the request. Of course, these bodies may include a health authority as well as an education authority, prison authority, youth custody authority or any other authority named by the Secretary of State.

My objections to Clause 17, if I have understood it correctly—and I am humble enough to know that I may not have—are rooted in my objections to the earlier clauses requiring disclosure of information by public servants to the police. Clause 17 seems to add insult to injury by giving the Secretary of State powers to issue directions to any public servant failing to provide information in order to secure compliance with the duty. Clause 17 goes on to say that a direction can be enforced by a mandatory order. Can the Minister assure the House that these clauses exclude the disclosure of information that could identify an individual? This is vital, as the Minister knows—and I have a great regard for our Minister, who understands these things.

A doctor or teacher, for example, may take the view that to pass information that risks identifying a patient, pupil or other individual to the police would be contrary to the interests of that person and would not contribute significantly to preventing or reducing serious violence. They may make a professional judgment not to disclose information that could identify a patient, pupil or other. I seriously question the Government’s proposals in Clause 17, unless this issue can be clarified.

For example, a patient may suffer from mental health problems and may be causing difficulties, but may still be making good progress in a therapeutic programme. It is likely to be utterly destructive to draw that person to the attention of the police. Likewise, if a child has severe behavioural problems at school, is vulnerable and is being targeted by a drug dealer but has agreed to co-operate with a cognitive behaviour programme and other support designed to deal with his or her problems, it would be incredibly damaging to involve the police at this point. That child could be driven into a life of drugs and crime instead of being carefully steered away from such a path.

Having worked as a social worker many decades ago—goodness knows how many—and worked with families with problems, and having also been on the Police Complaints Authority for nine years, I think I can look at these issues from both points of view. I have considerable regard for the police, despite being—indeed, perhaps because I was—involved in investigating complaints against the police for all those years. I understand that they do want information about young people who may be committing crimes. The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, knows well my view that a radical review of our Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 to focus on drug treatment, rather than criminalising sick addicts, would be a great deal more fruitful in reducing drug abuse and serious violence, including county lines, than this Bill, the serious violence prevention orders and these disclosure clauses.

I hope that the Minister will explain what penalties the Government have in mind if a public servant fails to provide information in accordance with a mandatory order. Are the Government at risk of criminalising public servants? I hope the Minister can reassure the House on these issues and that she will, if necessary, seek the agreement of her colleagues to reconsider the approach in Clause 17 before Report. I look forward to her reply.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I have to support what I have just heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for reasons we began to articulate on Monday evening. Noble Lords will remember we began to have a discussion about what is to be shared and in what circumstances existing duties of confidence and existing professional duties need to be overtaken in the public interest. But who decides? The Minister kindly gave me a very specific answer at one point in our discussion, when she said that it will be decided by the person who holds the data, but, obviously, that can be subject to challenge. That of course is my traditional understanding of professional confidence.

Way before this, and way before the Crime and Disorder Act, that was the traditional position: if the doctor, the teacher or whoever is not minded to hand over to the police the data about a specific person, or more general data, the police will have to go to the courts and try to get a warrant. That is the place for those hopefully rare disputes between professionals and the police, who are coming at this from different positions, to be decided, rather than being decided by direction from the Secretary of State.

Of course, normally, we want the health professionals, the policing professionals and the educational professionals to be working in discussion and collaboration, but, where there is a rare dispute because of their different professional angles and ethics, it really is for a judge to decide and not for the Secretary of State to trump all those existing ethics and duties. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, is nodding at me. That is the concern I hope the Minister can address in her explanation and defence of Clause 17.

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Chakrabarti and Baroness Meacher

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 3rd March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 6 I shall speak also to Amendment 16, both amendments having been recommended by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. The reasons set out in the DPRRC report are, in a nutshell, that the matters dealt with under the Henry VIII powers in the Bill are too central to its purpose and therefore not appropriate for the procedure, at least not as currently set out in the Bill. I hope that, in the light of that report, the Minister will consider either accepting my amendments or, perhaps, subjecting these powers to the affirmative procedure.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 6, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I apologise to the noble Baroness that I did not get a chance to have a chat with her before this evening, as I had originally added my name to the amendment. As the noble Baroness explained, the Bill as it stands proposes minimum periods of 20 weeks and six weeks for the two stages of divorce and dissolution proceedings. I thank the Minister for the very helpful meeting we had last Wednesday, where he clarified that a statutory instrument to shorten the period for divorces would indeed be subject to the affirmative procedure. The question has been whether there is any reason at all why the Lord Chancellor should be given a Henry VIII power to reduce the length of either of the two periods through delegated legislation.

The Bill is very clear that, in a particular case, an application may be made to the court to shorten the period for the proceedings. For example, if one of the partners is dying and wants to sort out their affairs before they die, it would of course be perfectly reasonable for them to make an application to the court to reduce the period required. Also, if there is a need to protect an abused spouse, time may be of the essence. However, to shorten the minimum period for divorce or dissolution in all cases is quite another matter. We have to think about that.

The then Minister for Justice, Paul Maynard MP, emphasised in the Commons Public Bill Committee on 2 July 2019:

“The 20 week period is a key element in a reformed legal process.”


There is currently no minimum period, and with respect to the second stage, the Minister said that part of the objective was

“to improve the financial arrangements. People may wish to delay a little longer until such a point. It is not a maximum period; it is a minimum, and the process might well take longer.”—[Official Report, Commons, Public Bill Committee, 2/7/19; col.35.]

As the Minister knows, I expressed my concern at Second Reading about a future Lord Chancellor having the power to allow for a more rushed process, without proper parliamentary scrutiny. Certainly, the decision to apply the affirmative procedure to any statutory instrument reducing the time period is, in my view, an important improvement. The Government argued in a memorandum that the Lord Chancellor

“will be able to make adjustments to the time periods, for example, if policy considerations meant that it would be appropriate to shorten one or both of the time periods.”

I do not want to be difficult, but when I asked the Minister during his presentation to the Cross-Bench meeting what policy considerations might justify reducing the timeframe for divorces in a general sense, neither he nor the civil servants present could provide an answer. However, during the meeting last Wednesday, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, came—probably quite inadvertently—to the rescue and suggested a justification for the use of this power. The noble and learned Lord suggested that if, for example, there were repeated applications to the court to reduce the length of time from 26 weeks, then a more general reduction in the minimum period would be helpful. Repeated applications to the court are unhelpful to the people immediately affected; I imagine there are delays and all sorts of things, including perhaps costs.

This sounds a very sensible justification for the Henry VIII power. The concern of the Delegated Powers Committee, on which I sit, had been that Ministers at that point had offered no rationale for the Henry VIII power. Now, thanks to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, to whom I must give due credit, we have such a rationale, as well as confirmation from the Minister that the affirmative procedure would be applicable. I am therefore personally satisfied that this matter has been acceptably resolved—I had intended to say “satisfactorily resolved”, but it has certainly at least been acceptably resolved. However, I must emphasise that I am not, of course, speaking for the Delegated Powers Committee as a whole; I am speaking purely as one member.