Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Brinton and Lord Phillips of Sudbury

Wednesday 4th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton]

I have attached my name to Amendment 14C, and rather than repeat the points made by my noble friend Lady Sharp of Guildford, I will say just that I endorse them. I will make a comment and then ask my noble friend the Minister a question on his Amendment 15D—which, as many other noble Lords have said this evening, takes us some way forward. I am grateful to the Minister and his civil servants for coming back with a proposal that means that we can actually discuss some of the boundaries—and therein lies my question. This relates to guidance: in particular, we discussed in Committee the revisions of the guidance to some of the very specific duties about checking presentations and making sure that people had been trained in specified authorities.

I have a more fundamental question about paragraph 50 in the current guidance, which I do not believe was proposed to be amended. It says that,

“universities must take seriously their responsibility to exclude those promoting extremist views that support or are conducive to terrorism”.

It is the phrase, “their responsibility to exclude”, that I want to focus on.

I am not sure that the qualifying statement,

“that support or are conducive to terrorism”,

is sufficiently clear as to provide reassurance. It is already illegal to directly or indirectly encourage others to commit terrorist acts, and universities are obliged to exclude those who do so. Beyond this, it is not clear which views should be understood to be conducive to terrorism. Non-violent extremism is not generally unlawful, and the Prevent strategy defines extremism as,

“vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values”.

These values and concepts include those that are rightly the subject of debate and consideration in universities. It is not appropriate for universities to be required to exclude those who lawfully oppose them.

In a letter to the Times on Monday, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills stated that the Bill,

“addresses terrorism and not extremism”,

which he described as, “a highly subjective concept”. I hope that the Minister will be able to confirm that the Secretary of State’s comments will be fully reflected in future versions of the guidance; and that universities will not be required to exclude from campuses those who, while acting within the law, advocate views that are classed as extreme.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I will briefly remark on the labyrinthine complexity of the law in relation to education and universities as it is already. I have a terrible anxiety that this Bill—well intentioned as it may be—along with the guidance, will add a dimension of further complexity that will be counterproductive to a quite significant degree. It is going to make the task of the authorities in schools and universities—and I should declare an interest as a former chancellor of the University of Essex—burdensome to a remarkable degree. I support this group of amendments, but very much hope that the Minister, who has a gargantuan task in shepherding through this Bill, will tell us whether there is any prospect at all that this side of the finalisation of our deliberations, anything could be done to cast light and clarity on what I believe is a forest fit only for lawyers.

Finally, I echo what many others have said, most recently the noble Lord, Lord Deben: that it is so easy to contrive a situation in legislation that is counterproductive. I have a fear bordering on a certainty that the good intentions of the Bill will prove to be just that: because what I believe the Government have not taken nearly enough into account is that universities are engines of enlightenment, truth, fact and tolerance. However, what is being imposed upon them will have a chilling and bureaucratic effect, particularly—I repeat—via the guidance that, we must not forget, as the Joint Committee on Human Rights put it, will expose universities to being found,

“in breach of the new duty and therefore subject to direction by the Secretary of State and, ultimately, a mandatory court order backed by criminal sanctions for contempt of court”.

I fear that it will end up undermining the unique virtues of the university sector. Of course, that would be the ultimate farce because the Bill is designed to uphold the values of which universities are exemplars.

Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill

Debate between Baroness Brinton and Lord Phillips of Sudbury

Wednesday 5th December 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I hesitate to intervene, but I read Amendment 20G as having a different impact from the one that its mover has suggested. It may be that my legal wits are failing me, but surely new Section 111A(2), which it intends to amend, merely defines what the pre-termination negotiations are in subsection 12(1). It states that,

“‘pre-determination negotiations’ means any offer made or discussions held … with a view to”,

there being agreement between the employer and the employee. I do not see where the amendment comes into that. It is irrelevant in terms of who may assist the employee in arriving at that agreement, be it a trade union official, a workplace representative or a legal representative. The way that the amendment has been moved is not consistent with its potential impact on the clause concerned.

[Baroness Brinton]

My Lords, I want to make it clear that I do not consider Clause 12 to be “Beecroft-lite”, whether that term is acceptable or not to my noble friend. I hope that there might be some information from the Minister to confirm that, but that was certainly not how I read it.

I want to raise a particular question and I apologise for not having given notice of it; I am more than happy to receive a written answer. I understand that an offer of a settlement agreement could not be used as evidence in an unfair dismissal claim but could be used as evidence in a discrimination claim. It is not unheard of at tribunals to hear both at the same time; therefore, which would take priority?