Armed Forces Bill

Baroness Brinton Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 2nd September 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Brinton]

21: Schedule 3, page 98, line 40, at end insert—
“Part 1AService Stalking Protection Notices1A In Part 3 of AFA 2006 (power of arrest, search and entry), after Chapter 1A (inserted by paragraph 1) insert—“Chapter 1BService Stalking Protection Notices74E Power to give a service stalking protection notice(1) An authorised service police officer may give a service stalking protection notice to a person falling within subsection (2) (“P”) if the officer has reasonable grounds for believing that—(a) P has carried out acts associated with stalking against another person, and(b) it is necessary to give the notice to protect that other person from stalking, or the risk of stalking, carried out by P.(2) A person is within this subsection if the person is aged 18 or over and is—(a) subject to service law, or(b) a civilian subject to service discipline.(3) A “service stalking protection notice” is a notice prohibiting P from carrying out acts associated with stalking against the person for whose protection the notice is given.(4) A service stalking protection notice may provide that P—(a) may not contact the person for whose protection the notice is given;(b) may not come within a distance specified in the notice of any premises in which that person lives or any other specified premises.(5) If P lives in premises in which the person for whose protection the notice is given also lives, the notice may also contain provision—(a) prohibiting P from evicting or excluding that person from the premises;(b) prohibiting P from entering the premises;(c) requiring P to leave the premises.(6) It does not matter where the acts associated with stalking referred to in subsection (1)(a) took place.(7) In this Chapter—“acts” includes omissions;“authorised”, in relation to a service police officer, means of or above the rank of naval lieutenant, military or marine captain or flight lieutenant;“service police officer” means a member of a service police force.74F Matters to be considered before giving a notice(1) Before giving a service stalking protection notice to a person (“P”), an authorised service police officer must, among other things, consider the following—(a) the welfare of any person under the age of 18 whose interests the officer considers relevant to the giving of the notice; (b) the opinion of the person for whose protection the notice would be given as to the giving of the notice;(c) any representations made by P about the giving of the notice;(d) in a case where the notice includes provision relating to premises lived in by the person for whose protection the notice would be given, the opinion of any relevant occupant as to the giving of the notice.(2) In subsection (1)(d) “relevant occupant” means a person other than P or the person for whose protection the notice would be given—(a) who lives in the premises, and(b) who is personally connected to the person for whose protection the notice would be given or, if P also lives in the premises, P.(3) The authorised service police officer must take reasonable steps to discover the opinions mentioned in subsection (1)(b) and (d).(4) It is not necessary for the person for whose protection a service stalking protection notice is given to consent to the giving of the notice.74G Further requirements in relation to notices(1) A service stalking protection notice must be in writing.(2) A service stalking protection notice given to a person must state—(a) the grounds on which it has been given,(b) that if the person is reasonably suspected of being in breach of the notice, they may be arrested in accordance with section 67(2), (3), (4) or (5) by a person subject to service law,(c) that an application for a service stalking protection order under section 236M will be heard within 48 hours of the time of giving the notice and that a notice of the hearing will be given to the person,(d) that the notice continues in effect until that application has been determined or withdrawn, and(e) the provision that may be included in a service stalking protection order.(3) The notice must be served on the person personally by a service police officer.(4) On serving the notice on the person, the service police officer must ask the person for an address at which the person may be given the notice of the hearing of the application for the service stalking protection order.(5) After serving the notice on the person, the service police officer must make reasonable efforts to inform the person’s commanding officer of the giving of the notice.74H Breach of notice(1) A person who is reasonably suspected of being in breach of a service stalking protection notice may be arrested in accordance with section 67(2), (3), (4) or (5) by a person subject to service law.(2) Section 67(6) applies in relation to the power of arrest conferred by subsection (1) as it applies in relation to the power of arrest conferred by section 67.(3) A person arrested by virtue of subsection (1) must be kept in service custody and brought before the Court Martial or the Service Civilian Court—(a) before the end of the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest, or (b) if earlier, at the hearing of the application for a service stalking protection order against the person.(4) In calculating when the period of 24 hours mentioned in subsection (3)(a) ends, the following days are to be disregarded—(a) any Sunday,(b) Christmas Day,(c) Good Friday, and(d) any day which is a bank holiday in England and Wales under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971.(5) If the person is brought before the court as mentioned in subsection (3)(a), the court may—(a) give orders for the further detention of the person in service custody, or(b) direct that the person is released from service custody.(6) The court may, when directing a person’s release from service custody under subsection (5)(b), require the person to comply, before release or later, with any requirements that appear to the court to be necessary to secure that the person does not interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice.(7) Where a person is given a service stalking protection notice under section 74E, a Provost Marshal must apply for a service stalking protection order in respect of the person.(8) The application must be heard by the court not later than 48 hours after the notice was given to the person, and subsections (3) to (7) of section 236D apply to the application as they apply to an application for a service domestic abuse protection order.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates a Service Stalking Protection Notice (SSPN) by mirroring the existing framework for Service Domestic Abuse Protection Notices, giving service police an equivalent power to provide immediate protection pending the determination or withdrawal of an application for a Service Stalking Protection Order.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have all three amendments in this group. They aim to improve the arrangements for cases of service stalking. Amendment 21 wants to create a service stalking protection notice—SSPN—by mirroring the existing framework for the service domestic abuse protection notices, giving service police an equivalent power to provide immediate protection orders pending the determination or withdrawal of an application for a service stalking protection order. I am very grateful to the Suzy Lamplugh Trust and Aurora New Dawn for their briefings and for correspondence in recent weeks.

Before going into the detail of these three amendments, I want to thank the Minister for his letter of a few days ago, following Second Reading. He says very clearly in that letter that the changes I want in order to strengthen the protections against stalking are not necessary because

“we fully recognise the importance of ensuring that the Service Police and other relevant personnel have the skills and knowledge necessary to identify stalking behaviour, assess risk and make effective use of the new protective measures”.

I am remembering discussions with Ministers in 2012, 2016, 2019 and 2022, when we tried to do the same for non-service stalking arrangements. Every single time we have not put the detail in the Bill it has gone wrong further down the process and has had to come back to Parliament to be corrected because, unfortunately, stalking, which is itself a very unpleasant crime, can quite often lead to murder. Therefore, some of these things that I am proposing are very much to protect the victim.

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I hope that, with what I have said, I have reassured the noble Baroness to an extent about some of the steps forward that the Government have tried to take and some of the improvements and changes that have been made to the Bill—particularly the inclusion of that conversion when somebody leaves and moves from military service into civilian life, but also the inclusion of interim service stalking protection orders.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister and the other speakers, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, with whom I have worked for many years on this; I am very grateful for her support. I am also grateful that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, has shown some interest in this. I think the point raised about whistleblowing and making sure it is part of this package as well becomes vital. As we discussed yesterday on the Public Office (Accountability) Bill, it is absolutely key to changing the culture, which is what one wants in this sort of situation. I am also very grateful to the Minister for the detail he has gone into.

I should have made it clearer that the service stalking protection notices that my amendment seeks to create are different from the interim stalking orders, not least because they would be a tool that can be used by a police officer without having to go to a court. It is like the first step on the ladder. Going to court takes time and you have to assemble a case for it to be heard, whether by a magistrate or in another court. Therefore, it is a much more serious document, with more serious implications.

The point about these notices is that they are a tool to make the stalker aware very quickly that there are now certain rules they must follow and that things will escalate quickly if they disobey them. I am looking at the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, because I cannot remember what year they were added, but they were added because there was this lacuna between identifying a stalker and being able to get some protection for the victim.

On the other points, the Minister very kindly offered in his letter to meet me and anyone else interested, including the charities I have been working with. I think the best thing to do would be to have them with us at that meeting, because they have some very specific concerns about detail that I could not possibly go into in the Chamber at this particular time of night.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Of course.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I thank the Minister. I am very grateful to him for that. On that basis, depending on the meeting, I may bring an amendment back on Report, but for now I withdraw Amendment 21.

Amendment 21 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Brinton]

24: After Clause 10, insert the following new Clause—
“Domestic abuse and summary hearings for assault and assault occasioning actual bodily harm(1) A commanding officer may not hear summarily a charge of assault or occasioning actual bodily harm where the alleged conduct amounts to, or is alleged to amount to, domestic abuse.(2) In any case to which subsection (1) applies, the allegation must be referred to a service police force for investigation or the Director of Service Prosecutions for consideration of prosecution before the Court Martial or such other court as has jurisdiction.(3) In this section, “domestic abuse” has the same meaning as in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to remove the power of a commanding officer to hear an allegation of ABH when there is a domestic abuse element to the allegation.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have three amendments in this group and, while they are not related to stalking, the principles behind tabling them are not dissimilar. They specify more detail than I think the Minister is comfortable with, but each states very clearly where the boundaries are on a number of issues.

Amendment 24 seeks to remove the power of a commanding officer to hear an allegation of assault or assault occasioning actual bodily harm when there is a domestic abuse element in the allegation. The amendment says that, in those circumstances, the case must be referred to a service police force for investigation or to the Director of Service Prosecutions for consideration of prosecution before that court martial or other such court has jurisdiction.

This whole area around the role of the commanding officer, who will have a very different knowledge of individuals, not just those who report to them but also perhaps their families who are involved in this case, is a sensitive one. We have to compare this with the position of the service police or prosecutors, who will not have that personal knowledge of all the individuals. It is obvious that any more serious crime that was committed would not be permitted to be heard by the commanding officer—and yet, a crime involving assault or ABH and domestic abuse can at present be heard summarily by the commanding officer.

The reason for concern is that the domestic abuse guidance for those involved in investigating DA and associated crimes are that all those involved should have specialist training to understand how domestic abuse, assault and ABH need to be identified when often victims say that those in authority in the past have diminished the seriousness because it was domestic or the perpetrator has managed to hide it very well. But assault and ABH are not minor crimes: committed on a domestic partner, they are very serious.

The role of the commanding officer in hearing cases at this level may be understandable if it is a fight between two servicemen, so I understand why there is some provision there, although there are many who now question whether this should be the responsibility of the commanding officer at all. But my amendment specifically draws out assault and ABH in a domestic abuse setting and says that that must be dealt with by the service criminal justice specialists.

There is a general principle here. The Centre for Military Justice and many individual victims and campaigners find it unreasonable that there is still a role for the commanding officer in these cases at all.

I think it was the Minister who referred to Gunner Jaysley Beck: an appalling case. She was sexually assaulted by a warrant officer more than twice her age and then sexually harassed for months by her line manager, who was almost 10 years her senior. The inquest found that the Army’s failure to deal with her report of sexual assault appropriately, and the pressure of relentless sexual harassment she had endured, contributed to her death by suicide on 15 December 2021.

Before and after the inquest, the family, with support from the Centre for Military Justice, campaigned for greater independence in the handling of serious service complaints for service personnel who have suffered serious sexual harassment, discrimination and bullying in the military. On 18 March 2025, the Government announced that they were taking responsibility for the handling of serious cases such as these away from any single service itself. That is good. However, I am afraid that some anomalies remain, such as the issues in my amendment relating to ABH and domestic abuse.

Amendment 25 ensures that the services victims’ code must always apply to victims of sexual offences. It also ensures that service personnel whose cases are being taken forward in the criminal justice system will receive an equivalent right to service-provided victim services as those whose cases are taken forward in the services justice system. I laid this amendment to prevent service personnel and their victims falling through the cracks between the criminal justice system’s victims’ code, the services victims’ code and all the other things that might pertain to their case.

Amendment 26 relates to

“Production orders: notice to the subject of the material”.


It sets out in some detail how an application is made, then handed or served to the individual. It also sets out that the judge advocate must be satisfied that all the requirements have been complied with, with some exceptions noted where it would involve risk of harm or exceptional other circumstances. This is not dissimilar to the requirements for the civil police arrangements under powers of stop, search, seizure and retention. I believe that this amendment would both strengthen the process of a production order and prevent any abuse of such an order.

All three amendments are highly specific and may seem rather niche, but they aim to do one thing: to clarify and improve the service justice system for all those who come into contact with it or who administer it. I beg to move.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, again, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for bringing forward these amendments, which are of significance to us all as we seek to improve the current situation. I also thank my noble friend Lord Stansgate for his contribution, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith and Lady Goldie. I will address some of the points they made in my remarks.

On Amendment 24, as set out by the Government in the other place, we are already committed to reviewing Schedule 1 criminal conduct offences for summary hearings and Schedule 2 serious service offences in the Armed Forces Act 2006 as part of implementing this Bill following Royal Assent. However—and I hope this speaks to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie—for offences related to domestic abuse such as assault or assault occasioning actual bodily harm, the necessary changes will be made by secondary legislation following the review. That would obviously involve consultation with a wide range of people. Schedule 1 offences are summary offences and therefore the commanding officer has a role. Obviously, Schedule 2 offences are more serious. We are looking at what we do with respect to that and what changes may or may not be made.

The proposed changes would be consistent with current defence policy, which is that such cases should always be referred to the relevant police authority so that they can consider investigating them. Where offences are removed from Schedule 1 and added to the more serious Schedule 2, the practical effect would be that they are investigated by the Defence Serious Crime Command and, if a charge is directed, tried at the court martial rather than at a summary hearing. As I say, that will be subject to a review. The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, raised quite considerable concern that if we did move forward, we needed to move forward constructively, carefully and with wide consultation. That review will take place to do that, but it is part of the implementation of the Bill and therefore the amendment is not acceptable to us. We do not want it in the Bill because that would prejudge any review which is to take place.

On Amendment 25, protecting victims is a clear priority. There is no question that we would ever restrict the application of the code for victims in the CJS in respect of victims of sexual offences or domestic abuse. The code for victims in the CJS is aligned with Section 2 of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024, which sets out the statutory rights of victims in England and Wales. The code for victims in the CJS and the code for victims in England and Wales will contain the same principles and the same 12 rights. This ensures that victims of service offences and civilian victims receive equivalent standards, protections and entitlements, which goes to the heart of what the noble Baroness was asking for.

If a serving person is engaged with the civilian justice system, they will still be entitled to the single service welfare support mechanisms, which are designed and tailored to support individual needs. A range of comprehensive support from both welfare professionals and the chain of command can be employed to support personnel, tailored to those individual circumstances, and can be provided by unit welfare officers, medical staff and pastoral support. Where needs are complex or relate to serious, enduring and/or multi-agency cases, a referral to specialist welfare support may be required. This is delivered by specialist trained staff, and each of the single services offers that option in addition to first-line welfare support. Although we are not where we should be, there has been some improvement.

I thank the noble Baroness for Amendment 26, relating to production orders, and for highlighting this important issue. This new clause is not required as any change to the procedures around production orders could be enacted through the relevant secondary legislation—if a change is needed, we can do that through secondary legislation—so long as a review of the current procedures has been completed so that we know what we are doing if we seek to make any change.

On a point that the noble Baroness was asking about, we will consider further whether our procedures around production orders, specifically with regard to giving notice to the individual to whom the information relates and the provision that representations can be made, should fully reflect the relevant procedures in the civilian courts and whether it is appropriate and necessary that they do so. I reassure the noble Baroness that, while the requirement for further review around production orders is considered, victims of crime are informed about information requests from third parties. That is an important addition.

When a victim information request is submitted to a third party, service police must, under Section 44B of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, give notice to the person whose information is being sought. However, that requirement does not apply in certain circumstances; for example, where it is not reasonably practical in the circumstances or, importantly, where doing so might risk causing serious harm to the victim or another person. Again, that is an important qualification. The code of practice relating to these requests also states that when the victim is informed, their views should be sought and they are able to make representations—again, unless specific exemptions apply.

I hope that with those explanations and reassurances, particularly with respect to one or two of the reviews, the noble Baroness may find it appropriate to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to all the speakers. To address the question asked by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, I think he is looking at that clause the wrong way round. He asked about the definition of actual bodily harm, where the alleged conduct “amounts to” or “is alleged to amount to”. I think one is an incident that has been witnessed by someone who is not the victim, and the other may be where it has not and therefore it is a “he said/she said” situation. That is my understanding of why the wording is as it is. I hope that explanation helps him.

I am grateful for the support of my noble friend Lady Smith. The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, made an important point about the chain of command, and I do not underestimate that at all.

That takes me to my response to the Minister. I am glad that there is a review, and I am sure there are many other issues as well as the ones that I have raised. However, the message that I have been picking up from the organisations and individuals I have been talking to is that in 2026 it may not be completely appropriate in some of these justice issues for the old-style chain of command to remain with the commander. If the review is going to be looking at that, I will be content not to do anything at the next stage, and ditto with the secondary legislation. If I am unhappy with the secondary legislation, I may return to the next Armed Forces Bill after this one. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 24 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford is, unfortunately, unable to be in his place tonight, so I am speaking on his Amendment 36.

In October 2006, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford moved an amendment to the Armed Forces Bill, with the support of Air Marshal Lord Garden to confine sentencing in court martials to the presiding judge advocate alone, following consultation with the members of the panel. He said: “The area of sentencing for criminal offences is difficult and complex. Sentencing is an exercise for which the members of the panel have no training whatever. They do not attend sentencing conferences or have the training on sentencing that the most junior assistant recorder in this country receives, let alone any further or higher training for dealing with serious offences”.

The 2006 Act was a major reform of the system but did not include this particular amendment. It did, however, abolish the pre-existing review system whereby the Judge Advocate-General reviewed the conviction and sentence before they became final, a process which historically had operated as a check on the sentence passed. The 2006 Act introduced a service supervision and punishment order under Section 173, which imposes a quite concrete restriction on a serving soldier’s movements.

A service community order employs the community order requirements contained in the civilian sentencing legislation, adapted for service courts. The court martial can impose one or more requirements on the convicted serviceman as part of such an order. However, the SCO is principally a sentence for someone who is being dismissed from the service, and it follows him into civilian life. The recent Sentencing Act 2026 brought in the possibility of new restrictions to the SCO, the most important of which is the imposition of a restriction zone to prevent an offender from entering a particular area with, for example, the intention of assaulting or harassing a victim. Other restrictions may prevent him drinking in certain pubs or attending public events or even impose restrictions on driving.

There is, therefore, a whole army of sentencing disposals for those who are convicted. Professional judges are trained to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of imposing particular restrictions on the individual who stands before them. This requires experience and judgment. The court martial panel consists of a president and members of warrant officer rank and above who are drafted in for a particular case. The president is usually an officer for whom the position is a final posting, but the members may never have been in any sort of court before. Compare that with a magistrates’ court. The sentencing powers of a magistrates’ court are still restricted to 12 months’ imprisonment on a single charge, even though the magistrates will individually have undergone considerable periods of training. The court martial panel, without any training, is unrestricted.

Further, there is no longer a review by a professional judge of the sentence they choose to pass. Certainly, the judge advocate at the hearing can advise the panel and has a casting vote in the event of equality of voting by the members, but he can be outvoted altogether and his advice ignored.

In 2014, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford gave evidence before a departmental review in Washington as part of an inquiry which led to widespread reforms of the military justice system in the United States, the equivalent of our 2006 Act. These reforms were intended to transform military justice from a disciplinary system operating under the chain of command to something increasingly resembling an independent criminal court operating within US Armed Forces. In its report, the 2015 Military Justice Review Group also pointed out, as my noble friend had urged, that military judges had greater experience and expertise in sentencing than randomly selected panel members. It was concerned about sentencing disparity. The existing system gave the panel very broad discretion and relatively little guidance. From a constitutional point of view, it was concerned that there was the perception of command influence over sentencing and military command culture could influence punishment. It is perhaps possible to detect such a culture in the public utterances of a certain Mr Hegseth.

In its Military Justice Act 2016, Congress compromised on the issue. Judge-alone sentencing became the norm, but as a concession to tradition, a convicted person was entitled to opt for sentencing just by the panel alone. During the four years that followed that Act, it was observed that defendants chose judge-alone sentencing in 96% of the cases. As a result, the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military, established in 2021 in the aftermath of intense congressional debate over sexual assault in the armed forces, was concerned in sexual offences cases that a service court martial panel would almost inevitably be male dominated, as in the case of Captain Jacob Wulfson from Lakenheath, that the noble Lord and I both referred to at Second Reading.

The commission recommended judge-alone sentencing in all non-capital general and special courts martial, subject to the establishment of sentencing parameters and mandatory restitution, akin to our own Sentencing Council. We have always led the USA in the reform of military justice, and it galls me that in this instance, it has taken the right and proper lead that sentencing is a matter for professionals and not for one-day amateurs.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has spoken in the debate and for the thoughtful comments they have made. To deal with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, the information I have is that there is no shortage of court martial board members. I can give the figures that the ministry has provided to me: in 2025, 447 service personnel were sworn in for 283 trials, and there has been no difficulty in constituting boards. The court martial already draws from a sufficiently wide pool of eligible personnel, so, as such, the amendment is not required. If she has more detail that she would like to share, obviously that would be useful, but that is the information that I have been provided with.

It is vital that board members are up-to-date and possess the necessary practical experience of the latest single service policies, procedures, standards and values. For that reason, individuals who have left service even recently may no longer be as acquainted with changes across the services since their departure. The Government acknowledge the valuable, meaningful contribution that veterans continue to make across our society. However, we do not consider it necessary or appropriate to seek to draw on their past experience and knowledge for service on a court martial board, particularly when there is no shortage of board members.

Amendment 36, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, ably spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to remove military lay board members from the court martial sentencing process, so that sentence would be decided by the Judge Advocate alone. One argument often used is that this would mirror the Crown Court in England and Wales. However, I do not agree that the Crown Court model should simply be replicated in all cases within the UK service justice system. The current position is the same as that during the passage of the previous Armed Forces Bill in 2021, that the Judge Advocate and the service members of the board discuss and decide the sentence together. That is not an anomaly or a weakness; it is one of the strengths of the court martial to have service members and the Judge Advocate deciding on sentences together.

In answer to one of the specific points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, that does not mean that the UK court martial has remained unchanged since the 2021 Act was implemented. In 2022, a new court martial rule was introduced that ensured that each court martial board includes at least one servicewoman. This is not sufficient, but it is a step forward. That is the only point I would make—which I am not sure my noble friends to the left of me totally agreed with—but all I am saying is that while it is not sufficient, it is a step forward.

In 2025, 28% of the service personnel who were sworn in as board members for court martial proceedings were women. Again, that is not what it should be, but it is a significant improvement. Since December 2024, court martial boards have been almost exclusively tri-service.

The judge advocate is of course the expert on sentencing. It is true that any sentence passed by the court martial must be determined by a majority vote, meaning that the judge advocate’s voice could, theoretically, be outweighed. However, the judge advocate will give the board the legal framework, identify the relevant sentencing guidelines and set the proper parameters within which the sentence must be considered. Failure to have regard to those guidelines and parameters opens the way to an appeal in the Court Martial Appeal Court.

The board members do not replace the judicial role. Their role is different and complementary. They bring current service experience to the assessment of what sentence is appropriate within the lawful framework. Service personnel are subject to rules, standards and operational expectations that go beyond ordinary civilian employment. Conduct that might appear straightforward in a civilian setting can have a markedly different impact in the military context, particularly where it affects discipline, cohesion, readiness, safety or operational effectiveness.

Board members bring up-to-date knowledge and real-time experience of single service policies, procedures, values and standards. The amendment would reduce the board’s role from one of equal participation to one of consultation only. There is a real difference between being consulted and being part of the decision. Consultation would mean that the judge advocate could hear the service perspective but reject it. The current system ensures that the service perspective is taken into account in the sentencing decision, while remaining subject to the judge advocate’s firm legal direction.

Nor is there any legal issue that this amendment needs to address. Sentencing in the court martial is already subject to stringent legal controls. The court martial must have regard to the relevant sentencing guidelines, which for criminal offences incorporate the same guidelines used in the Crown Court and the magistrates’ courts. The Judge Advocate-General also issues detailed sentencing guidance for the service courts. Aggravation and mitigation are fully addressed in open court by the prosecution and defence, and pre-sentence reports from experienced probation officers are available where required. Sentences are reasoned in open court and may be reviewed subsequently by the Court Martial Appeal Court.

It is also important to remember that, while military experience informs sentencing, it does not displace the legal principles governing it. Any mitigation advanced on behalf of an offender—whether arising from previous operational service, commendations, awards or personal circumstances—must be assessed within the sentencing framework directed by the judge advocate and in accordance with applicable sentencing guidelines. To be clear, board members are not free to substitute personal views of military merit for the lawful sentencing exercise, and any sentence that failed properly to reflect the relevant legal principles would be liable to appeal.

As court martial sentencing includes service-specific sentences such as dismissal, reduction in rank and service detention, military board members are particularly well placed to assess the practical effect of those sanctions on both the individual to be sentenced and the wider service community. Board members are lay decision-makers directed to exercise their own independent judgment: importantly, they are not representatives of the chain of command. Their current military experience assists the court; it does not compromise the court’s independence.

The Government argue that the amendment would therefore reduce the service character of the court martial without adding any significant additional safeguard. We believe that the current balance is the right one: the judge advocate provides the legal expertise and safeguards; the lay board members provide current military experience and independent judgment. Together, they produce a sentence that is lawful, reasoned and properly informed by the service context. For these reasons, I ask the noble Baronesses not to press the amendments.