Football Governance Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Brady and Lord Hayward

Committee stage
Monday 16th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hayward (Con)]

My Lords, in relation to consultation, on which several comments have been made during the discussions on this and previous groups, it is worth bearing in mind, when the Minister tells us that there will be wide consultation in whatever circumstances, what my noble friend Lady Brady said on day one of Committee. She said that the Government had consulted seven Premier League clubs, which did not include Manchester City. They consulted those seven clubs for about as long as it took Spurs to score four goals against Southampton yesterday. It was hardly serious communication and consideration. That is what worries so many of us: we are listening to a series of comments that sound reasonable in themselves—and I have sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, said—but I would believe it if there had been a very clear indication at previous stages of the Bill that there had been consultation with the interested parties.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 124. I think it introduces a sensible and proportionate idea: that the independent football regulator should have the power to delegate certain functions to competition organisers, such as the Premier League, the EFL and the National League, where it is appropriate. First, I want to consider the position of the leagues themselves, especially the Premier League and the EFL, both of which already play central roles in the regulation and operation of English football. These organisations are not merely administrative bodies; they are sophisticated, well-sourced entities with established systems for financial monitoring, licensing and governance.

For example, the Premier League currently performs all the UEFA licensing for clubs on behalf of the FA, demonstrating its capability to operate efficiently and effectively under stringent regulatory frameworks. It also has robust financial monitoring mechanisms in place, which ensure that clubs comply with obligations relating to profitability, sustainability and long-term planning. As I mentioned earlier in Committee, the Premier League also invests significant resources and time in performing its owners’ and directors’ tests to a very high standard, and intends to continue to do so.

Simply duplicating all these existing structures within the IFR would be inefficient and burdensome, as the White Paper that led to the Bill rightly acknowledged:

“The Regulator may wish to allow concurrent systems, or delegate responsibilities to industry bodies, in certain circumstances. It would manage this in a way that is coherent and simple for all involved, especially clubs”.


Unfortunately, however, no sensible delegation power currently exists in the Bill, so I commend my noble friends Lord Markham and Lord Parkinson for addressing this issue and allowing for this conversation. This amendment would align perfectly with that principle expressed in the White Paper. It would be a smart, almost unarguable step to take: delegation would allow the regulator to focus its resources, especially in the early years of its life, on areas where independent oversight is essential, such as addressing market failures and managing systemic risks. At the same time, it would give the regulator the option of leaning on existing processes or information systems where they are already successfully implemented.

Delegation would also address an important practical reality. The workload facing the IFR will be immense. I am not surprised that the EFL wishes to offload some of its costs to the regulator, and that is its right. In its early years, this regulator will have to establish itself, build capacity and gain the trust of stakeholders across the ecosystem. That is a big burden. Allowing it to delegate certain functions, with appropriate safeguards, ensures that it can deliver its objectives without being overwhelmed by administrative tasks that others are well placed to manage.

However, this clearly cannot be done on blind trust. The amendment includes what seem to be important safeguards: the IFR must ensure that any competition organiser meets the same degree of stringency, aligns with its objectives, and adheres to its regulatory principles. This would seem to protect the integrity of the regulatory framework, while avoiding unnecessary duplication and, therefore, unnecessary cost.

More broadly still, this amendment raises an important question that we must address about the future role of the Football Association. While the fan-led review’s position was that the FA’s current governance arrangements make it unsuitable to house the IFR at present, it also envisaged a scenario where one day this might change. As the review noted,

“the FA might at some point be a suitable location for IREF … However, the Review has concluded that this is not appropriate at this time”.

This amendment raises the possibility of the delegation of certain functions to the FA, as part of its reform journey. If the FA continues to modernise its governance structures and demonstrate the capability to take on certain functions, it could play a much larger role in football’s regulatory framework.

Indeed, I encourage the Government to consider including the FA in the scope of this clause as such, because it should meet the same rigorous criteria that the leagues have to. Delegation to football bodies could be tied to a broad review of football governance a few years into this regime. This review could assess not only the progress of the IFR but the readiness of the FA and other football bodies to take on greater responsibilities. This will ensure that the IFR can be a dynamic institution, evolving in response to the needs of the game and empowering existing bodies to step up, where it makes sense. I believe that all stakeholders, including the most ardent supporters of the fan-led review, as well as those worried about the unintended consequences of this delegation, could support this kind of sensible amendment.

Finally, but most importantly, in a letter sent to me by the general-secretary of UEFA only last week, he said:

“UEFA appreciate the background of the Football Governance Bill discussions and proposals, and we were encouraged by the intent of the original Fan Led Review which stated that this regulatory area should be returned to The FA in time. UEFA supports The FA and UK policymakers in ensuring that this is still the case”.


The FA told me, also last week, that it has recently told DCMS that

“the FA is willing to take on delegated powers from the IFR, if there are services that the regulator believes we can operate and deliver effectively”.

I ask the Minister: is it still the case, as UEFA and the FA seem to believe, that the Government intend the future delegation of powers to be handed back to the FA at some point? If it is, surely this is an amendment that the Government could and should support.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Brady and Lord Hayward

Committee stage
Monday 2nd December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendment 16, tabled by my noble friend Lord Jackson. The amendment would require the regulator to take into account the economic risks of overregulation and report against this risk. I am sure this is an approach that will interest all parts of the Committee, especially, as my noble friend Lord Jackson reminded us, as the Prime Minister himself recently made such a high priority of reducing the impact of regulatory burden on British investment and growth.

We should consider the Prime Minister’s words carefully. He spoke of breaking free from the trap of excessive regulation, of removing needless barriers to investment, and of ensuring that regulators take growth far more seriously. Yet, here we are again, at risk of creating a new regulator without proper safeguards against exactly these risks. Indeed, the Department for Business and Trade this year published a report on smarter regulation, which described the problem in stark terms:

“Good regulation allows our markets and societies to function. However, there is strong evidence that points to our regulatory culture acting as a drag on our ability to generate economic activity, innovation and to attract investment. The regulatory environment is often confusing and sometimes features of it appear to exist for the benefit of the regulators, rather than the industries who they regulate, consumers or Britain as a whole”.


We must take care to guard against our regulatory culture having a similarly damaging impact on British football.

As other noble Lords have pointed out, the Premier League represents one of Britain’s most successful exports, contributing £8.2 billion annually to our economy and more than £4 billion to the Exchequer, while supporting more than 90,000 jobs. Already, we are seeing concerning signs in the Bill: undefined ownership tests: parallel regulatory requirements; unproven intervention powers; and sweeping powers to redistribute Premier League revenue. Each adds complexity and risks that could deter the very investment that we need.

The Premier League competes globally for capital, for talent and for attention. Excessive regulation could quickly diminish its appeal to serious investors, with knock-on impacts for the pyramid which relies on the Premier League. As the chief executive of the Premier League has said in relation to this Bill, we must not wound the goose that lays English football’s golden egg. It is that egg that supports so much of the good work that we discussed earlier and the football pyramid as a whole.

The Prime Minister pledged to “march through the institutions”, ensuring regulators take growth seriously. Yet this Bill creates a regulator with no equal duty to consider success, economic impact or growth alongside the very vague notions of soundness and resilience, which, as I said earlier in this Committee, have no clear end state. We can have both effective regulation and economic dynamism, but only if we build in appropriate safeguards from the start. Without them, we risk creating exactly the kind of bureaucratic barriers to investment that the Prime Minister has correctly identified as holding Britain back.

[Lord Hayward (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Jackson. I will concentrate particularly on both the impact assessment and what my noble friend Lord Maude was referring to: the impact on small businesses. Following on from the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Birt, when I made my comments at Second Reading, I emphasised that my concerns are not that there are no problems; the question is how we actually tackle the problems that exist in the industry while not damaging the success.

I have made a number of references to the impact assessment, and I quoted from it earlier today. On page 8, paragraph 17, it states:

“This Impact Assessment (IA) provides evidence and analysis to support the government’s case for intervention”.

I am concerned after reading the impact assessment that, as my noble friends Lord Jackson and Lord Maude identified, the impact is not on the big companies. Anybody who has sat on the side of an industry, as I did when changes were made to licensing law, for example, knows that it is not the big companies that are affected by such changes. They have the resources. It is the small companies that are confused, concerned and lost. They do not have a specialist to deal with the minutiae of a clause. I was the chief executive of the British Beer and Pub Association at the time, and it was an enormous task to guide smaller companies through the issues they faced. For me, the impact assessment dramatically underestimates the impact that small companies face in these circumstances.

I will come back to other elements later, but I am particularly concerned—and am referring to page 53 onwards—about the identified benefits that are supposed to accrue to the industry. The costs are dealt with, but I must admit that I am not convinced. On the indirect benefits, paragraph 225 comes up with a wonderful sentence:

“These indirect benefits are extremely difficult to quantify, given the range of variables that will affect the profitability of individual football clubs. Therefore, these are not quantified in the appraisal”.


Paragraph 227 says:

“These benefits are extremely difficult and speculative to quantify and therefore are not quantified in the appraisal”.


The noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, will no doubt be relieved that I have not entered into any word counts on this occasion.

On accruing benefits for the community, paragraph 233, on page 54, states:

“The model states that the results of this contingent valuation survey of football users and non-users shows that people positively value the club they support/their local club and would be willing to pay an annual subscription to support it”.


I find myself at a loss to believe that my noble friend went round the streets of Wycombe or any other community and asked, “Would you be willing to pay X sum to support the club?” The suggestion that large parts of any population are

“willing to pay … to support”

their local club is really stretching credibility far.

This comment was made as a result of some work undertaken by Ipsos, an organisation for which I have high regard and with which I deal on polling. But the next paragraph, 235, refers to the following:

“DCMS guidance states that a lower bound”—


I am not sure whether the authors intend “bound” or “band”—

“95% confidence interval of willingness to pay (WTP)”.

That is rather like talking about turnout at a general election by asking people whether they are going to vote. I checked with a pollster this morning, and the mean answer given is 80%. The turnout at the last election was 60%, so there was an error of a quarter or a third, depending on whether you go upwards or downwards. To suggest that you can quantify the willingness of a community and people in the street to pay to support their local club stretches the bounds of credibility.

But on page 56 we have a breakdown, in detail, of the willingness of each region of the country to pay a sum to support its local club. There has been infinite reference to the fact that the support for clubs crosses from one place to another. Therefore, if you are contributing in the north-east or in London you may not be willing to pay to support a specific club. It is not surprising that London is identified as the place where people are most willing to supply most money, but it does not say whether the sums involved include a season ticket. Many of the people who answered the question will have thought, “Well, I actually pay in the form of a season ticket already and therefore I am contributing”.

What is depressing about the impact assessment is that it goes into such detail in relation to the benefits that will be gained from this legislation, but there is no attempt to identify what the clubs will have to pay. I am not talking here about the Premier League clubs; I am talking about the small clubs. In her response to the points that I and others raised at Second Reading, the Minister said that the costs would be proportionate. But no figures are given. I find it barely credible that such detail can be provided to identify how much people from each different area of the country are willing to pay, but there is no calculation of the cost for a small club.

That is where the important issue—the questions raised by my noble friend Lord Jackson—arises. People can concentrate on Premier League clubs, but we are talking here about regulating over 100 clubs. People do not realise that the impact will be on the small clubs. The Government need to be honest before this legislation passes, and to identify the probable burden for each of the small clubs, because without that information it is not appropriate to pass into law a football regulation Bill.