(1 year, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, much of what we have just heard would be very much supported by the group of people with whom I work. We do not want to reduce the protection of either group of which we are speaking, particularly small people asking for redress.
The ombudsman service needs reform; there is no doubt about that. We really have to discuss putting some stakes in the ground about not blaming people for things they would never have thought of at that point because we now think of them. I am afraid that my noble friend Lord Lilley’s amendments do not help us in that direction. In other words, all the issues I would want to raise about the ombudsman are not covered by these amendments. Similarly, it is true about the protection of people from the effect of investigation, even when that investigation turns out not to be justified.
I finish by reminding the Committee of the original discussion we had. We need a system that people see to be fair and is shown to work effectively for small as well as big people. I do not think these amendments will help this, but I hope we will be able to have changes. I do not think that you should accept any changes just because you want changes, and I submit that these are the wrong changes.
My Lords, I am speaking later than I would have in the debate, due to the absence of my noble friend Lady Kramer. The Committee will be pleased to know that I shall not try to say everything that I would have said, as well as everything that she would have said.
It is well known from the previous FSMA that I support independent review. I had an earlier amendment to this Bill suggesting the use of the NAO, to which the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, referred. I am pleased to support his amendments, which I have put my name to and which lay out a much more thorough range of new provisions. At this stage, I should probably remind the Committee of my interests in the register, in that I am a director of the London Stock Exchange, as I am going to talk about my regulator.
The UK would not be alone in having independent review of financial regulations as part of its accountability. That was one outcome of the review of the financial crisis in Australia. I have been around this argument many times, and today it has already been eloquently explained by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, so I pose instead the question: what happens without an independent review? One thing that is certain is that there will be complaints about regulations and, by and large, the regulators will defend their work. Parliament’s committees will try to scrutinise, but that is a public process—or it has been called the political process. They are well adapted to do the kind of inquiry that they do and often get into the nub of the matter. But as we have found out in the Industry and Regulators Committee, it is difficult to get industry to state in public what its issues are with the regulators. As I have pointed out with amendments and speeches on previous days, the Government do not give any legislative status to the parliamentary reports, so there is scrutiny but no consequence, which is not accountability.
Additionally, within intensively supervised frameworks, such as that which exists, probably uniquely, in the financial services sector, there is genuine concern on the industry side about regulators’ retaliation or suspicion if they complain. I acknowledge that the heads of the regulators have said that this would not happen, and would be wrong, but that does not allay concerns or whispers about this most crucial of relationships between industry and its regulators, where every word is guarded. There are also genuine concerns that explanations require public disclosure about investigations or other difficulties that firms may have faced in compliance, which they would rather not put in the public domain—for example, out of commercial confidentiality about future plans and not for reasons of bad behaviour.
Industry will therefore instead bend the ear of government through many of the private channels that it has, whether through the Treasury or at Cabinet level—for example, as it has about international competitiveness. The Government may choose to act, as they have in that instance. Meanwhile, the public channels remain uninformed or unconvinced, because—and I refer again to the experience of the Industry and Regulators Committee—we were given evidence of only operational inefficiency and not of rules that caused any lack of competitiveness. How is public trust to be maintained under these circumstances? How is there to be the legitimacy that has been spoken about? How are reviews to get through the confidentiality concerns in a way that the public trusts?
The Minister has sat tight on review in all the previous debates on this Bill and the previous one, saying that the Government have given themselves powers to satisfy those requirements—powers to ask the regulator to review its rules. I do not object to that, but it hardly has any independence or new eyes. There are powers to seek independent reviews but as we know from experience, because those powers have been around for a while, such reviews have not been used quickly or frequently. They tend to follow a sequence of disasters, as the Gloster review did, and not to be done in any checking or anticipatory way. I understand why that is, because government must keep a certain distance and look for some systemic concern rather than one-off causes, but that distance leaves a gap.
Of course, there are powers to intervene by way of directions, which need to be used with care if the independence of regulators and international respect for them are to be maintained. None of those powers satisfactorily address how there should be checking in a way that permits private submissions but remains free of it looking as if government either is interfering too much and getting too cosy with industry, which is what it will look like if the Government use their powers to intervene as much as might be needed, or never acts until there has been substantial damage, when it really is too late.
I would also be interested if the Minister would inform the Committee of the level of resources and number of personnel that the Treasury is able to put behind its own monitoring, and whether it is free from reliance on industry and consultancy involvement. It is no good if it is just sent back to the same people, who will give the same information as comes in through the private channels anyway. How is that meant to be independent? I hope the Minister will take account of the fact that calls for independent review, as well as enhanced parliamentary scrutiny, come from all sides of the House and need to be addressed. There should be some serious conversations before we get to Report.
I will briefly say a few things about the amendments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley but I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie. It would be a dreadful shame if one of the major achievements of this Parliament after the last financial crisis were watered down or, even worse, set aside. I fear that, as has been explained, that could well be the case. When the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, introduced his previous amendments, I said that I am not totally against a libertarian approach—one where you have to take care, and if you get it wrong then you are for the high jump—but that is not what is presented here. This proposal would make it extremely difficult for the regulators. It does not fit with the kind of regulatory system we have, with its underfunded regulators. It is a way to make it easy to set aside what the regulators have done. Given what I just explained about the relationship that firms have with their regulators—one of the reasons why, regrettably, they will shy away from legal action—it will not necessarily overturn that.
I do not agree with the predictability and consistency objective, for the reasons that others have explained: we want agility and change, and have to adapt to circumstance. If something comes to court, surely it could remain that a judge ultimately applies it, but that would be in the light of circumstances and an acknowledgement that circumstances change and regulation necessarily proceeds.
Likewise on a good-faith defence and reasonableness, my take on the senior managers regime is that the whole point is to make individuals be proactive, rather than just coasting along in what has been a comfortable way of life—how things have always been done. It has meant they have to engage their brain, think about it and update in the light of circumstances. Just saying, “There was a set of rules and I complied”, is not meant to be enough; you have to take account of what is going on.
Is there not a conflict here to some extent between people on the one hand talking about wanting principles-led regulations and, on the other, talking about that being vague? There are complaints that there are too many rules, yet it is industry compliance departments that are first off the blocks saying, “Where are the rules? Give us the rules! I want to know where to put my tick”, so I am not sure which section of the market this proposal is supposed to serve.
My Lords, again, I declare my interests as listed in the register—in particular, as a director of London Stock Exchange plc.
I shall start where the Minister finished, in the sense that he said that there had been constructive engagement with stakeholders and industry. I acknowledge that that is true, and I also acknowledge that HMT has, by and large, done a very good job with the full range of statutory instruments, a great many of which some of us have had the pleasure of looking at. However, I have a comment to make on the others, and I say this because the Minister is relatively new to his post. Previously, once there was a final version, this was sent to those of us who were engaged on the SIs with a little more notice than we have had in this case—perhaps to look up a few things and occasionally even to find a few more mistakes than we have been able to this time.
I recognise that this is an unusual time, with our having been dragged back when perhaps the Government had not expected that—although that was obviously the right thing to do—but if any more SIs are lined up, can the Government try to give us a little more notice of the final versions? That would make things far smoother for us. We are rather large stakeholders but are not really being consulted until it is in the final form. We sometimes have only a couple of days to look at it. The Government are giving far more time to the people who do not have to make decisions than those who do. In general with secondary legislation, it is very important that this can be done with much more time at our disposal.
I do not have a great deal to say. I agree that, by and large, these are relatively small changes. It gives us a nice list of things that I need to go and look at in the Criminal Justice Act—it raises my curiosity about what regulated markets are defined elsewhere. Obviously, if it is a question of bad behaviour, we want to catch that globally, not just within the EEA. I assume that we have some definitions of regulated markets, such as in the United States and elsewhere. Maybe that can be answered for me, but I will have to go and have a look.
Something jumped out at me slightly in the amendments to MiFID, where it is being redefined to refer just to the UK systematic internalisers, rather than reading “EU systematic internalisers”. It says that that was previously a mistake and should have been localised to the UK. We have had several instances where things were deliberately UK-wide and EU-wide sometimes—the question was whether it would be a symmetric or asymmetric case. In some ways, this reflects back to the whole criminal justice thing: we are catching bad behaviour in the whole of the EEA and they presumably want to catch it in the UK, even if by an EU firm.
Was it previously a mistake that it covered the whole of the EU or has there been a slight change of policy from the UK’s perspective? Are we saying, “Okay, we are going to narrow this down so that you have to do it in the UK, rather than allowing you to do it in a wider range of locations”? I would like to know that. We have previously picked up on things and asked, “Why are you allowing these to be EU-wide?”. That is the only point I really have to make, other than repeating the fact that it would have been nice if the Explanatory Memorandum had been slightly updated.
Oh, yes—there was also a point on solvency. I note that the PRA becomes in charge of the risk-free rates. I hope that there will be some co-ordination there so that we do not end up having a completely different risk-free rate from the rest of the EU. That might be a rather difficult situation. I cannot resist saying that I hope the PRA makes a better job of the risk-free rate than the Government have of the discount rate.
My Lords, I remind the House of my declaration of interests, particularly my chairmanship of the association representing financial advisors.
I apologise to the House—but not to my noble friend, because he has not heard the comments that I have carried through all the debates on these statutory instruments. I would not like this statutory instrument to pass without us yet again making the point that this is rubbish. We should not be here. This is a nonsense. The more you read about it, the more you realise what a nonsense it is. The truth is that we are kindly giving other people the opportunity to do things that we have always done, and we will not be able to do them unless we are prepared to take the same rules as everyone else. So the whole thing is a nonsense. I am sorry that my noble friend the Minister has to present it. He will do so charmingly and nicely and will not be rude about it, but I do not want him to go without some people on this side of the House, as well as others, saying that we should not be here. We have spent hours and hours on debate. He very rightly thanked all the people who have helped him, but they should not have been wasting their time. We have spent an enormous amount of time doing something wholly deleterious to the United Kingdom. In the whole of my long life I cannot remember an occasion on which that has been so obvious.
This happens to be a worse Government than those who have preceded them in this situation, but the fact remains that we should not be here, because what is being proposed is bad for Britain. We are not taking back control; we are putting ourselves into a position in which other people will have control and we will have no say in it at all.
That is the first point about this very small and unimportant series of amendments. The second point is this: as the noble Baroness has so often said before and has said again today, it is utterly impossible for people to keep up with the minutiae, or with the very fact that the Government has had yet again to make changes. I noticed a very elegant phrase that my noble friend used: “Like all legislation, when we went through it again there were things that we needed to change”. Of course there are, if you keep on legislating entirely unnecessarily at great length in order to damage our country. That is what is so serious. Of course, it is true that we have found yet more examples. I imagine that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, with her considerable knowledge, will find some more, and we will go and tell the Government how nice it would be if they added all these other things.
The third reason I intervene is simply that the financial services industry is an important part of the United Kingdom’s economy; it does some very important things. Over many years, it has become respected throughout the world for its knowledge and under- standing. There have, of course, been occasions when things have gone wrong. I am the last person to defend that. But we have an established reputation throughout the world. I say to my noble friend the Minister that this is another example of us undermining that reputation for no good reason at all.
Of course, we will pass this and go through the motions yet again, but I resent having to spend good time on bad proposals. I resent it not just for myself, noble friends or noble Peers opposite; I resent it for all those decent civil servants who have spent their time not improving this country, not extending its influence, not making things better for Britain—but undermining it, in what I know they will have tried to make the least damaging way. The fundamental process is deeply damaging. I do not think that this House should pass these things without reminding the Government, including even so charming a Minister as we have, of the nonsense that we are engaged in.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI hope that my noble friend the Minister has listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, on this matter. We are faced with a real difficulty here. We have agreed to many kinds of legislation, of which this is only one, to protect ourselves against the extraordinarily damaging situation whereby we leave the European Union without a deal. One of the dangers, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, pointed, was that, if we are not careful, we will be so sure that something is not necessary that we will not look at it as carefully as we ought.
The reason I suggest that my noble friend take Amendment 7 and the amendments that we are now discussing very seriously is this: the whole purpose of Parliament is to make sure that we expose the full extent of decisions of the Executive; it is to curb the Executive in the sense that it ensures that things do not slip through with unintended results.
I am sure that the Government have every intention of using this legislation properly; I am in no way criticising them about that. However, it is true that decisions made primarily by civil servants, which are not open to public scrutiny, can be disastrous. Any of us who have been Ministers know that; we know that one of the most important, perhaps the most important, protection the public have—and the most important discipline that one has as a Minister—is that decisions have to be debated and discussed. My noble friend knows that in this House, where we have limited powers, it is still true that very often during Committee and Report terrible gaps have been shown in legislative proposals. These are gaps which, once they have been revealed, the Government are rapidly determined to fill: to change what they are proposing because they had not meant to have that result.
In those circumstances, it is difficult, is it not, to give these powers so totally to the bureaucratic system? That is so even if one imagines that Ministers themselves have no intention of delivering other than what is perfectly in line with these legislative requirements. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to suggest that there should in all circumstances be a public discussion. The Government’s usual response is, “We can’t possibly do this as there isn’t time”. I am prepared to accept that as a generality, but this is not to impose a long-winded system; it is merely to say that what is proposed shall have sufficient public exposure and discussion to enable people to see whether it is within the proper confines of the Bill or reaches beyond it.
Although I had to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, on an earlier amendment and his view of it, this one seems to draw attention to a very real issue. My noble friend and I share a considerable desire that these circumstances shall never arise. He is in no position to share my further desire, which is that we shall not leave the European Union anyway—I have no idea what his personal views are but I know what his views have to be at the Dispatch Box. The public will become less and less enamoured with this whole unprofitable and unacceptable process. If the Government want to protect themselves, at least to some extent, it is extremely important to make sure that these matters are processed in public. If they were ever to come about, the Government would find that protecting and defending what they have done was extremely hard, but why not accept that some further process beyond that allowed for in this Bill would be a democratic help in circumstances which will, we hope, not occur?
My Lords, I agreed with the amendments of Lord Adonis; I do not agree that they are not needed, even with Amendment 7. There is still the issue of sequencing in terms of what is and is not being done; Amendment 7 does not solve the cherry-picking point or various other things. I attach quite a lot of importance to the reports provided by subsections (8) and (9). In that context, I read the amendments that added in the Bank of England. The noble Lord has explained that in the sense of taking advice from the Bank of England. But when doing these transpositions, there are inevitably delegated acts and other associated things that will be done at the level of the regulators and will not even be contained in a statutory instrument. Therefore I thought it was right that the regulators reported how things are dealt with as well as the Treasury. I support the amendment but would add the PRA and the FCA. In that way, we get the full Treasury report through to the regulators, so that we see that we are all on the same page and where the tweaks, even within the available limits, are made. So I agree with the noble Lord.
As to whether Amendment 11A is needed, there is no harm in putting it there. The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee and other committees will still be doing their part when the things come to them, so I see no reason not to give some work to the Treasury Select Committee.