Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted and Baroness Lawlor

Committee stage
Monday 6th July 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I broadly support Amendment 142A, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for bringing it forward. I also think that the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, or something similar would obviously be needed as some kind of companion to it.

Whatever the FCA may have been intended to be, it is now proudly and explicitly a consumer protection body. For much of its work that is good, but some noble Lords will know that it has taken me and others four years to get incorrect cost disclosure descriptions for listed investment companies corrected, simply because consumers like the incorrect versions. Indeed, that saga led to a telling exchange at a meeting of the Financial Services Regulation Committee. The FCA chair insisted that consumer views always took priority, and I replied, “If you ask whether one and one makes two or three, and the consumer says, ‘I like three—it’s a bigger number’, is that what you use?” There was no denial. That is the scale of the problem: a regulatory culture where consumer preference for something factually incorrect overrides market integrity. It is a mindset that has already cost billions in potential investment in productive assets.

That was where it touched consumers; now let us move on to look at the wholesale areas. The trouble is that that mindset gets pasted across too. We do not need to debate whether the FCA went overboard in demanding that wholesale businesses had to proactively prove that they do no consumer harm in transactions that never touched consumers. The admission is there in consultation CP26/23 at paragraph 1.3, acknowledging overreach, as well as acknowledging

“unnecessary cost, complexity and uncertainty, without clear benefits for retail consumers”.

However, having finally identified the cancer, the regulator is merely applying a sticking plaster. All that is being offered is the mildest semantic tweak to guidance—effectively, a guide to guidance. It has no legal effect. It allows the regulator to continue its current trajectory with a slight adjustment to its vocabulary. We all know that this change was extracted only after heavy nudging by the Chancellor and intense parliamentary scrutiny. It is hardly being done with good grace and provides no guarantee of permanence.

The fact is, we must deal with the FCA as it is, not as it might have been. Since the advent of the consumer duty, the retail-first culture is irreversibly embedded into the psyche of staff, and in many instances it is the reason why they joined the regulator in the first place.

Perhaps one of the most telling things is to look at what is said about other regulators. On the Monetary Authority of Singapore, which I found a very enlightened body on my visit there some years ago, the comment is, “Although MAS is a unitary regulator, it splits its internal policy divisions strictly by target market rather than by trying to govern everything under an overarching outcomes-based code like the UK’s consumer duty”, and, “It works because the wholesale division, answerable to the MAS leadership, is judged primarily on market liquidity, innovation and international competitiveness. There is zero risk of a consumer advocacy group hijacking a wholesale policy consultation”. I wonder where they were thinking about. A ring-fenced, structurally separate wholesale unit within our regulator’s architecture must live up to that standard.

Some may argue that all wholesale activity impacts retail eventually, and I agree, but there is a massive, fundamental difference between regulating wholesale markets for the integrity of the system, which protects everyone, and regulating as if they are a high-street retail shopfloor. The former ensures safety, the latter ensures paralysis. For any noble Lord worried about this structural change, nothing being suggested would remove liability for wrongs or harms to consumers, should that occur. Let us be clear: this amendment is not an attempt to escape oversight; it is an attempt to ensure that oversight is competent, technically accurate and focused on the reality of the market being regulated. Let nobody forget that MiFID and other legislation already provides a rigorous framework governing transparency, best execution and conflicts of interest. This is no soft ride: this amendment is a necessary structural correction, and I support it.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group, but I shall confine my remarks to Amendment 165 and the linked Amendment 173 from my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for an FCA operational readiness report presented by the Treasury. Amendment 165 would mean that Parliament has the opportunity to ensure, by a Treasury report, that we have an assessment of the FCA’s operational readiness to exercise any significant new regulatory function conferred by the Act of staffing, resourcing and the capability of the systems in place and of the impact expected on authorisations, supervisions and enforcement timeliness. This will be a formal report to Parliament. Until we have such a report from the Treasury that the FCA is operationally ready, Amendment 173 would ensure that the Act cannot start.

My Amendment 165A proposes that the report must also assess readiness in terms of preparatory training and the interpretation of the application of the Act. Such a requirement should prompt the FCA to deploy and train existing staff with the specific knowledge and understanding of the new powers they will operate under the Bill and to therefore be up to date and competent to regulate firms under the law. It would require the Treasury to report to Parliament and, in this way, there is a measure of accountability.

It might be contended that this requirement is otiose, but the FCA’s workforce is around 5,000, recruited from candidates with a diverse range of skills under different headings. Finance and operations make up 46%; engineering makes up 30% and sales and marketing make up 23%. The median employee tenure is 4.2 years. Regulators come to their post with a diverse range of skills; some are highly experienced and others less so. Today, 17 posts are advertised that cover a wide range of jobs and responsibilities for which different skills are required. For example, there is a senior insurance supervisor job, a financial crime marketing interventions associate, an L&D associate, a lead for global strategy and engagement, a primary markets supervisor, a senior crypto and payment supervisor and a technical specialist in AI—my noble friend Lord Holmes will be pleased to hear that.

The skills range required can include the common skills we would expect or generic skills, for instance, in data systems. The senior crypto asset and payment supervisor responsible for working in this developing sector, who will lead difficult cases, identify risks, deal with crossborder problems and help prevent crime, is also expected to “drive improvements in standards”.

These are important and demanding tasks. They also operate in a rapidly developing area. Given the nature of the system and that the principles still apply, regulators are internally accountable for what will be subject to interpretations and judgments. There should therefore be the requirement of at least general and specific knowledge, and competencies for each role but, as financial products continue to be developed and the framework of law continues to change, there must also be continuous learning and updating in the law and the powers given to the regulators under it, rather than assuming that somehow the regulators will be equipped and operationally ready to do the job.