Payment Accounts (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Wednesday 12th December 2018 Grand Committee

Finally, can I ask the Minister for an assurance that under these regulations there will be no weakening of the disclosure of information to customers from banks and payment account providers on matters such as fees and charges, and any other matter on which there are currently disclosure requirements to the customer?

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bates, for his introduction and the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, for drawing attention to the report of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee’s Sub-Committee A, on which I sit, so I do not have to do it. With the state of my voice, that is welcome.

The issue of note here is that an obligation to service non-UK residents is removed. Many of these will probably be UK nationals and will probably come to the UK sometimes, even though they are resident elsewhere. I am sure that this will be an inconvenience and that is greatly regretted. In the interests of saying that this is not being reciprocated, there has been a lack of generosity of spirit in this statutory instrument. Can the Minister confirm whether there would be any supervisory pressure, under “know your client” provisions, for these accounts to be closed? Will supervisors make it more awkward and put pressure on the banks so that closure is de facto the most likely event?

I also remind the Committee that one of the purposes of this legislation was to ensure that basic bank accounts could be opened in advance for people who were moving around for the purposes of work. Otherwise, you get into a Catch-22 situation where you cannot get a permanent place of residence until you have a bank account and you cannot get a bank account until you have a permanent place of residence. While I was an MEP, I got this in my postbag. Indeed, one of my own children had this problem. We were constantly having to intervene to get these things sorted. If we want to encourage talent and still allow it to come to the UK, why make it awkward? I am sure that those who come for big and well-paid jobs may find that they can open accounts, but what about the more ordinary person? I think that, actually, this is a very bad measure.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for presenting this instrument. When I first read the Explanatory Memorandum, I thought it was good and it convinced me that, broadly speaking, the instrument was doing its job. Then my noble friend Lady Drake decided to share her speech with me and I realised that perhaps I had not fully understood it, but by this point in the proceedings, the Minister had enough questions to answer anyway without me inventing any more.

The point that has come out of the last two speeches is important. The Government often conclude that an impact is minimal because it affects quite a small number of people. The problem with that attitude is that for the people it affects, it affects them 100%. If you cannot get a basic bank account, that is pretty close to catastrophic in the modern world, so I hope that the Minister will have good answers to my noble friend’s points.

My question is one that runs through many of these SIs—the lack of formal consultation. The consultation paragraph states that there has been discussion with “relevant stakeholders”. One has an uncomfortable feeling that the relevant stakeholders are in fact the financial institutions themselves and not the key relevant stakeholders—the consumers. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us who the relevant stakeholders were and whether they included consumer representatives, and, if not, why not?

Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill [HL]

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 4th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, the Bill establishes a short-cut alternative to starting over again with primary legislation for provisions that are in the EU pipeline and in which the UK has already been engaged. It looks like a convenient scheme. However, I share the concerns raised by other noble Lords, although I agree that the legislation need to be implemented because the large majority of it—at least, what is in the schedule—completes the post-financial-crisis review of legislation.

I am sorry that we have not been given more guidance to what might be objectionable than the example of location policy. Once the short-cut onshoring of bits of legislation has happened, Parliament will be left with very little scope ever to come to grips with major financial services policy. That means that what we are doing now as a temporary measure will have permanent effects. It will all be delegated and in the hands of SIs and regulators—back to the Treasury and the regulatory officials who make up the rules in international consortiums. That, as I have said, is “delegate and deference”, not parliamentary democracy. It is far worse than the scrutiny available in the EU. If we are taking back control, we ought to make sure that our scrutiny is as good as that of the EU.

The Bill is also difficult for me because there is the possibility of wide powers being used differently from non-legislative promises, and because precedents are being set that may then be used in other circumstances. Here, a precedent is set of bypassing primary legislation and piggybacking on somebody else’s scrutiny—for our largest industry. Of course, that may be the truth of Brexit.

There are some non-legislative assurances listed in paragraph 1.9 of the Treasury policy document, which has already been referenced, but I am not sure I find them reassuring. The first is that any method other than coming to Parliament will be used in preference. I do not see virtue in avoiding the scrutiny of Parliament. There is also a commitment to undertake extensive engagement and co-operation with key stakeholders. I do not decry that but—from experience—that does not seem to include Parliament. In the present circumstances, it is all the more important to consult Parliament when, by the Government’s own admission, this is a process that replaces the more detailed scrutiny of primary legislation.

I too have noted the provisions about preparing reports. I particularly noted, in subsection (8)(b), the report on the,

“proposals for exercise of the powers”,

in the second year. Maybe that gives us something to expand on, because it is very important to have an overarching idea of the policy being pursued and the concerns that I have identified. But, as other noble Lords have perhaps already hinted, it is needed in advance of year one as well.

I accept that a no-deal Brexit is not quite what is planned, but, even so, everything that the Government have ever said about our relationship with the EU post Brexit has aimed at getting equivalence or better. If that breaks down because policy changes a great deal, I will accept it, but we must not find that we abandon equivalence by accident because we have made various incremental changes that, in EU eyes, could collectively destroy equivalence prospects without there having been explicit consent to that being what we wished to do. Moreover, as emphasis has been put on consultation with stakeholders, how can we know, whatever the current intention, that the Bill does not turn out to be a dilutors’ charter, because the specified legislation is now out there as an Aunt Sally at which interested parties may chance their arm? I have seen the gleam in the eyes of some in the City already.

In the all-Peers meeting last week with the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Bates, and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, John Glen MP, it was said that the words “corresponding, or similar” from Clause 1(l)(a) would not permit changing or deleting aspects of wider legislation not detailed in the specified items of EU financial services legislation. We inevitably got on to bankers’ bonuses as the example everyone knows, so although the schedule includes CRD5 on prudential regulation of banks, it would not, according to the analysis, open up change to the details in CRD4, which is where most of the bankers’ bonus information resides. It would be good for the Minister to confirm that understanding, as an example.

Developing that point further, and because there are some proportionality measures on remuneration for smaller businesses within the specified legislation, does it mean that proportionality measures could not be stretched by the UK to apply to larger businesses than the EU legislation intended? Given that, in my experience, the UK has not used all proportionality provisions—some of which I worked very hard to get—what is the policy on implementation of proportionality?

I could go through the list of legislation and ask lots more questions, but I will spare noble Lords with just one more example. Are the Government now in favour of extending the suspension of the clearing obligation for pension funds—a measure that I forced into the original legislation without any particular support? We should be told, because it could be that the Government do not want to do that and it could be crossed out with our being able to make a specific objection.

Why cannot the Government make a more fulsome policy report now of their key points and concerns? I accept that some things will change, but that does not detract from being given a grounding in where decisions are coming from.

More generally, the words “corresponding, or similar” are too wide. It may be possible to have a corresponding piece of legislation that is not similar. At the moment, I am veering towards suggesting that the provision should be “corresponding, and similar”.

The next part that concerns me is that EU legislation could be cherry picked. That may not be the intention, but the words,

“or any of the provisions”,

allow that possibility. It is very permissive, covering from everything to nothing of a piece of specified EU legislation. I want to find ways to qualify that to ensure that the overall framework that could sustain the objective of equivalence is being retained, and is not disappeared by stealth or accident via statutory instrument. One way to deal with that might be for “corresponding, and similar” requirements to apply to the whole of a piece of legislation, rather than individual provisions, but I accept that we need some more tightly defined requirements for omissions that might be necessary.

Then I come to,

“any adjustments the Treasury consider appropriate”.

In the meeting, we were told that new things cannot be created, but it is not entirely clear that the “corresponding, or similar” provision governs subsection (1)(b). I come back to my point that in this context there needs to be some kind of track record on the policy against which you can measure what is being done. The word “appropriate”, which is the unfortunate and common construction used for delegated power, is usually employed when there is some policy context in the primary legislation. In the Bill, there is no policy context other than to pick, choose, change and avoid primary legislation.

I do not understand why it is necessary to have such broad powers for the completed specified legislation. It is known what was argued and it is in its final form. We will know what was lost and any changes that might need to be considered. Why can we not know them now?

Legislation that is not complete in the schedule is not new or surprising either: there have been years of consulting. I did some of it. By the time an EU proposal is published, before you go through any amendment provisions, it has been well consulted on. The Commission, other member states and many MEPs know the UK lines. I often used to get it from them before I ever got it from the Treasury. How about telling us what those lines are in respect of that legislation? They must exist. Again, that would give us a background against which we could measure what is intended. Without that, we are approving a procedure blind of policy, facts and principle. It is not sufficient to think that an affirmative procedure is enough to satisfy all those concerns.

Central Securities Depositories (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Wednesday 28th November 2018 Lords Chamber

The Treasury has been working very closely with the FCA, the Bank of England and industry bodies to draft the instruments. In advance of laying them, the Treasury published the TR instrument in draft along with an explanatory policy note on 5 October 2018, and the CSDR instrument in draft along with an explanatory policy note on 22 October 2018, to maximise transparency to Parliament, industry and the public. Regulators and industry bodies have generally been supportive of the provisions in the SIs. Both are essential to ensure that a functioning legal regime is in place for trade repositories and central securities depositories in the event of no deal, and that UK regulators are equipped to manage any cliff-edge risks. UK businesses and customers who currently use trade repositories and central securities depositories can be confident that they will continue to operate in the UK, no matter what the outcome of negotiations. I hope that colleagues will join me in supporting the regulations, and I commend them to the House.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bates, for his introduction. As usual, I declare my registered interest as a director of the London Stock Exchange. By now we are familiar with the pattern of how powers transfer to the UK regulators and temporary regimes. I will not revisit that. I have just two points regarding these SIs that the Minister might be able to clarify.

I do not need a response to anything on the trade repositories regulations. I just note as new—new in the sense that I have not commented on it before—the way an ESMA-recognised UK trade repository or entity can simply move into the UK regime. That seems a sensible provision.

On the CSDs, the policy note and guidance on the Treasury’s website say that applications before exit will be “subject to existing law” while the application is considered. I wondered whether there could be some elaboration on the difference between that UK law and the onshored CSDR once firms switch to it. What happens at the point of switching, or is this just, as I suspect, splitting hairs and no big deal? That provoked my curiosity and, with other things going on, I did not quite have the energy to work through absolutely every last word and work it out for myself.

Two issues are general to all these SIs, particularly in the context of the no-Brexit—sorry, that is a Freudian slip—of the no-deal preparations, so I take this opportunity to raise them. Last week I showed a letter to the noble Lord, Lord Bates, when we expected to discuss the SIs that are to come later. It was sent to the chair of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, explaining that the SIs laid under the EU withdrawal Act will be deferred, amended or revoked by the withdrawal agreement Bill, ready for the end of an implementation period, rather than exit day. My first point is that it is dangerous to think of any of these SIs as just-in-case provisions. Obviously, much of this allocation of powers is a provision for any Brexit scenario, but it would be helpful to know which provisions are likely to be revoked or substantially modified if we go into an implementation phrase. I am not sure we can necessarily do that for these at this point, but it would be useful if it was in the Explanatory Memorandums.

The other point that we have not previously discussed is that since Monday last week we have had the impact assessment. It did not reveal a great deal—there was no new or useful information—but I do not have a clue where the figures of the costs for firms to familiarise themselves with regulations come from. The amounts seem very small indeed. I wonder whether they include the thousands of pages of consultation that the FCA is doing, which is up to about 1,800 pages just on Brexit preparation. For MiFID, one of the largest regulations and which we will deal with later, the familiarisation cost is a mere £1,900. That is a very low charging rate. I cannot see anybody getting much legal advice for that; at London rates that is about two hours. Just for comparison, how long does it take the Treasury to make a complete transcription? It obligingly sent us the MiFID schedules, along with caveats about accuracy. The problem is that the firms that have to familiarise themselves with these new regulations cannot put in caveats about accuracy. Their compliance executives work under the rigours of a senior managers’ regime. There are no short cuts. I do not mean to cast any aspersions on the hard work being done by anybody in the Treasury—I know that a lot of diligent work is going on—but I do not see how these rather minimal costs can be justified.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I will take the statutory instruments in order, starting with the central securities depositories regulations. A characteristic of these SIs is that they tend to have two parts. I wish I had the same interests to declare as the noble Baroness because then I would come to this knowing something about it. Starting from scratch is quite a battle. My analysis of these SIs is broadly that there is a bit about the transfer of functions and a bit about the transitional provisions. They are more or less in those two groups. The transfer of functions is unexceptionable, except that I am not at all convinced that the Treasury should be solely responsible for the equivalence decision. That is a view that I shall take all the way through. The noble Lord does not have to answer me on this SI because I will bring it up on the last one, by which time a note might have arrived from the Box.

The transitional provision is more complex in all the SIs, but in particular with this one. When you dig into it you discover that apparently there is only one UK CSD and its transition will be little more than a formality, which is good to hear, since these organisations are so important in our lives. Non-UK CSDs have a more complex transition process, but, as far as I understood it, that was okay.

Similarly, the transfer of functions for the trade repositories is straightforward, except for my caveat on the Treasury’s role. I understand that there are five UK trade repositories, covered by paragraph 7.18 of the Explanatory Memorandum. Once again, it looks as though that is pretty well a formality. I found the non-UK TRs transfer regime more complicated, but the one feature I saw is that some new TRs—if they ever emerge—seem not to be fully registered for up to three years. Can the Minister explain why such a long period is necessary?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

May I go back to the point about when CSDs switch from being under the present UK regime to being under the new regime? It seems a bit peculiar. Is it the situation that while they are currently running under the UK regime, once they start to run under the onshored CSDR there will be an equivalence decision and they will then be under a tighter, more extensive regime? It seems very strange that as soon as you have recognised a country as having equivalence, you then require more rather than less—or have I misunderstood something?

[Lord Bates]

I certainly would not suggest that the noble Baroness has misunderstood anything. I will work my way through the pile: I have a feeling that I will have an answer for her very shortly.

She asked what would be amended if there were an implementation period. The legislation would not come into effect in March 2019 in the event of an implementation period. It would be amended to reflect the eventual deal on the future relationship, or to deal with a no-deal scenario at the end of the implementation period. Amendment would depend on agreement being reached with the EU.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked if was appropriate that the Treasury is the only body responsible for equivalence decisions. The Treasury takes the role of the Commission in equivalence decisions, but will be informed by advice from the FCA as necessary. As to why the regime will last for three years, the TRRs provide sufficient time for the FCA to be satisfied that the new TR fully meets the requirements set out in the draft Over the Counter Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories SI, of which he and I have fond memories and which was published on 22 October. Three years was judged the most suitable duration period, based on consultation with the FCA. The timescale aligns with other temporary regimes such as the CCP temporary recognition regime.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked specifically about the transitional regime for central securities, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, also referred to it. The transitional period is intended to allow non-UK CSDs to continue to provide services in the UK after exit. UK CSDs that have applied for authorisation prior to exit day will be automatically entered into the transitional regime. There is a requirement for non-UK CSDs to notify the Bank before exit day of their intention to continue to provide services in the UK following exit. Any non-UK CSD that fails to notify the Bank may be subject to public censure. A non-UK CSD that has notified the Bank and entered the transitional regime can continue to provide CSD services in the UK on the current basis for a certain period. For a CSD that has made an application for recognition to the Bank of England, that period ends when the application is decided. For a CSD in a jurisdiction that the Treasury has determined to be equivalent and that has not made an application to the Bank of England, that period extends to six months after the Treasury’s equivalence determination. I think that is a partial answer to the question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, also asked why the Government are not bringing into UK law the settlement discipline regime. Certain CSDR provisions on settlement discipline do not come into force until after exit day. As a result, they cannot be considered retained EU law and are beyond the scope of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. Returning to the question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, she said that it seems strange that once a country has been found equivalent, more is required of that CSD. Equivalence is a decision on the alignment of another country’s regulatory regime. This is a decision of the Treasury. The recognition of a specific CSD is a more technical decision at the level of that CSD, and that is made by the Bank of England.

Markets in Financial Instruments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Wednesday 28th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government are planning for all eventualities, including the UK leaving the EU without an implementation period, and changes made in this statutory instrument might not take effect on 29 March 2019 if the UK enters an implementation period. None the less, statutory instruments intended to deal with all eventualities, even though they might not happen, should not set precedents and practices in the use of SIs that are undesirable.

As the Minister said, MiFID II is the EU legislation that introduces a transparency and disclosure regime into financial markets, particularly by requiring firms to provide trade data to give transparency on the best-execution obligation and transaction reporting requirements, which are used by regulators to detect market abuse. The intended outcome of this regime is to improve protections for investors, increase confidence in financial markets and maintain financial stability.

The functions under MiFID II are carried out by EU authorities, so if the UK leaves in a no-deal scenario this legislation needs to continue to work, and these regulations transfer responsibilities to the FCA, the PRA and the Bank of England, with overall responsibility reserved to the Treasury. In particular, it gives the FCA a set of temporary powers to operate the MiFID II transparency regime with flexibility during a four-year transitional period—with the intention, it states, of preserving the existing outcomes of the transparency regime as far as possible: that is, improving protections for investors, increasing confidence in financial markets and ensuring financial stability.

The FCA has to issue a statement of policy on its use of these temporary powers but, as the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee observed in its report of 1 November, and as the Minister has acknowledged, that policy statement is not available to consider alongside these draft regulations. That is not helpful, given that the FCA is taking responsibility for complex legislation which governs the buying, selling and trading of financial instruments.

It will take four years for the FCA to become operationally ready to carry out its functions relating to transparency and disclosure, and these regulations could result in significant policy changes. Yes, this SI addresses a deficiency by transferring the functions of the European Securities and Markets Authority to the relevant UK regulator and the functions of the Commission to the Treasury, but it also gives the FCA a set of temporary powers that allow it the scope to operate the transparency regime in a stand-alone UK context.

It is clear from reading the Explanatory Memorandum that these temporary powers go beyond the narrower issue of correcting deficiencies into making policy. For example, as the Explanatory Memorandum confirms, waivers and thresholds for disclosure contained in the current transparency and disclosure regime are calculated on the basis of EU-wide market data. An abrupt move to using UK-only data will pose operational challenges for the FCA and could result in outcomes that do not enhance investor protection and market confidence.

The Explanatory Memorandum further confirms that the FCA is given powers that include amending and freezing obligations on firms where it is considered appropriate. Certain transparency conditions could be suspended during the four-year transition period. In effect, there could be a weakening of the transparency regime, with implications for investor protection. These are important matters which necessitate the FCA statement of policy on how these temporary powers will be used being in place before exit day if there is no implementation period.

There is also a time-sensitive issue. Firms will need to review their contracts, and contracts on derivative trades may need to be agreed some time in advance. So I ask the Minister for an assurance that an FCA policy statement will be in place before exit day and that Parliament will have the opportunity to consider that statement, as the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee flagged. In his opening speech the Minister acknowledged the need for the FCA to have the necessary resources. But it is not simply a matter of saying that it needs extra FTE of 200, 500 or whatever; it is about whether the Government are confident that there is the supply of staff with the necessary expertise to carry out what is going to be a hugely complex challenge for the FCA.

As the Treasury made clear in response to a question from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, it can refuse to approve the FCA policy statement on the use of its temporary powers if the department considers that the statement would prejudice an international agreement it hoped to reach. That again prompts a series of questions. Can the Minister confirm that, in the event of the Treasury refusing such approval, its reasons will be made known to Parliament, and Parliament will be able to consider them? If the Treasury vetoes an FCA policy statement, what policy will apply in its stead? These temporary powers are given to the FCA to maintain a transparency and disclosure regime intended to protect investors and maintain confidence in financial markets, so could the Minister give an illustrative example of when potential prejudice to concluding an international agreement could justify vetoing an FCA policy statement and possibly weakening the transparency regime?

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, once again I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bates, for his introduction and declare my interest as a director of the London Stock Exchange plc. I will speak on many of the things that the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, has just mentioned. I too echo the feelings of Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee (Sub-Committee B) about being asked to approve this legislation in the absence of the FCA policy. Even if it is not completed, we could have been given more clues about its shape and type of content.

In its reply to the sub-committee, the Treasury says the response to the FCA consultation is needed first. I think that refers to the FCA consultation that came out last Friday, and I wonder whether it was timed to come out after we would have, under the normal scheme of things, approved this the previous Wednesday. So was it actually being kept away from our beady eyes? I could not get around to looking at it until today; in fact, I could not even find it when I looked earlier. In fact, it just repeats that the policy is yet to come. It is 986 pages long, but on pages 39-41 I found some useful information. It says:

“We will issue a statement of policy on how the temporary powers will be used”.


That refers to the transparency regime. Everything else in there just details the powers it has been given.

I found a little more useful information around page 770, but only about the new Article 17A of the relevant BTS, which appears to say how it will operate those waivers that will remain, such as “large in scale”, and how it will operate deferred publication on venues—but these are not actually among the main things that the FCA has been given the power to suspend.

The only firm policy we have been given is that the FCA does not have the necessary resources and that some of the most controversial, industry-disliked parts of MiFID II and publication on waiver volumes are to be suspended by up to four years. It is a major policy change to go from mandatory measures to suspension for such a long period and yet the Government say that they aim to preserve existing outcomes of the transparency regime as far as possible.

I shall go on to test that statement in a moment but, before I do, I should mention that the Treasury, in reply to the Secondary Legislation Committee, in Appendix 1, states:

“A properly considered statement of policy on the use of the temporary powers would need to be informed by”,


the FCA consultations. However, there is nothing in the FCA consultations that informs how the policy of suspension will be used. In another reply, it states:

“HM Treasury received no objections from any of the industry stakeholders on the way these powers would be used by the FCA”.


So it seems that industry has been consulted. However, it was not a public consultation—I have looked for that too. Industry has been spoken to and has some knowledge of what is going on but we, who have to approve this legislation, are the ones most kept in the dark. This is a decision in search of a policy and that is not the way properly to treat Parliament.

I shall go on to test the statement about preserving existing outcomes of the transparency regime as far as possible. With equities, the double-volume cap is suspended because the FCA does not have all the information, but here there is a mitigating measure in that the FCA can suspend two of the transparency waivers for six months at a time. The formulation used for the suspension of those waivers is,

“if the FCA considers that it is necessary to do so to advance the FCA’s integrity objective under section 1D of FSMA”.

I have asked the Minister to confirm whether the policy intention of the double-volume cap—which, broadly speaking, is to limit the amount of dark trading—is fully encompassed in that integrity objective, taken together with the additional conditions of having reference to consumer protection, competition and the pre-Brexit thresholds.

I ask this question about the integrity objective because the FCA objectives as defined in FSMA are not coupled to MiFID II, and historically UK regulators have gone to less-strict standards. For example, on best execution, the UK regulators always went with “all reasonable efforts”—indeed, I remember the fight to get that wording into MiFID I—rather than the strict “best endeavours” that the EU finally went out with as the standard of MiFID II. So if we fall back on FSMA objectives, my concern is that they are not as strict as the requirements of MiFID II.

There is a mechanism here for the FCA to address the dark-trading policy, but it is thrown into doubt by the statement that there will be no publication of trading under waivers and that the FCA will not have sufficient data. Does this mean that there will be no way of checking whether the FCA has done its job? I do not understand why the FCA will not have data, because it collects UK data. What lack of data is preventing information under the equity waivers when they are used?

There are other things that the FCA could also do. Under MiFID I, venues had the task to monitor waivers and impose restrictions under conduct of business rules. My next question is: is the FCA empowered to revert to such a mechanism should they wish and are there any plans to do so? I certainly have not seen any in the consultation because it was all silent about how these powers would be used. Concerning equities, my conclusion is that there is, possibly, the ability to live up to the statement about preserving the outcomes of the transparency regime because there is a substitute regime, but there is still no way for observers to know that if there is no information about the use of waivers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, at this hour a letter is an attractive proposition. I counted some 27 questions, which is a pretty respectable ratio from the three distinguished speakers in this debate. I will try to deal with as many as I can in the time available. Clearly, I will have to read the Official Report with officials to see if there are any points we need to write on; I suspect there will be. Therefore, if we run out of time, I will include other answers in that communication.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked why the amended thresholds which appear in Article 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) of the Commission of Delegated Regulation 2017/567—thresholds for determining which equity instruments are liquid—have not been changed. However, replacing references to Union data with UK market data in the legislation would change which instruments were classed as being liquid for UK market participants.

On the FCA not having the data, it needs sufficient time to build systems to analyse market data independently from ESMA. It estimates that this will take four years. As noted, the Treasury can end this period earlier if the transparency regime cannot operate earlier. The FCA does not have all the data relating to firms in the UK, as EU firms currently report back to their own competent authority and not to the FCA.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

Does not this very regulation enable that, within the transition period, the FCA will collect that data? That is one of the other provisions. Although it might not have it now, after Brexit, as soon as we are into the transition period, it will have it.

[Lord Bates]

Of course, in the event of a deal, that would be the case, and that is what we would expect to happen. On the transitional period that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked about, it took approximately four years to develop the detail of the current transparency system and put it in place. On her point about the FCA being held accountable, and what parliamentary oversight of the FCA’s decisions there would be—a point also raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe—the powers being granted to the FCA are necessary to uphold market stability. These powers will generally be constrained to situations where their use is necessary for the advancements of the FCA’s integrity objectives. The FCA will be held accountable in two ways. First, it will be required to publish a statement of policy explaining its approach; the policy statement could come into effect only if the Treasury did not raise objections. Secondly, Parliament will be able to further scrutinise and question Treasury Ministers; if the Treasury objected, the FCA would need to revise its statement.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked about the transitional powers. Without these powers—

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I am sorry to interrupt again, but I think that the noble Lord just said that Treasury officials would interrogate the FCA about its policy and that it would have to change it if they did not like it. However, my understanding of the regulation is that they can do that only with regard to either international standards or if it would interfere with some international negotiation. The provision does not appear to have been put into the legislation as an all-round general policy; indeed, I think that the whole idea is that the Treasury is not supposed to interfere with what the FCA does. So I am not sure that this line from the Treasury—“We’re going to make sure it’s all right”—fully stands up.

Short Selling (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Wednesday 28th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Department for International Development (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, this statutory instrument forms part of the work being delivered to ensure that there continues to be a functioning legislative and regulatory regime for financial services in a scenario where the UK leaves the EU without a deal or an implementation period. As a responsible Government we are of course preparing for all potential scenarios, despite remaining confident of securing an ambitious deal with the EU.

The instrument has been drafted using powers delegated to Ministers under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 to address deficiencies in applicable EU law relating to the regulation of short selling that will be transferred directly on to the UK statute book at the point of exit. It will also amend relevant parts of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. This is in order to provide continuity, given that the approach of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act is to maintain existing legislation at the point of exit. The instrument has already been debated in the House of Commons this morning.

Short selling is the practice of selling a security that the seller has borrowed, with the aim of buying the security back at a lower price than the price that the seller sold it for. The short selling regulation, the SSR, was introduced after the financial crisis to enable the EU to act to suspend or ban short selling in cases where financial stability was at risk. It covers the EU’s regulatory oversight of short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, and relates to financial instruments that are admitted to trading or traded on an EEA trading venue.

Post exit, the SSR will no longer be effective in maintaining the framework to regulate short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps in the UK. This is because in a no-deal scenario the UK will be outside the European Economic Area and therefore outside the EU’s regulatory, supervisory and legal framework. The solution is therefore this instrument, which will amend the retained EU law related to SSR to ensure that it continues to function effectively in the UK post exit.

The instrument makes the following amendments. First, it will amend the scope of the regulation to ensure that it captures instruments admitted to trading on UK venues and UK sovereign debt only. The SI will therefore not capture instruments admitted to trading only on EEA trading venues. Furthermore, amendments have been made under the instrument that change the scope of the UK’s powers to address threats to stability or market confidence in the context of the regulation. Currently the SSR allows the UK to act against instruments that have their most liquid market in the UK or if the instrument was first admitted to trading in the UK. That has the effect of requiring the UK to seek consent from the relevant EU regulator if it wants to take action on the basis of an instrument that has its most liquid market elsewhere in the EU or was first admitted to trading on an EU venue. The instrument removes that provision. In line with other third-country instruments, the UK will in future be able to take action against any instrument traded on a UK venue. The UK will be required to consider threats to UK market confidence and financial stability only before using these powers.

Secondly, the instrument transfers functions currently carried out by EU authorities to the appropriate UK bodies. For example, powers will be transferred from EU supervisory bodies to the FCA as the most appropriate regulator, given its expertise in regulating short selling currently. These include the power to make technical standards: for example, to take action on all instruments admitted to trading on a UK venue, not just those for which the UK is the most liquid market. Functions are also transferred from the European Commission to the Treasury, as in other statutory instruments, including the power to specify when a sovereign credit swap transaction is considered as hedging against a default risk.

Thirdly, the instrument will maintain a number of existing exemptions. Certain exemptions are already provided for reporting requirements, the buy-in regime and restrictions on uncovered short selling for shares that are principally traded in a third country. These will be retained. In respect of the last point, the FCA will take on the responsibility for publishing the list of relevant third-country shares. This ensures continuity by recognising the European Securities and Markets Authority’s list for two years following exit day. Additionally, the instrument will maintain the SSR’s exemption for market makers and authorised primary dealers. Market makers will be required to join a UK trading venue and notify the FCA at least 30 days before exit should they want to benefit from this exemption. Those who have done so already will not see any change. The exemption means that firms can carry out certain market-making activities and primary market operations without disclosing their net short position, and they are not required to comply with restrictions on uncovered short selling, provided that they meet certain thresholds.

Additionally, amendments provide HM Treasury with the power to set relevant thresholds after exit. The instrument will also allow market participants to use UK credit default swaps to hedge correlated assets and liabilities elsewhere in the world rather than just the EU. This will ensure that UK firms can continue to use UK sovereign credit default swaps to hedge correlated assets or liabilities issued by issuers outside the UK.

Lastly, the instrument deletes provisions that facilitate co-operation and co-ordination across the Union. Currently member states must notify other regulators ahead of taking action to restrict short selling, with other regulators then determining whether to apply corresponding restrictions. This SI deletes these provisions, as well as deleting the European Securities and Markets Authority’s intervention powers except in exceptional circumstances.

The SI makes technical amendments to existing UK legislation—in the case of Part 8A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, to ensure that the UK can continue to respond to requests for information from overseas regulators. The UK intends as far as possible to maintain a mutually beneficial working relationship with the EU, in the same way we currently co-operate with non-EU regulators under the existing provisions of the Act.

It should be noted that, in accordance with the comments we received from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, the Explanatory Memorandum for this instrument has been revised and relaid. The revisions to the Explanatory Memorandum provide further clarity on amendments made to ensure that UK firms could continue to use UK sovereign credit default swaps to hedge correlated assets or liabilities outside the EU. It addressed why amendments had not been made to the buy-in procedure in Article 15 of the SSR, clarifying that this is repealed by Article 72 of Regulation 909/2014 and that, given that will not be in force before exit day, we cannot use EU withdrawal powers to enable it. A separate instrument will make this amendment. Lastly, it clarified that notifications given to the FCA continue to be effective for exemptions for market-make—therefore, they will see no change.

In summary, the Government believe that, should the UK leave the EU with no deal or implementation period, this SI will provide for a framework to regulate short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps effectively post exit.

I hope that noble Lords will join me in supporting these regulations. I commend them to the House and beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bates, for his introduction and once again declare my interest in the register as a director of the London Stock Exchange plc.

It is fair to say that when this legislation was negotiated, a lot of it was directed against the markets in London, so if anyone is worried that the regime will run without so many requirements for consultation, it should not be the UK. I had the advantage of participating in scrutiny on Sub-Committee A of the Secondary Legislation Committee, on which I sit. As the Minister explained, in consequence, there has been an extension to the Explanatory Memorandum, and I thank him for that. The correspondence about that is in Appendix 2 to the report. As he said, it mainly concerns the use of sovereign credit default swaps for hedging purposes. That is the single issue to which I shall return.

By way of background, sovereign credit default swaps and their short selling was a highly contentious issue at the time of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, with many wanting to ban sovereign CDSs altogether, blaming them for escalation to the crisis. It took several months of my life turning that around to establish that there was such a thing as legitimate hedging of correlated assets. Due to that sensitivity, it is worth more clearly explaining that in consequence of changes made in the regulation, there is a widening of the scope of the assets that sterling CDSs could be used to hedge—which, again, the Minister explained— which happens by removing the EEA reference and replacing it with a global one. I do not object to that widening—there was a choice between narrowing or widening, and widening probably goes with the open approach of the UK—but it means wider possible use of sterling credit default swaps. I want to ensure that that is properly understood, should anyone ever read this debate.

It would also be worth knowing what, if any, assessment of the additional volume that is expected to create, if any such calculation has been done, especially in the event of a no-deal Brexit, when some more chaotic things may be happening of the variety that was of concern during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. I am still confused why Articles 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 of the delegated act regulation have been deleted. Deleting those paragraphs removes the requirement for a Pearson correlation coefficient of 80% as part of the high correlation definition under Article 3.7(b) of the short selling regulation. The 70% threshold is retained under Article 3.7(c), within Article 18 of the delegated Act. Article 18 was cited in correspondence with the sub-committee as what the Treasury will follow when it takes over setting the correlation conditions.

I do not object to the Treasury taking over setting correlation conditions, because I think it has a good interest in what happens to hedging using sterling CDSs. I just want to know whether 80% is out of favour, whether something happened to replace it prior to the regulation, or whether that change is another widening.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for presenting this statutory instrument. I thank him, first, for forcing me to understand a little about short selling; it took several hours to get a reasonable knowledge of it. What I found most difficult were the various exemptions. I sought help from the department to try to understand them. It was pointed out to me that, in some ways, that was the wrong question. The key essence of much of what we are doing tonight is in Section 8 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act. I remember the debates on that provision with great care, and the overwhelming requirement of Section 8 is that it should not be used to change policy, except as required for the smooth transition.

Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2018

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Wednesday 28th November 2018 Lords Chamber

will operate in practice?

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, first, I again thank the noble Lord, Lord Bates, for his introduction; it makes a change not to be the expert in the room. I greatly welcome this legislation and have just a few points to make, some of which follow up on those made by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake.

As I understand it, much of the problem with cold calling is that the cold callers—in this case, the introducers—are offshore. We will not be able to get at those generators of leads and they will attempt to sell on their information, which at the moment they may do quite successfully. The UK buyer of those leads would then presumably be committing an offence by following them up with a cold call, on the assumption that the person buying the information is not already, for example, the financial adviser to the individual concerned. Those following up, having bought that information in this hypothetical case, would be subject to the penalty. They should therefore be too scared to do it, so nobody buys leads and offshore cold calling stops because they cannot sell their ill-gotten gains. I think that is how it is meant to work, but it would be good to hear that confirmed.

We still have to address the wider issues of cold calling, beyond protecting pensions. I hope that, having dealt with this issue, we will not think that it is “job done” and that is the end of it. Following the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, I shall look at some of the issues that were not dealt with after the consultation period. The first was the time limit for having given consent. If the case in question happened 20 years ago, it rests on whether a person would reasonably expect to be contacted. It is probably quite a sophisticated system if the caller has information about the person because they already have a policy, for example. It all sounds very formal, and they go through some kind of identity check. I understand that the reason for not doing anything was the fear of setting a wider precedent within the GDPR, but that is a common excuse that is used more widely.

There may be more that could be done in due course because there is also consent by inertia, which was mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake. Perhaps after a time lapse, instead of saying that someone is not allowed to make the call, there could be a halfway house of having to make sure that the person still consents to receiving calls, especially if they are on a related product rather than the product they have already been advised on. The existing client relationship could become very stretched, especially where one firm is taken over by another which has a wider suite of products on offer. A client might expect a much narrower relationship than would come from an enlarged entity. I am not sure that the recipient of a cold call stating that the caller is the successor of Bloggs and Co would know that the call should not perhaps have been made.

Ultimately, we may have to look at more than just pensions. If we are successful, that lucrative strand for the scammers and the cheaters will be closed off, but individuals who have diligently put money into ISAs—especially if they have put it into stocks and shares ISAs over the period since ISAs started—can have as much saved in them as they might have in a pension fund. So when these organisations start looking for where else they can swindle people, those might be next on their list.

I urge that we do not think that this is “job done”. This instrument is excellent as far as it goes, but it is a work in progress and we have to continue to keep an eye out for where the scams move to.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, subject to a satisfactory response from the Minister to the queries by the two noble Baronesses, I warmly welcome these regulations. I am sure many people will value the fact that cold calling is reduced, particularly in this important area.

Central Counterparties (Amendment, etc., and Transitional Provision) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Tuesday 30th October 2018 Grand Committee

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, I would like to intervene briefly to ask my noble friend a couple of questions. Although we all hope for a deal scenario, not a no-deal scenario, nevertheless the practical approach to these matters should perhaps be thought through a little more. My first point is a procedural one relating to the statutory instrument—I refer particularly to the EEA passport rights matter. I spent some years—not many, thank goodness—as a member of the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments in the House of Commons, which was chaired by the late Bob Cryer. He was scrupulous about determining the nature of approaches towards statutory instruments.

I am concerned that we have, effectively, a hybrid—an affirmative resolution, but nevertheless with the prospect of a negative procedure in the event of any extension of time, for registration of the various bodies that may need registration in due course. I find that rather concerning. I would like my noble friend to confirm that we are not getting dangerously close to a ban on negative approaches. Clearly that could happen when the affirmative approach is required but where there is a fee involved for a function which a UK public authority would exercise.

I believe the registration itself must by implication—although it is not revealed in this document—carry with it some financial implications; some fees will have to be paid, although they are not referred to here. If that is the case, would it not be more appropriate for affirmative resolution to be carried through to those extensions as well as to the rest of the item? That is my first point.

My second point is that while the FCA seems capable of handling quite large numbers of registrations for companies under EEA processes, the Prudential Regulation Authority does not. That is a deep concern. So far, the PRA seems able to manage only 10 or 12 applications per year. It has already indicated that it expects that there will be between 100 and 200 applications in the event of a no-deal scenario under these proposals. How does my noble friend believe this can be dealt with, without some form of massive increase in resources or powers, particularly in the hands of the PRA? I would be grateful if he would allow that.

I come to my third and final point. He has talked about the extension of the extension, which requires six months’ notice from either the PRA or the FCA as to the needs arising. To my mind, that is an almost indefinite process; we would see these extensions going on ad infinitum, or certainly for a considerable time. Surely that must be a disadvantage to the entities applying for registration and, indeed, to the position of this country in relation to the financial services in which it is at present so pre-eminent. Can he assist with that? I am grateful to him for his introduction.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction and I concur with him that these are necessary instruments. I declare my interests as in the register and, in particular, as a director of the London Stock Exchange.

Starting with the EEA passport rights regulations, I fully understand the need for temporary or deemed permissions and some flexibility, but in the longer term there are risk and competitiveness issues to consider, so I shall explore further the time periods and how the policy surrounding them might operate. There are two time periods: two years from exit before a formal application for authorisation has to be made, and three years from exit, extendable, within which the relevant regulator makes a determination. Supervisors can require a formal application to be made before the two-year period is up, and presumably that could be exercised for a variety of reasons, such as phasing in for size or complexity of entity or for other risk-based reasons. As the Minister has already mentioned, the two-year period is also potentially useful to EEA firms trying to decide what to do, getting used to UK supervision and having time to organise themselves before having to seek authorisation. It can also be that the two years is simply a waiting room until the regulators have the capacity to carry out the authorisation determinations. How is it envisaged that the two-year period will operate? What is the policy? Is it a phasing mechanism? Will the regulators be controlling that phasing? Is it wholly in the hands of the firms that want their passports replaced? Is it expected that everyone will have two years and then there will be a sudden rush of applications; or, as I asked before, will there be some kind of risk-based assessment about which applications must be brought forward in time?

I now turn to supervision, because the entities in the temporary regime will come under supervision. Can the Minister assure us about the regulator’s capacity to supervise and that significant supervision will take place? If it is envisaged that there may be an unmanageable, or at least long, queue for authorisations because of capacity issues, what is the capacity situation with supervision?

Does two years really mean a fixed two years that cannot be extended? I cannot find anything to say that it could be, and there is nothing in the Explanatory Memorandum. But just in case I might have missed something, will the Minister clarify whether the construct of the regulation stating that “Section 55U” of FiSMA “has effect as if” is a good way of keeping the two years unamendable by any power to make changes that might be embedded in FiSMA or anywhere else? I am still learning the tricks of some of the parliamentary drafting that goes on here, and that is quite a good one to remember.

As to the three-year limit allowed for determination of applications, it can be extended, as has already been said. How necessary that is might in part be determined by the policy over the preceding two years. Is extension available only if the regulators do not have the capacity to conclude within three years? I think that is what the Minister said. Has three years been set assuming a rush of applications at the two-year stage, or will an extension be inevitable if that two-year rush happens?

As the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, said, it would clearly not be appropriate for the extension to be used on a rolling basis to allow businesses that might not measure up to full UK authorisation standards to continue to operate in a temporary regime because there had been no determination of their application. That is one of the reasons why I share the view expressed by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee that there is a good case for an extension requiring the affirmative procedure. I do not agree with the reply from the Treasury Minister John Glen in the correspondence. It is not satisfactory to say that some affirmative permission somehow flows from this SI so that the negative procedure is enough at the time of the extension. That might have been the case if the policy on these time periods had been more clearly elaborated, but it was not. In fact, it seems to be in the hands of the regulators, and if that is the case, then I cannot see how avoiding affirmative procedure is the right way to go. If the Government had set the policy and embedded it in here, that would be different, but this does not include the policy on how it is going to be used.

--- Later in debate ---

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked whether there is a contradiction between Regulations 12 and 19 about when the application needs to be made. The central counterparties may apply before exit day but are not required to. They have up to six months after exit day to apply for full recognition.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

Regulation 12 states:

“A central counterparty established in a third country”,


that,

“intends to provide clearing services … on and after exit day”,

has to make an application and that the application “must” be submitted before exit day. I do not think that is quite what the Minister said. I realise that time is short now, and there are quite a few things that the Minister has had to gloss over. I hope he will review what I have said, and I would welcome a written response.

[Lord Bates]

We may have misunderstood the point that the noble Baroness was making. I am very happy to undertake to write to her on that specific point and copy it to members of the Committee.

The noble Baroness asked why a CCP might not have been recognised within the initial period. While the Bank of England has credible working estimates of the number of CCPs that will apply to it for recognition, there is an unavoidable degree of uncertainty about this.

My noble friend Lord Lindsay asked whether third-country CCPs includes EU CCPs. EU CCPs will be treated as third-country CCPs post-exit. EU CCPs and third-country CCPs will be eligible for the temporary recognition regime if they were permitted to operate prior to 29 March 2019.

My noble friend Lord Kirkhope asked whether the regime could be extended continually each year. It is in everyone’s interest for firms to transition from the current system of EEA passporting rights to full UK authorisation as quickly and efficiently as possible. There would be no circumstances in which it would be desirable for the regulators or the Treasury to extend the length of the regime on a continuous basis. He also asked whether the negative procedure is an appropriate instrument. I respect the work of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, whose report we have before us today. I addressed this in my opening remarks. We believe that the choice of procedure is appropriate, given the overall powers being scrutinised now through this affirmative instrument. The negative procedure would just be an extension of that. The power to extend the time period is not a provision which relates to fees and so would not, if made alone, attract the affirmative procedure under Section 8 of the Act, to which my noble friend referred. He also spoke about the process for registration with the PRA and its ability to deal with the volume of applications. I reiterate what I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles: I am confident that the PRA and the FCA are making adequate preparations to deal with the scale of the challenge which they face, but it is a significant challenge.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked whether the regulators may ask firms to apply for authorisation sooner than the two-year deadline set out in the statutory instruments if they so choose. The EEA Passport Rights (Amendment, etc., and Transitional Provision) (EU Exit) Regulations will give regulators the ability to direct firms to make an application for authorisation during a specified period within two years from exit day if they have not already applied for authorisation. This will help regulators manage the flow of applications in a smooth and orderly manner. I draw the Committee’s attention to the FCA’s recent consultation paper published on 8 October, in which it set out its intention to allocate each firm a three-month landing slot within which that firm will need to submit its application for UK authorisation. It plans to issue a direction shortly after exit day setting out which firms have been allocated to which landing slot.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked how the two-year application period will operate. I dealt with that earlier but I did not cover one specific point: the two-year deadline for applications to be received cannot be extended.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked whether this is a one-sided arrangement and whether there will be any reciprocation. The Government are only able to take legislative action in relation to EEA firms’ passport rights to the UK; they cannot through unilateral action influence the status of UK firms. That is why we are seeking to agree a deep and special partnership with the EU, as well as an implementation period, so that important preparations can take place in an orderly manner.

The noble Lord asked what the impact on the financial services sector would be if there is a no-deal exit. Reaching a deal is in the mutual interests of both sides. We are focusing on the negotiation of the right future partnership based on a proposal published in the White Paper on 12 July. That White Paper outlined the Government’s position on financial services and Brexit. We propose a framework for financial services that will provide stability for the EU-UK ecosystem, preserving mutually beneficial cross-border business models and economic integration for the benefit of businesses and consumers in the UK and the EU.

The noble Lord asked what it says about the regime if a firm is denied authorisation. Once we leave the EU we cannot rely on this co-operation continuing and therefore we are making these preparations. It is important that these regulations go ahead so that consumers in this country have confidence in the financial services put forward here.

I have addressed the Financial Services Compensation scheme and I will now deal with one or two points relating to central counterparties. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, made a point on the memorandum of understanding with the host state. Yes, there are a number of necessary steps for a non-UK CCP to be recognised in the UK. These include that the Treasury must determine that the relevant third country’s regulatory and supervisory framework is equivalent to EMIR; the bank must agree supervisory co-operation agreements or memorandums of understanding with relevant competent authorities of the CCP applicant; and the non-UK CCP’s application for recognition to be assessed by the bank must include information on its financial resources, internal procedures and various other relevant information.

The noble Lord asked what would happen if the central counterparty is not recognised. If a non-UK CCP were to continue to provide clearing services to UK firms without recognition, it would be in breach of a general prohibition under the Financial Services and Markets Act, which prohibits anyone carrying out a regulated activity unless they are authorised or exempt. The CCP would be guilty of an offence and subject to a fine or imprisonment. However, further legislation will be laid at a later date to enable such firms to wind down their activities in an orderly manner by being treated as being recognised for a short period.

I hope that has addressed many of the questions.

Royal Bank of Scotland

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Wednesday 13th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

My noble friend is absolutely right. The RBS shares were acquired not as an investment but as a rescue, and all parties supported that systemic action to restore confidence in the sector. When you are left with a large proportion of stock on your hands and you have stated publicly that you want to dispose of that asset, the only way to do it is on independent advice and over a period of time to avoid any market fluctuations, and that is what has been done.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, the Government have been a majority shareholder in RBS for a decade, during which time the GRG small business restructuring scam took place. From the Cadbury report through to the Walker review, UK corporate governance has relied on shareholder stewardship rather than regulation. What stewardship, particularly with regard to culture and GRG, has been or is being made on behalf of the Government as a major shareholder?

[Lord Bates]

The noble Baroness is knowledgeable in these matters and will know that they are dealt with at arm’s length. We have an arm’s-length relationship with the regulator, operational decisions are dealt with by the bank and the investment is managed by UK Financial Investments. We have made our position very clear: it is important that small and medium-sized enterprises are treated properly, and when proven misconduct has taken place, those businesses should, as far as possible, be adequately compensated for the problems they have been caused.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 6th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova (Lab)]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 68ZA and will refer to the other amendments standing in my name. The rationale for this amendment springs from the considerable and widespread concern that there is insufficient democratic oversight of the future anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regime, which together with broad delegated powers will permit any future Government to both bypass Parliament and weaken the UK’s anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regime. Accordingly, the amendment seeks to impose an expressly ameliorative obligation on ministerially created regulation in detecting, investigating or preventing money laundering or terrorist financing, or indeed implementing the standards of the Financial Action Task Force.

When the current Foreign Secretary talks of a low-tax, low-regulation dream of a post-Brexit UK, it will be appreciated that he creates concern over whether this includes deregulating our current anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regime in due course. Given the importance hitherto of the UK’s AML and terrorist financing regime marching in lockstep with the EU, the low-regulation rhetoric has a destabilising impact on the perceptions of our European partners. A low-regulation AML and terrorist financing regime in the UK would of course create a new and substantial weakness in the global battle against economic crime, and would be an allurement to organised crime.

The role of the City as the pre-eminent global financial centre places certain responsibilities on the Government, including the maintenance of a strong and up-to-date AML and terrorist financing regime. It would be interesting to hear from the Minister what consideration the Government have given to the adverse effect on access to EU financial markets if UK financial services were subject to an AML and terrorist financing regime diverging materially from the EU regime. Obviously, there will not be an impact assessment of this, but some indication might be helpful.

Be that as it may, the amendment would improve confidence that the UK will not succumb to any temptation to weaken its current regime, and go for a low-regulation regime, in the event that the UK leaves the EU. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendments tabled in my name and in that of my noble friend Lady Kramer. First let me take a brief moment to set the context. At Second Reading the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, said that this Bill was,

“about powers and not policy—it is a technical Bill”—[Official Report, 1/11/17; col. 1374].

Later, when replying to the debate, stimulated by comments by my noble friend Lord McNally, he amended his comment that the Bill was technical and said that it was about principles.

I do not agree. I would say that the problem with the Bill is that there are no principles, because they have not been carried over; there are only unconstrained powers. That is even more the case in the money-laundering part of the Bill. The principles, the starting points, are not defined. In fact, current law is undermined—and, as has already been well expounded on previous days in Committee, the good intentions of the current Minister and the Opposition Front Bench are no safeguard for the future.

There is also the widening effect when EU legislation is no longer governed by the policy constraints of EU treaties or the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which has a particular place in relation to the subject matter of the Bill. In transposition, all that has gone. This leaves us with two fears to address: first, that good law might be wantonly minimised or revoked, and, secondly, that wide powers might be used oppressively or for the wrong purpose. Both those prospects take advantage of the inadequacy of statutory instruments as a way to deal with fundamental matters.

Amendment 68A, which would replace Clause 41, Amendment 69E, which is about standards and designations, Amendment 72A, which would delete Clause 44(3), and Amendment 69A, which deals with exemptions from amendment and revocation, together address the fears that I have outlined. Before getting into the detail I will explain how they fit together. Of course, at this stage they are probing and illustrative, and I know that they are not perfect.

Amendment 68A would delete Clause 41 and replace it with an anchored principle that the money laundering regulations 2017 will continue, and that if they are to be amended, it must be done by an Act of Parliament. Amendment 69E, which could have been rolled up into the same amendment but stands separately, would provide an exception to the requirement for an Act of Parliament for amendment, and would allow for regulations to follow Financial Action Task Force standards and to update the definition of high-risk countries.

I think that there is general agreement that that is needed, but within that context—my Amendment 69E is not perfect in this respect—I have to caution that following FATF standards does not necessarily take into account civil liberties, so a framework of policy is also needed for that. Clause 41 does not give any guarantees of any such framework being carried over, and that aspect needs more attention. So the two amendments that I have outlined lay the general shape as I see that it should be. There are, however, many ways in which the provisions of the Bill, and elsewhere, can render complete change or revocation to whatever shape is laid out.

Amendment 72A to Clause 44(3) would remove the prospect of shape shifting from within the Bill. It would remove the potential to change, by regulation, the definitions of terrorist financing that were themselves made in separate Acts of Parliament that did not envisage change by regulation.

Amendment 69A is there to remind us that shape shifting and revocation options exist externally of this Bill via the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, which can, by regulation, revoke all or part of any Act or regulation in the name of efficiency. Of course, there is no escaping the fact that procedures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing must impose burdens, which to some means inefficiency. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson, has already hinted at some of that. Amendment 69A would, therefore, exempt from revocation or amendment under the two Acts that I have just mentioned.

As regards the deletion of Clause 41, I, too, have had emails from NGOs and others raising concern about the lowering of standards, including one from Global Witness suggesting that Clause 41 be narrowed to permit only enhancement of legislation. I appreciate that is what the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson, sets out to do, and I borrowed some of the language from that to use in one of my amendments. However, the problem is that it is not only in Clause 41(1) that legislation can be done away with by regulation. It appears again, particularly in Schedule 2, where, under paragraph 20, there is carte blanche to change or revoke the money laundering regulations 2017, and one can only interpret that as some kind of intention so to do. I have already mentioned the withdrawal Bill—Clauses 7 and 17 of that Bill are prime suspects—and the “revoke anything” provision in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act. So we need to do more to protect against revocation of things that we do not want to see revoked.

On the other fear, of being overbearing, there is the prospect that the already wide definitions of money laundering or terrorist financing could be extended. This is where Clause 44(3) comes in, which uses Clause 1 to modify definitions of terrorist financing that appear in the four other pieces of legislation mentioned in Clause 41(3). Thus Clause 1, which we have already heard quite a lot about as regards the sanctions part of this Bill, now creeps into the anti-money laundering part. It is also worth reminding ourselves that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has already said in paragraph 37 of its report that each of prevention, detection and investigation have the potential to allow the grant of significant powers affecting the rights of individuals and bodies—and that is before any tinkering with the definition of terrorist financing and before considering the removal of European protections on civil liberties.

Of course, under Clause 1, one of the objectives for change includes furthering a foreign policy objective of the United Kingdom. I pointed out on the first day of debate how UK terrorist legislation was used to freeze the assets of Landsbanki for having reckless capital adequacy and interest rate policies. This was what got them into difficulty—things that were nothing to do with terrorism. Is that the kind of thing that in future might be a foreign policy objective? In that particular instance, I know that it was cooked up in the Treasury. But what guarantees are there against all kinds of disconnected foreign policy objectives? All that flows from Clause 1 becomes relevant in the money-laundering part of the Bill.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

The Minister said that the reason this is done in regulations is because telling a bank how to do its due diligence is too detailed for primary legislation. But he is rather overstating the case, because Regulation 18 of the 2017 money laundering regulations says that, “A relevant person”—this would be the bank—

“must take appropriate steps to identify and assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing to which its business is subject”.

The first requirement there is:

“In carrying out the risk assessment required under paragraph (1), a relevant person must take into account … information made available to them by the supervisory authority”,


under Regulation 17. If you go back, you find that the supervisory authority has to take notice of what the Treasury and the Home Office have said. So this is a cascade that automatically updates. If there is a new risk, the Government identify it, along with mitigating measures, and tell the supervisors, which devise ways to update the information for their sectors. Then the onus is still on the individual businesses to work out how to do this. Yes, there is a list of factors to include, but it is within the power of the Government to say, “This is an extra factor; it does not even need any legislation”. However, it embeds the duties of the Government to have a position and to come out with their reports and then the duties of the supervisors. None of that is definitely retained, because everything to do with this money laundering directive can be rubbed out. So it is not about the excruciating detail that the Minister says it is—the excruciating detail comes from the supervisors.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I understand the point the noble Baroness makes, but it is not about—to use her term—the excruciating detail. Secondary legislation—with parliamentary scrutiny—provides the Government with the ability to react to rapidly changing circumstances. Relying on primary legislation would not allow the Government to do that. We have a difference of opinion in that regard—but, on the point she made, guidance to financial institutions would follow whatever legislation and whatever rules and laws prevail at that given time.

I turn to Amendment 69A. After the EU (Withdrawal) Bill receives Royal Assent, the powers under the Bill as they are drafted will allow changes to the money laundering regulations 2017 and to the funds transfer regulation which are appropriate to prevent deficiencies that arise as a result of the UK ceasing to be a member of the European Union. It will not enable any other changes to be made. I note that the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Kramer, are aware of the need to make such changes to the money laundering regulations 2017, as demonstrated by Amendment 69D, which we will discuss later today. However, the Government’s approach in this area is to ensure continuity for regulated firms, and certainty for businesses as to the nature of the obligations with which they need to comply.

In order to ensure that our anti-money laundering regime makes legal sense on withdrawal from the EU, we anticipate laying brief regulations made under the power in Clause 7 of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill so as to fix a limited number of deficiencies within the money laundering regulations and the funds transfer regulation. Our approach will make amendments such as—for example—removing references to the Government needing to have regard to reports published by the European Commission and to the Government having to file notifications of risk assessments with EU institutions. It would not be appropriate to keep these obligations, as I am sure noble Lords acknowledge, once the UK ceases to be a member of the European Union.

Given the necessity for such changes in order to have functioning UK law, I do not agree with Amendment 69A, which would remove the ability to make these necessary fixes to our existing laws. Being unable to make necessary changes of the type that I describe would not take account of the fact—the basic fact—that the UK will have ceased to be a member of the European Union.

Legislative reform orders that derive from the 2006 Act are designed to reduce the regulatory burden rather than achieve any policy changes. They must meet a number of preconditions before they can be used to reduce regulatory burdens. Most importantly, they are not allowed to remove any necessary protection, and are therefore not a risk to regulatory safeguards within the money laundering regulations 2017.

I do not agree with the proposed exclusion of a useful tool to ensure that the UK’s anti-money laundering regimes can be simpler, easier to understand and easier to comply with, while ensuring—a point well made by the noble Baronesses in speaking to their amendments—that standards are not driven down, which I agree with, and the strength of the system is maintained. That is another point of principle I agree with.

I hope the Committee will also consider how legislative reform orders are used. There is no convention to use them to make controversial changes, and the preconditions in the 2006 Act will always apply. I believe that the preconditions of the 2006 Act are the appropriate way of constraining the use of its powers. Further, disapplying legislative reform orders in a single case might suggest that it would be appropriate to use them in other similar contexts.

I turn now to the proposed new clause contained in Amendment 69E that would limit amendments to the money laundering regulations 2017 to only those which implement standards published by the Financial Action Task Force, or that identify or revoke a designation of a high-risk third country. I should add that I am again grateful that within the clause both noble Baronesses recognise that new powers are required to update the UK’s money laundering regime after we leave the EU.

The Government are committed to playing a leading role in shaping global anti-money laundering standards through our membership of the Financial Action Task Force. Noble Lords will be aware that we led a successful campaign through the FATF to clarify that only some charitable organisations, such as those working in conflict zones, are vulnerable to terrorist financing, and in doing so improved the ability of civil society organisations to function and receive funding. We have also actively worked to clarify the obligations on the private sector to share financial intelligence. In doing so, we are addressing a key priority for the private sector, which consistently delivers the message that we will be better able to manage financial crime risk if it is able to share more information regarding suspicious customers.

It is right that the Government have the power to update the UK regime when such standards change. There are, however, several areas where the UK’s anti-money laundering regime already goes beyond these standards. Our recently established register of trusts generating tax consequences, for example, goes beyond the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force. Similarly, the decision at Budget 2015 to regulate virtual currency exchanges for the purposes of anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing did not reflect an expectation of the Financial Action Task Force—it went beyond and it was a policy decision to which we expect to give effect through transposing amendments to the fourth EU anti-money laundering directive.

Although we will remain aligned with Financial Action Task Force standards after the UK ceases to be a member of the EU, our anti-money laundering regime already exceeds its standards in certain areas and we will wish to ensure that our defences against misuse of the financial system remain ahead of global standards, rather than solely reflecting them. Ensuring that we can make regulations so as to detect, investigate and prevent money laundering or terrorist financing, as well as to implement the standards of the Financial Action Task Force, is the most certain method of placing future changes to our anti-money laundering system on a sound legal basis. Adopting the amendment would limit our ability to do so in future.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I concede that maybe we should have said “be at least as strict as”, but there is nothing in the Bill that says we are going to maintain and be ahead of global standards. We would all be a great deal happier if there were something in there indicating that standards would be maintained. We know there are good intentions, the Government have been doing good things and the Front Bench opposite would do good things, but it is not there in writing. That is what is fundamental to this: the principles are not fixed.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I thank the noble Baroness for acknowledging the actions that this Government have taken and—I am sure I speak for the Front Benches—for the faith that she has in both Front Benches. I have listened carefully to her point. The point that I am making is that the UK has already shown that through our commitment to the FATF, which we will continue to be part of. Not only are we complying but we are leading, and that role will continue and indeed be strengthened by the UK’s membership of the FATF. The objectives and obligations that it asks member states to adhere to will continue after we leave the EU.

I turn to Amendment 72A. The definition of terrorist financing contained in Clause 41 of the Bill is identical to that which already exists in the 2017 money laundering regulations. This definition provides that “terrorist financing” means an act that constitutes an offence under various legislative provisions, being sections of the Terrorism Act 2000; the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida (Asset-Freezing) Regulations 2011 and the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010.

As noble Lords will note, elements of the definition of terrorist financing within Clause 41 cross-refer to secondary legislation that creates a criminal offence; namely regulation 10 of the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida (Asset-Freezing) Regulations 2011. This provides that any person who contravenes prohibitions contained elsewhere in those regulations commits an offence relating to the financing of terrorism. The offences created through those regulations play an important role in deterring the financing of terrorist organisations. Regulation 14 of those regulations further provides that a person guilty of the relevant offence is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years’ imprisonment or to a fine or indeed both.

Clause 1 of the Bill provides that an appropriate Minister may make sanctions regulations where doing so would further the prevention of terrorism, whether in the UK or elsewhere. It is possible that such regulations made under the powers conferred by Clause 1 could impose targeted sanctions and penalties similar to those that are established through the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida (Asset-Freezing) Regulations 2011, and which are already captured within the definition of terrorist financing within the 2017 money laundering regulations. If such regulations are made, they will effectively update the UK’s regime for counterterrorist financing. I am sure noble Lords will also note that the reference in the definition to the Terrorist Asset Freezing Act etc. 2010 will become obsolete when Part 1 of that Act is repealed.

In these circumstances, it is right that the definition of terrorist financing within Clause 41 of this Bill can be updated so that the UK’s counterterrorist financing framework can be applied consistently, working off a single definition of terrorist financing. Clause 45(5) of the Bill provides that any regulations updating this definition would rightly be made through the draft affirmative procedure, providing Parliament with an opportunity for fully scrutinising any such changes. In the absence of such a power, the Government would otherwise be obliged to maintain a definition of terrorist financing within this legislation that could quickly go out of date and so limit the effectiveness of our response to the financing of terrorist groups.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, there are a lot of regulations going on here that interact with one another. Will they be considered one by one, so that they can be looked at comprehensively, or will they come in a great big wodge—akin to the sort of thing we get on money laundering?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I am sure that the noble Baroness will accept that there are times when it makes sense to discuss certain regulations together in a group. At other times, they will be discussed individually. We will certainly look at the context of each regulation and introduce it in the appropriate manner. The key point I would make in all this is that, under the procedure we have adopted, we want to ensure that there is effective scrutiny.

I totally accept the point of principle and have noted our difference of opinion on the point made by both noble Baronesses and others on primary and secondary legislation. However, I have explained why the Government believe their approach is the right one. I also appreciate the patience of Members of the Committee in our detailed discussions setting the context, which I am sure will be reflected in our discussions today. I thank noble Lords for their patience and indulgence, and hope that they are minded to withdraw or not move their amendments.

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The amendment is directed against all those who would corrupt the integrity of our system and allow our country to be a safe haven for the proceeds of crime. I very much hope that your Lordships’ House will support it, and I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, I have only a little bit to add on this—you may be relieved to know—because I was present during, and participated in, the debates on the Criminal Finances Bill. I saw that this amendment had been tabled and I was available at the time, and I thought that because there had been so much support for it during the passage of that Bill I had better get my name on this amendment quick, before the list got full up. That is why I am second on the list of names attached to the amendment. I did not table an amendment myself because I did not think that it was right to steal somebody else’s good work when I expected that something like this would arrive.

Almost everything has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. This is something that needs to be done, and this is an opportunity to do it. It would need very persuasive reasons for me to concede that it should not be done now. As I did at Second Reading, again I remind noble Lords of the context which stretches across everything to do with money laundering and transparency, and that is that the eyes of the EU are upon us. These issues, such as people purchasing property in London with dubious money, are ones on which I often heard accusations when I was chair of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee. I was often trying to do something useful for the UK, and one weapon to try to take out my contribution was to attack the UK for not being such a good place because we allowed money laundering and the proceeds of money laundering to reside here in the UK and elsewhere. It is in that context that I suggest to the Minister that he looks kindly on this amendment and sees too that, as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, says, now is the time to do it.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendment. Like the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, I apologise for not having been involved in previous aspects of the Bill, but I participated in the Criminal Finances Bill, and particularly on this area. As we have a new Minister, I shall use that excuse to develop a bit of what we have from history to assist his briefing. But it is a matter of regret that people still consider the UK, and London in particular, a bolthole for dirty money. London is not nicknamed “Londongrad” for no reason.

There is the legacy of the former Prime Minister, David Cameron, to whom I pay a massive tribute on this issue. He took a bigger stand than any previous Prime Minister, and I shall quote him on the record, because it is important. He made that speech in Singapore in July 2015, and he could not have been clearer. I shall quote three or four paragraphs, because it is important to what I want to say and the examples I want to give.

He said that,

“this is a challenge for everyone – including ASEAN, including Britain. We too must get our house in order – and we are. And that is why the UK government has legislated to ensure that from next year, Britain will become the first major country to establish a publicly accessible central registry showing who really owns and controls all British companies.

This will open up a new era of corporate transparency in Britain. But, of course, it will only apply in Britain and for British companies. So the aim should surely be for others to follow. To really tackle corruption effectively, we need to be able to trace data from one country to another. We don’t want criminals to be able to go unnoticed, just because they move money across borders or have assets in different countries. The torchlight should be able to follow them. If we are to win, we must make sure that there is nowhere to hide.


So I’ll continue to make the case for transparency with international partners – including the British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies. And I am willing to go further, and take concrete steps to force the pace. And that includes looking at whether we can get foreign companies investing in the UK to step up to the same level of transparency.


Now with £122 billion of property in England and Wales owned by offshore companies we know that some high-value properties – particularly in London – are being bought by people overseas through anonymous shell companies, some of them with plundered or laundered cash. Just last week, there were allegations of links between a former Kazakh secret police chief and a London property portfolio worth nearly £150 million.


I’m determined that the UK must not become a safe haven for corrupt money from around the world. We need to stop corrupt officials or organised criminals using anonymous shell companies to invest their ill-gotten gains in London property, without being tracked down”.


It was a seminal speech and an incredible read from a British Prime Minister. In some ways, I much regret that we do not get the same thing from the present Prime Minister, because it looks as though things have gone a bit flaky.

As part of the briefing for the Bill, Global Witness and Transparency International produced some of their previous examples. I will not go through them all but there are a couple that I want to raise. The research from Transparency International identified £4 billion-worth of property bought in London with suspicious wealth. Where information is available, Transparency International has found that 98% of the companies involved in the purchases are based in secrecy jurisdictions and that 90% are incorporated in the British Virgin Islands alone. Among this information—Global Witness was a partner—it was revealed that a £147 million property on London’s Baker Street could be linked back to Rakhat Aliyev, the former head of the Kazakh secret police, as referenced by the Prime Minister.

This made me go back to my monopoly chart, which was provided on the first kleptocracy tour of London in February 2016, when Members were invited to go with journalists to various places in London to hear the story of various properties, who bought them and where the money may have come from. The properties in Baker Street of Rakhat Aliyev, the former KGB chief, and their location in the building were pointed out—we had the address and the postcode. He could never have purchased those properties from his salary; it would have been absolutely impossible. We have to be careful about tracking him down because, in 2015, he was found dead in his prison cell in Austria—he had been up to other things and had been arrested.

There were other properties listed on the chart, but I am not going to go through any more of them because the examples are always there. When we have examples like this, we cannot just ignore them. But nothing seems to happen. Journalists, investigators and people who want a democratic, open, transparent and modern rule-of-law Russia come to London to look at the situation and to talk to people. However, there are issues relating to what we have done so far.

I shall come to the Land Registry in a minute, but the brief from Transparency International went on to say that its analysis of the recent Land Registry data, and that of Who Owns England? and Global Witness, revealed that in the two years since the property register was promised, nothing had changed. Financial investigators, civil society and the wider public are still in the dark about the real people behind the 86,397 properties in England and Wales owned by companies registered offshore in the secrecy jurisdictions. The analysis found that, just in 2015, 87% of all the properties owned by overseas companies had an owner in a secrecy jurisdiction, and 57,318 were owned by companies registered in the British Overseas Territories, jurisdictions which do not publish.

Over the last two years the UK Government have made some progress in tackling corruption and money laundering and set the global standard on beneficial ownership transfers by launching a public register of companies—and in the last Parliament, of course, they introduced the unexplained wealth orders. But we need to know who is behind the companies, and where their money has come from. That is absolutely crucial. Otherwise the proceeds of crime will continue to pour into the UK, particularly into London. Evidence has been given to the consultation that closed in March 2017, but as of today there are no results.

Before I make my final point, I advise the Minister, as I did his predecessor, to see the film “From Russia with Cash”—and I think there is also one called “From Ukraine with Cash”. They are easily available, and watching them would benefit the wider debate about what is actually happening here, in this country. I want to refer to the text of the amendment, regarding bids for UK contracts, because the same issue was raised by David Cameron in his Singapore speech. This should not just be about property, but also about overseas companies bidding for contracts in the UK. We should know who owns them.

Let us see how far we have got in the UK. David Cameron said in his Singapore speech that as a first step, he had asked,

“the Land Registry this autumn”,

that is, autumn 2015,

“to publish data on which foreign companies own which land and property titles in England and Wales. This will apply to around 100,000 titles held on the Land Register”.

One evening last week I put that to the test, and applied to the Land Registry for the overseas ownership data. I went through all the seven steps on the website: status, names, date of birth—which I thought was a bit irrelevant, but I filled it in—address and telephone number; I went through the process to prove I was not a robot, and then I agreed the terms. Fortunately, I was able, as I went through it all, to print each page, so I know exactly what information I gave. However, when I came to step 7—downloading the data sets—it said, “Please note these download links will only remain valid for 4 minutes 47 seconds”. After five minutes my little computer said that there were four minutes still to go—at which time, of course, the thing closed down. So I tried it again, and got exactly the same results.

No wonder people cannot find out information, on the basis of things that we have already done, and which we boast about. We are asking the Government to go further than they have already gone with regard to overseas companies, but it is being made difficult to access what is supposed to be there already for public access. There was no cost, and every step was completed, but I ended up with less than five minutes to download. Perhaps that is down to the barmy broadband speeds we have failed to provide. I was in central London when I tried to do this, by the way; I was not at home in Shropshire. This is crazy, and the Minister needs to look at it—although I may have done something completely wrong, in which case I will take advice.

I just want to strengthen what the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, and what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said during the earlier attempts to do this. I realise that this discussion will definitely upset a lot of people, as the previous Prime Minister said. However, the fact of the matter is that so much money is piling into London—leaving aside the rest of the country—that there will come a time when it will put our economy at risk. We are talking about huge amounts. The National Crime Agency is concerned about it and people in that agency are on record as having said various things. It looks as though the instruction has been given, “Turn a blind eye to this money coming in because it is good that it comes in”. The fact that it is completely distorting London property prices and making London another country within the UK is beside the point.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

69B: After Clause 41, insert the following new Clause—
“Failure to prevent money laundering
(1) A relevant body (B) is guilty of an offence if a person commits a money laundering facilitation offence when acting in the capacity of a person associated with B.(2) For the purposes of this section “money laundering facilitation offence” means—(a) concealing, disguising, converting, transferring or removing criminal property under section 327 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (concealing etc);(b) entering into an arrangement which the person knows, or suspects, facilitates (by whatever means) the acquisition, retention, use, or control of criminal property under section 328 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (arrangements); or(c) the acquisition, use or possession of criminal property, under section 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (acquisition, use and possession).(3) It is a defence for B to prove that, when the money laundering facilitation offence was committed, B had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent persons acting in the capacity of a person associated with B from committing such an offence.(4) A relevant body guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine, (b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine, or(c) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.(5) It is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether—(a) any relevant conduct of a relevant body, or(b) any conduct which constitutes part of a relevant criminal offence,takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.(6) In this section, “relevant body” and “acting in the capacity of a person associated with B” have the same meaning as in section 44 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017 (meaning of relevant body and acting in the capacity of an associated person).”

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, this amendment introduces a new corporate criminal offence of failure to prevent money laundering. The UK already has two failure to prevent corporate criminal offences. The first is in Section 7 of the Bribery Act and the second was introduced recently in the Criminal Finances Act for tax evasion. The wording of the proposed offence is modelled on those existing offences, especially the more recent one that uses the form of facilitation.

Proposed new subsection (2) contains a definition of what the money laundering facilitation offence would be. Proposed new subsection (3) introduces the defence of adequate procedures being in place. The other proposed new subsections follow the format already established in earlier, similar offence types specifying fines, and also cover behaviour outside the United Kingdom.

The money laundering regulations 2017 already establish provisions about procedures for businesses most likely to be used for money laundering. Under those regulations, there are substantial regulatory fines for a company that fails to comply. However, regulatory fines, even large ones, are often taken as a cost of doing business, and they do not have the same impact on a company as a criminal conviction, which is taken much more seriously by both the company and the directors. As a consequence, it makes them sit up and take notice about the controls that are in place and the quality of their internal audit procedures.

In tandem with the possibility of entering into a deferred prosecution agreement, a “failure to prevent” can be a very powerful tool, both as a deterrent and a means of prosecution. Why do we need it? It is a well-known fact that, in the UK, it is almost impossible to find a large company guilty of a criminal offence because our criminal law applies a doctrine of intent derived from law relevant to an individual. Corporate intent requires the finding of a senior responsible individual or “directing mind”—and that is next to impossible in large companies where directors are not regarded as able to know everything and, indeed, the concept of collective responsibility of boards effectively prevents it. It can pay not to even look too hard. For small companies, a director is far more easily assumed to know everything. With little likelihood of being prosecuted in a large company, there is also little incentive for it to enter into a deferred prosecution arrangement—and that is reflected in prosecution statistics. Various other factors taken into account all favour large companies against small companies. Our law is unbalanced.

The Crown Prosecution Service’s legal guidance itself says under its “further evidential considerations” in paragraph 21:

“The smaller the corporation, the more likely it will be that guilty knowledge can be attributed to the controlling officer and therefore to the company itself”.


As long ago as 2010, the Law Commission, at paragraph 5.84 of its consultation paper 195 called the identification doctrine,

“an inappropriate and ineffective method of establishing criminal liability of corporations”.

The Attorney-General was not able to prosecute firms for LIBOR and the observation was made by the Telegraph’s chief business correspondent in 2016 with regard to LIBOR and Forex that,

“we outsource corporate accountability for criminality in the City to US prosecutors”.

The same story is repeated for money laundering. The US achieved deferred prosecution agreements against HSBC and a fine of £1.2 billion. In the UK, only regulatory investigations have been opened, and commentators have blamed the identification regime. Jonathan Fisher QC told the press that it would be “difficult and clumsy” for the FCA to criminally prosecute HSBC as the FCA,

“would have to show that a director or some other controlling mind in the parent company in London knew all about the alleged misconduct”.

So there are rewards for ignorance. Indeed, if any noble Lords watched the appearance of the HSBC chair, CEO and chair of audit before the various Commons Select Committees that they made appearances at, they would have seen that the issue of internal audit was one of the issues that was probed—without success. Sitting and saying nothing is by far the safest option.

The UK introduced a failure-to-prevent offence for bribery in Section 7 of the Bribery Act. The effect of that was reinforced by the introduction of deferred prosecution agreements in 2014. It is useful to consider the effect of the “before and after” of those provisions by looking at BAE, which represents the situation before, and Rolls-Royce, which represents the situation after. Before Section 7 of the Bribery Act, we had the longest-running bribery investigation ever: BAE settled with the SFO. I quote from the blog of David Corker, another lawyer specialising in financial crime litigation, who said that,

“BAE’s obduracy resulted in a humiliating settlement for the SFO and a profound defeat for the interests of justice … BAE was able to dictate the terms of the SFO’s surrender: a plea of guilt to an obscure books and records offence buried away in the Companies Act, the payment of a trifling gratuity to faraway governments at BAE’s discretion”—

that is, BAE chose whether to pay it or not—

“and an everlasting immunity for all its employees who had conducted and overseen the bribery”.

No wonder it was called “humiliating”.

In the “after” scenario in 2017, after Section 7, Rolls-Royce admitted its systemic corruption, paid a fine of £500 million and, instead of seeking immunity for its employees, committed itself to helping the SFO. The need for, and effect of, such a corporate criminal offence are therefore clear. Without such an offence, it will continue to be extremely difficult to prosecute large companies for money laundering offences and the UK will continue to outsource its justice to the United States. Again, I pray in aid the EU situation—but it is unlikely to impress in Brussels, which is progressively turning the handle on these issues and is well able to have them in a list of regulatory requirements that need to be in place to gain any equivalence, or any deal, on financial services.

I turn to Amendment 69C, which requires that if the correct anti-money laundering procedures are not in place—meaning that there had been a corporate conviction of a failure to prevent money laundering—the Secretary of State should ask the court to investigate whether the directors were fit and proper. An automatic finding that they were unfit is not intended; the intention is to mirror what happens under competition law where, following a breach of competition law, the director’s role is looked at. It is already possible for the Secretary of State to refer to the court under their own volition, but I am seeking that there should be some kind of routine follow-up to see whether the directors were, in effect, wantonly negligent or disregarding of their duties, in particular with regard to how they handled internal audit.

I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson, and the noble Lord, Lord Collins—who submitted Amendment 69F, calling for a public consultation on corporate liability—will note the overlap with the issues of their concern. I will be interested to hear what is said. Personally, from the general evidence available—including from the Law Commission as long ago as 2010—I am not sure whether consultation is needed on the need to reform corporate liability in general. It is a matter of getting on with it and doing it. There are other areas in which the whole identification doctrine rears its head. Hopefully they will be looked at in due course—but right now, I believe that in the field of economic crime, where we have the precedents for failure-to-prevent offences, the mechanism is known and has been effective and we should proceed to avail ourselves of it. I beg to move.

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[Lord Bates]

I am happy to undertake to write to the noble Lord in response.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his responses to the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend. I am conscious that there are issues of due process around consultation, but forgive me if I also think that there was a bit of fancy footwork going on with the alacrity with which a call for evidence went out during the progress of the Criminal Finances Bill, when some distinguished Members of the other place started to take a great deal of interest in including an offence of failure to prevent. It is the best part of nine months since then and probably three months since I was contacted and asked whether it was okay to publish my submission to the call for evidence. I said yes, but still nothing has been published. I do not know why we cannot see some of the responses separately from the response of the Ministry of Justice.

However, one thing that has been established is that we have a pretty rubbish criminal regime on corporate liability. Something has to be done. In that context, it would be good to know how long the Minister thinks it might take for the Government to analyse whether any good has been done by having a second failure-to-prevent offence on tax evasion. I gave an exposition of how good it is to have one, and it will not be shown to be any weaker vis-à-vis tax evasion than it is vis-à-vis bribery. Therefore, to require specific evidence within the economic crime sphere is probably overegging it.

The Minister referenced fines, and there will potentially be more fines under the money laundering regulations 2017. I accept that, as well as what he said about the senior managers regime—but ultimately you have to be able to bet to board level. It is, importantly, board members who ultimately control how much resource goes to internal audit. That is behind the director disqualification point. It is always somebody further down, not the people at the top—the people who are able to pass the buck to some junior person who may not necessarily have been given the resources. They are the ones who carry the can, mainly in the senior managers regime.

I therefore hope that the Minister will listen to and think about these points, and consider how much use the Secretary of State is making of the potential for director disqualification when it is discovered that procedures have not been in place in the regulatory environment. The Secretary of State could still say, “Right, I want investigations of whether the directors are fit and proper because they have allowed these things to go on within the companies for which they are ultimately responsible”.

[Lord Hain]

I would be grateful if the noble Baroness and my noble friend Lord Collins would consider putting this amendment to a vote on Report. I worry that the consultation will go on for so long that the Bill will have passed through this House—and possibly the Commons as well—before we have a chance to vote on this important failure to prevent offence.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hain, for his support. It is certainly a matter to which we will return—not least because the other place has shown interest in this subject. There are problems with the timing; it may be on the never-never, as he suggests. But for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 69B withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

69D: After Clause 41, insert the following new Clause—
“Money laundering: technical amendment
(1) Until two years after exit day, as defined by section 14 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2017, an appropriate Minister may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (S.I. 2017/692) in order to—(a) replace references to EU directives and regulations with corresponding references to UK legislation;(b) transpose references to European Supervisory Authorities and any review, report, guideline or Regulatory Technical Standards requirements of the European Supervisory Authorities into corresponding requirements of UK supervisory bodies with any obligations to take account of international developments and to consult also being carried over;(c) transpose requirements for European Commission reports into report requirements from the Treasury and Home Office, including any obligation to take account of international developments;(d) transpose references to delegated acts into provisions for regulations made by the affirmative procedure;(e) update references relating to EEA passport rights or replace them with any corresponding or negotiated right; (f) amend definitions of credit institutions and financial institutions or any other definition lists to eliminate EU cross-references and establish corresponding entity lists;(g) convert any amount in euros to sterling;(h) modify or delete provisions relating to the EEA to retain reference as appropriate or combine with third country provisions;(j) replace reference to the identifying of high risk third countries by the Commission with corresponding UK procedure that takes account of international provisions.(2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

My Lords, the amendment is a very probing amendment—a very “proby” probing amendment—and an illustration of what technical changes could look like, not just with the money laundering regulations but in financial services more generally. It is a vehicle to discuss further what transposition from an EU directive means. The interest is in the contrast between the sorts of things I am going to talk about and what happens through the withdrawal Bill. I drafted the amendment as an add-on to preserved money laundering regulations. While it could be what Schedule 2 could look like, it could be used in the context of the withdrawal Bill, which I understand has to be even more generic. However, it all looks rather “smoke and mirrors” and is not clear on the scope of what might be considered appropriate or redundant, or what might emerge from it. I confess that what I have produced was initially based on my own little check-list of what I might look for in the future, and I thought it would be useful to discuss it.

The amendment says that the Minister “may” make regulations, but some of the points are essential and here we should at some point say there “shall” be carry-over of the relevant policy elements. That is what I am driving at—that one should not lose the policy framework.

Paragraphs (a), (f) and (g) are simply terminology corrections: instead of defining financial institutions with reference to the EU capital requirements directive and markets in financial instruments directive, one just transposes that into a UK list of entities. That is doubtless the sort of thing the Government will be doing. I also suggest changing amounts in euros to sterling. In the context of the fifth money laundering directive, one should probably go further and also be able to change the amounts by regulation. I would have no problem with that.

However, paragraph (b) should perhaps contain “shall”. It provides that reports, reviews and guidelines that were previously to be done by European supervisory authorities be taken over and carried out by UK supervisors, and policy guidance be carried over,

“to take account of international developments”.

My fear here is that in eliminating what are regarded as superfluous EU references, we inadvertently end up disregarding the policy. As my noble friend pointed out, the Government have not addressed the loss of policy framework alongside putting in compensation for a loss of power framework. The Government have said repeatedly that they do not intend to change policy in making post-Brexit or ready-for-Brexit changes, but then you cannot leave behind some of the policy that came from the EU. On the money laundering directives, that would include provisions on proportionality.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

That may indeed be a very helpful intervention from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. However, for the record, because this is a serious point, the note that I read out may not fully reflect the announcement to which my noble friend has referred. To make sure, I shall seek some additional clarification. The next group is very germane to the issue that he raises in relation to overseas territories. Therefore, perhaps without presuming on my noble friend too much, we may have some further information that will better answer that particular point.

In fact, a note has arrived, and I can say that the list published yesterday relates to tax. The EU maintains a separate list of countries which represent a high risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, to which UK firms must have regard. That may be part of the answer; more will come in the next group, if my noble friend can bear with us.

On the EU withdrawal Bill, which the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Kramer, asked about, Clause 7 is very clear—it is a power to remedy deficiencies in law that arise as a result of the UK leaving the EU, no more and no less. That is a level of certainty which I hope will offer some reassurance to the noble Baroness. We do not intend to make changes to the 2017 regulations other than to make those fixes. The 2017 regulations refer to guidelines issued by the European supervisory authorities. Amendment 69D enables those references to be removed only if they are replaced by references to those issued by the UK supervisory authorities. Those would cause additional work and a risk of duplication with other guidance. So, in response to that, and after what I am sure has been a very helpful debate, if not fully illuminating at this stage, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

I thank the Minister for his response. As he perhaps imagines, we will return to the issue again. I take his assurance about the withdrawal Bill not being to make changes of policy, but we still have the problem of what this Bill will be doing. It opens the door to very substantial changes of policy and principle, and that is the problem—nowhere does it have such reassurance that that is not going to happen. I think that the Minister has understood that there are things, especially in financial services regulation, where there is a policy framework, as we have tended to refer to it. Without duplication, you make sure that it is within scope of what the UK supervisory authorities would do—or there are provisions that there should be reviews, which have been put into European legislation for good and proper reason. I probably put a lot of them there myself, and I was probably cheered on by people in the Treasury for doing so. It would be quite appropriate to have something that says that we will continue in the same vein.

I thank the Minister for his comments about my drafting skills. As he probably knows, this involves about 100 directives and I remain available to assist if somebody does not know why they are there, because I probably do. At this point, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 69D withdrawn.

Scrutiny of Secondary Legislation

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Monday 6th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak, first, to the procedural issues to which the regret Motion directly refers and then turn to the anti-money laundering and terrorist-funding measures which these instruments have introduced.

Noble Lords will know that I take a great deal of interest in secondary legislation, particularly when it pertains to Treasury matters. I am therefore familiar with the reports that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee produces. In recent years I have rarely read such a scathing assessment from the committee about the Government’s approach to the checks and balances, such as impact assessments, public consultations and timetables, which underpin our legislative process. At the very least, I would expect the Government to learn from the errors that they have made. However, they appear not to have learned anything. In the Government’s response to the committee, Stephen Barclay MP, the new secondary legislation champion, stated:

“My officials have alerted me to a similar issue where the General Election purdah period has also had an impact on finalisation of the impact assessment for the implementation of the Payment Services Directive 2. The Government will shortly be laying the Payment Services Regulations 2017, which implement the Directive. Whilst a final impact assessment for implementation of the Directive has been submitted to the RPC, the Government will not be able to publish an impact assessment that has been through RPC scrutiny alongside the Regulations”.


I ask the noble Lord: how many more pieces of secondary legislation will be subjected to sub-standard preparation?

One of the most striking aspects of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee’s report is the number of occurrences of bad practice that it has noted. First, there is the timing. The three SIs in question were laid on 22 or 23 June and came into force on 26 June, thereby breaching the convention which expects instruments to be laid 21 days before they come into law. The Government go on to say that the general election held on 8 June made it impossible to meet the 21-day deadline, but the Treasury consultation closed in November 2016—nearly a year ago. Why did it take the Government until April of this year to publish the final regulations? It should be of concern to us all that, as the committee says, the Government’s default position is to reduce the time available for parliamentary scrutiny.

Secondly and perhaps even more significantly, despite the scale of the impact that this measure will have, the Government did not see fit to publish an impact assessment at the same time as the instrument. The net cost to businesses will be £5.2 million a year—not an insignificant impact. The absurdity of this situation can be summed up by paragraphs 11.2 and 11.3 of the Explanatory Memorandum published alongside the regulations. Paragraph 11.2 reads:

“The Impact Assessment will provide further detail on impact for small businesses”.


Paragraph 11.3 goes on to say:

“No specific action is proposed to minimise regulatory burdens on small businesses”.


Frankly, the Government had no idea whether action was required, given that the final impact assessment had yet to be published. What is the Government’s excuse this time? Will they say that the Regulatory Policy Committee was also affected by the general election? However, the committee makes the point that the RPC is an independent body. Do its role and functions change during a general election? Did all the RPC’s work cease?

We are as unconvinced as the committee was that the Government could not have published provisional or indicative figures in the memorandum. Given that the draft impact assessment was completed on 13 April 2017, that would seem to have been entirely possible. Why did the Government choose not to pursue this course of action and, given that this is clearly not going to be a one-off, will the Government commit to publishing provisional figures in future if an impact assessment is not available?

I should now like to address the substance of the three instruments. I start by making it very clear that we support efforts by the Government to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing. We agree with the Government’s objective of making the financial system as hostile as possible for illicit finance, and it is right that businesses know their customers and manage their risks. Indeed, we welcome the Government’s decision to clarify that an estate agent should consider that they enter into a business relationship with a purchaser as well as a seller. Estate agents must now apply due diligence checks to both parties and, in so doing, close an existing loophole.

It is also encouraging to see that the Government have acted on PEPs. A firm will now be required to assess the risk posed by each individual on a case-by-case basis. The FCA guidance states that UK PEPs should be treated as low risk unless the firm has identified independent high-risk factors. This is a common-sense change which we support.

However, as I am sure the Minister would expect, there are omissions from the regulations and elements of policy which we query, so I have a number of questions for him. Perhaps the most striking omission from the regulations is a reference to providers of gambling services other than casinos. The Government have explained that this decision,

“was based on evidence that indicated the gambling sector was low risk relative to other sectors”.

What evidence was produced suggesting that money laundering in the gambling sector was low? Whom did the Government consult beyond the gambling industry, and did those other stakeholders share different views about the potential for money laundering and terrorist financing?

Although I confess to being concerned by that omission, I am pleased that the Government have been explicit that this will be reviewed by 26 June 2018. This report— to be produced by the Treasury and the Home Office—must identify, assess, understand and mitigate the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. This is a substantial piece of work and, given that one reason we are here this evening is the Government’s failure to meet a deadline, I would like the Minister to say how long they anticipate that this process will last. Whom do the Government intend to consult and, with particular reference to the gambling sector, what criteria are the Government using to determine whether the status quo should be maintained?

I turn to due diligence, which makes up a substantive part of the SI. Part 3 of the main money laundering regulations outlines the three different levels of due diligence that companies have to apply based on the specific nature of a business relationship. The Government have stated that they do not want to be prescriptive and, as such, they have made the decision not to publish guidance alongside these instruments. However, it strikes me that this is exactly the sort of area where prescription is required. I note that it will be up to the regulators—the Financial Conduct Authority, HMRC and the Gambling Commission—to produce guidance on how to carry out these checks. Have the regulators been in contact with each other to ensure that there is consistency where necessary, as well as delineation between the three due diligence categories? Businesses and the regulators will require clarity and this will be achieved only if there is integrated working.

On the matter of the regulators, this will place a further strain on their resource capacity. HMRC in particular has in recent years faced reduced budgets with increased demands. I would be interested to know whether HMRC, the FCA or the Gambling Commission have contacted the Government asking for additional resources. I am sure the Minister will highlight that the Government intend to hire an additional 5,000 HMRC staff, which is welcome news. However, how many of those staff will have anti-money laundering responsibilities?

On the specifics of enhanced due diligence—the highest category—the regulations stipulate that “additional independent, reliable sources” and increased,

“monitoring of the business relationship”,

are needed in order to fulfil the requirements of the legislation. But what practical differences would the Government expect to see under enhanced measures and what would be regarded as sufficient monitoring?

Alongside the additional screening and scrutinising measures, larger businesses will also have to make changes to their management, and in some cases perhaps their structure. This underlines that committee’s point about the significance of these regulations. Businesses will be required to appoint one individual from the board of directors or senior management team to take responsibility for compliance with these regulations. Furthermore, the company must establish an independent audit function to examine and evaluate the effectiveness of policies, controls and procedures adopted by the chosen board member, and make recommendations and monitor their compliance. How many companies will this affect, and when are they expected to have complied with this aspect of the regulations? Can the Minister say more about the independent audit function? Could it be incorporated in the company’s existing auditing arrangements, or are they expected to be separate?

My final point relates to the issue of failure to co-operate. What mechanisms are in place if businesses fail to comply with these changes? Have the Government indicated the scale and extent of the reprimand they can expect from the regulators?

The main intent behind this Motion was to get to the bottom of the procedural irregularities which took place in the preparation of the regulations. The Government are not short of problems, and I am sure that they do not want to be accused of undermining the crucial work of your Lordships’ House in scrutinising secondary legislation. We will of course support the Government in preventing money laundering and terrorist financing, but however noble and vital a policy may be, there are principles and procedures which are necessary components to our legislative process and which must be followed. I can only hope that the Government take heed of the warnings from ourselves and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, by chance this Motion is being debated on the same day that we have had the Urgent Question on the paradise papers. I would like to make a couple of short points before I get on to the main issues of timing. Seeing the paradise papers means that we cannot avoid having many more debates on tax avoidance and money laundering. It shows yet again that more has to be done on the transparency of British overseas dependencies and territories. I would like to point to an extract I have seen from the Government in the context of money laundering, which comes from the Companies House annual report 2014-15 and says that the,

“benefit in having an open, and up to date, register means that it has ‘many eyes’ checking the information … The more open the data is, and the more it is viewed, trust and transparency will increase”.

That says it all about closed registers.

Turning to the Motion, I am not a member of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, and am not yet an expert in the intricacies of how secondary legislation is scrutinised here, but I was quite expert at dealing with, and changing, comparable processes in the EU. I find myself asking why the Government organised themselves to make this regulation just in time for transposition so that there was then no breathing space to permit proper parliamentary scrutiny when a general election was called. Time did not have to be so tight, but I fear that it is part of a pattern of seeing scrutiny of secondary legislation as a mere fig leaf for due process.

The fourth money laundering directive was completed some time ago. All but the final trialogues were completed when still under my remit as chair of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. It was not a difficult directive. It closely followed the Financial Action Task Force recommendations that came out in 2012. Despite being slowed down by the election of a new European Parliament, the summer break, and the palaver of appointing a new Commission, it was done and dusted, translated and published by June 2015, setting two years for transposition.

What filled those two years? It took 15 months to get a first consultation out. The consultation was not opened until 15 September 2016 and closed eight weeks later on 10 November. There were a total of 186 responses to that consultation. I have not tracked down a breakdown, but that number covers all the responses from supervisors and other Government departments, as well as from NGOs and industry. It is not a huge number. Unfortunately, I have not managed to find publications of the actual submissions, but have seen a summary in the following consultation.

By then, the timing problem had been created, but there was a follow-up with a second consultation and draft regulation after another four months; it opened on 15 March 2017 and closed on 12 April 2017. The regulation would have got to a touchdown only just in time even if an election had not been called. That first 15-month delay is unacceptable, because it was scheduled in that Parliament would be given minimum time and scheduled in that there was no contemplation of a vote against, because there would not have been time for changes even without an election. I cannot find any excuse in the subject matter for delay. It is frequently iterated that the UK is a leader in FATF. Back in 2012, it was known what the provisions were and where flexibility lay. If the Government are so keen to say that they lead the field by example, which by all means they should as host to a centre of global financial services, why were they pushing up against the deadline?

I know that amendments by way of the so-called fifth money laundering directive were soon under way. It might have been convenient to delay and try to do this at the same time as transposing the fourth directive. That does not seem appropriate, but if that were a reason for delay it means that convenience was given priority over parliamentary scrutiny. The European supervisory authorities managed to complete their consultation and guidance by November 2016, even though it is guidance for supervisors that they do not have to follow until June 2018. However, it helps with how to deal with risk assessment, and has already been referenced in the consultation that the FCA has launched. There is a problem in and around how you deal with assessing risk. In that regard, the Government possibly did their best by publishing the annex of factors from the directive in the regulation. However, a lot of businesses will have been left dangling, and wondering what they are going to do.