Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 6th July 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 142A and 142C from my colleagues, the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Ashcombe. As has been said, this can be summed up in one word: proportionality. We have debated these themes on previous days in Committee and they are still as strong as they were when we mentioned them on day one. To “proportionality” I would add “specificity” and “applicability” because, without making this critical distinction—though difficult in some of the marginal cases—we are effectively saying that rules apply across the piece, which inevitably means increased burdens, increased costs, a lack of specificity, inapplicability, and holding firms and the UK economy back.

As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, rightly said, we have the at least odd situation right now where pet insurance is treated the same as marine or aviation insurance. I can see only one potential case where this would be appropriate: if many people were petting flying fish. As I do not believe we have an increase in flying fish petting, I believe that proportionality, specificity and applicability would be achieved by embracing the principles set out in Amendments 142A and 142C.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I broadly support Amendment 142A, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for bringing it forward. I also think that the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, or something similar would obviously be needed as some kind of companion to it.

Whatever the FCA may have been intended to be, it is now proudly and explicitly a consumer protection body. For much of its work that is good, but some noble Lords will know that it has taken me and others four years to get incorrect cost disclosure descriptions for listed investment companies corrected, simply because consumers like the incorrect versions. Indeed, that saga led to a telling exchange at a meeting of the Financial Services Regulation Committee. The FCA chair insisted that consumer views always took priority, and I replied, “If you ask whether one and one makes two or three, and the consumer says, ‘I like three—it’s a bigger number’, is that what you use?” There was no denial. That is the scale of the problem: a regulatory culture where consumer preference for something factually incorrect overrides market integrity. It is a mindset that has already cost billions in potential investment in productive assets.

That was where it touched consumers; now let us move on to look at the wholesale areas. The trouble is that that mindset gets pasted across too. We do not need to debate whether the FCA went overboard in demanding that wholesale businesses had to proactively prove that they do no consumer harm in transactions that never touched consumers. The admission is there in consultation CP26/23 at paragraph 1.3, acknowledging overreach, as well as acknowledging

“unnecessary cost, complexity and uncertainty, without clear benefits for retail consumers”.

However, having finally identified the cancer, the regulator is merely applying a sticking plaster. All that is being offered is the mildest semantic tweak to guidance—effectively, a guide to guidance. It has no legal effect. It allows the regulator to continue its current trajectory with a slight adjustment to its vocabulary. We all know that this change was extracted only after heavy nudging by the Chancellor and intense parliamentary scrutiny. It is hardly being done with good grace and provides no guarantee of permanence.

The fact is, we must deal with the FCA as it is, not as it might have been. Since the advent of the consumer duty, the retail-first culture is irreversibly embedded into the psyche of staff, and in many instances it is the reason why they joined the regulator in the first place.

Perhaps one of the most telling things is to look at what is said about other regulators. On the Monetary Authority of Singapore, which I found a very enlightened body on my visit there some years ago, the comment is, “Although MAS is a unitary regulator, it splits its internal policy divisions strictly by target market rather than by trying to govern everything under an overarching outcomes-based code like the UK’s consumer duty”, and, “It works because the wholesale division, answerable to the MAS leadership, is judged primarily on market liquidity, innovation and international competitiveness. There is zero risk of a consumer advocacy group hijacking a wholesale policy consultation”. I wonder where they were thinking about. A ring-fenced, structurally separate wholesale unit within our regulator’s architecture must live up to that standard.

Some may argue that all wholesale activity impacts retail eventually, and I agree, but there is a massive, fundamental difference between regulating wholesale markets for the integrity of the system, which protects everyone, and regulating as if they are a high-street retail shopfloor. The former ensures safety, the latter ensures paralysis. For any noble Lord worried about this structural change, nothing being suggested would remove liability for wrongs or harms to consumers, should that occur. Let us be clear: this amendment is not an attempt to escape oversight; it is an attempt to ensure that oversight is competent, technically accurate and focused on the reality of the market being regulated. Let nobody forget that MiFID and other legislation already provides a rigorous framework governing transparency, best execution and conflicts of interest. This is no soft ride: this amendment is a necessary structural correction, and I support it.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group, but I shall confine my remarks to Amendment 165 and the linked Amendment 173 from my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for an FCA operational readiness report presented by the Treasury. Amendment 165 would mean that Parliament has the opportunity to ensure, by a Treasury report, that we have an assessment of the FCA’s operational readiness to exercise any significant new regulatory function conferred by the Act of staffing, resourcing and the capability of the systems in place and of the impact expected on authorisations, supervisions and enforcement timeliness. This will be a formal report to Parliament. Until we have such a report from the Treasury that the FCA is operationally ready, Amendment 173 would ensure that the Act cannot start.

My Amendment 165A proposes that the report must also assess readiness in terms of preparatory training and the interpretation of the application of the Act. Such a requirement should prompt the FCA to deploy and train existing staff with the specific knowledge and understanding of the new powers they will operate under the Bill and to therefore be up to date and competent to regulate firms under the law. It would require the Treasury to report to Parliament and, in this way, there is a measure of accountability.

It might be contended that this requirement is otiose, but the FCA’s workforce is around 5,000, recruited from candidates with a diverse range of skills under different headings. Finance and operations make up 46%; engineering makes up 30% and sales and marketing make up 23%. The median employee tenure is 4.2 years. Regulators come to their post with a diverse range of skills; some are highly experienced and others less so. Today, 17 posts are advertised that cover a wide range of jobs and responsibilities for which different skills are required. For example, there is a senior insurance supervisor job, a financial crime marketing interventions associate, an L&D associate, a lead for global strategy and engagement, a primary markets supervisor, a senior crypto and payment supervisor and a technical specialist in AI—my noble friend Lord Holmes will be pleased to hear that.

The skills range required can include the common skills we would expect or generic skills, for instance, in data systems. The senior crypto asset and payment supervisor responsible for working in this developing sector, who will lead difficult cases, identify risks, deal with crossborder problems and help prevent crime, is also expected to “drive improvements in standards”.

These are important and demanding tasks. They also operate in a rapidly developing area. Given the nature of the system and that the principles still apply, regulators are internally accountable for what will be subject to interpretations and judgments. There should therefore be the requirement of at least general and specific knowledge, and competencies for each role but, as financial products continue to be developed and the framework of law continues to change, there must also be continuous learning and updating in the law and the powers given to the regulators under it, rather than assuming that somehow the regulators will be equipped and operationally ready to do the job.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

142D: After Clause 22, insert the following new Clause—
“Litigation funding as a regulated activityAfter paragraph 24 of Schedule 2 to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (regulated activities), insert—“Litigation funding agreements
24ZA Rights under a litigation funding agreement.24ZB Entering into a litigation funding agreement as funder.24ZC Administering a litigation funding agreement.24ZD Arranging a litigation funding agreement.24ZE Advising on a litigation funding agreement.24ZF (1) For the purposes of this Schedule, a “litigation funding agreement” is an agreement under which—(a) a person (“the funder”)—(i) agrees to fund (in whole or in part) the provision of advocacy or litigation services (by someone other than the funder) to another person (“the litigant”), and(ii) the litigant agrees to pay a sum to the funder in specified circumstances, or(b) a person provides financial support to a firm of solicitors which is involved in contentious matters or to a claims management company.(2) The sum to be paid by the litigant may be—(a) an amount calculated by reference to a multiple (if any) of the amount of the funding provided by the funder,(b) an amount calculated by reference to a percentage (if any) of any specified financial benefit obtained by the litigant in connection with the matter in relation to which the funding is provided,(c) an amount calculated by reference to a rate of interest, or(d) such sum, or method of calculation, as is prescribed by the Treasury pursuant to sub-paragraph (3),provided that in respect of the sum to be paid, howsoever calculated, it must not exceed such sum as may be prescribed by the Treasury pursuant to sub-paragraph (3).(3) The Treasury may by regulations make such consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving provision as it considers appropriate in connection with this paragraph.”” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment brings third-party litigation funding within the FCA regulatory perimeter by creating a new category of regulated activity under FSMA 2000.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, my amendment proposes that the Treasury makes litigation funding a regulated activity, with a list of matters that I propose should be covered in the amendment.

Litigation funding has come into the spotlight for several reasons. There was the 2023 PACCAR decision, which held that litigation funding agreements were a form of damages-based agreement and unenforceable for failing to comply with the DBA regulations 2013. There has also been concern about the source of some litigation funding, especially when a significant proportion of funders who are active in this space are not headquartered in the United Kingdom and may utilise what can be described as dodgy derivatives.

The Conservative Government tried to address the PACCAR decision with a Bill that did not make it through the wash-up. They also proposed a wider review of litigation funding and asked the Civil Justice Council to assess whether the regime was effectively providing access to justice and whether regulation of commercial funders was necessary. An interim report and consultation were launched on 31 October 2024 and the final report was published on 2 June 2025. This was a substantial and diligent review with stakeholders across the spectrum, including litigation funders, welcoming and endorsing its recommendations. In December last year, the Labour Government made clear their intention to reverse the effect of the PACCAR judgment, so that litigation funding agreements would no longer be treated as damages-based agreements. At the same time, the Government said that they would take steps to regulate the third-party litigation funding sector—one of the central purposes of the review and its recommendations.

The issue is not whether there should be regulation but when and by what route. It is urgent. That urgency has been acknowledged by the previous and current Governments in commissioning the review. But a year has passed since the final report and we need fast delivery. At present, the sector is essentially self-regulated, which in practice means that it is unregulated. More than 70 funders operate in the UK, collectively deploying many billions. The Association of Litigation Funders covers only a small proportion of the market and cannot provide assurance about the rest.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the Minister for their comments in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, may be interested to know that I am a victim of the PBO too. The reason that “Treasury” appears where I put “Lord Chancellor” is down to the PBO. My intention was correct, but it was one of those things where it was one minute to four—the last moment for getting it in—so I said, “I will make sure it is right if it goes to Report”.

I was inspired, if you like, to put this suggestion forward because I was rather alarmed at the fact of litigation funding becoming an asset class into which speculative and dubious investment was going on in overseas countries. Whichever side of the argument you are on, we do not want that kind of inflated funding meaning that cases are brought that possibly never should be, but the whole thing is just speculative. The more I looked at it, I thought, well, if we need any regulation, as I have explained, it belongs with the FCA. Then I looked further and discovered that Australia and elsewhere, as quite often is the case, have got there first and have already assigned it to being under their financial services regulators. That is my background. I think it has been interesting. I offered it as what I thought would be a faster route, especially if we could do it as a designated activity, but I also admit that, yes, I am stealing a march on what the Government will have to do, taking their time a little more. I hope that the possibility of this route has been noted and for now, I will withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 142D withdrawn.

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

142E: After Clause 22, insert the following new Clause—
“Building society governance standards(1) The Treasury must, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, make regulations by statutory instrument requiring the Financial Conduct Authority to make rules establishing minimum governance standards for authorised building societies.(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must require the Financial Conduct Authority to make rules ensuring that—(a) elections of directors are conducted in accordance with minimum democratic standards, including—(i) equal treatment of candidates in election materials and communications;(ii) protection of candidates’ election addresses from alteration except with the candidate’s request or written consent or where alteration is required by law or for production purposes;(iii) minimum statutory duties and reporting requirements for independent scrutineers;(b) voting arrangements prohibit bundled voting instructions and require voting instructions to be determined separately in respect of each candidate and each resolution;(c) members approve, by ordinary resolution at intervals not exceeding three years, the remuneration policy for directors and senior executives; (d) every authorised building society whose total assets exceed £5 billion maintains not fewer than two board positions to be filled by member-nominated directors elected by Members; (e) every annual general meeting is held at a physical place whilst permitting additional participation by electronic means;(f) every question submitted by a member for an annual general meeting, together with the building society’s response or the reasons for not providing a response, is published following the meeting.(3) Before making rules under this section the Financial Conduct Authority must consult—(a) HM Treasury;(b) the Prudential Regulation Authority;(c) representatives of authorised building societies;(d) organisations appearing to represent the interests of members.(4) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires HM Treasury to require the Financial Conduct Authority to establish minimum governance standards for authorised building societies. It applies governance principles already recognised by Parliament in relation to listed companies, occupational pension schemes and statutory democratic elections to member-owned financial institutions.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, building societies occupy a unique place in the United Kingdom’s financial system. Unlike banks, they are not owned by external shareholders; they are owned by their members. That distinction is fundamental. It means that the legitimacy of a building society rests not only upon prudent management and financial soundness but also upon effective member democracy. The Building Societies Act 1986 established the statutory framework for that democracy. It has served the sector well for many years. However, Parliament has not stood still. During the four decades since the Act was passed, this House and the other place have progressively strengthened governance standards in many comparable areas of law—I mean company law, obviously.

For quoted companies, Parliament introduced binding shareholder votes on remuneration policy through the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. For occupational pension schemes, Parliament has required member representation on trustee boards. For statutory elections in trade unions, Parliament has established detailed protections to ensure that elections are conducted fairly, that candidates are treated equally and that election addresses are not altered without consent. Building societies, however, remain governed largely by a statutory framework dating from 1986 that has not developed in a similar way. My amendment does not seek to transplant those other regimes wholesale, nor to interfere with the independence of boards or with the mutual model itself—quite the opposite. The amendment is intended to strengthen confidence in mutuality by ensuring that members enjoy democratic protections comparable to those that Parliament has already recognised elsewhere.

The amendment is also deliberately framed as an enabling provision. Rather that attempting to prescribe detailed rules in primary legislation, it would require His Majesty’s Treasury to make regulations requiring the Financial Conduct Authority to establish minimum governance standards for authorised building societies. The FCA is plainly the appropriate body to consult on and develop those detailed standards.

This amendment identifies a number of areas where minimum standards should exist. The first is elections. Members should be able to choose between candidates through elections that are demonstrably fair. Candidates should be treated equally and have equal opportunity to communicate with members, and independent scrutineers should operate to consistent statutory standards.

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[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for raising this important issue. Building societies are a key part of the UK’s financial services sector. The Government are committed to supporting the growth and long-term success of the mutual sector, including through our commitment to double the size of the mutual and co-operative economy.

Building societies are already subject to an extensive legislative and regulatory requirement. Building societies must comply with the Building Societies Act 1986, FCA and PRA rules, and the senior managers and certification regime. Of course, there is also wider company law and the financial services regulatory requirements where applicable. The FCA and PRA already have the powers to set and supervise governance standards where they consider it necessary.

However, I do not agree that we should make such detailed rules on things such as board composition, annual general meetings and reporting arrangements. The building society sector is diverse, ranging from small regional societies to large national institutions; this was mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. The rules need adequately to reflect the different governance needs, operational models and challenges faced across the sector, and building societies need to focus their energies on serving members. Such governance matters are generally best determined by individual societies, taking into account their size, complexity and membership, while operating within the existing legislative and regulatory framework and ensuring that boards have the skills, experience and expertise needed to govern effectively.

The Government’s approach has been to modernise the framework for building societies while preserving flexibility. Consistent with feedback from the sector, we believe that governance arrangements should uphold high standards while allowing societies to adopt structures that reflect their individual circumstances, business models and memberships. The Government continue to engage closely with the mutuals sector and regulators to ensure that the framework remains proportionate and supports growth, including through the Mutual and Co-operative Sector Business Council and other stakeholder forums. We have welcomed the recent work undertaken by the FCA and the PRA on the mutuals landscape, which is helping inform future policy development as well.

Although the Government share the objective of strong governance and membership engagement, we do not believe that it should be delivered in this way. Building societies already operate within a robust framework, which we continue to keep under review and modernise where appropriate. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I thank the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe; I might take the noble Baroness up on her offer to proceed further with something to do with blind voting. I accept that this is the “Full Monty” version, which I put in at this stage because I wanted to draw comments.

I do not think that you can have what is, in essence, a substantial financial institution with a board that can fiddle who gets on to the board and who does not. This is the nub of the issue: it is possible to block in a way that we do not allow for listed companies. Not all listed companies are as big as some of the institutions I am talking about—I accept the proportionality point; maybe one has a threshold—but the situation that has gone on is not acceptable. If we could start with the bundled blind voting point, we might begin to get somewhere. I thank everybody but, obviously, for now, I will withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 142E withdrawn.

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At the end of the day, we are looking to enhance the ability of the existing parliamentary committees, which are, as I have explained, already under some pressure, by finding some way of making parliamentary oversight of the regulators have real meaning in the scheme of FSMA as it was originally set up 26 years ago. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I support these amendments. They almost follow naturally from the debate that we had earlier about the need for a structurally competent wholesale function within the FCA. It is clear that you cannot produce a credible cost-benefit analysis without a credible evaluation capability. The PRA has understood that and already has the beginnings of an evaluation function, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said.

I can understand that in part, because prudential regulation requires modelling, capital assessment and an understanding of how rules transmit through markets. The PRA’s world is balance-sheet solvency, capital modelling and risk transmission, so it already employs actuaries, quants and economists, and the evaluation office therefore fits more naturally into that culture. The FCA is different; its culture, as we have discussed, is overwhelmingly consumer focused. That is appropriate for retail regulation but it means that the FCA has never developed the technical machinery for the evaluation of wholesale market impacts. Consumer protection does not require the modelling of liquidity, pricing dynamics or market structure, but wholesale regulation does.

It occurred to me only when I was thinking about this in the context of this amendment that the need for an evaluation office points again to the different sides of the FCA and why somehow upgrading, or separating the wholesale side, becomes more relevant because functions are missing due to the consumer focus. We have heard that the FCA tends to do the minimum of cost-benefit analysis required by statute and then largely ignores it—again, probably because it thinks that it is not relevant to consumer protection, but I would say it is to the particular detriment of the wholesale side. That is an additional reason for supporting these amendments.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I am sorry that I was not able to be here last Wednesday for the debates on the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, and others that proposed the creation of an office for financial regulatory accountability. I have read the debates in Hansard and there is a remarkable similarity to three years ago when we debated similar amendments. This was a significant error in 2023 during the passage of the last Financial Services and Markets Act. It would have been a significant improvement to the ability of Parliament to hold the regulators to account—a complement rather than a replacement.

I shall touch briefly on the ability to scrutinise the proportionality of specific rules. I shall look closely in Hansard at the Minister’s comments during the second group, when he seemed to agree that the specific scrutiny of the rules is in fact important, contrary to the approach that the Bill now takes. This holding of the regulators to account by Parliament has become only more important and more difficult, I think, as we give yet more responsibilities to the regulators under the Bill with, as we have heard, the move of the PRS, the Consumer Credit Act and so on.

Amendment 142 would provide an alternative way of achieving something similar to the amendments that were discussed on Wednesday that might perhaps be easier for the regulators and the Government to accept. It proposes the creation of offices of regulatory evaluation within both the FCA and the Bank but, unlike the office for financial regulatory accountability proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, it would lie within the regulator, although it would probably have much the same role. Whichever way we do it, I am sure the Minister will have heard loud and clear the concerns that are shared across the Committee about the accountability of the regulators to Parliament, another of the main themes that are emerging as we load ever greater responsibilities upon them.