Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Berridge and Baroness Lawlor

Committee stage
Friday 27th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

Absolutely, and therefore the medical examiner’s evidence is that, when they have the body in that circumstance, they are under an obligation, we think, to locate and find a relative. Sadly, this happens more frequently than we would like to think, and the local authority powers to perform a public health burial then become apparent. So, yes, there are these situations.

It is important to clarify this in relation to this Bill, because we have this evidence from the medical examiner that the first the family might know is when they are called by the medical examiner. We need to be clear about that and about the position of families. Is this personal autonomy—that is the conceptual point—so fully and properly enacted that there would be a public health burial, without any obligation to inform anybody that this is happening?

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 472, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Gray of Tottenham, to which I added my name, along with the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe. I also support Amendment 941 from the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich, and I will just say a few words about that.

Amendment 941, to Schedule 2, on the assisted dying panel, would require the social worker to take account of financial dependence, potential financial pressure and potential coercion from someone benefiting financially from a person’s death. My noble friend Lord Deben referred to this apophthegm earlier, but I first heard it from the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner: “Where there is a will, there is a relative”. This is a very important amendment, and I hope the noble and learned Lord the sponsor will consider it seriously.

Amendment 472 from the noble Baroness, Lady Gray of Tottenham, would require that the panel must ask the person seeking an assisted death whether they have discussed the matter with their next of kin. We have been discussing this in different ways today. At the very least, this requirement would prompt reflection about those most affected by this action. It might prompt such a chat simply by virtue of asking.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Berridge and Baroness Lawlor

Committee stage
Friday 23rd January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

The obligations that have just been explained refer to medical treatment, but this is not a medical treatment. The previous comments are not accurate because the normal clinician’s responsibility is one of the things that we need clarifying. Clause 12(2)(d) refers to

“their wishes in the event of complications”,

but there is no obligation to talk about the risks of complications. Those are different things—your wishes and the risks.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

Is it the noble Baroness’s understanding of Clause 12(2)(d) that, while there is an obligation to discuss the person’s wishes in the event of complications arising, there is no obligation to discuss exactly what those complications could be?

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Berridge and Baroness Lawlor

Committee stage
Friday 16th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 40 and 59. The changes I propose may seem puzzling or pedantic, but, when dealing with legislation about life and death, every word matters. My amendments aim to bring the same care for language to subsections (2) and (3) as is used in subsection (1), which sets out that only if the conditions in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) are met then assistance to end a person’s life, in accordance with Clauses 8 to 30, may be provided. If any of these conditions is not met then the action is subject to the existing criminal provisions of the Suicide Act 1961.

As they now stand, subsections (2) and (3) do not set out conditions in this way. Rather, they describe other parts of the Bill. Clause 1(2) is framed as an observation about Clauses 8 to 30, and Clause 1(3) apparently sets out a geographical marker for the certain steps provided for elsewhere in the Bill that “must be taken”. Subsection (2) therefore seems entirely redundant, since it purports merely to note what is said elsewhere. Subsection (3) is puzzling. Is the “must” a mistake or should it be “may only”?

Perhaps more important than such redundancy, inelegance and imprecision in drafting is that, in their present form, subsections (2) and (3) do not deprive those who act in contravention of the paragraphs they contain of the protection of the law from assisting suicide. They fail to make it explicit that this remains prohibited and punishable unless it meets subsections (2)(a), (2)(b), (3)(a) and (3)(b). My amendments would remove this perhaps unintentional looseness—the sponsor may wish to comment on the intentionality or otherwise—by making it explicit that assistance to end a person’s life may not be provided unless subsections (2)(a), (2)(b), (3)(a) and (3)(b) are all met.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 38, which raises for the first time in your Lordships’ House the complex issue of those who may be physically terminally ill but also have long-standing mental illnesses. While the legislation cannot be used only for mental illness, under Clause 2(4), cases where there is physical and mental illness can be very complex and particular safeguards will be needed. My main questions around those safeguards are for those who may be detained under the Mental Health Act, and are matters more for the Minister than the sponsor.

I served on your Lordships’ Select Committee on the Mental Health Bill. A person detained under the Mental Health Act may yet still have capacity to make some or most of their own decisions. If someone has gone through the process in this Bill with a six-month prognosis but is outliving it, they can also have regular periods of being detained under the Mental Health Act. It is important that we are clear about the position legislatively for the patient, clinicians and their family. What is the position? Which of these statutes will make clear which piece of legislation takes priority, if it is the case, as I understand it, that there are scenarios where both pieces of legislation could apply to a particular patient? You can be terminally physically ill and detained under the Mental Health Act but still have capacity, so you would be under the TIA as well as the Mental Health Act.

For clinicians, this relates to the strident evidence given to the Select Committee of your Lordships’ House on this Bill by Professor Alex Ruck Keene KC. This was partly outlined by my noble friend Lord Goodman previously in Committee when he was speaking about teaching clinicians on capacity and the criminal law. He said:

“I need to be able to say, with crystal clarity, ‘You’re no longer in that zone”—


meaning the suicide prevention zone—

“you’re now in the zone of the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill’”.—[Official Report, 14/11/25; col. 522.]

Obviously, the suicide prevention zone he was referring to is a general duty for clinicians to all patients, but it is highly relevant when there is detention under the Mental Health Act. When you are thinking of a patient under the Mental Health Act, it focuses that issue down.

It is important to know which regime takes precedence for the family. This Bill is about individual autonomy, so the family are irrelevant. The new Mental Health Act, however, has extensive powers for nominated persons—and that is often family members—to exercise certain powers and even to discharge the patient. It is also key for the patient who has capacity but is under the Mental Health Act and has a six-month prognosis. Under the Mental Health Act, they can be made to take treatment—treatment that may well then mean they do not want to take the action in their existing declaration under the TIA. Has the Minister considered how the new Mental Health Act relates to this situation?

This issue exemplifies that the Committee of this House is actually trying to provide a White Paper or consultation function. The problem I have outlined, and that Mr Ruck Keene outlined, stems from the different philosophy of each of these pieces of legislation. The terminally ill adults Bill is all about personal autonomy, but the Mental Health Act is about treatment of illness, prevention of harm and preservation of life. This Bill is the state enabling and enhancing autonomy to take your own life, but the Mental Health Act is the state taking away some of your autonomy to preserve your life and prevent you taking it. One of the guiding principles in the new Mental Health Act is enhancing choice and autonomy, precisely because the Act’s powers take away some of an individual’s autonomy, even when they still have capacity. Given that we have different philosophical bases for two pieces of legislation, no wonder there is not the crystal clarity needed, as Mr Ruck Keene outlined, by him and other clinicians.

In practice, there is a human face to this. Take, for instance, a young adult who lives at home. They have been out of secure care for decades, they have always been treated well, their suicidal ideations have been managed, and they are well known to the local services, but they now have a terminal physical diagnosis and a six-month prognosis. They have gone through the procedure in the Bill but are now outliving that prognosis. Under the powers of admission for mental illness, they are treated, and, having been treated on a number of occasions, no longer want to exercise their declaration. But their family carers go on an extended holiday, so they go to stay with other family in a different part of the country. They become mentally ill and they are admitted, and they have capacity under the Mental Health Act. Can their declaration under the TIA Bill be used in this situation, or do they have to be treated? Do the nominated persons have to be told? If you are exercising a TIA declaration, you are no longer under the Mental Health Act.

Could it be that the TIA Bill is actually used without the family being told, which we know is the scenario given by evidence from medical examiners? They come home and their relative has died, and no one knew they had just been accepted on a clinical trial at the local hospital.