Youth Violence

Debate between Baroness Barran and Lord Paddick

Thursday 20th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barran]

Well, I have with me a copy of Hansard from Monday, when my honourable friend the Minister in the other place gave a list of what we are doing. I fear that time does permit me to read it, but it runs to more than half a column. So this really is an area where the Government are doing a great deal.

In response to my noble friend’s specific questions, police funding is increasing by over £1 billion this year, as your Lordships are aware, and we are aware of plans to recruit of a further 3,500 police officers and staff. With youth services, we are particularly proud of the Youth Endowment Fund that the Government have announced, which will be delivered over 10 years. Those of us who have worked in the charity sector know how valuable 10-year funding is. The figures on school exclusions are not entirely clear about the impact of exclusions, but 21% of young people convicted of possession of a knife were excluded from school, 50% of them after the event.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I appreciate that the noble Baroness said that the Government were doing a lot, but their so-called Serious Violence Strategy is actually an underfunded collection of unconnected existing initiatives and various piecemeal pots of money that have been indiscriminately thrown at the problem over recent years. When will the Government take youth violence seriously by setting specific goals based on a coherent and comprehensive strategy to address both the symptoms and causes of youth violence?

[Baroness Barran]

I think the noble Lord is a little harsh. The Government absolutely recognise that a huge culture change is required and that for too long the police have been the service of last resort in addressing youth violence. That will never get to the root of the problem unless we are able to engage other services—education, health and so forth. So just two days ago, as the noble Lord may be aware, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary announced funding for the initial establishment of 18 violence reduction units, which I hope will produce exactly the results the noble Lord aspires to.

Catalytic Converter Thefts

Debate between Baroness Barran and Lord Paddick

Thursday 20th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barran]

I should clarify; his knowledge does not come from personal experience, as I understand it. He makes a fair point. There are many reasons, including social ones, behind crime. Of all types of crime, this is one where a technical solution is relevant. Metal theft is down by 73% since the scrap metal Act was introduced in 2013. In this industry, technical innovation has helped to reduce crime.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Antonia Grey, the public affairs manager for the British Metals Recycling Association, said:

“It is highly likely that these stolen catalytic converters are finding their way into the recycling system here by being taken to illegal scrap metal dealers who are openly offering to pay cash for materials. This is happening because there is now no enforcement of the law at a time when the budgets of police and local authorities have been eviscerated”.


Does the Minister agree?

[Baroness Barran]

I am aware that if you go online—there is no end to the research one does in your Lordships’ House to find out about these things—you find a number of dealers advertising cash for scrap metal, as the noble Lord mentions. Often, however, when you go on to the site, it offers delayed payment, so the dealers may be using a cash offer as a hook. The noble Lord makes a fair point. Obviously, the rise in metal prices has an impact on the attractiveness of this crime type but the scrap metal Act was reviewed in 2017 and found to be working well. We believe that part of the increase in recorded metal thefts is due to better police recording. I repeat: overall crime in this area is down by 73%.

Immigration: Community Sponsorship

Debate between Baroness Barran and Lord Paddick

Thursday 25th April 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lady Sheehan and at her request, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in her name on the Order Paper.

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

The Government’s view is that community sponsorship is a success, thanks to the commitment and compassion of community groups directly welcoming and supporting resettled refugees in their communities. Since the scheme began in July 2016, 219 refugees have been resettled by community sponsor groups across the UK, and the number of community groups taking part continues to increase.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, based on the Canadian experience, allowing community groups to take responsibility for refugees should be an economical, efficient and effective way of integrating refugees into society. Yet, as the Minister said, only 219 refugees have been resettled through this route, despite the Home Office providing £1 million in funding to provide training and support for these community groups. What has gone wrong?

[Baroness Barran]

I thought the noble Lord was asking a very fair question until the last moment. I do not think anything has gone wrong; we are seeing a significant acceleration in the number of groups at different stages of the process. Just over 50 groups have gone through the whole community sponsorship process. The work done by Reset and other civil society groups around the country has addressed some of the blocks that meant we got off to a slow start. The application process has been significantly simplified, the training is now available on the Reset website, and groups are starting to share their successes. There are now over 100 groups in the process of application, so we can be confident of seeing a strong increase next year.

Immigration (European Economic Area Nationals) (EU Exit) Order 2019

Debate between Baroness Barran and Lord Paddick

Monday 18th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

It is the other instrument.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Baroness Barran and Lord Paddick

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 4th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, we return to the argument that the Bill is full of unnecessary new legislation that has clearly not been thought through and which is already adequately covered by existing legislation. The Bill is being used simply to send a message that the Government are taking the issues of knife crime and corrosive liquids seriously, instead of investing in those things that really make a difference, such as youth services and community policing.

In Committee I raised the fact that the offence of affray was almost identical to the proposed changes to the existing offences of threatening with an article with a blade, a pointed article or an offensive weapon. Section 1A(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 states that:

“A person is guilty of an offence if that person … has an offensive weapon with him or her in a public place … unlawfully and intentionally threatens another person with the weapon, and … does so in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to that other person”.


Subsection (2) says:

“For the purposes of this section physical harm is serious if it amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861”.


Section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 states:

“A person is guilty of an offence if that person … has an article to which this section applies with him or her in a public place or on school premises … unlawfully and intentionally threatens another person with the article, and … does so in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to that other person”.


Again, serious physical harm means grievous bodily harm under the Offences against the Person Act 1861.

The main differences proposed by the Bill concern the nature of the risk, which is changed from,

“immediate risk of serious physical harm”—

GBH—

to the person threatened, to a much wider definition of,

“a reasonable person (“B”) who was exposed to the same threat as A”,

that is, the person being threatened,

“would think that there was an immediate risk of physical harm to B”,

that is, the reasonable person.

So we go from an immediate risk of GBH to the person being threatened to a much vaguer concept of a reasonable person—is that a reasonable martial arts expert or a reasonable old-age pensioner—thinking that there was an immediate risk of physical harm. Does that mean common assault, ABH or GBH?

In Committee, the Minister and I engaged in an intellectual and legalistic argument over the technical differences between the offence of affray—in Section 3 of the Public Order Act 1986—and the proposed new offences. That section states:

“A person is guilty of affray if he uses or threatens unlawful violence towards another and his conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety”.


So in affray we have,

“uses or threatens unlawful violence towards another”,

instead of,

“unlawfully and intentionally threatens another person”.

In affray we have,

“his conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety”,

instead of,

“a reasonable person (“B”) who was exposed to the same threat as A would think there was an immediate risk of physical harm to B”.

Can the Minister really tell the House that there is a practical difference between a “person of reasonable firmness” fearing for their personal safety and a “reasonable person” thinking there was an immediate risk of physical harm? I would be grateful for an example. Indeed, the affray definition does not rely on the extremely vague concept of a “reasonable person” but instead refers to,

“a person of reasonable firmness”—

not a reasonable martial arts expert or a reasonable old-age pensioner but what we are really talking about: a person of reasonable firmness.

This legislation also adds further education premises to school premises in the 1988 offence, but affray can be committed in private as well as in public, so all premises are covered. Therefore, the only substantive difference between affray and the new offences is the maximum sentence on indictment: three years for affray and four years for the 1988 offence. This amendment addresses the one outstanding issue by increasing the maximum penalty for affray to four years for an offence in which a corrosive substance or bladed article has been used. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, this amendment returns, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, just said, to an issue that he raised in Committee about the differences between the revised offence of threatening with an offensive weapon in public in Clause 29 of the Bill and the offence of affray under Section 3 of the Public Order Act 1986. I wrote to him on this matter on 21 February. I will try to clarify the difference to your Lordships’ satisfaction and give an example of how it will work in practice. The difference between the two offences is not simply a matter of different maximum penalties, as Amendment 94 implies.

The offence of affray deals with circumstances where a bystander observes someone threatening another person and where the bystander feels threatened. The offences of threatening with an offensive weapon in public under Section 1A of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 and of threatening with an article with a blade or point or offensive weapons under Section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1998 deal with circumstances where a person is themselves being threatened. Indeed, in practice it is possible to commit both offences at the same time, as the noble Lord will be aware and as the CPS charging advice sets out. An example would be where someone is holding person A by the throat in the road, screaming and shouting, but also waving a knife around in the air so that person B thinks that the defendant might also come for them—that would be an offence of affray—or someone might start a fight in a pub in such a way that people nearby think that the person might also start on them, as opposed to cases where there is not that perception that a bystander would be affected. Case law examples include driving a car at another occupied vehicle or setting dogs on the police with the words, “Go on! Go on!”—only in case law does such language get used.

Therefore, affray concerns a reasonable bystander who witnesses someone else being threatened and fears for their own personal safety. This is a different test from that under the offences amended by the Bill, which ask whether a reasonable person exposed to the same threat as the victim would think that there is an immediate risk of physical harm to that victim. Under the offences in the Bill it is therefore what a reasonable person in the victim’s shoes would be likely to feel when threatened, rather than whether a person witnessing a threat against someone else also feels threatened. Amendment 94 therefore fails to address the fact that these offences deal with different things. As I have indicated, it is not just about penalties, although I fully accept that I highlighted this as a key difference in Committee. Affray is a public order offence and therefore focuses on the weapon and the threat to the wider public, rather than the impact on the victim. The offences of threatening in public deal with the victim being threatened.

I hope, in the light of this further explanation, that the noble Lord is persuaded that we are not creating unnecessary duplication in the criminal law and, on that basis, will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. I do not think that it does away with my general comments about the legislation as a whole but on this occasion, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Baroness Barran and Lord Paddick

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Tuesday 26th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, Schedule 1 contains a list of corrosive products for the purposes of the offences in Clauses 1 to 4 that relate to the sale and delivery of corrosive products. The Bill includes a power by regulations to amend Schedule 1. In Committee, I undertook to consider an amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to require prior consultation before any such regulations are made. As I indicated in the debate, we would fully expect to consult affected persons in any event, but we are content to include an express requirement to this end in the Bill. These amendments do just that. I beg to move.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for these amendments. One of the main things that irked people in the police service was people taking credit for other people’s work. These amendments were originally spotted and drafted by my noble friend Lady Hamwee.

[Baroness Barran]

I apologise to the noble Baroness for my oversight.

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[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, in moving this amendment I will speak also to Amendment 13. The only purpose of revisiting these amendments which we tabled in Committee is to make a point—and I refer to a letter in relation to these matters from the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, dated 12 February—about the fact that two substances of the concentration specified in Schedule 1, sulphuric acid and nitric acid, are specified there as substances which should not be sold to people under the age of 18. This is despite the fact that you need a Home Office licence under the Poisons Act to buy these substances. Therefore, the chances of someone under 18 getting a Home Office licence to buy what are precursors for making explosives are diminishingly small. Indeed, in her letter the noble Baroness says that it is extremely unlikely that anyone under 18 will be able lawfully to acquire or purchase these acids. This goes to the point of a lot of this Bill—that it is there simply to send a message, which is not what we should be using legislation for. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, pointed out, these amendments return to the debate we had in Committee about the relationship between some of the substances we have listed in Schedule 1 to the Bill and the provisions of the Poisons Act 1972. The noble Lord is concerned that we have listed both nitric acid and sulphuric acid in Schedule 1, despite the fact that these are already regulated substances within the Poisons Act.

I reiterate the point I made in Committee, that both sulphuric and nitric acid were identified by our scientific advisers at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory and the police as appropriate for inclusion in Schedule 1. This was because we know that sulphuric acid has been used in attacks, and that nitric acid is considered to be one of the most harmful corrosive substances. While I understand the noble Lord’s concerns about including these two poisons which are already regulated under the Poisons Act, our overriding concern in framing the Bill’s provisions relating to the sale and delivery of corrosive products is that we do all we can to prevent anyone under 18 getting hold of these substances. We therefore think it is appropriate that they are included in Schedule 1.

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[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am moving this amendment on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and at his request. Part of the defence to the sale and delivery of knives to under-18s is that the package containing a knife is clearly marked to indicate its contents. The amendment is intended to probe the effect of labelling a package as containing a knife on the likelihood of the package being stolen during delivery. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barran]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining the amendment on behalf of my noble friend Lord Lucas, because it gives us the opportunity to consider the requirements that remote sellers need to meet if they are to rely on the defence that they have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid selling bladed articles to a person under 18.

Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 makes it an offence to sell a bladed article to a person under 18. It is a defence that the seller took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence—for example, that they had asked to see proof of a person’s age.

Clause 15 provides that, in relation to remote sales—for example, online sales—of bladed articles, the seller can rely on the defence only if they can prove they have met certain conditions. These conditions are: that they have systems in place at the point of sale for verifying the age of buyers; that they clearly mark the package containing the article when it is dispatched, and have taken steps to ensure that the package is finally delivered is delivered to someone over 18; and that they did not arrange for the article to be delivered to a locker.

The amendment concerns the second of those conditions, which is that that when the package is dispatched it must be clearly marked to indicate that it contains a bladed or sharply pointed article, and that when finally delivered it should be into the hands of someone over 18. The amendment would remove the first part of this condition, so the package would need to be labelled to say that it must be handed to a person over 18, but it would not need to say it contained a bladed or sharply pointed article.

Before I turn to the amendment itself, it might be worth saying a bit about the purpose of Clause 15, which is to drive a change in behaviour by remote sellers. It sets out the minimum requirements we would expect sellers to meet if they wanted to be confident that they were not selling to under-18s, but it is mainly aimed at individual transactions—young people trying to buy knives online—rather than large business transactions. It is not aimed, for example, at a seller of kitchenware that deals exclusively with restaurants and hotels.

The requirements under Clause 15 are therefore the minimum requirements that a seller has to meet if they want to rely on the defence that they have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence, should they ever be prosecuted for selling to an under-18. Where a seller knows their customers, they may decide not to comply with the conditions under Clause 15 because they are sure they will never be prosecuted. Examples would be: where a seller sells only to a wholesaler; where a seller has traded with the same customer for years; or where a seller knows the individual they are selling to—for instance, where they make hand-made items for particular customers, they will know the buyer is over 18 and may decide that complying with the conditions is unnecessary.

Turning to the amendment, our discussions with delivery companies and those who provide collection point services indicate that they want any packages that they are going to handle to be clearly marked by the seller so that the risk that they inadvertently hand them over to a person aged under 18 is reduced. You cannot expect staff working for a delivery company or at a collection point to ensure that the package is handed over to an adult unless it is clear from the packaging what it contains and what the restriction is on delivery. It makes sense that those working for delivery companies and at collection points know what they are handling. This will enable them to treat the package with due caution. This is particularly the case where the package contains sharp objects or corrosive substances.

Finally, the amendment applies only to Clause 15 and not to Clauses 16 and 17, which deal with the same matter in Scotland and Northern Ireland, or to Clause 2, which sets the same conditions in relation to corrosive products where these are sold remotely.

I hope I have provided the noble Lord with sufficient explanation around the purpose of Clause 15 and the labelling requirement and that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Barran]

I will write to my noble friend with an accurate answer on that. I am confident that there is a tight definition of this but at this hour I cannot recall it exactly.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, wanted the Government’s response to the amendment on the record and that is what we have achieved. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Baroness Barran and Lord Paddick

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 6th February 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have given notice of our intention to oppose the question that this clause should stand part of the Bill. I will also speak to Amendments 71 and 72. Clause 28 would change current legislation in terms of the risk that must be present for an offence of threatening someone with an offensive weapon to be proved. Currently, the person threatening must do so in such a way that there is an immediate threat of serious physical harm. The Bill changes this level of risk to what a reasonable person would think was an immediate threat of physical harm, not serious physical harm—it is only a perceived threat and not an actual threat.

In their joint briefing, the Standing Committee for Youth Justice and the Prison Reform Trust point out that the new definition is a much lower threshold for conviction. The person being threatened does not have to be present or at actual risk of harm. Previously, there had to be an immediate threat of occasioning grievous bodily harm; now, it is an undefined level of physical harm, and the “reasonable person” test is vague.

Clause 28 relates to offences in public places and Clause 29 to offences on further education premises. I question why these offences are needed at all. Section 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 states that a person is guilty of an offence,

“if he uses or threatens … violence towards another and his conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety”.

An affray may be committed in private as well as in public, and a person guilty of affray is liable to a maximum sentence of three years in prison or a fine, or both. Can the Minister explain which parts of these new offences are not covered by the offence under Section 3 of the 1986 Act?

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for affording the Committee the opportunity to debate the provisions in the Bill updating the offences of threatening with an offensive weapon. It may assist the Committee if I briefly explain the provisions in Section 1A of the Protection of Crime Act 1953 and Section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and then explain why we have brought forward changes to these provisions. I will also cover Section 3.

Section 1A of the 1953 Act provides for an aggravated possession offence where the person in possession of the weapon threatens another person with the weapon in a public place. Section 139AA of the 1988 Act similarly provides for an aggravated possession offence where the person in possession of an article with a blade or point threatens another person with the article in a public place or on school premises.

Unlike the offences in Section 1 of the 1953 Act and Section 139 of the 1988 Act, which are simple possession offences, where a person is convicted of an offence under Section 1A of the 1953 Act or Section 139AA of the 1988 Act, the court must, in the case of an adult, impose a custodial sentence of at least six months’ imprisonment, unless it would be unjust to do so. The power to make a community order is not available in circumstances where the mandatory minimum sentence condition is met.

It is an essential element of these aggravated offences that the defendant threatened the victim with the weapon,

“in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to the victim”,

as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, explained. However, the view of the Crown Prosecution Service is that the requirement that the defendant threatens with the weapon or article,

“in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to that other person”,

sets too high a bar to prosecution and does not take proper account of the effect of the threat on the victim.

The noble Lord will be aware that in the 12 months to September 2018 there were just under 13,500 offences resulting in a caution or conviction for possession of an article with a blade or point and just under 7,000 for possession of an offensive weapon, but only 958 for threatening with a knife or offensive weapon. I hope the noble Lord will agree that fewer than 1,000 offences of threatening compared with more than 20,000 possession offences does not appear to be an accurate reflection of what is happening on our streets, where we are seeing one homicide a week in London as a result of knife crime. The noble Lord will be aware that this point was made by the Chief Crown Prosecutor for the north-east, Andrew Penhale, when giving evidence in another place.

The penalty for the offence of affray, which the noble Lord referred to, is three years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both. The penalty for threatening with an offensive weapon is four years. The Government consider that that reflects the seriousness of using an offensive weapon to threaten an individual. Importantly, the Government also believe that it is fairer to the victim that the test be based on how a reasonable person in the victim’s place would respond to such a threat, not on whether the victim was objectively at risk of immediate harm. The reference in Clause 28 to the effect on a reasonable person removes the element of subjectivity on the part of the person threatened. We believe that the replacement objective test is more appropriate in the context of these aggravated offences.

Striking out Clause 28 and amending Clause 29, as the noble Lord seeks to do, would maintain the current test of what constitutes risk of physical harm for these aggravated possession offences. However, I put it to the noble Lord that these offences were introduced to protect victims threatened with offensive weapons and ensure that offenders are appropriately punished. Clauses 28 and 29 will ensure that the victim’s point of view is put at the heart of these offences. I hope that I have been able to persuade the noble Lord of the case for the new test and that he will support Clause 28 standing part of the Bill.

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[Baroness Barran]

I thank my noble and learned friend for helpfully pointing out that detail.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation, most of which does not seem to hold water. She said that under the existing offence, someone can only get six months in prison, so they are unable to get a community sentence. However, an offence of affray carries a three-year sentence; therefore, you can give a community sentence to somebody convicted of affray.

The Minister also said that existing offences under the Prevention of Crime Act and the Criminal Justice Act set the bar too high, evidenced by only 958 offences of threatening and almost one homicide per week. If a knife makes contact with somebody, that is a substantive offence, probably of grievous bodily harm or wounding, possibly with intent. Inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent carries a maximum life sentence, so the number of instances where somebody threatens but does not make contact is likely to be small, but the number of offences where somebody is found in possession of a weapon—perhaps in their pocket—and is not threatening another person is likely to be high. The number of offences of GBH or, regrettably, homicide is likely to be high. That is the plausible explanation for why the number of offences of threatening is low, rather than the evidential bar being set too high for the existing offences.

However, the only reason why the offence of affray does not provide a legitimate and reasonable alternative to the Government’s proposals here is that one carries a sentence of three years and the other a sentence of four years. Of course, that could easily be amended by increasing the maximum sentence for the offence of affray. An objective test is included in the offence of affray under the Public Order Act. I am afraid that apart from the difference in the length of sentences, all the reasoning seems to fall away, bearing in mind that an offence of affray can be committed in private as well as in public so the offence would apply in FE colleges, schools and public places. However, I will not pursue the matter any further at this stage.

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[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I understand what the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, is trying to do with the amendment. It raises again the issue of websites that are hosted overseas and the lack of territorial reach to apply the suggested offence to overseas website owners. That creates an imbalance, as we discussed on previous elements of the Bill, between UK and overseas sellers of knives and corrosive substances, for example. I see some practical difficulties with this but I understand what the noble Lord is trying to achieve.

[Baroness Barran]

I am grateful for the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, which seeks to make it a criminal offence when,

“a website … is used to advertise, list or otherwise facilitate the sale of any weapon listed in Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 … or any offensive weapon capable of being disguised as something else”.

We can all agree on the spirit of the amendment. Indeed, in preparing my remarks, I spent five minutes googling what I could buy online. The noble Lord makes a good point: some very shocking weapons are easily accessible online. However, I hope to persuade him that his amendment is not needed.

We are satisfied that there is no gap in the law and that legislation addressing the criminal behaviour outlined in the amendment already exists. Indeed, the noble Lord alluded to that in his remarks. The Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability wrote to the Public Bill Committee in the other place to set out the legal position on online platforms that advertise or sell offensive weapons in contravention of Section 141 or Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. It may assist your Lordships if I set out the position.

Section 141 of the Act states that,

“any person who manufactures, sells or hires or offers for sale or hire, exposes or has in his possession for the purpose of sale or hire, or lends or gives to any other person, a weapon to which this section applies shall be guilty of an offence”.

A list of such weapons is set out in Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988. Section 141A of the 1988 Act makes it an offence to sell certain articles with a blade or point to anyone aged under 18. Clause 1 of the Bill will make it an offence also to sell corrosive products to a person aged under 18. As is clear from these provisions, anyone who sells, hires, offers for sale or hire, exposes or has in their possession for the purpose of sale or hire any of the weapons to which the 1988 order applies—whether online or otherwise—is guilty of an offence. This would apply to individuals, but “a person” can include a body corporate or unincorporated, such as a company.

Where the user of a website places advertisements or listings for anything contained in the 1988 order on that website, the service provider may rely on the defence in relation to hosting under Regulation 19 of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. Whether Regulation 19 applies will depend on the facts of the case. As the noble Lord mentioned, there may also be jurisdictional issues if the service provider is based overseas. I assure noble Lords that the sites I found were all based overseas. Regulation 19 will not apply where the provider of the website is offering the items for sale directly and where the provider had actual knowledge of the unlawful activity and upon obtaining that knowledge did not act expeditiously to remove or disable access to the information.

We therefore consider that the provider of a website who sells items on it directly would likely be caught under the wording of the legislation. Where the provider of the website is enabling advertisements to be placed by others, the defence under Regulation 19 may be available. We have discussed the matter with the Crown Prosecution Service, which is of the view that these provisions can be used to prosecute where appropriate. In the light of this explanation of the existing law, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Baroness Barran and Lord Paddick

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I support this amendment, which is why I added my name to it. There is little that I can usefully add because, as members of the Sikh community, the noble Lord, Lord Singh, and the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, have already articulated exactly why this amendment should be accepted. I hope that the Government can accept it.

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for setting out the case for exempting all kirpans from the relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. I can reassure him from the outset that both I and my noble friend Lady Williams would be delighted to meet representatives of the Sikh Council UK and other noble Lords as the noble Lord sees fit to discuss their concerns.

Before I go on, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Singh, and my noble friend—

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[Lord Tunnicliffe]

This takes me back to those heady days when we had a Labour Government and I was a lowly Whip. That sounds like a very Treasury counterargument. One day when I was handling a particular clause, I was told that it was impossible to frame the legislation to meet the need. I said, from my lowly position in the massive meeting, “You’d better try because otherwise you will get the words that are in the amendment because it will pass at the next stage”. At that, there was a great writing of things and, lo and behold, the Government managed to find an amendment which was satisfactory. I strongly recommend that the Government make an intense effort to frame an amendment of their own which meets the across-the-board support for the spirit of this amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

Before the noble Lord withdraws his amendment, it should be said that concerns are being expressed at the impression being given by the Government of there being no room for negotiation on this issue. I hope that they will at least approach that meeting with an open mind rather than giving the impression, as might be inferred from what the Minister has said from the Dispatch Box, that there is no room for manoeuvre.

[Baroness Barran]

I can reassure the noble Lord that the Government will approach the meeting with an open mind. I tried to be clear that the key issue is achieving a specific definition for a kirpan, which we will obviously make every effort to work with. We will see whether that is possible.