Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Baroness Barran and Duke of Montrose

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 4th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his amendments, which return us to the proposed prohibition on the dispatch of bladed products to residential premises and lockers.

I hope I can quickly provide my noble friend with some reassurance on the point he has raised but, before I do so, I would like to answer the point he raised on Report, on 26 February, about the definition of “pointed articles” and whether it includes things like screws carried in someone’s pocket. Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 makes it an offence to possess in public,

“any article which has a blade or is sharply pointed”,

without,

“good reason or lawful authority”.

Section 141A of the same Act prohibits the sale to under-18s of articles with a sharp point that are,

“made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person”.

The wording “sharply pointed” is used in various parts of the Bill, including Clauses 15 to 17 and Clause 31.

The new offence of arranging delivery to residential premises or a locker is limited to “bladed products”—that is an article which is, or has, a blade and which is capable of causing serious injury by cutting the skin, so does not include pointed articles. It will be for the courts to decide whether an article is sharply pointed, or has a sharp point, in each specific case, but the legislation was clearly never intended to include screws, which are not generally considered to be offensive weapons and which have not been made or adapted for the purposes of causing injury. We are not aware that the definition of pointed articles has caused any problems with the operation of existing offences over the past 30 years.

The amendments in this group would enable bladed products that are used for agricultural or forestry management purposes to be sent by the seller to a solely residential premise. Some agricultural and forestry management items will be caught by the definition of bladed product, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that they will no longer be able to be sent to solely residential premises or a locker. However, the definition of residential premise is limited to those premises that are used solely for residential purposes. My noble friend eloquently set out a number of ways that one could demonstrate whether something was also a business address. It will be a matter for the seller of a bladed product to satisfy themselves that the delivery address is not used solely for residential purposes.

This means that bladed products will still be able to be sent to business premises and this includes, importantly, where a business is run from a residential premise. Therefore, bladed products could be sent to a farm, an agricultural supplier or a forestry centre. They could be sent to the home of a person who runs a self-employed forestry business from their home. We have been clear from the outset that deliveries to farms will not be prohibited under the Bill and, in most cases, agricultural and forestry tools will be related to business activities and should not be affected.

Clause 19 also includes a regulation-making power which will enable further defences to be added by secondary legislation if it becomes clear that the prohibition on home delivery is having a particularly negative impact on certain types of business or not-for-profit activities. A defence for agricultural and forestry equipment could therefore be provided if it becomes clear that there is a detrimental impact on this type of trade or activity. However, for the reasons I have set out, we do not currently think that this is necessary.

I hope I have given my noble friend sufficient reassurance that the deliveries of agricultural and forestry equipment should be largely unaffected by the measures in the Bill. On that basis, I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[The Duke of Montrose]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for all her efforts in answering the questions which I have raised from time to time. What she has said has been much more reassuring. It sounds as if a letter to your supplier is critical to whether or not you have a registered business. It does not have to be certified in any way; you can just say to your supplier: “This is my business address”. Maybe that situation is adequate, though there are obviously loopholes.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made an interesting point. The amendments were attached to different parts of the Bill. I thought the wording was a little more appropriate in each case, but I would not stand by it terribly much.

I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. We are in a happier position, for those who require blades and pointed instruments, than we were when it started. I beg leave to withdraw.

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[Baroness Barran]

I am grateful to my noble friend, Lord Lucas, for these amendments. As he mentioned, we had a very useful discussion on the issues covered by them on 13 February that went through in detail the concerns of collectors and theatrical suppliers.

These amendments would create new defences for the supply and possession of weapons covered by Section 1 of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959, namely flick-knives and gravity knives. The amendments would provide defences for Crown functions and visiting armed forces, for theatrical, film and television production purposes, and for flick-knives and gravity knives made before 1945. As I set out in Committee, Section 1 of the 1959 Act makes it a criminal offence to manufacture, sell, hire or lend a flick-knife or gravity knife and prohibits their importation. Clause 23 extends that prohibition to cover the possession of flick-knives and gravity knives.

I turn first to the proposed defence for Crown functions and visiting armed forces. I am afraid we are not persuaded that a defence is needed in this area. The supply, including importation, of flick-knives and gravity knives has been prohibited for a long time and the Ministry of Defence has advised that there is no need to provide defences for this purpose. We are also not aware of any Crown function that would use flick-knives or gravity knives, unlike under Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act where curved swords may be an issue. In any event, the general principle in law is that statutes do not bind the Crown unless by express provision or necessary implication. Where acting as agents or servants of the Crown, the military will benefit from the Crown exemption. The Government are therefore not persuaded that any defence for the Crown or visiting armed forces is needed.

On a defence for the purpose of theatrical performance or filming, it was clear at the meeting that the supply of flick-knives and gravity knives for such purposes has not been an issue in the past 60 years, despite their supply being banned. The supplier at the meeting suggested that most of the items used for these purposes are blunt, so it is doubtful they meet the knife definition in the 1959 Act. Given this, again, we are not persuaded that any defence is needed for flick-knives and gravity knives for theatre and film purposes.

I have more sympathy for the proposed defence for flick-knives and gravity knives made before 1945. We are aware that there are collectors of these weapons and we also know that families sometimes inherit them from relatives who fought in the war. Possession of the weapons will be banned under the Bill, so collectors and families will need to surrender any weapons they own and claim compensation, or gift them to a museum where they are of historic importance.

Our concern in accepting a defence for pre-1945 weapons is that it will be difficult to operate on the ground. In contrast to what my noble friend suggested, the police will not know with any certainty which knives had been made before 1945 and which are more modern. I appreciate this is not the answer that my noble friend would like to hear, but given that the supply of the weapons has been banned in this country since 1959 we remain of the view that there is no good reason why anyone should possess them.

[The Duke of Montrose]

Can the noble Baroness reassure me on a question that I raised at Second Reading? Does the Royal Company of Archers, the Queen’s bodyguard in Scotland, qualify for the Crown’s exemption on weapons? I also asked about a rather shady area, which the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, is probably more familiar with than I am. Are the Atholl Highlanders taken to be doing historical re-enactments, or are they likely at some point to take up weapons as a legal army?

[The Earl of Erroll]

Given that they are the only private army, but are sanctioned by Her Majesty, after Queen Victoria, I find it a very interesting question.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Baroness Barran and Duke of Montrose

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Tuesday 26th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Duke of Montrose for his detailed questions about the use of batteries. I can reassure him that under-18s will be allowed to buy batteries. He also asked about having a good reason to have a battery in a public place and about extracting sulphuric acid from batteries. I am not a battery expert but, as I understand it, all batteries are sealed and you would have to cut one open to remove the acid. The acid has never been used—

[The Duke of Montrose]

I am sure that my noble friend the Minister has looked into this in more up-to-date detail than I have. Car batteries and anything of that size are sealed, but I think there are larger batteries, with a capacity of around 100 amps, which have individual cells with a screw top. You can probably get at those rather more easily.

[Baroness Barran]

I think this is above my battery expertise. I was advised that even open vent batteries have caps which are sealed for home delivery, but I hope we are not going to argue with my noble friend about this. The principle behind the logic of many of the clauses is that we are trying to prohibit access to acid that has been used in attacks; there is no evidence that acid has been extracted from batteries of any type and then used in attacks. Indeed, I think I am right in saying that my noble friend Lord Goschen pointed out in Committee that this was an extremely expensive way of accessing sulphuric acid. I hope that reassures my noble friend.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barran]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining the amendment on behalf of my noble friend Lord Lucas, because it gives us the opportunity to consider the requirements that remote sellers need to meet if they are to rely on the defence that they have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid selling bladed articles to a person under 18.

Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 makes it an offence to sell a bladed article to a person under 18. It is a defence that the seller took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence—for example, that they had asked to see proof of a person’s age.

Clause 15 provides that, in relation to remote sales—for example, online sales—of bladed articles, the seller can rely on the defence only if they can prove they have met certain conditions. These conditions are: that they have systems in place at the point of sale for verifying the age of buyers; that they clearly mark the package containing the article when it is dispatched, and have taken steps to ensure that the package is finally delivered is delivered to someone over 18; and that they did not arrange for the article to be delivered to a locker.

The amendment concerns the second of those conditions, which is that that when the package is dispatched it must be clearly marked to indicate that it contains a bladed or sharply pointed article, and that when finally delivered it should be into the hands of someone over 18. The amendment would remove the first part of this condition, so the package would need to be labelled to say that it must be handed to a person over 18, but it would not need to say it contained a bladed or sharply pointed article.

Before I turn to the amendment itself, it might be worth saying a bit about the purpose of Clause 15, which is to drive a change in behaviour by remote sellers. It sets out the minimum requirements we would expect sellers to meet if they wanted to be confident that they were not selling to under-18s, but it is mainly aimed at individual transactions—young people trying to buy knives online—rather than large business transactions. It is not aimed, for example, at a seller of kitchenware that deals exclusively with restaurants and hotels.

The requirements under Clause 15 are therefore the minimum requirements that a seller has to meet if they want to rely on the defence that they have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence, should they ever be prosecuted for selling to an under-18. Where a seller knows their customers, they may decide not to comply with the conditions under Clause 15 because they are sure they will never be prosecuted. Examples would be: where a seller sells only to a wholesaler; where a seller has traded with the same customer for years; or where a seller knows the individual they are selling to—for instance, where they make hand-made items for particular customers, they will know the buyer is over 18 and may decide that complying with the conditions is unnecessary.

Turning to the amendment, our discussions with delivery companies and those who provide collection point services indicate that they want any packages that they are going to handle to be clearly marked by the seller so that the risk that they inadvertently hand them over to a person aged under 18 is reduced. You cannot expect staff working for a delivery company or at a collection point to ensure that the package is handed over to an adult unless it is clear from the packaging what it contains and what the restriction is on delivery. It makes sense that those working for delivery companies and at collection points know what they are handling. This will enable them to treat the package with due caution. This is particularly the case where the package contains sharp objects or corrosive substances.

Finally, the amendment applies only to Clause 15 and not to Clauses 16 and 17, which deal with the same matter in Scotland and Northern Ireland, or to Clause 2, which sets the same conditions in relation to corrosive products where these are sold remotely.

I hope I have provided the noble Lord with sufficient explanation around the purpose of Clause 15 and the labelling requirement and that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

[The Duke of Montrose]

My Lords, perhaps my noble friend can clarify on the record to what extent an article is regarded as pointed. I am afraid I am the one who is always raising the virtually impossible but it would be possible to extend this provision to a packet of screws or an order of nails—which are not all that sharp but they are sharply pointed articles—and anything else of that nature.

[Baroness Barran]

I will write to my noble friend with an accurate answer on that. I am confident that there is a tight definition of this but at this hour I cannot recall it exactly.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Baroness Barran and Duke of Montrose

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for explaining these amendments. I do not think we are far apart in what we want to achieve in relation to deliveries to residential premises. I hope that I will be able to clarify our intentions and assuage any concerns that might remain.

Clause 17 makes it an offence for a remote seller of bladed products to send them to residential premises or a locker. When developing the offence, we were keen to ensure that it did not apply to the delivery of products to residential premises from which a business was run—the noble Baroness gave the example of a craftsperson in a shed. We heard during the consultation from builders, plumbers and others who ran businesses from their homes. These people sometimes needed to have tools and other bladed products delivered to them quickly to allow them to carry on their businesses. We were also keen to ensure that farms would not be affected by the prohibition on delivery to residential premises. This point was made on Monday by the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, and again today by the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose.

To achieve this, the definition of a residential premises at Clause 17(5) is limited to those that are,

“used solely for residential purposes”.

This means that anyone who runs a business from their home can continue to have bladed products delivered there. To put this beyond any doubt, Clause 17(6) explicitly states that, where a business is carried on from a premises, it is not to be regarded as a residential premises. I hope this addresses the example that the noble Baroness gave; her face suggests that she is not entirely convinced.

Amendments 43A, 43B and 43C would achieve the same effect but are unnecessary. Where a person runs a business from residential premises which they own or occupy, the Bill already ensures that they can have bladed products delivered to such premises. It will be for the seller to satisfy themselves that they are not sending the bladed products to an address that is used solely for residential purposes. The noble Baroness raised the earlier example from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, of UPS, the delivery company. The noble Lord is right that there is no fool-proof way of establishing whether a property is a genuine business address. However, we are creating in Clause 17 a new offence for the seller, and in Clause 18(1) we set out the defences to that offence. We hope that these together will motivate the seller to take “all reasonable precautions” in verifying the address, although we acknowledge that there is no fool-proof way of doing that.

There are various ways that a seller could ascertain whether a premises is used as a business. The buyer could provide evidence that the house was registered for business purposes or they could provide confirmation in writing of the business entity and confirmation that the business is run from home. In many cases the seller will also have a relationship with the buyer as a business, possibly having supplied them with bladed products over many years. I hope this provides the clarity sought on these provisions and that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendments.

[The Duke of Montrose]

Again, going back to my problem of sheep-clippers, or itinerant workers, do the business premises being delivered to have to be in the name of the person carrying out the business? If you happen to land with somebody who is running a business, could you have something delivered there?

[Baroness Barran]

There is no restriction on delivering to a business premises.

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[Baroness Barran]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his explanation of these amendments which relate to the provisions in Clause 22, updating the prohibition on flick and gravity knives. Amendment 64 seeks to widen the defences for those charged under the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 or the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 to cover conduct relating to a weapon for the purposes of functions carried out on behalf of the Crown or a visiting force, for the purposes of theatrical performance or filming, or in relation to a weapon of historical importance or which was manufactured before 1945. It may be helpful if I describe briefly the current legislation and the changes provided for in the Bill.

Section 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 makes it a criminal offence to manufacture, sell, hire or lend a flick-knife or a gravity knife. The importation of such knives is prohibited by Section 1(2) of the Act. Clause 21 amends the 1959 Act to update the definition of a flick-knife. The current definition is quite old, and new designs are available that mimic the speed with which a flick-knife can be opened, but do not strictly fall under the existing definition. For example, in many models currently on the market, the mechanism that allows the blade to open at great speed may not be in the handle—as required by the current definition—but the knives nevertheless mimic a flick-knife.

Clause 22 extends the current offence of possession of a flick-knife or gravity knife in a public place to cover any possession, whether in a public or private place. These weapons have no legitimate use, and we believe that it is appropriate that they are prohibited both in public and in private. This will ensure that the police will be able to seize these weapons if they come across them.

Clause 22 provides a defence for a person charged with an offence under the 1959 Act if the person shows that they have the weapons in their possession for the purpose of making the knives available to a museum or gallery, or if the person is acting on behalf of a museum or gallery. We have included this defence following responses to the public consultation that informed the Bill. In relation to whether a defence should be provided for the purposes of functions carried out on behalf of the Crown or a visiting force, flick and gravity knives have been prohibited for a long time. As my noble friend would expect, we have consulted the Ministry of Defence about these provisions and it has advised us that there is no need for such a defence to cover the Armed Forces. In relation to a defence for the purpose of theatrical performance or filming, new subsection (2F) already allows the lending and hiring of flick-knives and gravity knives by museums or galleries for cultural, artistic or educational purposes.

Nor am I persuaded that a defence should be provided for items of historical importance or which were manufactured before 1945. I am concerned that this defence may be used by people who want to use these weapons in crime. Such a person may deliberately seek to acquire a knife made before 1945, or they may argue that the knife belonged to their parents or grandparents and that the weapons were manufactured before 1945. I believe that we need to be cautious and should not provide defences under this legislation that could be easily abused. I hope that my noble friend agrees with me on this point.

Amendment 65 also seeks to exclude from the ambit of the law flick and gravity knives manufactured before 1945. As I understand it, my noble friend’s intention is also to future-proof the legislation to ensure that, irrespective of the passage of time, a flick or gravity knife manufactured after 1945 can never acquire the status of an antique. Again, I hope I can persuade my noble friend that this amendment is not needed. The 1959 Act does not provide an exemption for antique flick and gravity knives. The antique exclusion applies only to weapons to which Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies, which brings me to the beginning of my noble friend’s earlier words. I accept that there is a disparity between these two provisions, but it is one that has been in place since 1988. Moreover, the prohibition on flick and gravity knives has now been in place for 60 years and has operated successfully without an exception for antique knives. That being the case, I am unpersuaded that we should now alter this approach by merging the regimes under the 1959 and 1988 Acts as the amendment seeks to do. I hope I have been able to persuade my noble friend that these amendments are unnecessary and that he will be content to withdraw them.

[The Duke of Montrose]

The question of exception for use for theatrical purposes was included in the 1988 Act under Section 141. Is it necessary to repeat it here?

[Baroness Barran]

The advice I am getting is that it is necessary because they are subject to different legislation. If that is not entirely clear I am happy to write to my noble friend.