(9 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberT3. The Foreign Secretary has made it clear that any renegotiation with the EU will have trade at its heart, which my constituents welcome ahead of the referendum, but does the Minister envisage concurrent discussions on bilateral free trade agreements with high-growth economies such as India, which will be needed in case the British people choose to leave the EU, or will any such discussions come after the referendum vote?
As my hon. Friend knows, the treaty provisions are that the EU has exclusive competence over international trade negotiations, which means that we benefit from the collective leverage of a market of about 500 million people in prising open access to third markets. As regards India, the Prime Minister raised with the Indian Prime Minister at Brisbane the need to reopen the EU-India talks on free trade which had been paused because of the Indian election. We hope very much that Mr Modi’s Government will want to take that forward now.
(11 years, 12 months ago)
Commons ChamberWhat Croatia has to do is what was set out in the negotiating chapters, particularly in chapter 24, to equip itself to deal with the responsibilities of European Union membership. I shall say a little about the borders issue later to try to address those comments. Membership of Schengen requires Croatia and any other member of Schengen to go further. The pace at which any reforms specific to Schengen are introduced and implemented is a matter between Croatia and the Schengen members. It is difficult for me as a Minister for a country that has chosen to stay outside Schengen and has no intention of joining it to try to prescribe what the pathway should be for Croatia’s hopes to join the Schengen agreement.
In its report the European Scrutiny Committee made a number of criticisms of the Commission’s and the Government’s conclusions about the readiness of Croatia to join the European Union. The Government will of course reply formally to the report of the Scrutiny Committee in due course, but as the Committee has chosen to tag its report to the debate today, I thought it might be helpful to respond to the main thrust of the Committee’s criticisms now, during the debate. We will have other opportunities during later stages of the Bill to explore the points that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) and his Committee raised, and as I said there will be a formal Government response to the Committee in due course.
I shall try to deal briefly with three or four of the main issues raised by the Committee in its conclusions. Let me take first the issue of war crimes, both co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and domestic war crimes. On co-operation with the tribunal, I want to stress that not just the United Kingdom but the European Commission and the tribunal itself believe that Croatia is fully co-operating with the tribunal. Indeed, the chief prosecutor, Mr Brammertz, has now said that he sees no need for him to visit Zagreb again and he has taken the decision to wind down the status of the tribunal’s office in Croatia. On 3 May this year, while visiting Zagreb, Mr Brammertz said that there were “no outstanding issues” that might burden relations between Croatia and ICTY. On 7 June, in a statement to the UN Security Council, he said:
“The Office of the Prosecutor continues to rely on Croatia’s cooperation to efficiently complete trials and appeals. In the current reporting period (as at 14 May 2012), the Office sent 18 requests for assistance to Croatia. The Croatian authorities have given timely and adequate responses to the requests made and it has provided access to witnesses and evidence as required. The Office will continue to rely on Croatia’s cooperation in upcoming trials and appeals.”
The chief prosecutor, who in the past has been critical of what he saw as shortcomings in Croatia’s level of co-operation with him, has now said that in his view Croatia has co-operated, and continues to do so, in the way he would rightly expect.
The issue of domestic war crimes is a difficult one. One need only look to our own country’s history in Northern Ireland to see how difficult it can be to get to the truth about some of the most vile murders. There are about 1,200 cases on file relating to domestic war crimes in Croatia, but we need to break that total down into three categories. There are about 400 cases for which trials are pending, about 400 where the accused cannot be found and a further 400 or so where the indictments are in a pre-investigative phase but the perpetrator is unknown—it is believed, on the basis of evidence, that a war crime might have been committed but no individual or group of named individuals can be cited as having been responsible. The average length of a trial for a domestic war crime is about six to seven months.
In 2010, four specialised chambers were established to deal with domestic war crimes. In May 2011, new legislation took effect to require the transfer of outstanding cases to those chambers and, in the autumn of 2011, new judges were appointed to those specialist tribunals. So far, 87 cases have been transferred to the specialist tribunals. The Government’s view is that progress has been too slow and that the Croatians need to devote more resources to that work. Our assessment is that the commitments Croatia made can be described as “almost complete” but that more progress is still required. We are confident, given the commitments we have had from the Croatian Justice Ministry, that that acceleration will have taken place by the time we reach the expected accession date.
Some of that progress is simply about procedural reforms: new listing priorities have now been established; prosecutorial standards are being applied better; there is, importantly, improved co-operation between the Croatian and Serbian authorities in investigating war crimes; and the Croatian side has submitted a draft agreement between those two countries for co-operation in the prosecution of such cases. The Commission has said that more still needs to be done to secure the attendance and protection of witnesses, who might well fear for their safety when giving evidence in this kind of case. We think that progress has been slower than it ought to have been but are confident about the seriousness with which the Croatian authorities are taking it.
I will move on to borders and address the point that the former Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee, the hon. Member for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty), made in his earlier intervention. Croatia has been making good progress. She already has 81 fully operational border crossing points and has given assurances that the necessary infrastructure and technology will be in place to support those crossing points and ensure strong border management by the time she accedes to the EU. The most important outstanding element is the need to provide formal border crossing points in the Neum corridor, which is the very narrow stretch of Bosnian territory that divides Croatia. The Croatians have told us that they are on course to complete the border crossing points in that important area next spring.
After Croatian accession, of course, there will continue to be border controls between Croatia and its European Union neighbours. Because Croatia will not join Schengen straight away, those neighbouring countries that are EU member states already will maintain their border controls with Croatia, so any third-country national who got into Croatian territory, whether before or after EU accession, would still be subject to the same level of controls in a country such as Slovenia, and certainly in the United Kingdom, as they are today. I will add that one key advantage for us of Croatia’s accession is that she will come within the scope of the Eurodac regulation and the Dublin agreement on returns and readmissions, which will be helpful to us in the case of any people who manage to get through and abuse the asylum system and need to be returned to Croatia.
There will obviously be a seven-year transition period on economic migration from Croatia. Can the Minister tell the House—this is a general point relating also to Romania and Bulgaria—whether it would be possible under British law for us to extend that transition period if we think that is right for Britain?
The answer is that we cannot go beyond the period for transitional controls laid down in the treaties. I will say a little more about arrangements for Croatia later. For Romania and Bulgaria, we have extended the transitional controls for the maximum period committed and they have to come to an end by the end of 2013.