(1 day, 22 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I extend my personal sorrow to the family of Lance Corporal George Hooley. His tragic death is a humbling reminder of the risk that we ask all those who serve with such honour to confront on a daily basis.
In relation to the Urgent Question, we have here a story of starkly, indeed darkly, contrasting facts. In the summer, troops were taken ill after using Ajax vehicles. In late November, 31 soldiers fell ill after using the vehicles, forcing a two-week suspension of Ajax’s use while a safety investigation was carried out. Personnel have been limited to spending only one and a half hours inside the vehicles due to health concerns. Their speed has been restricted because of instability, and they cannot fire while moving. Meanwhile, in early November Mr Luke Pollard, the Minister, visited General Dynamics in Wales to mark the initial operating capability of Ajax. The November edition of Desider, an internal MoD publication, lavished praise on Ajax as a “world-class armoured fighting vehicle” and a “transformational capability”.
Given what we now know, I ask the Minister how on earth the MoD could accept initial operating capability. Who signed that off? If this nightmare cannot be fixed, as looks increasingly likely, can the contract be terminated?
I thank the noble Baroness for her remarks about our British serviceman who was so tragically lost. The whole House will join in her remarks.
With respect to the position regarding Ajax, the previous Minister will be well aware of the various reports and representations that have been made to various Ministers over a number of years. All Ministers, past and present, will want answers to the very questions that the noble Baroness has quite rightly put to us. Like all of us, she will be waiting for the results of the various investigations that have been set up. I assure her that—as she will have heard from my colleague in the other place—when we get the results of those investigations, we will consider all available options on how we move forward.
My Lords, we on these Benches also recognise the responsibilities we have with troops now helping to train the Ukrainian army and we send our condolences; we know that we are committed to Ukraine. Now that we are waiting for further comments on what is really happening with the Ajax vehicle, can I ask three quick wider questions?
First, the Minister in the Commons admitted:
“The Army has a number of vehicles that … have been in service for a long period”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/12/25; col. 58.]
I think that is saying that both the fighting fleet and the logistics fleet are pretty outdated. Does that mean that in this much more dangerous period we should be investing much more into the Army fleet than we currently plan to?
Secondly, the SDR says that we are now in a very different situation but the Treasury, at the Budget, has said that we will do a little bit of extra investment in the next two years and then maybe a bit more in three or four years. Should we not now be talking about a much more serious threat that requires much more defence investment than we are currently planning?
My third question is about strategic partnerships. The Defence Industrial Strategy says:
“It is no longer affordable for NATO Allies, especially within Europe, to develop their own exquisite capabilities at low production volumes”.
That means much closer co-operation and collaboration with others. Given what President Trump is saying about the NATO alliance, that means hard negotiations with our European partners, difficult though it is. Does the Minister agree?
There was quite a bit in that. I thank the noble Lord for his comments about the bravery and sacrifice of our Armed Forces. He will know that we have paused all use of the Ajax vehicles pending the outcome of the investigations as the safety of our Armed Forces comes first.
On logistics, I think he refers to the fact that large numbers of trucks are having to be repaired. They are being repaired, and we expect that to be completed in the new year. On the SDR and the money, he will see the budgets that have been made available and the increase over a period of time. He referred to the aspiration to move even further with that, particularly by 2035.
On the point he made about strategic partnerships, of course they are crucial. We spend a large amount of time negotiating with European friends and partners. He will have seen the recent Norway deal with respect to the frigates, and the arrangements we have made with France, Germany and Poland. They are just some examples, and I hope it demonstrates to the noble Lord that we take seriously the need to negotiate, work and co-operate with our European friends, most of which are members of NATO as well.
My Lords, this scandal reminds me of a scandal I worked on when I was a very young man: the airborne early warning system of the 1980s. It started under Labour and was cancelled by my noble friend Lord Trefgarne; it cost millions of pounds. Working within that company, Ministers were deliberately deceived so that they could get payment for costs plus. Can the noble Lord, who is a highly respected Minister in this place, assure the House that Ministers have not been deceived over this contract? Is it possible that we could decide to go for an off-the-shelf product from a manufacturer within this country or one of our allies? My noble friend made the difficult decision, and in the 1980s we took an off-the-shelf product to replace the failed airborne early warning contract. We took AWACS, which still works to this day.
I thank the noble Lord for the question. Clearly, Ministers from all Governments make decisions on the basis of the advice they receive. Let us see what the investigation tells us about that advice. He will know that there are four different aspects to the investigations. There are the defence, Army and ministerial aspects, then alongside that, which I think the noble Lord will appreciate, we are looking to people outside the MoD—some independent consultants—to look at what is happening so that we get independent advice. I think that was something the former Minister in the other place, James Cartlidge MP, asked for. When we get the result of those investigations we will take the decisions that are necessary at that point, but we need to wait for the results.
My Lords, has any foreign interest been expressed in purchasing Ajax at any stage? If it is not going to be purchased, will it be a UK-only piece of equipment?
I am not aware of any foreign interest in it, but I will check my facts and come back to the noble and gallant Lord if I am incorrect.
My Lords, I have enormous sympathy for the Minister, given the situation in which he finds himself. More than £6 billion has been spent on a fighting vehicle that is more dangerous to our own troops than to the enemy. What steps are being taken to pursue redress for malefaction on the part of the company concerned, General Dynamics? Permanent Secretaries at the Ministry of Defence have been the accounting officers responsible to Parliament for this expenditure. If we find that at the very highest level, Permanent Secretaries and directors-general in the Ministry of Defence have made mistakes that have endangered the lives of our fighting men and wasted millions, will we in this House have the opportunity to ensure that appropriate action is taken to ensure that they cannot play a future role in public life?
I do not know the absolute answer to the noble Lord’s last point, but at some point there will be a significant number of debates and questions that will explore in much more detail the whole Ajax programme since 2014 up to the present day. As I say, we are in a slightly difficult situation because we are waiting for the outcome of those investigations to inform the way forward. The budget of £6.3 billion was set in 2014 and is the same budget now, but I take the noble Lord’s point. Let us come back to it at a future debate when we have the results of the investigations.
My Lords, I declare my interest as a chief engineer working for AtkinsRéalis. We have a difficult history of armoured fighting vehicle procurements in this country. The TRACER programme was a failed procurement, as was the multi-role armoured vehicle, MRAV, and now we have issues with the Ajax programme. What lessons learned from Ajax are being brought forward into future procurements, such as Boxer and Challenger 3?
Without being flippant, I am fed up with lessons learned from various reports over a period of time. The bigger question is why the lessons learned so often do not translate into something that makes a fundamental difference. The noble Baroness worked in the MoD, and the noble Lord works in the way that he suggested. I do not think that the vast majority of people set out to do a bad job; they work with dynamism, principle and determination to do their best. But somewhere along the line, we do not seem to be able to procure the equipment that we should, at the pace we should and for the price we should.
I hope that the defence reform that the Secretary of State has implemented—the establishment of a new National Armaments Director Group, with a new National Armaments Director at the top who is directly accountable for what happens with respect to procurement —is a reform that, in a year, two years or whenever, the noble Lord will be able to describe as a reform that worked. He will be able to say that lessons were learned and actions taken that made a fundamental difference.
We have to get our defence industry working, whether across Europe or fundamentally within our own country, because the defence and security of our nation depend on the sovereign ability of our own industry to produce and develop the goods, ammunition and war equipment that we need to support our soldiers.