Aviation Safety (Amendment) Regulations 2025

Wednesday 15th October 2025 Grand Committee

Considered in Grand Committee

17:13

Moved by

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Aviation Safety (Amendment) Regulations 2025.

Relevant document: 34th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[The Minister of State, Department for Transport (Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill) (Lab)]

My Lords, noble Lords will wish to know that the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments has considered a draft of the order before it was laid and then gave informal pre-laying approval. After the draft order was laid on 16 July, it was formally cleared by the Joint Committee. Likewise, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee formally cleared the draft order. The committee raised no specific concerns about this instrument, although it noted it as an instrument of interest, the reasons for which will be addressed later in my speech. Prior to this, the department had responded to preliminary inquiries from the committee’s clerk to the satisfaction of the committee.

This instrument amends existing aviation safety regulations to update and rationalise requirements for the maintenance and repair of aircraft, and to clarify the Civil Aviation Authority’s powers of delegation. These amendments ensure that UK law remains clear and proportionate.

I will start by providing some background information about these regulations. UK airspace and airlines are among the safest in the world. Even with this success, we are not complacent, and the Government are committed to maintaining and improving the high safety standards in aviation. The UK is therefore committed to ensuring that technical requirements remain up to date, and in line with international standards and best practice set by the International Civil Aviation Organization. The Civil Aviation Authority is the UK’s independent safety regulator, responsible for advising the Government on amendments to technical aviation safety requirements and regulations.

17:15

I turn to the detail of the draft regulations. They have four objectives, three of which relate to the continuing airworthiness regulation, which ensures that the maintenance and repair of aircraft and aircraft parts is conducted safely.

First, this instrument makes amendments to the continuing airworthiness regulation regarding the release of aircraft parts into service. Currently, all components added to an aircraft require a “form 1” to be issued by the maintenance organisation, which certifies that the parts are safe to be released to service—a technically complex process. This amendment allows approved design organisations to identify certain aircraft components as appropriate for release to service by making a less onerous “declaration of maintenance”. This declaration can be used only for parts that have a negligible impact on the safety of the aircraft, such as a pilot’s document holder. These amendments complete the introduction of a policy that was set out in the initial airworthiness regulation in the 2023 regulations. This will help to reduce the burden on maintenance organisations.

Secondly, this instrument rationalises parts of the continuing airworthiness regulation by combining similar requirements into one location, making the regulations easier to follow. These amendments also reintroduce qualification requirements for aircraft maintenance staff, such as on the timings for retaking key examinations, which were erroneously omitted.

Thirdly, this instrument rationalises and corrects references and errors in the continuing airworthiness regulations arising from the 2019, 2023 and 2024 regulations. Although irregularities and inconsistencies in the regulations introduced by the errors have not caused a safety issue, the department acknowledges that the errors could mean that the industry finds it harder to follow the regulations as intended. The draft regulations therefore correct the errors to ensure clarity.

Lastly, this instrument makes amendments to Articles 62 and 69 of the basic regulation. Under the Civil Aviation Act 1982, the Civil Aviation Authority has always had the ability to delegate its functions or tasks to third parties and a similar power existed under a previous version of the basic regulation. This power was used when the CAA considered that the relevant skills sat outside its organisation—for example, it would delegate the authorisation of carriage of dangerous goods, such as radioactive materials, to the Office for Nuclear Regulation—or that a third party was better placed to assess an issue than the CAA or was able to better protect the public. For example, the meteorological obligations resting with the CAA are delegated to the UK Meteorological Office.

I will now address comments on this instrument made by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee on how the CAA will use delegated powers. Following changes to the basic regulation of 2018, the CAA’s delegation powers could no longer be used by the CAA for aviation safety tasks. This instrument amends Articles 62 and 69 of the basic regulation in a way that reactivates the CAA’s power to delegate aviation safety tasks. The CAA intends to use these powers to delegate the training and examination of drone pilots, as well as the assessment of the drones’ flightworthiness, to qualified third parties. This is similar to the CAA’s approach to pilot training and airworthiness for fixed-wing and helicopter aircraft. By delegating these powers, the CAA will be able to support the sector to develop and grow new technologies more quickly, which will support growth and innovation. The CAA has set out stringent requirements for third parties to be qualified entities. Qualified entities will be subject to an audit regime to ensure continuing compliance with the CAA’s requirements.

Before I turn to my closing comments, I draw the Committee’s attention to another point raised by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee: the instrument’s use of powers in the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023. Due to post-EU exit powers issues, we cannot amend assimilated law provisions that have criminal sanctions associated with them without using the retained EU law Act. The safety management systems corrections in this instrument are necessary for the proper operation and implementation of such systems; the policy on them was set out in the Aviation Safety (Amendment) Regulations 2023. REUL Act 2023 powers were not available when the 2023 regulations were made.

Once these powers have been used—the REUL Act powers expire in June 2026—a longer-term solution will be required to make further amendments, as we previously relied on Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 when the UK was a member of the European Union. The department is actively working on options to reform the way in which aviation safety regulations are made, in order to enable future amendments to the assimilated aviation safety legislation.

We must continue to ensure that aviation remains among the safest forms of travel, as the safety of aviation and the travelling public is a priority to this Government; these draft regulations represent a further step in ensuring that that remains the case. I beg to move.

[Baroness Foster of Oxton (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his comprehensive outline of this topic. I seek clarification on two areas.

In paragraph 6.4 of the EM, reference is made to low-risk parts. Paragraph 5.4 also talks about allowing

“certain aircraft components to be installed without needing a Form 1, as long as they are declared safe by the design organisation”.

I want a little clarification here on what is defined as a low-risk part. I ask this for the right reasons, having spent 25 years in the industry—much of that time onboard aircraft—and having dealt with primary legislation for many years as a Member of the European Parliament.

In 1990, there was an incident involving a BAC 1-11. When a windscreen was replaced, the incorrect screws were used. That caused what we would have called a rapid decompression; they called it an explosive decompression. I knew the crew. The captain survived; he was swept out of the window. Since that accident, there was also a rise in fake parts, about which the industry was very concerned. Barcoding was introduced to ensure that the equipment, parts and components were all absolutely authentic.

My point is that the component that caused the accident was a tiny screw. You would look at it in the round as being a fairly low-risk component. It was just a general thing; it was nothing complex. I ask the Minister: what do the Government consider “low-risk parts”? Would they be used on certain parts of an aircraft that would not require a Form 1? We cannot be too general about these things because there is always a chain of events; the smallest component can cause a technical incident or accident. That is my first point.

My second point concerns drones. I drafted the drone report in the European Parliament in 2015. It was about the civil use of drones and the rise in the industry. The CAA has been extremely good. We have a fantastic organisation in it—as well as an excellent Department for Transport, if I may say so, having worked closely with many members of that department over time. My question is: does the CAA intend to delegate the assessment of drone pilot competency and of drones’ flightworthiness to third parties? The CAA has introduced excellent training for drone pilots—it did that itself—but who would these third parties be, in terms of taking over the role that the CAA currently holds, in which it is absolutely diligent in giving out licences?

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, following on from my noble friend Lady Foster, I will touch on the second point she raised, because it is relevant. We have a situation where the CAA’s delegation and decision-making powers are being changed because of the nature of the arrangements with the European Union.

This whole set of regulations is part of a much broader project led by the CAA at the moment, which deals with, among other things, the simplification of the licensing and training of general aviation pilots—of which I am one. The issues around the changes in licensing are very important, because they bring about the ability of someone, who, like me, flies a single-engine piston aircraft, to fly an electric aircraft. I will not go into the shock-horror that the likelihood of me flying an electric aircraft is equivalent to my enthusiasm for driving an electric car, which is rather limited at the moment.

My question, which follows on from the point raised by my noble friend Lady Foster, is about the delegation of powers to the CAA. She raised a very good point on drones, but I would like the Minister to set out for us whether there were any changes as a result of these circumstances in the agencies, which can have a delegation from the CAA to make decisions, and whether that is adequate in terms of who looks into which agencies can have those delegated powers.

I will raise another point. This statutory instrument does not appear to have happened through impact assessments or anything else; it is a usual statutory instrument where nothing seems to have been necessary to draw to anyone’s attention. To what extent are the resources of the CAA being tested, as a result of these regulations or of ones that have been envisaged? As I think we are all aware, the CAA is short of cash. It is already doing a considerable number of functions, including coming up to date on the things that I have referred to: technology, licensing, the training of pilots and so on.

There is also the question of safety, which develops inexorably as we go along due to the rise of new-generation aircraft. There is also the issue around airports, including the changes in the control zone basis of airports, which must be costing the CAA considerable sums of money. Can the Minister also confirm that there are adequate resources for the operation of the CAA to pay agencies or others to which it delegates powers, and that he is satisfied that we will not need to go back to the Treasury and ask it for more cash? Safety in the air—the safety of training and the other uses of pilots et cetera—must be paramount if our skies are to be secure.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I express my gratitude to the Minister for arranging a very helpful briefing by officials.

Like my noble friend Lady Foster of Oxton, I had some concern about the abandonment of the use of Form 1 for certain non-safety critical parts. We can rely only on the personal assurance of the Minister that, in proceeding in this route, he and his department will take full responsibility for the consequences of that decision. As my noble friend pointed out, the notion of a non-safety critical part can be deceptive because of the close integration of every working part on an aircraft. We cannot challenge the statutory instrument on that basis; we have to accept that the Minister and his department know what they are doing and that they are willing to accept the responsibility that falls on them from pursuing this proposal.

I also share the caution expressed by my noble friend Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate about the delegation of Civil Aviation Authority powers, and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about that. Beyond that, and with those reservations, the Official Opposition have no objection to this instrument, which consists largely of consolidation and clarification. We have no objection to it, but we would like to hear the Minister’s response on those areas that cause us some potential concern.

17:30

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for attending the debate and for their input. I listened intently to the highly experienced noble Baroness, Lady Foster. She raised a valuable point about the minute parts that might cause a serious failure. I recall the example used, albeit not as a practitioner. The answer to that is that type certificate holders will have a design process in place to establish the potential failure impact of every part, and that design process has to be established by the CAA as adequate. Any potential failure must be shown to have a negligible effect on the functioning of the aircraft. The screw that the noble Baroness referred to, part of the assembly of a windscreen, would be considered within the design process so that it would not be excluded from form 1 if the design process for the more major component was safety critical. You could not exclude the screws and still have the windscreen assembly—that is the practical answer to that question.

The noble Baroness asked who the CAA will delegate to. I cannot give her the names of the third parties, but the CAA has set out stringent requirements for third parties to be qualified entities. Qualified entities will be subject to an audit regime to ensure continuing compliance with the CAA’s requirements. They will clearly need sufficient subject matter expertise and regulation capacity, and the CAA will accredit and monitor their performance to ensure continuing safety. The CAA has to set out in detail how it intends to assess the competence of qualified entities for drone flightworthiness, assessment and training. It has experience of doing that in respect of how it dealt with the pilots of fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, so we are entitled to conclude that those processes are robust.

The noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, referred to the delegation of powers. The criteria are more or less what I have just said, but if there is any omission from the explanation that I should have given as a consequence of his question, I will write forthwith. As for the testing of adequate resources for the Civil Aviation Authority, I believe that it is the Government’s responsibility to ensure that the resources are adequate and that it has adequate resources to pay the agencies to which this work should be delegated. Again, for the avoidance of doubt, I will write to the noble Lord and confirm that that is the case in respect of this element of these regulations.

The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, rightly asked whether the department, and I as the Minister proposing these regulations, take responsibility for them and for the proposal to delegate. The answer to that is, of course, yes. The department should not propose such regulations without feeling confident that it is competent to propose them and that what it is proposing is the right thing to do.

I believe that I have answered all the points raised. I conclude by saying again that the safety of aviation and of the travelling public is a priority for the Government. My department is committed to ensuring that aviation remains safe. The draft regulations form part of an important legislative programme which implements proportionate best practice in aviation safety regulation. I commend the regulations to the Committee.

[Baroness Foster of Oxton (Con)]

When I referred to the screws, the noble Lord quite rightly pointed out that we were looking at the design, et cetera, which makes sure that it is a bona fide part. The air accident that took place was not because the screws themselves were badly designed, or that they failed because of what they were, it was when they were fitted—it was the incorrect component. There is a differentiation here between something failing because of a design fault and something failing because the incorrect component has been fitted into a specific, probably critical, area of an aircraft. Could I just leave that with the noble Lord? I thank him.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I am very happy that the noble Baroness leaves it with me. I will make sure that I write to her. I recognise the issue that we are dealing with—the incorrect fitment of correct components.

Motion agreed.