Arrangement of Business
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Stansgate) (Lab)
My Lords, if there is a Division in the Chamber, we will adjourn immediately and resume after 10 minutes. However, when I last looked at the Chamber, it was happily busy with the Renters’ Rights Bill, so we need not expect a Division at all.
One Hundred Year Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine
(2 days, 20 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I am moving this Motion on behalf of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, chair of the International Agreements Committee, who sadly is unavailable today.
The International Agreements Committee, of which I am a member, took great interest in the UK-Ukraine 100-year partnership agreement. We welcome the Government’s extension of the CRaG period for scrutiny of this agreement, which has allowed time for this debate. We think this is a useful window and believe it is an appropriate acknowledgement of the high level of interest in this agreement across both Houses.
The agreement has been laid in the context of a rapidly changing geopolitical environment. As noble Lords will appreciate, the situation has developed significantly even in the period between taking evidence and publishing our report, and has continued to change since the report’s publication. Amid these changes, the Government’s ongoing support for Ukraine remains firm, and the committee welcomes the Government’s resolution. It is in this context that we sought to assess this agreement.
We heard that this agreement seeks to put in place a long-term framework governing future co-operation between the UK and Ukraine across a range of areas and sectors. The Minister, Stephen Doughty, told us in evidence that the agreement reflects a fundamental change in the “context and depth” of the bilateral relationship. Hanna Hopko, co-founder of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory, told us that the agreement represents a “historic milestone” in our relationship.
Notwithstanding this rather dramatic framing, the aspiration to provide stability and structure to the UK- Ukraine relationship is laudable. However, as we note in the report, the title of this agreement, the 100-year partnership, raises expectations while distracting attention from the vital matter of the substance—or, in some cases, the lack thereof—contained in this agreement. Indeed, given that the agreement may be terminated with six months’ notice from either party, the title and stated duration of the agreement could be described as somewhat illusory.
The agreement itself is broad. Detail is included in the accompanying and non-binding political declaration. This declaration spans a range of areas including defence, security, maritime co-operation, co-operation on the economy, trade and investment, energy, justice and combating disinformation. We heard that this declaration is intended to evolve over time.
Our report focused on the areas it covered that we felt were significant to the national interest or had the potential to deliver tangible benefits for the United Kingdom. I turn first to the defence and security provisions. The agreement commits the parties to develop joint defence-industrial capabilities and to strengthen Ukraine’s defence procurement. The accompanying political declaration envisages creating
“rapid response mechanisms … and joint use of military formations and other specialised structures to provide … mutual defence and security services”.
It sets out ambitions jointly to produce and develop
“advanced weapons and ammunition manufacturing capabilities”,
to
“deepen cooperation on long-range strike capabilities”
and to integrate
“air and missile defence and complex weapons stockpiles”.
Your Lordships should note that it reiterates the Government’s previous commitment to provide Ukraine with £3 billion in annual military assistance
“until 2030/31 and for as long as needed to support Ukraine”.
I note that this is a very long-term and substantial commitment of taxpayers’ money.
Leaving the financial commitment to one side, in our report we considered the merits of this kind of co-operation. We heard of some opportunity costs to the UK’s military readiness but also of benefits both to the UK’s international reputation and, potentially, to our future defence and security capabilities and industrial base. Ukraine has developed modern military capabilities from which the UK stands to learn—for example, in AI-assisted drone technology. Yet it is impossible to truly assess how future benefits to the UK will be realised without greater detail on how these aspects of the agreement are to be implemented. In our report, we stress the need for the Government to develop more concrete plans as to how defence-industrial projects might be carried out under this agreement, to set out some indicative timeline and to provide assurance as to how these projects will benefit the United Kingdom.
In view of current events, our report also considers the important question of the relationship between this agreement and security guarantees to Ukraine. In doing so, we considered whether an agreement of this nature could possibly offer a deterrent to future Russian aggression in Ukraine. This is not a binding security guarantee of the type sought by Ukraine from its allies. As such, in and of itself, it likely will not offer a deterrent of this kind. However, witnesses told us that the agreement could help to
“maintain, increase and improve, through co-operative agreement, Ukraine’s ability to defend itself”
and that it facilitates the co-operation and action needed to underpin a future security guarantee. Were this to occur, we would welcome this outcome.
The agreement establishes a maritime partnership between the United Kingdom and Ukraine. The political declaration tells us that it is the aim of both parties to ensure the
“speedy restoration of Ukraine’s control over all temporarily occupied territories and strengthen its potential as a powerful maritime and riverine state”.
For my part, this is perhaps the crux of the overall partnership, as currently envisaged by this agreement. The Minister told us in evidence that this aspect of the agreement is about
“equipping Ukraine to protect its own assets and operations in line with international law”.
He highlighted that, in the short term, this partnership will involve “providing force-generation training” for the Ukrainian mine countermeasure task force to support Ukraine in dealing with mines in the Black Sea and other risks to future civilian and military navigation. Force generation in the NATO context refers to the process by which allies resource the personnel and equipment needed to carry out operations and missions, so perhaps the Minister can confirm whether this will mean Royal Navy personnel on board Ukrainian naval vessels in the Black Sea.
I turn to other aspects of support. As the committee understands it, the UK has to date provided £265 million in support of Ukraine’s maritime capabilities. It was not clear to us where the partnership proposed in the agreement departs from or builds on this existing practice. In order to assess the depth of the proposed maritime partnership, it would be helpful to hear from the Government exactly what additional support will be offered to Ukraine under the maritime partnership, and in what way this would complement existing arrangements.
Looking forward, I trust that when the strategic defence review is published it will explain how the Royal Navy will balance this currently open-ended commitment with a range of other needs, such as the UK’s recent accession to the Bahrain-US Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement, C-SIPA; an expanding need to protect subsea assets locally; and a likely need to expand operations in the Arctic. How will it achieve this while simultaneously maintaining the Navy’s other activities?
Returning to this report, the committee urges the Government to ensure that any maritime partnership as envisioned by this agreement contributes to the overall stability of the region. As such, we have recommended that the Government review the agreement in general, and the maritime partnership in particular, in the event of a peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine. This should also take into consideration the increased territorial claims made by Putin on the Black Sea area since this report was published, so we have asked the Government to keep Parliament informed of any such review.
I now turn to the economic, science and technology co-operation set out in the agreement. The Government’s evidence stressed that, beyond the immediate security needs of Ukraine, the priority of this agreement lies in securing growth, innovation and economic co-operation between our countries. The Minister told us that this included fostering business-to-business links and encouraging mutual investment and joint ventures. Our report welcomes the aspirations set out in the political declaration to support the development of Ukraine’s financial centre and business environment through sustained UK market access and the proposals to develop Ukraine’s public procurement regime. We note that this will not be a one-way process as the UK stands to learn from Ukraine’s experience—for example, in the development of critical technologies.
In this vein, we draw the attention of the Grand Committee to subsequent correspondence we received from the Government—it is available on our website—which outlines the sectors in the UK that stand to benefit commercially from co-operation under this agreement, including via UK Export Finance support for contracts in the defence, infrastructure and construction sectors. In view of the importance of securing stable market access for UK companies, we were pleased to hear that the Government are seeking to deepen co-operation on the crucial issues of the rule of law, good governance, anti-corruption and transparency. These are vital ingredients of a stable business environment and, accordingly, of the UK’s national interest in this agreement.
Our report calls on the Government to continue to work closely with Ukrainian counterparts to support governance reforms and strengthen the rule of law, including by structuring funding to encourage this outcome. We view this activity as vital to the success of this agreement and accordingly have asked the Government to keep Parliament informed on their work in these areas.
To sum up, the committee supports the underlying aims of the agreement, although we have concerns about the lack of substance and detail. Accordingly, we ask the Government to provide Parliament with a clear and realistic road map of how and when the activities on defence co-operation and maritime security will be undertaken. We have asked that the Government formally review the arrangement in the event of a settlement between Russia and Ukraine, with a particular focus on the maritime security partnership, and that they keep Parliament abreast of updates. We welcome the reports by the Minister that the UK continues to work with Ukrainian counterparts on governance and rule of law issues. We hope that this work can bring about a closer economic and investment relationship between our two countries.
To finish, I draw noble Lords’ attention to our final conclusion, which considers the ongoing work at an international level to bring Russian aggression in Ukraine to an end. The committee welcomes the Government’s ongoing support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, their position on security guarantees and a US backstop and their commitment to future domestic defence spending. We believe that these steps will be vital to achieving successful implementation of this agreement. I beg to move.
Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on his admirable opening and on the way in which he chaired the International Agreements Committee as a great substitute. I was musing that, had that committee not examined this agreement, no other committee in either House would have done so—neither the Foreign Affairs Committee in the other place nor the International Relations and Defence Committee here, both of which have dealt generally with Ukraine although not in this sort of detail.
I shall make one or two rather critical comments on the agreement. Before doing so, it would be appropriate for me to set out my broad position. I yield to no one in criticising the illegal Russian invasion and in admiring both the courage and the national resilience of the people of Ukraine. I fully support the leadership response of the Government and the Prime Minister on both the military and civilian sides; it has broad support in the country. I share the Government’s readiness to stimulate further bilateral co-operation with Ukraine but I question certain elements of the agreement. Be ambitious, yes, but to fix a timescale of 100 years is somewhat absurd, as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, said. Why not 1,000 years, which would be even more absurd? Even a timescale of 10 years would raise questions, given the volatility of the international situation. Each day, when we turn on the news, we get some new utterance from President Trump that may alter substantially the position in Ukraine.
The stated 100 years lacks a sense of history. Think of the way in which borders in central and eastern Europe have changed over the past 100 years or so, albeit with two world wars. Whole regions have changed. Ruthenia, Silesia, Galicia and Sudetenland no longer exist, at least not as they were. People have stayed in their village but changed their nationality. I recently read with interest Professor Philippe Sands’ book, East West Street, which gives some indication of the way in which frontiers have been so indistinct and changed so much over the years. No one can be confident, therefore, as to what the configuration of central and eastern Europe will be in time. I lived in Hungary for two years and imbibed the treachery of Trianon, with the loss of Transylvania at that time; it is very much a theme of the Hungarians.
The Government’s defence is that this is only a symbolic commitment, but the realities are more important: the speed of geopolitical change; the capricious policies of the Trump Administration; the ultimate ceasefire; the nature and composition of any security or reassurance guarantees; and the new borders of Ukraine, as President Zelensky himself has conceded that there will be territorial concessions. What will Ukraine’s relationship with the European Union and, more problematically, with NATO be? The aims of the agreement are worthy but the substance is very sketchy indeed. A road map is not included and there is no mention of priorities in the agreement. If everything is a priority, nothing is a priority.
I say this in general but take an example, such as the inclusion of the Sea of Azov. After the Russian invasion —or takeover—of 2014, there is no serious prospect of Crimea returning to the sovereignty of Ukraine. The Sea of Azov is part of that, in effect, yet it is included in the agreement. Does anyone seriously expect Crimea, including this sea, to return to Ukrainian sovereignty?
NATO membership in Article 2 is aspirational, but there is no serious prospect of it, so far as we can plan, knowing the position of the US Administration. On maritime security, 75% of Ukraine’s navy was lost in 2014. I visited Odessa three years ago and saw the fleet, which was one rusty Soviet-era ship, lots of locally produced small patrol boats and, happily, one junior officer who had spent a period at Dartmouth. That was my impression—it had great morale but was rather irrelevant. Where there have been successes in the Black Sea, they have not been due to the navy itself but to missiles that, for example, have led to the sinking of the “Moskva”, the flagship of the Russian fleet, and to the Russians moving their major ports further east in the Baltic.
There are references to critical minerals. This has been largely overtaken by the soon-to-be agreement between the US and Ukraine. I accept that this is a bilateral treaty. There is no mention of other allies or of our attempting to broker agreements with the EU and helping and encouraging others to join the coalition. The truth is that we should have considered a more limited and realistic agreement based not on lofty aspirations but on practical assistance to Ukraine, which is much needed and welcomed, recognising the mutuality of benefits. Ukraine had done remarkably well in adapting to the local production of drones, for example, and mastering AI. We have much to learn from it on this. The UK could draw on our own successful experience in the 1990s and beyond of the Know-How Fund for countries in the Balkans.
It is no wonder that the committee in paragraph 34 calls for a “review” of the agreement in the event of a peace deal in the reasonably near future. An early revision is therefore likely—much earlier than 100 years.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for his excellent standing in as our chairman when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, was not around. I pay tribute to both chairmen and colleagues on the committee for their dispassionate and open approach to this agreement. It was everything a committee should be. I also thank the officials, who were quite terrific in getting us through the business.
I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Swansea, said about the lack of substance and the curious nature of a 100-year agreement that has a six-month period of notice. It has defence and security provisions at a time when the position is very volatile. It includes territorial boundaries, the Sea of Azov and NATO membership. All these defence questions, which the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has taken us through, are very much in the air.
I would like to ask the Minister about the background to the agreement and the timing. The 100-year partnership was signed in January this year, in the same month that the new US President Donald Trump was inaugurated on a manifesto that included ending the Ukraine war rapidly—I think at one stage it was in a day—and stopping the dispatch of what he called US treasure. Thus, when this agreement was signed, the context was that the current and future circumstances were and would continue to be fluid. A peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia would potentially render parts of the UK-Ukraine 100-year partnership out of date. Therefore, I would like to probe the Government further on whether the timing of the agreement may add to the doubts about the agreement’s value lying primarily in its signalling rather than its substance, to which the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Anderson, have already alluded.
Our report welcomes the
“efforts to contribute to a secure and peaceful Ukraine”
but notes that the value of the agreement
“appears to lie primarily in its signalling function, and we are concerned by the lack of detail on the substance of the Agreement”.
We add, in paragraph 21, that
“we heard from witnesses that the title is rather meaningless, and risks distracting attention from the substance of the Partnership”—
the stated aim being
“to provide stability and structure to an enduring … relationship”.
Can the Minister therefore explain the Government’s thinking as they went ahead to sign a 100-year agreement, parts of which might need immediate revision in the event of peace being reached? I know that these conversations are secret, but it would be very helpful for Parliament to know whether the Cabinet considered these rapidly changing circumstances at the outset. Did it discuss the wisdom of proceeding with the agreement we now have? Were there reasons to do so? If so, what were they? Can the Minister explain whether there was a desire to rush things through and, if so, why? Did the Government take into account the implications for Britain’s international standing of making commitments to Ukraine under an international agreement parts of which were potentially unlikely to prove durable in the short or long term?
I turn to the economy and the economic implications of this agreement, on which our report has some things to say. One matter highlighted by the IAC report is the lack of detail on the potential economic implications. The Explanatory Memorandum is not short on aspiration. It says that the agreement
“provides a framework to build enduring links in support of the UK’s growth, development, and security objectives”.
That was confirmed by the Minister, to whom I am very grateful for being so generous with his time, coming along to discuss the Government’s position. Giving evidence, he said that his main priorities, beyond the immediate security of Ukraine, lay in the “growth and economic space” to build “business-to-business links” and investment, to create a “better climate” in Ukraine for UK investment and joint ventures.
Our report, however, addresses the articles on the economy and trade. Paragraph 44 refers to
“articles … which deal with economic and trade cooperation (Article 4), cooperation on energy and climate (Article 5) and on science, innovation and technology (Article 8)”.
Our committee stressed that
“there is a need for further work to ensure that the necessary legal and commercial architecture is in place to support these activities”.
Can the Minister tell us what steps are being taken, or have been taken, to ensure that the legal and commercial architecture needed is in place to support these activities, as the report asks in paragraph 44? What do the Government believe should be tackled exactly, and what would make things better?
I refer now to the three articles. Article 4 of the agreement, to summarise what we say in the report, requires that the parties strengthen conditions for investment and co-operation across a range of sectors. The report indicates that this will involve improving the use of the 2020 treaty and the digital trade agreement that came into force last September, which is for free trade, without duty,
“removing barriers to trade, establishing business-to-business partnerships and supporting the development of Ukraine’s financial centre and business environment through sustained … business access”.
The political declaration also
“proposes using UK Export Finance to support priority infrastructure and defence projects”,
such as building bridges in the capital, co-operating on food security and agricultural development, as well as co-operating to develop a database to verify grain shipments
“to identify grain theft by Russia”.
That is in paragraph 46 of the report.
The report outlines that Article 5 of the agreement says that
“the Parties will co-operate on clean energy transition”.
The suggestion in the political declaration is that there will be collaboration on renewables to attract UK investment, and it explores collaboration on low carbon and supporting critical minerals.
Article 8 refers to co-operation in the field of science, technology and innovation—and here the explanation in the political declaration is that this will involve
“developing capabilities in the use of critical technologies”
such as the digital infrastructure, communications and so on, building on Ukraine’s expertise in the area of AI activities, which the report records
“are to be supported … in the field of research and innovation … delivering ‘mutually beneficial’ joint programmes between commercial bodies, universities and research centres”.
That is all very aspirational. We have here a commitment on economic and trade co-operation that sounds very aspirational. If there is evidence that it will work, it is something that we would wholeheartedly support. However, our report stresses that a stable environment for mutually beneficial innovation and growth is contingent on good governance and the rule of law, as well as well-policed public procurement. Although the Minister’s reassurance that work on governance reforms and strengthening the rule of law was encouraging, more detail is needed on how the Government intend to continue the work and whether initiatives will depend on progress. Our report suggests that aid and co-operation under this should be subject to the strengthening of the rule of law and good governance, which is a recommendation that I strongly support and emphasise.
The partnership agreement raises a number of very serious questions, some of which have already been raised by the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Fox. I close by emphasising the questions about the economic and fiscal implications for the UK economy and for taxpayers who will foot the bill of government commitments; as well as for businesses that may be encouraged to invest in what so far seems to be a one-way agreement in which the UK gives and Ukraine takes, without there being in place the legal, economic and commercial structures to guarantee any return for those footing the bill and investing. Therefore, I probe further on the evidence for any benefits to the UK economically and fiscally.
Since 2022, the UK has given £12.8 billion to Ukraine, £7.8 billion of which is in military support since the invasion and £5 billion in non-military support. The political declaration indicates a further UK commitment of £3 billion a year in military aid until 2030-31 and for as “long as it takes”. That commitment was announced on 10 July last year. I echo the noble Lord, Lord Fox, in saying that this is a very significant commitment.
The political declaration also proposes using UK Export Finance to support priority infrastructure and defence projects. The Government explain that UK Export Finance has already committed £3.5 billion of financial support for critical reconstruction. This, we hear from the Government, has enabled bridges et cetera around the capital to be rebuilt and mine countermeasure vessels to be provided. What evidence is there that there will be a return from this finance to a war-torn country, which as yet does not have the basic legal, commercial and other building blocks in place for sound business, contracts and investment? In respect of UK Export Finance, the Government say quite clearly on their website that this finance will help businesses that could not get private sector money. I am concerned that there will be pressure by Ukraine and businesses to get hold of this UK Export Finance for projects that have not been considered sound by the commercial sector and that we will be indebting the country unnecessarily with projects that, as yet, have no evidence of any return.
I welcome the committee’s thorough examination of this treaty. Like it, I support the Government’s general aim and their proposals, but I am concerned about commitments made in a 100-year partnership that may not be able to be met. Indeed, they may not be able to be met because of circumstances beyond our control, not least the fluid and volatile situation.
Lord Marland (Con)
My Lords, I am disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, has scratched because he is a valuable member of our committee and always has plenty to say on this subject. However, he has chosen to do that and the Floor is therefore mine. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and the members of the committee who are here for the valuable contributions they make and, in particular, the officials who spend hours slaving over and listening to our every word—if indeed they do; they are probably asleep most of the time, but I want to thank them.
I fully endorse the Government’s position and the previous Government’s position on Ukraine, which was brave and showed real leadership. The current Government have done the same. I will leave the geopolitical aspects to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond, who understand these things far better than I do.
Let us face it: this is a poor treaty. The name gives it away: a 100-year agreement with Ukraine. Seriously? The evidence has found that there has been only a one-way agreement. There has been nothing for the benefit of British businesses in Ukraine. I found myself wondering why we were looking at this agreement at this time. Perhaps it was a trick carried out by civil servants before the Government got their feet under the desk properly. The very idea that it is a partnership when everything has been one way strikes me as utterly absurd and uncharacteristic. I am not going to repeat the various items in the tour de force by my noble friend Lady Lawlor, but will stick to a couple of points that she made and perhaps invite the Minister, who I hold in the highest regard, to respond to them.
The basic truth is, if this was about football teams, the score would be 12.8 billion to the Ukraine and nil to the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom taxpayer has suffered huge increases in energy prices as a result of this war. The UK has had to pay more for its grain and bread, and for its crops and harvests through the cost of fertiliser. We have to understand what the benefit is for the British taxpayer and the British citizen.
We read that, in return for their support, the Americans want a minerals deal, so perhaps the Minister could let us know what this Government’s policy is for creating a positive framework for British business, trade and involvement in the future of Ukraine. What practical steps will the Government take to ensure transparency and the reduction of bureaucracy so that there is a framework for British business? We all want the best for Ukraine but, at some point, we want the benefit for British business. We know that growth is at the heart of this new Government’s philosophy. Creating a framework where Britain can do business and trade with Ukraine properly can only be of benefit for that growth agenda.
Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)
My Lords, I am delighted to follow my good friend, the noble Lord, Lord Marland, and have this opportunity to make a small and relatively brief contribution to this debate. I do not have anything to add to the International Agreements Committee’s excellent observations on the agreement itself. I agree with the prevailing view expressed so far that the partnership agreement does not present any specific new obligations; there are no specific deliverables and there is no measurable or accountable substance to what is being offered.
I recognise that one of the principal purposes of the treaty is, therefore, purely its symbolic signalling of enduring support to Ukraine. However, I find this lack of definition in respect of deliverable substance somewhat disconcerting, especially in the area of hard and tangible military support. I say this because we are enjoying—if that is the right word—unusual levels of geopolitical uncertainty at the moment and it is very difficult to understand how our assessed national security policy objectives are being prioritised in order to inform the optimum use of the very welcome uplift in defence expenditure that the Government have recently announced.
To expand on this further, I offer at least six national policy objectives that are potentially vying for military resources at the moment. The first, obviously, is the need to make our national contribution to re-establishing conventional deterrence against Russian expansion in Europe. I say this in the context of our extremely poor national record of meeting our NATO targets over the last 15 to 20 years. The second is the need to enhance the resilience of our own domestic critical national infrastructure against conventional and increasingly hybrid threats. The third is the need to support Ukraine either in continuing to fight Russia or, in the context of a potential ceasefire, to enhance rapidly its fighting power and deterrent capability.
The fourth is the potential requirement to lead and significantly contribute to an enduring operation to oversee a potential ceasefire agreement in Ukraine—the nature, demands and risks of which are yet far from clear. The fifth is the emerging requirement to refashion the delivery of European security in the context of the United States of America withdrawing its security guarantees to Europe. The sixth is something of a catch-all: to meet whatever residual global security role the Government believe we should retain the national capacity to fulfil. I include in this such diverse commitments as the security of the overseas territories, South Korea, AUKUS, the evacuation of citizens from danger overseas and so on.
I fear that we face at least two significant challenges in meeting the demands of these six potential policy requirements. First, we simply cannot meet them in the context of any current projection of defence expenditure, so we have to prioritise. The second is the hard reality that the capability demands of each policy requirement are to some extent either marginally or completely different. The choices to be made are not so much ones of where to use capability as what capabilities we invest in to optimise the reduction of strategic security risks.
I suggest that, as of today, the policy decision over which we have the least control—the one that is infinitely the most worrying and would result in the most expensive capability deficiencies—would be the removal of the current US security guarantees to Europe. This scenario underpins my concern about entering into partnership agreements with countries without being absolutely clear about the defined extent of our military commitment. I would extend my concern to the need to be even more careful about committing forces to a ceasefire monitoring role without an absolutely clear understanding of the associated risk, and in the context of a partner to that ceasefire that is now proven to be wholly malevolent—in this case, Russia.
In closing, will the work of the strategic defence review, which feels increasingly overdue, provide the capability recommendations needed to meet these various policy objectives? What priority is being applied to them? Does the Minister share my concern that the affordability considerations might result in the need to take intolerable risk?
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
My Lords, I, too, thank the committee for its report and thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for his masterly introduction of it. I cannot live up to the advance billing that I was generously given by the noble Lord, Lord Marland, I am afraid.
I do not intend to say very much but I would like to comment on the slightly mechanistic, transactional view of UK interest that I derived from the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, and the noble Lord, Lord Marland. Fifty years ago, if you travelled in Spain and someone wanted to wish you good luck, they would wish you war in Crimea, because war in Crimea blocked the grain exports from the breadbasket of Europe—it is now called Ukraine—and raised the price of grain in rural Spain, thus making rural Spain prosperous. Ukraine is a phenomenally rich country, potentially. Its mineral wealth is largely concentrated in the Donbass. The President of the United States may not have noticed that, actually, it is in the bits he seems content to see given away, rather than in the north or the centre. Its agricultural land is the best in Europe for cereals—except, possibly, that of East Anglia and the San Juan Basin. So investment in Ukraine’s stability is investment in the future. It is a bit transactional to score it—12, was it?
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
It is an investment in both liberty and the values in which we believe. It is also, if you want to look at it transactionally, an investment in a potentially strong economic partner for the United Kingdom.
I strongly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that the title of this treaty is a little pretentious. I can think of only one precedent for as hubristic a title of a treaty signed by Brits. In 1809, the East India Company signed a treaty of perpetual friendship with Ranjit Singh, the then leader of the Sikh community in India. Neither the East India Company nor the separate Sikh state survived 100 years after their perpetual friendship treaty. I also agree with those who say that the content of the treaty is a little thin, but it is very important that, unlike the East India Company and the Sikh state in India, Ukraine should survive. It is important to both our security and the security of all of Europe.
I would like to make one macro point and one micro point. My macro point is that Putin says that Ukraine is not a legitimate state; that, therefore, its national sovereignty cannot exist; and that it is Moscow’s mission to obliterate it. We should take him at his word. He would not be satisfied with a settlement that gave him the Donbass. I think that the correct analogy for today is 1938. At Munich, Hitler got one-third; six months later, he was back for the other two-thirds. He was not satisfied then, and I do not believe Putin would be satisfied now. Hitler came back for Poland nine months later; the Poles, the Finns and the Baltic states are quite right to be worried now. So, despite the thinness of the content and the hubris of the title, I welcome the treaty as an additional confidence-building measure for the Ukrainians and a framework for future co-operation with us. All the detail still has to be filled in, but that is a job worth doing. It is strongly in our interest.
My micro point is about the preambular reference in the treaty to the
“United Kingdom being dedicated to supporting Ukraine’s irreversible path to NATO membership”.
“Irreversible” is quite a strong word. I was not altogether sure of the wisdom of NATO’s 2008 offer of membership to Ukraine and Georgia—nor, indeed, of the Vilnius 2023 or Washington 2024 language, which introduced the concept of irreversibility—but it is out there now and President Zelensky will no doubt want it repeated at the June NATO summit. Given President Trump’s clear scepticism—I use no stronger word—about Ukraine’s NATO membership, pressing for it at the NATO summit would be all too likely to lead him to denounce it, so disproving irreversibility at a stroke.
The drafting of the report’s paragraph 28 is a little obscure—particularly the last sentence—but paragraph 29 is judiciously silent on irreversibility. I hope that the Government are following its example and advising President Zelensky that the least said about irreversibility at the NATO summit, the better: no repetition, no denunciation. Let the summit instead concentrate on the immediate and manifest need for Europe to up its game, spending more on defence and spending it better; building up its support for Ukraine; and ensuring that the United States does not withdraw its support. If you want peace, prepare for war.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My Lords, I add my thanks and congratulations to the committee. I have said previously, when we have debated reports from the International Agreements Committee, that I believe it is the most significant of all the committees of this House. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Swansea, said, no other committee in either House would have studied such an agreement and come up with a constructive report. That fact gives testimony to the work of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, his colleagues on the committee and the committee staff, who managed to communicate in very clear language and to report on what can well be very detailed treaties. This is not one of them when it comes to detail but, nevertheless, the consequences are considerable.
I saw that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, was to speak before me and knew that he would have looked back, with his diplomatic experience, at previous times when we have signed treaties of friendship or perpetual amity. I found ones with regard to our treaty of friendship with Tonga in the 1950s and a treaty of peace, friendship and commerce with Costa Rica in the 1850s; there have been others. Most of our treaties of friendship or perpetual relationship have the common characteristics of being one-sided friendships—in the interests of Britain—and of not having a duration of perpetuity. One of note is the Treaty of Perpetual Peace between England and Scotland of 1502; it fell short of perpetuity because 11 years later, in 1513, there was the bloodiest battle between England and Scotland not far from where I live in the Borders.
So, on one look at it, 100 years is a relatively modest period given what has been signed with regards to aims for perpetual relationships between countries, but, as my noble friend Lord Fox pointed out, the committee noted that
“the value of this Agreement appears to lie primarily in its signalling function”,
with little detail of substance. Given that, as my noble friend said, it can be ended with six months’ notice by each party, the century-long lasting partnership may be somewhat illusory. However, the question we have to face is whether the signalling is of importance in its own merit, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said; I will close with my own remarks about that.
The committee asked us to move on from the perhaps “meaningless” title and not to be distracted from the substance. We have had a good debate on the substance of it so far. It is also worth noting that, although this is a bilateral treaty, Ministers have been at pains to say to me at the Dispatch Box that we are working hand in glove with the United States on our Ukraine policy. It is worth considering that, as we debate a UK agreement for 100 years, our main and apparent ally, the United States, barely has a Ukraine policy that lasts 100 hours. Therefore, our ability to see through the unpredictable nature of the Trump Administration—to put it at its kindest—presents us with challenges. As members of the committee have noted, the political landscape has changed even from the time when it was agreed and when the committee took evidence on it. All that said, there is merit in the substance of what is included in the pillars and the articles of co-operation on defence, industrial capabilities, joint production, procurement and transferring technologies.
I will now ask the Minister my first question on transferring technologies. In principle, the UK-Ukrainian relationship could well be developed in a deep way where we have no qualms about the transfer of technologies from Ukraine to the UK and from the UK to Ukraine. However, given the fluidity of the situation—we are still in a conflict and we do not know, if there is a ceasefire, what the terms of peace may be—there is a degree of uncertainty when it comes to protecting UK intellectual property in some regards.
Just 10 years ago, I was in the Maidan in Kyiv, where the buildings were still charred after the peaceful Maidan revolution—the orange revolution. The previous Ukrainian president had fled to Russia with a lot of his people’s money and with the oligarchs who own much of the industrial complex of Ukraine around him. So, if we are to have a deep commercial relationship with much of the private sector in Ukraine, are there any guard-rails when it comes to how we monitor how that will be taken forward?
I am very pleased that we are committed to supporting the liberal democratic leadership of President Zelensky; he leads one of our sister parties in Kyiv. I hope that our defence industrial strategy will have more detail on how the operation and transparency of the relationship will go forward. We can only hope that there will be a sustainability of liberal democratic leadership in the country. That is why they are fighting, and they are sacrificing their lives for it. But given that this is a 100-year timeframe, more detail on how we can see this operating would be beneficial. I hope that, as we are anticipating the Government’s defence industrial strategy, we will have more details in that.
That said, I am in awe of the resilience of the members of the Ukrainian Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, a democratic parliament that is still functioning in incredibly difficult circumstances. They are still carrying out parliamentary functions long after they were due to be either assassinated or held hostage by Putin’s regime in the first 48 hours of the Russian attack. They are a testimony to every country in the world when it comes to how a parliamentary system should operate in incredibly difficult circumstances.
Therefore, I was repulsed by President Trump declaring that Ukraine started this conflict and repelled by JD Vance when he ignored the UK personnel, who have paid with many of their lives, alongside US allies in conflicts over the last 30 years. I will say to the Minister that I wish our Government had condemned the US envoy for Ukraine; he demeaned the work of our Prime Minister, who is working with a coalition of the willing and allies in support for Ukraine. Given the suspension and re-establishment of US military intelligence support—the kind of support that was used so deftly by President Biden and Secretary Blinken and which, probably more than anything else, thwarted the success of the Russian attack in the first few days—how reliable is the United States as a partner when we embark on our first elements of this 100-year partnership?
As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, indicated regarding the irreversible nature of NATO membership, in this agreement we are committed to the interoperability of capabilities with Ukraine. How valid will that be if the United States is a reluctant partner—not just a reluctant one, but potentially a blocking one? Will it be problematic for the defence co-operation partnership if the United States becomes an obstructive element to it? In this context, paragraphs 34 and 43 of the report have great significance; they ask for an update to be provided to Parliament if there is either a ceasefire or some form of agreement for peace. A full parliamentary debate on when we receive this would be welcome.
The committee was right to call for more practical information on the type of the economic and commercial relationship, which has also been raised in this debate. If the sum of the agreement is simply going to be the promotion of economic co-operation, we should see more information about what joint delivery vehicles there will be for that. Is it the Government’s intention that there will be shared capital investment? Will there be UK-Ukrainian entities to deliver some of the infrastructure, which the Government have said is one of their priorities? How do the Government anticipate these operating in practice?
Is it the Government’s intent that we will move from the continuity agreement that we already have with Ukraine, from 2020—which this Parliament approved as part of the legacy of the European Union relationship —towards a comprehensive deep and free trade agreement with Ukraine? One reason why I ask that is that, having looked again at the continuity agreement of 2020, I notice that there are some suspicious areas where the language is the same. If the purpose of this agreement was to build on the continuity agreement, take it to the next stage and develop it, then cutting and pasting is not the way to do it. I simply refer to Article 10, with regard to migration co-operation and support, which uses the same language as Article 15 of the continuity agreement of 2020. What does it mean if we are moving ahead in a more comprehensive way, if we are simply restating the continuity agreement that we had previously with the European Union?
This leads on to the second question on working with our European allies. Are there any parts of the agreement that are exclusive? I do not think that the UK alone will seek agreements for the reconstruction of Ukraine—for infrastructure, technology and research and development. The European Union and European partners are well developed in those relationships. Are any of these elements in any of these pillars anticipated to be uniquely UK-Ukrainian elements, or will they all be part of working with our allies? Unless there is a degree of exclusivity, I am not certain why this particular agreement for 100 years is any different from a commercial relationship where the UK could be part of consortia with other European partners.
Little is said about the situation that we may well face: the growing of trade that starts from an incredibly low base. With the greatest respect, if I had to choose between the perspectives of the noble Lords, Lord Marland and Lord Kerr, with regards to the investment opportunity, on balance I would settle with that of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. But, in 2019, when building on trade in a peaceful situation, total UK exports were just £0.7 billion, or 0.1% of all exports; Ukraine was 71st in the list of our export partners. If we are to see rapid growth of UK economic partnership in reconstruction, rather than out of peace, there needs to be more detail about how it will be driven forward, rather than it being simply aspirational.
I wish to ask one further question and make an appeal to the Minister. The question relates to what the committee considered on the impunity and aggression of Russia. I commend the Government on continuing support for seeking justice for the crimes committed by the Putin regime, and I commend them on moving ahead on seeking penalties under the crime of aggression—but these are two areas where the United States is now a block. The United States believes that there was no aggression and has halted evidence-gathering for the very type of justice that we want to see. Is the UK committed to continuing to do this alone, if the United States is seeking to be a block?
Finally, we will most likely be in a situation where there will be an ongoing debate about whether Russia or Ukraine has lost or won. Indeed, there will be lots of academic debate about the definitions of not losing compared to not winning. We may well be in a situation of both sides not losing and not winning. However, what does a type of victory look like, when there is security but also sustainable reconstruction? Ukraine has reliable allies and many of the developing economies in the wider region, and the Middle East and Africa, see Ukraine as a success story for reconstruction to partner with—but they are also not drawn within the sphere of influence of the Putin regime.
My final appeal before I close is that it is not too late for the Government to reverse their decision to slash overseas development partnership dramatically. If there is any lesson from the war in Ukraine, it is that the consequences have been far wider than simply the territorial border of that country. Given the impact on developing economies in the wider region, including neighbouring countries such as Moldova, which continue to see Russian interference attempts, cutting back on UK technical assistance for resilience against Russia and development partnership unfortunately sets us in a narrative that makes us more like the Trump and Putin regimes rather than the Zelensky and Verkhovna Rada regime. Ultimately, I hope that this proposal will be a success, but more detail and more development partnership will be required.
Lord Callanan (Con)
My Lords, I too pay tribute to the International Agreements Committee and its work examining this treaty. It is right that it has an impressive amount of detail, probably more detail than the treaty actually requires, but it is nevertheless important work and it was ably introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, whom I thank for that.
The decision by the Government to enter into this partnership with Ukraine further demonstrates the strength of the relationship between our two countries. I understand the comments from many noble Lords about the nature of a 100-year partnership and the many examples that have been quoted. Who knows whether the borders will still stay the same in six months or 100 days never mind 100 years? I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that it is a little bit pretentious and probably symbolic, but my view is that it is importantly symbolic. Ukraine stands for the shared principles that underpin our whole way of life—democracy, liberty and the rule of law—and it is right that we support our ally in the fight against Putin’s illegal invasion of its sovereign territory.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, about the capricious nature of the current US Administration. We hope only that there is a change either in the attitude of the current leadership or in new leadership to restore the US to the right side of the fence on this issue. I am proud that the UK’s world-leading support has made a material difference, which has been acknowledged by so many Ukrainian interlocutors, to Ukraine’s capacity to combat this invasion. I am proud of the work that the previous Government did, and I am also proud of and support the work that this Government are doing. The UK was the first to provide Ukraine with vital lethal aid, such as Challenger 2 battle tanks and Storm Shadow missiles, and this Government have, to their credit, remained committed to supporting Ukraine with arms, as reflected in the announcement to provide it with Altius drones in conjunction with many excellent British defence companies.
I also welcome the UK Government’s commitment to spend 2.5% of GDP on defence by 2027. It is right that in a world of increasing uncertainty Ukraine can continue to count on British support. That is a valuable feature of our democratic system, and all three main parties that have supported Ukraine deserve our thanks and our support.
I also support the commitment to reach 3% by the mid-2030s, in the light of what we all recognise are uniquely dangerous and challenging times on the world stage. I think it is perhaps too late, but I understand the financial pressures on the Government. I certainly hope that they will look towards accelerating to reach that 3% target by the end of this decade, although I know that that is challenging in current circumstances. Translating words into action should not be subject to delay. Will the Minister say what discussions the Government have had with regard to possibly meeting this commitment by the end of the 2020s? We can support our allies effectively only if we make spending decisions responsibly, and it is imperative that these spending commitments should be based on growing the economy and spending restraint in other areas.
In addition to marking the UK’s long-term support for Ukraine, this 100-year partnership agreement, as many noble Lords have pointed out, offers British firms the chance to contribute to the Ukrainian war effort. Can the Minister provide any update on the discussions the Government have had so far with UK defence companies regarding ways in which they can help to advance and enhance Ukraine’s manufacturing capabilities—helping them to help themselves? Can he elaborate on what specific advanced weapons capabilities the UK and Ukraine might work together to develop?
It is vital that the Euro-Atlantic community continues to be intensely robust in the face of this completely unjustified Russian aggression. The lesson that we have surely now learned over the past 20 years, to our cost, is clear: Putin only comes back for more. The Minsk agreements of 2015 failed to stop Russian aggression and ultimately did not return any of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Any peace must fully protect Ukraine’s sovereignty, and I very much suspect that it can be done only with military support. Can the Minister confirm that it is with this resolve and commitment that the Government engage with allies on the subject of the mooted ceasefire?
I know that noble Lords across the Committee will have noted the talks due to be held tomorrow with allies including the US, France, Germany and Ukraine itself. I hope the US proves to be an ally in this respect. Will the Minister be able to keep the House updated on the outcome and progress of those discussions? Finally, can he provide us with any updates on the assessment the Government have made about the ongoing reliability of US support and the steps that the UK and European partners are making to ensure that any change in US objectives does not undermine overall support for Ukraine?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Lord Collins of Highbury) (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for introducing this debate. I pay tribute to his work on the International Agreements Committee, and to the other committee members who have contributed to this afternoon’s debate—my noble friend Lord Anderson, the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, and the noble Lord, Lord Marland.
I absolutely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Callanan —not for the first time—that this is an example of all three major parties being absolutely committed to support for Ukraine. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, summed it up: this is about our collective security. Our response has to be on that basis. This is not simply about defending a country that has been illegally invaded. It is fundamentally, as the Prime Minister made clear in his statement about defence spending, a generational change. The strategic defence review will address all the issues that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, has raised. I will not go into the details of it, because I do not know them yet, but I am sure that when the report is finally published we will be able to have detailed scrutiny on how we will be able to respond to this threat. It is absolutely about our collective security.
The 100-year partnership agreement and political declaration signed by the Prime Minister and President Zelensky is a signal of long-term commitment to Ukraine. I hear my noble friend Lord Anderson and other members of the Committee on this timescale—but sending a clear signal to the world that we are in this for the long run and that our commitment is generational, far beyond the end of hostilities, is important. That is a clear, important signal.
The agreement focuses on shared interests and a common vision with three main aims: to enhance military and security capabilities in order to counter future attacks; to strengthen Ukraine’s economic development, reform, resilience and growth, benefiting both Ukraine and the United Kingdom; and to deepen UK support for Ukraine’s shift to the West through partnerships in education, health, justice and culture. I assure the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, and others that the agreement builds on existing co-operation in areas such as military and fiscal support, recovery, reform and humanitarian programmes. It reaffirms the UK’s ironclad support for Ukraine and respects Ukraine’s request to make the document legally binding.
Many noble Lords have expressed concern about the lack of a road map. Clearly, a road map for a 100-year agreement is difficult to predict. On the one hand, we want to show a clear signal of long-term commitment; on the other hand, we know that we must respond to shifting tides of technology, culture and economics. That is why there is greater emphasis on these issues in the political declaration supporting the treaty’s implementation, with commitments reflecting current realities, for example, to co-operate on demining, green steel production, stronger health systems and more. The whole of government is working to drive these initiatives forward and show early results. However, many objectives will be realised over a long timeframe, with Article 11—I do not say this as a criticism; it is a positive thing—providing flexibility for review as needed.
Noble Lords have raised the question of maritime. Black Sea security is, of course, crucial for Ukraine and the United Kingdom. Much Ukrainian trade, including 90% of its pre-war agricultural exports—the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, referred to this—went through this route. The war has disrupted these exports, causing food prices here and around the world to shoot up. As Minister for Africa, I know the impact that this has had on food security in that region.
We are taking forward the commitments under the maritime pillar of the agreement. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, referred to the letter from my honourable friend Minister Doughty of 25 March. I will not go through all the details in it because the committee has seen it and responded to it. The capability coalition, co-led by the United Kingdom and Norway, is delivering boats, landing craft, drones, outboard engines and short-range air defence to Ukraine. We will deepen co-operation with Ukraine’s maritime force to secure naval routes further.
Besides military support, the United Kingdom will work more closely with Ukraine on overall security. This includes fighting hybrid threats, such as foreign information manipulation and interference, through co-operation between institutions. We have regular discussions to track threats and responses, share research and deepen links between experts in order better to understand Russia’s malign activities. We are also supporting the Ukrainian Government to act against harmful networks.
I remind the noble Lords, Lord Marland and Lord Purvis, that the 100-year partnership agreement builds on the strategic partnership agreement of 2020 to enhance trade and investment in Ukraine. It focuses on sectors such as energy, defence and infrastructure—this was highlighted in my honourable friend Minister Doughty’s letter—by improving governance, financial systems and anti-corruption measures. These are vital components to delivering the growth that we expect. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, that this will attract global capital and create opportunities for UK businesses. As part of this, we are supporting public procurement reforms in Ukraine to improve market access for United Kingdom businesses and aid Ukraine’s reconstruction. Our trade mission programme is fostering international business relationships and opening new markets for United Kingdom companies.
Again, to reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, and the noble Lord, Lord Marland—and to address the specific question of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan— I note that the partnership is already strengthening economic ties. For example, on 2 March, the Prime Minister announced a £1.6 billion order for a Thales missile factory in Belfast to supply 5,000 air defence missiles to Ukraine, supporting British jobs. The agreement will also enable UK businesses to support Ukraine’s reconstruction, estimated to cost £524 billion over the next decade. The Department for Business and Trade cochairs an infrastructure task force, with Ukrainian Ministers supporting UK industry involvement in Ukraine’s reconstruction, benefiting both Ukraine’s recovery and United Kingdom growth.
The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, mentioned something that I hold dear to my heart too: accountability. Ukraine wants those responsible for terrible atrocities in Ukraine to be held accountable. We are supporting Ukraine’s prosecutor-general and the International Criminal Court to ensure that this happens. Last month, we agreed on the legal details to set up a special tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine. We are working closely with Ukraine and the Council of Europe to move this forward. We are also trying to create an international mechanism to secure compensation from Russia for the damage caused by the war.
The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked about ODA cuts. The Prime Minister made clear in his announcement his commitment to increase spending on defence to 2.5% from 27 April. This increase will be funded by reducing ODA from 0.5% to 0.3%. As I have repeated to the noble Lord before, the impact on specific programmes is being worked through, following this decision, but I have reassured noble Lords that Ukraine remains a priority.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and other noble Lords that we are absolutely committed to securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine and engaging with key allies in support of this effort. The ball is now in Russia’s court: President Putin must prove that he is serious about peace and sign up to the ceasefire on equal terms.
I again reassure the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that, on Wednesday, the Foreign Secretary is bringing together the United States, Ukrainian and European Foreign Ministers and national security advisers to discuss next steps, including what a ceasefire might look like and how we might make sure that any peace leaves Ukraine secure for the long term. The Kremlin’s dithering and delay over President Trump’s ceasefire proposal and Russia’s continued barbaric attacks on Ukraine run entirely counter to President Putin’s stated desire for peace.
The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, mentioned the 2008 NATO commitment to ensure that the NATO alliance has made a long-term commitment to Ukraine that is on an irreversible path to membership, and we stand by that. But I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, is repeating advice I have often given: it is often better not to ask a question you do not know the answer to.
The important thing is to build a strong consensus among all our allies about how we can build a consensus, rather than focus on areas of potential disagreement. When, how and on what terms this war comes to an end can be decided only by negotiations with Ukraine at the heart of them. Our focus until then is on ensuring that Ukraine is in the strongest possible position. Certainly, President Putin must stop delaying and playing games, and he must agree to a full and immediate ceasefire without conditions, as Ukraine has done.
I conclude by reflecting that, for centuries, this House has witnessed passionate debates during pivotal moments in our nation’s history and, no doubt, 100 years from now, Peers will celebrate the enduring Ukraine-UK relationship, forged in the fight for liberty, sovereignty and democracy. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said, it is about our values, and that is why it will endure. Our friendship is deep, and the United Kingdom will always stand with Ukraine—today, as we strive for peace, justice and accountability, and in the years to come, as our countries work together to build a much more secure and prosperous future. Slava Ukraini.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, this has been an important and valuable debate. I thank all noble Lords who have spoken and the Minister for his considered response. I will not try to summarise the debate, but I will make a few comments and points on it—perhaps abusing my position here. Noble Lords not on the committee may have detected the varying tones of its members, which speak to the challenge not just of chairing the sessions but of writing the report. You get a sense of that balance from the committee report, which was highlighted by some of the comments today.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Swansea, rightly pointed out the gaps in the CRaG process. Were it not for this report and the Government extending the deadline for us to have this debate, there would have been absolutely no parliamentary scrutiny of this at all. Frankly, a treaty or agreement of this nature should have more, not less. Those noble Lords not on the committee will be interested to know that the CRaG process itself is the subject of its latest inquiry.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, raised some important questions about Ukraine’s future relationship with NATO and the EU, which also came up later. This is a big issue. We talked a lot about NATO, but Ukraine’s potential EU relationship may be even more important because it may be more tangible. It will be interesting to see how the United Kingdom contributes to that, given our position outwith the EU.
The noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, and, to some extent, the noble Lord, Lord Marland, set out a number of concerns around how this will go forward, which points to what I raised earlier. Many of those concerns might have been dealt with had there been more detail. I understand the Minister’s dilemma in setting out detail for 100 years, but he could have started with the first two years, or perhaps three, of that 100, and set out some milestones. There is still time for the Government to look at that and come back to Parliament to explain how we are taking this forward piece by piece. If we dissect elements of the Minister’s speech, there were milestones in it. Frankly, if they had been made available in a more palatable way when we were considering the report, some of those reservations might have been less strident.
The noble Lord, Lord Marland, raised the issue of a critical minerals deal. That was spectacular by its absence in the evidence, the debate and otherwise, given the high-profile nature of this, so it remains something of an enigma. Again, there is more work to be done on how that fits into the overall frame.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond, gave a tremendous strategic overview. I suggested that the strategic review had a lot of ground to cover, and I think the noble and gallant Lord really gave a sense of the huge nature of the challenge that this country, the defence establishment and the Government have to cover at least some of his six pillars, if not all of them. We absolutely need the strategic defence review, and the military industrial strategy that follows it, because we have to understand how we are going to move forward. Time is not on our side.
The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, clearly paid attention in his geography lesson back in the day, when he was looking at the industrial capabilities of Ukraine. It was helpful to pull us back to look at the economic value that Ukraine can generate. If there is a strong partnership, those partners will benefit from the economic power. However, I think the noble Lord’s warnings about Putin’s ambitions were starker. We should all take that seriously, and I do not think any of us trust what is going on. We must be vigilant and not start pulling back. With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I do not think we should start ticking off things that should not be in a peace agreement; everything has to be on the table at this point, rather than saying, “not Ukraine” or “not this or that”. We have to be firm now because—as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, pointed out—in the mind of Putin, some territory will not be sufficient until it is all territory. I do not think we should pander to that.
My noble friend Lord Purvis made one of his characteristic speeches, and the history lesson was important. However, I pull out of it his reminder that we need commercial guard-rails. The report is very clear, some of your Lordships were clear and I was clear that a commercial environment is needed where British companies can safely go and collaborate with Ukrainian ones and not be fearful of their IP, money or other commercial things being stolen. If this partnership does nothing else but drive that business culture into Ukraine, it will have been a resounding success, so I endorse that.
My noble friend Lord Purvis also raised the exclusivity, or otherwise, of this agreement. I think we have to assume it is not exclusive so, in some sense, what we get back will be a function of what we put in and the way we do it. He suggested that other countries will be circling, and I add to his observation that Turkey has very strong hopes on the reconstruction contracts that will come out of Ukraine eventually. They are positioning themselves very meaningfully.
The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is clearly very supportive of the current policies and where we are going forward, as are the Liberal Democrats. The unanimity in the approach to this is an important part of your Lordships’ House. I observe somewhat wryly that it is easier to be a hawk on the defence budget when you are on His Majesty’s loyal Opposition Benches than when you are on the other side of the Chamber.
As I said, the Minister gave a strong speech; if we pick out the bones, we have got quite a lot of detail of what we asked for. He did not speak to coming back to Parliament as matters change. I am sure, however, that the Minister meant to commit to that. I am also sure, without speaking for the committee, that in the event of things happening, we will be chivvying for the opportunity to come back to that.
The Minister framed this as collective security and shared interests, and that is the strength of this. Putting aside the hubris of the 100 years in the treaty title, I can understand how it sends a signal. Sometimes I think that people have to look past that at the practical and look at the next two, three, four or five years on the way to 100. However, I think we all agree that keeping Ukraine strong has to be a priority, because it is only from a position of strength, or relative strength, that we can move in the right direction.
In closing, I thank fellow members of the committee, the secretariat of the International Agreements Committee, our expert advisers and all those who gave evidence in the short time we had available. Once again, I thank all contributors to this debate, and I beg to move.