Southport Attack

Thursday 6th February 2025 Lords Chamber

Statement

The following Statement was made in the House of Commons on Wednesday 5 February.

“With permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will make a Statement updating the House on the Government’s response to the Southport murders.

The attack in Southport in July last year was one of the most appalling and barbaric crimes committed in this country. For young children and adults to be attacked in this way, and three young girls killed, is utterly heartbreaking. The Home Secretary and I would like to thank those people who showed great bravery in attempting to stop the attack. For this foul act of violence to happen while children were enjoying themselves at a dance class at the beginning of the school holidays is beyond comprehension. Our thoughts and prayers are with the families of the three girls, and with all those injured as they continue to live with the trauma of that dark day. No one should have to go through what they have, and we are steadfast in our commitment to ensuring that they get every possible support.

Responsibility for this abhorrent attack lies with the perpetrator. Axel Rudakubana has been sentenced to life imprisonment. He will serve a minimum of 52 years in prison, and Mr Justice Goose said it is highly likely that he will never be released. When the Home Secretary addressed the House on this case last month, she outlined the multiple interactions that the perpetrator had with state bodies in the years before the attack. Those included police, social services and mental health services. There are serious questions about how various agencies failed to identify and collectively act on the warning signs. All those questions must be answered—we owe that to the families who deserve the truth about what went wrong. That is why the Government are committed to understanding and addressing the failings in this tragic case through a comprehensive public inquiry. It will examine the issues raised in this case, but also wider challenges around rising youth violence. We are moving swiftly to set up the inquiry. We will consult the families to ensure that all critical issues are addressed, while remaining sensitive to the needs of those most affected. We expect to announce further details about the inquiry next month.

Although we do not pre-empt the conclusions of the inquiry, there are areas where action can and must be progressed immediately. Prevent is a vital part of our counterterrorism system. We must endeavour to identify those susceptible to radicalisation early and before they go on to commit terrorist acts. Prevent receives nearly 7,000 referrals every year, and our hard-working front-line staff have supported nearly 5,000 people away from terrorism since 2015. We must get Prevent right. That is why the Home Office and counterterrorism policing commissioned a rapid Prevent learning review immediately after the attack. These are usually internal technical reviews intended to identify swift learning and improvement for Prevent. However, the importance of the families needing answers has meant that today, following close engagement with them, we are taking the unusual step of publishing the Prevent learning review.

I can update the House that the perpetrator was referred to Prevent three times between December 2019, when he was aged 13, and April 2021, when he was 14. Those referrals were made by his schools. The first referral reported concerns about him carrying a knife and searching for school shootings on the internet. The second referral was focused on his online activity relating to Libya and Gaddafi. His third referral was for searching for London bombings, the IRA and the Israel-Palestine conflict.

On each of those occasions, the decision at the time was that the perpetrator should not progress to the Channel multi-agency process, but the Prevent learning review found that there was sufficient risk for the perpetrator to have been managed through Prevent. It found that the referral was closed prematurely and that there was sufficient concern to keep the case active while further information was collected.

The review is clear on the concerning behaviours that the perpetrator demonstrated. It highlights his interest in the Manchester Arena attack and that he talked about stabbing people, and it flags that some of the grievances that could have been a motivation were not fully considered. The review also highlights the perpetrator’s clear vulnerabilities and complex needs, which may have made him more susceptible to being drawn into terrorism.

The review concluded that too much focus was placed on the absence of a distinct ideology, to the detriment of considering the perpetrator’s susceptibility, grievances and complex needs. There was an underexploration of the significance of his repeat referrals and the cumulative risk, including his history of violence. There were potentially incomplete lines of inquiry. At the time, the perpetrator could have fallen into a mixed, unclear or unstable category for Channel, due to his potential interest in mass violence. Indeed, the overall conclusion of the review is that he should have been case-managed through the Channel multi-agency process, rather than closed to Prevent. That would have enabled co-ordinated multi-agency risk management and support.

The Prevent learning review made 14 recommendations for improvements to Prevent. We have accepted those findings and rapid action has been taken to implement the recommendations. Counterterrorism policing has conducted in-depth assurance visits to every region to determine whether the issues identified in this case have been resolved by operational improvements made since 2021. Urgent work is under way to address the findings.

The Prevent assessment framework was launched in September and is now in place across all regions. It was developed by experts and is being used to triage and risk-assess all Prevent referrals. It will improve decision-making at all stages of the Prevent system. Rollout of this tool has been accompanied by rigorous mandatory training. We have begun an end-to-end review of Prevent thresholds to ensure that Prevent can deal with the full range of threats we see today, from Islamist extremism, which is the most significant terrorist threat the UK faces, through to the fascination with mass violence we saw in the Southport case. This internal review will complete in April and further strengthen the approach to repeat referrals and ensure that clear policy, guidance and training are in place.

We have completed the first stage of a policy review into how Prevent supports referrals who have mental ill-health or are neurodivergent. Actions for improving the operational approach have been identified and will be implemented swiftly, with oversight from the new Prevent commissioner. We are also strengthening our approach to the oversight of referrals that do not meet Prevent thresholds to make sure that people receive the right support. Next week, a pilot starts in several local areas to test new approaches to cases that are transferred to other services.

The Government have appointed the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, as interim Prevent commissioner. This is the first time in its history that Prevent will have dedicated independent oversight. That will help ensure that Prevent is always held to the highest standards. The first task of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is to review the perpetrator’s Prevent history, drawing on the Prevent learning review. That will identify whether there is further learning, examine improvements made to Prevent since 2021 and identify any remaining gaps that require further improvement. He will complete the review within his term as interim commissioner, which will end with the appointment of a permanent commissioner this summer.

However, it is simply not enough to focus only on this case. We need to take an even more robust approach to identifying learning swiftly and driving that learning through the Prevent system. The Prevent commissioner will be tasked with overseeing a new approach to Prevent learning reviews that enables rapid debriefing and urgent action after incidents, but also that provides a clear framework that binds other agencies into the joint learning process. Transparency and enabling public scrutiny are also fundamental. That is why we will take steps to publish the findings of other independent Prevent learning reviews where there has been an incident of national significance. Next week, we will publish the Prevent learning review into the appalling attack on Sir David Amess, to enable further public scrutiny of this important programme.

The first duty of government is to ensure the security of our country and the safety of our people, because nothing matters more. While we can never undo the hurt and pain caused by this unthinkably wretched attack, we can, we must and we will do everything in our power to prevent further atrocities. As the Prime Minister said, Southport must be

‘a line in the sand’

for our country. If that means asking difficult questions about shortcomings or failures, so be it. If it means holding institutions and processes to account, we will do so without fear or favour. If changes are required to protect the public and combat the threats we face, this Government will not hesitate to act. I commend this Statement to the House”.

12:25

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing this Statement to your Lordships’ House. I reiterate the shadow Home Secretary’s message in the House of Commons. He said that we must keep in our thoughts and prayers the innocent victims of this despicable act: Bebe King, just six years old; Elsie Dot Stancombe, who was seven; and Alice da Silva Aguiar, who was only nine. Their lives were cruelly and senselessly cut short while attending a Taylor Swift dance class. I know all Members of this House will once again wish to extend their deepest condolences to their families and honour the memory of these young children, whose futures were stolen from them.

This tragedy underscores the necessity of a robust and transparent investigation to ensure that lessons are learned and that no stone is left unturned in holding accountable those responsible for any failures that may have contributed to this heinous act. I welcome the inquiry announced by the Home Secretary a couple of weeks ago and note the Security Minister’s confirmation in the other place that it will begin on a non-statutory footing but transition to a statutory footing. Does the Minister have any information about the timeline for this transition? Can he assure the House that this inquiry will be given the necessary resources and authority to investigate thoroughly? Furthermore, does he agree that it is vital for this House to be kept regularly informed about the inquiry’s progress and findings, transparency being essential to restore public confidence?

I am also pleased to hear that the Prevent thresholds are being reviewed. The lessons learned review highlighted several critical areas for further investigation, particularly the apparent mismatch between the focus of Prevent referrals and the actual threat landscape. Does the Minister share the concern that this imbalance indicates a misalignment in how resources are being allocated within Prevent? What steps are the Government taking to ensure that the review addresses this and that Prevent is laser-focused on tackling the most pressing and dangerous threats? Will the review also examine the training and guidance given to Prevent officers to ensure that they are well equipped to assess and respond to credible threats? Furthermore, could the Minister clarify whether there will be any changes to how information is shared between local authorities and counterterrorism units to improve early identification and intervention in cases of radicalisation?

I am sure the Minister agrees that we must do everything in our power to prevent future tragedies, and I look forward to his assurances that the Government are committed to acting swiftly, decisively and transparently.

[Baroness Thornhill (LD)]

My Lords, I have a sad sense of déjà vu, as this is a very real echo of the earlier Question from the noble Lord, Lord Balfe. I respect the insightful comments from noble Lords on that similar issue.

The whole country was unified last summer over the horror of events in Southport. It was indeed a brutal and senseless act of violence. We owe it to the memories of Alice, Bebe and Elsie to do everything we can as a society to ensure that such acts of brutality are not allowed to be repeated. Sadly, they appear to be repeating. We want communities to feel safe and individuals to go about their daily business, like Taylor Swift dance classes in the summer holidays, without fearing that there are dangerous people out there intent on hurting them.

It is deeply troubling that the Prevent learning review makes it clear that warning signs were missed in the lead up to that attack in Southport. These Benches have long raised concerns about the failures of Prevent. Indeed, as, the elected mayor of Watford when Prevent was first introduced, I remember the trouble that we had with our Muslim community in trying to get it to accept what Prevent was trying to do. It has had a very troubled journey through its many incarnations. For that reason, we welcome the decision to publish the learning review.

We also welcome the creation of the new Prevent commissioner. We are very pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, will serve as interim commissioner. He is highly skilled and experienced in the complex issues that he will need to navigate that tricky road. I would welcome some details from the Minister on what powers the commissioner will have to enforce any recommendations and to ensure that they will be enacted. Recommendations must lead to actions and actions to swift, successful resolution with full transparency and accountability. Often, we do not have a very good track record in that regard.

Looking more widely, we have to ensure that our national security strategy is fit for purpose, given the wide range of threats we now face as a country. We clearly need to tackle extremist ideology, but not to forget those who are motivated not by any particular ideology, but rather by an obsession with violence or a hatred of society. Will the Minister say what the Government can do? What are they going to do to prevent people slipping through the net?

A point that often is not made is that we also have a duty of care to those individuals whom we ask to decide, for the safety of society, whether an individual is a threat to life. What is being done to support those people in that role? What training are they given to ensure that they can make the best possible decision on behalf of us all?

Finally, after the tragic murders in Southport last summer and the disorder on the streets afterwards, we saw communities coming together in far greater numbers to clean up the streets and affirm belief in something bigger than themselves. Protecting communities must be at the centre of everything that the Home Office does. What is being done to reassure the public that they remain safe from threats? What is being done to ensure that incidents such as this are not exploited by groups or individuals who would wish harm upon our communities?

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, for their contributions. Like them, I want to start with the victims of this crime. They should be for ever in our thoughts when we deal with how we respond to these issues. Bebe, Elsie and Alice need to be remembered at all times. I remind the House that the perpetrator, whom I shall not name today, is now serving 52 years, a sentence passed by Mr Justice Goose in the Crown Court. That perpetrator will have a significant sentence as the result of the crimes he committed.

I am grateful for the welcome for the inquiry from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill. The noble Lord asked me particularly about the timeline for the public inquiry. As the Home Office has already said, the inquiry will be non-statutory. We reserve the right to change it to a statutory inquiry if circumstances require. I hope that the noble Lord will know, because I have said this before, that the choice of chair, the terms of reference and the timeline for the inquiry are important matters that I will report back to this House on in due course.

Our first priority is to consult the families and the coroner who is undertaking a statutory duty in relation to this incident. We will therefore, at some point, be able to answer the noble Lord’s questions in a way that I cannot at the moment, but I commit to bringing this back to the House in due course.

The Home Secretary swiftly commissioned a review shortly after the murders which has brought forward 14 recommendations. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, mentioned two particular issues: data sharing and training. Recommendation 1 addresses data sharing and putting in place some measures to help with that. Recommendation 3 is about improving training. Having discussed the implementation of the 14 recommendations with officials, I can give a commitment that this House will have a report back by—I hope—this summer on the finalisation of those recommendations and the resulting practical action. The Government accept all 14 recommendations to be implemented in due course.

The noble Baroness and the noble Lord mentioned the appointment of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who I am pleased to see in his place. I know he has a busy schedule looking at the issues we are discussing at the moment. The noble Baroness asked about the powers of the recommendations that the noble Lord may make. He is the interim commissioner. We have asked him to look at what happened in this case, and also to do a quick sprint on Prevent more generally. He, and whoever is appointed as the permanent commissioner, will have powers to make recommendations. I am still of the view that recommendations are to Ministers who will decide on those recommendations and be held accountable for them. I suspect that, in due course, there will be agreement on the outcome of any recommendations made. That will help to review independently, and to decide politically the way forward.

The noble Baroness also mentioned widening Prevent’s essentially terrorism role to look at other issues where people may have mental health challenges, be obsessed with violence or general hatred or have a whole range of other issues driving them that are not related to Islamist or far-right terrorism as we know them. We are looking at this and how it can be adopted. This is another issue that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, will look at in order to give what I hope will be a considered response to difficult and challenging issues.

Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, made a point about the community. What really impressed me about Southport after the attack was that the religious, civic and ordinary communities came together to reject the violence that had occurred in their town. They showed that the violence emanating from the violence in their town was also not acceptable or applicable and was rejected by the community. That was a valuable lesson. As political leaders, we need collectively to reject those who would exploit difficult issues for political ends. I am acutely aware that we have our political differences, but we should be standing together against terrorism, violence and the type of actions that led to the deaths of these three young girls.

I take some comfort from the response of the Southport community, while having to recognise that there are lessons to be learned because of mistakes that were made. As ever, those mistakes need to be rectified to ensure that we make positive change for the future. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, can assist the Government bringing his expertise to this area.

12:38

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, this case, terrible as it is, shows the fine line that can exist at times between mental illness and terrorist offences, particularly where a single person is involved.

Prevent has struggled at times when police officers are trying to make decisions, based on intelligence or factual evidence, when mental illness is involved. I wonder whether the Minister might look at the unit in the Metropolitan Police called the Fixated Threat Assessment Centre. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, may consider it. It was created in 2006 and has about 20 people in it. It was designed to protect royalty against people who become fixated on them. It is led by psychologists and psychiatrists. It makes a medical assessment of the threat, rather than just a criminal assessment as a police officer might do. It has police officers and mental health nurses who are able to access data from the health service as well as from the police. That balanced approach can be quite helpful. Sometimes, the way forward might be treatment, sometimes it should be criminal investigation with the consequences that might follow. This process has been quite well established for about 20 years, but it has never extended beyond royalty-fixated threat assessment. I wonder whether we all might learn from it.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe; he brings immeasurable expertise in his contribution to this debate. I will say two things in response. First, the Prevent programme still has to focus primarily on people who are being radicalised through a range of means and pose threats on both Islamist and extreme right-wing fronts—that is the main focus. But, secondly, this case shows that there are potential areas where we need to look at other issues, including misogyny, concerns around violence and its worship generally, and people just wishing to inflict hate on society for a range of reasons that are not politically or culturally motivated. I take what the noble Lord said, as there may be lessons that we could learn from it. I would be very grateful to discuss—with both the Metropolitan Police and the noble Lord, if he wishes—how we can widen the debate on looking at potential areas. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, will look at how we can draw a wider circumference around the support mechanisms to help with cases that fall outside the broad areas of Prevent but which still lead to the types of actions that Prevent is designed to prevent.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister and others for understanding that not everything can be squeezed into the rubric of “terrorism”, with its ideological motive and so on. I will make a small point on a previous point my noble friend made in reference to the sentence of 52 years. It is quite important to remember, and for the public to understand, that this was, rightly, a life sentence with a minimum of 52 years before any consideration of release; one would not always get that information from reading the newspapers. I hope that my noble friend will forgive me for making that clear.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My noble friend is absolutely right. The 52 years is a minimum; it is a life sentence. Indeed, in his sentencing remarks, Justice Goose indicated that he felt that it was highly unlikely that the individual convicted would be released. That is a matter for well downstream. The concerns that we have around Prevent are things that we can resolve to stop that type of activity taking place in the future. As my noble friend knows, the reason a whole-life tariff was not imposed was because of the age of the perpetrator at the time of the event. I suspect that, if he had been older, a whole-life tariff may well have been given by the judge. My noble friend was right to add further definition to my comment, which was not meant to undermine in any way the sentence given.

[Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as set out in the register. My thoughts are with all those affected by this tragedy in Southport. I am sure that the Minister will accept that there is a big difference between the decision-makers involved in Prevent—who are referred over 19 cases a day, and therefore 7,000 cases a year—and a reviewing officer who is looking at one particular case with the benefit of hindsight. I share the concerns that the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, has about the decision-makers in such cases. Indeed, I do not think that it came out clearly in the review’s executive summary on the government website that, in this case, all the procedures and policies were followed by those involved in the decision-making. Therefore,

“it is the subjective decisions that have come into focus”.

Can the Minister explain how the Government will address the issues around subjective decision-making in such cases? Also, what does he think the impact will be on the considerable number of cases that these officers have to deal with now? Prevent is apparently expanding its definition to include a fascination with mass violence, in addition to concentrating on the areas of, say, Islamist and right-wing terrorism, which the Minister said the Government want Prevent officers to concentrate on.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord and for the experience that he brings to this issue. He raised two points; I will first answer the latter one about the potential widening of the definition. We are dependent ultimately on further advice from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, downstream. As I mentioned to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, it will still mean that the focus is on Islamist and extreme right-wing terrorism, because those two issues are the most extreme areas that we need to resolve and deal with; they are where most cases come from. In the light of that, there may be—as in the first part of his question—additional pressures on case officers to look at how they work with different types of activity, which they may not be used to working with to date and on which they may need further training and support.

I hope that the noble Lord will have a chance to look at the 14 recommendations in the executive summary. The second states:

“Further training should be considered regarding the circumstances where visits to individuals during the initial assessment can be conducted”.


That further training aspect, alongside the other 13 recommendations that we have now accepted and will implement by this summer, will look at the range of issues that the noble Lord mentioned in the first part of his question.