Trident

Friday 26th January 2024 Commons Chamber

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—(Mike Wood.)

14:31

Neale Hanvey (Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath) (Alba): Last night was Burns night, and I found myself reflecting over a couplet from the bard’s timeless “A Man’s a Man for a’ That”:

“The honest man, tho’ e’er sae poor, is king o’ men for a’ that.”

I open this debate in a spirit of honesty, truth and transparency—a trinity that has been lacking in most of my exchanges thus far with the Ministry of Defence over mounting concerns about the UK’s nuclear Trident programme. The spiralling costs of the programme, be they financial or human, demand an earnest response from Ministers—something that has hitherto eluded the MOD—but I am hoping for candour and honesty today, or in writing in the forthcoming weeks.

The economics of the Trident programme are more straightforward. As per the House of Commons Library, the total acquisition expenditure on the four Vanguard-class submarines housing the Trident missiles was £12.52 billion, which equates to approximately £21 billion in today’s money. Additionally, annual in-service costs are currently estimated at 6% of the defence budget—based on current planned expenditure, that is another £3 billion for 2023-24.

Further, the cost of the design and manufacture of the new Dreadnought-class submarines is estimated at £31 billion, including inflation over the life of the programme. A £10 billion contingency has also been set aside, making the current potential total for replacement £41 billion. In-service costs are expected to continue at approximately 6% of defence expenditure. The National Audit Office has raised concerns about the impact of the MOD’s nuclear programme based on the affordability of the Department’s overall equipment plan, but these astronomical figures continue to be spent.

That brings me to the three pressing concerns surrounding the Trident programme that I will set out for the Minister today, the first of which is the dangers of radiation exposure and the issue of nuclear safety in Scotland. Secondly, based on those incidents, there is growing scepticism about the overall preparedness of the existing Vanguard fleet in the light of its allegedly dangerous and “rotting” state, referenced by Dominic Cummings, the former senior adviser to the former Prime Minister. Thirdly, as a consequence of the nuclear exposure hazards that the UK has imposed on the population of Scotland and a lack of transparency concerning the programme as a whole, I will set out why the nation of Scotland has much to gain by removing that nuclear arsenal from its waters.

First and foremost, I would like to provide a factual context to this debate. I was contacted by a whistleblower at the Coulport armaments depot who told me that there had been an emergency evacuation at the site due to a radiation leak. I raised this matter directly with the Defence Secretary, who then wrote to me on 10 January 2023. In that letter, the Defence Secretary denied that there had been any serious radiation breaches at Faslane or Coulport. He wrote:

“I can confirm that the alleged radiation incident referred to during defence questions in the Commons did not occur.”

However, public concerns remain about the relocation of staff from building 201 at RNAD Coulport to building 41. The MOD has failed to confirm the date on which the staff at Coulport building 201 were first informed that they were being moving to building 41. The Defence Secretary also stated:

“no serious radiation breaches have occurred at His Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde or RNAD Coulport”.

However, that response implies there was a threshold for reporting radiation leaks.

As I said at the time, the Defence Secretary’s response raised more questions than it answered. It suggests that there were radiation breaches, but they fell below an unqualified serious threshold. What is that threshold? How is it defined, and what are the risks from non-serious radiation breaches? In response to a parliamentary written question about serious radiation breaches at the Clyde and Coulport ports, the Minister acknowledged:

“There have been historical events with minor radiological consequences at both His Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde and the Royal Naval Armaments Depot (RNAD) Coulport.”

That revealed 15 recorded radiation leaks at Coulport and a further 43 at Faslane in 2023 alone, although the MOD insists that none was considered serious. Surely further detail of each of these events and the risk they did or did not present to the immediate vicinity is necessary. Will the Minister commit to providing that information?

Will the UK Government continue in their attempts to minimise the number and scale of such events by referring us to obscure codes and categorisations to obfuscate risk or by invoking national security as both an excuse and a smokescreen? The latter were deployed six months ago when the Alba party submitted a freedom of information request asking how many convoys there had been each year for the last five years carrying materials from Atomic Weapons Establishment Aldermaston to Royal Naval Armaments Depot Coulport. Section 24, on national security, and section 26, on defence, of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 were invoked to withhold that information from Scotland and our people—the very people who are frequently placed at risk of exposure to radiation were to be kept in the dark.

Formulaic tests of public information versus national interest are simply not good enough. I would like to pointedly ask the Minister: approximately how much nuclear material has been transported between Aldermaston and Coulport in the last 12 months and in the past five years? How many convoys were used, and what is the frequency of such transports? How many workers are sufficiently close to be impacted by even low-level nuclear exposure? We need answers, and the people deserve the most basic of information. Even the details of potentially catastrophic incidents that have received media coverage are routinely denied to right hon. and hon. Members of the House and the public alike, on the spurious grounds that the Ministry does not comment on operational matters in respect of submarines.

It was recently reported that a Royal Navy nuclear submarine plunged towards its crush depth due to a concerning malfunction of its main depth gauge. It was finally reported last November, but the incident took place a year before that. We still have no specifics about where it took place, despite my personal request for information from the Ministry.

Turning to the preparedness of the Vanguard fleet itself, in September 2023, one of the Vanguard-class submarines returned from a patrol of more than six months. Defence commentators noted that it was double the three-month missions previously completed. Additionally, Navy Lookout reported that the returning submarine seemed to be missing exterior tiles and was covered in marine growth to an extent that had not been seen before. As of this year, the life expectancy of the current Vanguard fleet is repeatedly being extended, despite only three of the four vessels currently being seaworthy. I would like to credit The National newspaper in Scotland for its persistent and thorough reportage of the nuclear predicament in Scotland.

If it is the case that submarines are failing in seaworthiness and labouring under increased operational pressures, as is indicated by the malfunctioning of vital components, extended periods of deployment and missing exterior tiles, while radiation leaks are being under-reported, I ask the Minister in good faith, how are the people of Scotland or right hon. and hon. Members to place any trust in this Government? Specifically, how is the Dreadnought class to avoid exactly the same fate and, most critically, what additional safeguards are being taken to mitigate civilian exposure to nuclear contamination, given this shocking evidence?

Given that the chief adviser to an erstwhile Prime Minister has referred to the UK’s nuclear fleet as a “horror show”, I would hope that the Minister would come through with some degree of information and transparency, and not rely merely on obfuscation. That brings me to my third and final concern. The deficit in trust is one of the many reasons why the people of Scotland would benefit from becoming an independent state in lieu of being held in this Union against our will.

“Bairns not bombs” was one of the galvanising messages of the independence movement in the run-up to the 2014 referendum. That slogan embodied a persisting sentiment against nuclear weapons of mass destruction and their dangerous and corrosive impact on our country and the planet. Opinion poll after opinion poll shows that the majority of Scottish people oppose WMDs being hosted in Scotland. Whenever independence is mentioned to the UK Government, their immediate reaction is to attempt to assert that the Scottish economy is better served as part of the United Kingdom. Within the realm of defence manufacturing, such an argument is as far as from reality as possible. In October, the Government signed contracts totalling £4 billion to design and manufacture the world’s most advanced submarines. However much I disagree in principle with the so-called nuclear deterrent, it illustrates perfectly the fact that Scotland receives few of the manufacturing jobs, which are located in Barrow-in-Furness, Raynesway and Derby. The jobs, the growth and the capital are yet again directed anywhere but Scotland. Meanwhile, the rotting hulks of Dreadnought subs retired in the 1980s have been rusting away at Rosyth longer than they were in service. The people of Scotland have a precarious future, in which key economic infrastructure such as the Grangemouth oil refinery is threatened with closure.

While the current situation is bleak, I would not like to end my speech on a pessimistic note. Instead, I look towards the future with hope: a future where an independent Scotland can build on and benefit from its vast renewable energy potential, rather than host nuclear weapons; a future where there is a safe, feasible and practicable way to ensure that an independent Scotland will begin its life as a nuclear and WMD-free state from day one of independence; a future where the Government and the people of Scotland are no longer kept in the dark about the dangers placed in their midst by a remote, arrogant London Administration.

14:43

[The Minister for Defence Procurement (James Cartlidge)]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Neale Hanvey) for initiating this debate. We have had a number of exchanges on this matter including, for example, in Defence oral questions.

The key point is that every day since April 1969, there has been at least one nuclear-armed Royal Navy submarine at sea, helping to keep the United Kingdom safe—the whole of the United Kingdom. In January 1980, when the House debated the successor programme to Polaris, which led to Trident—the title of this debate—the Secretary of State for Defence, Lord Pym, boiled down the Government’s position to one essential point. While acknowledging the “horrendous” nature of nuclear weapons and regretting that we could not “disinvent” them, he concluded that Britain needed to be a nuclear power because of what it would contribute to NATO’s strategy of deterrence and, through that, to our own national security.

Essentially, that has been the position of every UK Government since then. The renewal of the nuclear deterrent was approved by an overwhelming majority of 355 votes in this House in 2016, and it remains this Government’s position today. In 1980 the debate was framed by the cold war, but in 2024 the threats facing our country have multiplied and become far more complex. The number of nuclear states has grown, while Putin’s aggression and intransigence have set back the prospect of nuclear disarmament more broadly. Russia still holds around 6,000 warheads, and we face a much more assertive, nuclear-armed China. North Korea remains hellbent on honing its nuclear capabilities at the expense of the wellbeing of its own people, while Iran has repeatedly violated its international nuclear obligations and has enriched uranium far beyond what it needs for civilian purposes.

Significantly, our competitors are investing in novel nuclear technologies, including new warfighting nuclear systems, to integrate into their military strategies and doctrines. If we measure the need for an effective nuclear deterrent by the number of nuclear-armed states overtly working against the UK’s national interest, it is clear that the need to deter has never been greater. Let us not forget that a credible nuclear capability is about more than merely countering nuclear threats; it is about deterring all of the most extreme threats to our nation. That is why the Government are investing in upgrading our nuclear infrastructure to support the next generation Dreadnought-class submarines and replacement warheads. These will be some of the most advanced nuclear systems ever built, which sends a clear message to any would-be adversary.

Four Dreadnought submarines will replace the Vanguard-class submarines that have maintained our nuclear deterrent since 1992. They will give us an independent, continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent well into the second half of the century, and progress is on track to deliver the first of the Dreadnought submarines into service in the early 2030s. At £31 billion, it is correct to say that the estimated cost of the programme is significant, but we cannot develop this type of world-leading capability on the cheap, and we must also weigh that against the terrible cost of war, which is what the nuclear deterrent deters from happening.

Not only will the programme keep us safe; it is fuelling economic growth around the country. The submarines are being built by BAE Systems in Barrow-in-Furness. They will be maintained by Babcock in Devonport and on the Clyde. Their nuclear reactors are designed and built by Rolls-Royce in Derby. Our nuclear warheads are designed, manufactured and maintained by the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Berkshire. Hundreds of companies form the network of supply chains, and the stationing of our submarines at His Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde will ensure that it remains one of the largest employment sites in Scotland, bringing significant benefits to the local economy. Directly and indirectly, the nuclear deterrent is responsible for thousands of jobs in Scotland.

In preparation for the delivery of Dreadnought, we are carrying out a £1.4 billion upgrade of our nuclear facilities at HMNB Clyde. We are committed to replacing our current nuclear warheads and are working with the US to refresh the Trident II D5 missile. [Interruption.] If the hon. Gentleman wishes to intervene, he is more than welcome to do so.

[Neale Hanvey]

I thank the Minister for unexpectedly allowing an intervention. He says that he is working with the US, but the reality is that the US controls the nuclear deterrent that the UK provides.

[James Cartlidge]

That is wholly erroneous. Yes, we have a very, very close working relationship with the United States. We recently celebrated the 60th anniversary of the Polaris agreement. With the United States we secured the freedom of Europe in the second world war, and with the United States we are continuing to secure the freedom of our United Kingdom by deterring the most significant threat that we could face.

I emphasise that while we continue to invest in our nuclear deterrent, the Government remain fully committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. As a country, we have a strong record on disarmament, having unilaterally reduced our nuclear forces significantly from their cold war peak. We now have the smallest nuclear warhead stockpile of the five nuclear weapons states recognised under the non-proliferation treaty, and we are the only state to have reduced its deterrent capability to a single nuclear weapons system. However, other states have not followed our example, and as we survey the dangers facing our world today, our assessment is that further unilateral disarmament would only undermine our security and that of our allies. Nevertheless, we will continue to see opportunities to advance multilateral disarmament under the framework of the non-proliferation treaty.

Our nuclear deterrent deters aggression and coercion and helps to preserve peace.

[Neale Hanvey]

I thank the Minister for giving way a final time. I will not take too much time, but I did express a number of specific concerns that relate to the people of Scotland and their concerns about hosting these weapons on their shores. The Minister has made the business case, albeit perhaps not the moral case, for hosting WMDs, but he has not responded to any of my concerns about hosting these weapons in Scotland. Will he commit to respond in writing and in detail to the points I have put to him today?

[James Cartlidge]

I did respond in detail to the written questions the hon. Gentleman tabled last May about those incidents, and the Secretary of State wrote to him about the allegations that were printed. We rejected them.

The hon. Gentleman asks about the moral case, and I have made the moral case: it is about peace, it is about deterrence. If he does not understand that, let me put on the record the fact that it is the policy of his party to withdraw from NATO, not just to disarm. Let us ask ourselves what greater folly there could be in the current international situation than for the United Kingdom to withdraw from NATO. How would the Kremlin react? What would the people of Ukraine think—the people we have done so much to help remain free?

Peace is not cheap. That is why we support our deterrent, whose existence has kept us and our allies safe for decades, and we remain fully committed to investing in it. Of course, we absolutely hope never to have to use our arsenal, but in our more dangerous world, I strongly agree with Lord Pym when he told this House, 44 years ago almost to the day, that irrespective of the nature of the threat we face, it is better to have “effective options” than accept defeat. Or, as I would put it sincerely, the best way to avoid a war is to deter it from happening in the first place.

Question put and agreed to.

14:51

House adjourned.