Draft Pharmacy (Preparation and Dispensing Errors - Hospital and Other Pharmacy Services) Order 2022
Draft Pharmacy (Responsible Pharmacists, Superintendent Pharmacists etc.) Order 2022
(1 year, 10 months ago)
General CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (Maria Caulfield)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Pharmacy (Preparation and Dispensing Errors – Hospital and Other Pharmacy Services) Order 2022.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider the draft Pharmacy (Responsible Pharmacists, Superintendent Pharmacists etc.) Order 2022.
Maria Caulfield
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma.
The draft order, which was laid before Parliament on 28 April, extends across the United Kingdom. Both orders have been in development for a long time under the auspices of the rebalancing medicines legislation and pharmacy regulation programme board, membership of which includes representatives of the pharmacy sector, and professional and regulatory bodies from across the United Kingdom. The draft orders have benefited from full scrutiny by those experts, and they have been welcomed by pharmacy professionals working in hospitals and relevant pharmacy services. They also have the support of the four chief pharmaceutical officers of the United Kingdom.
During the covid pandemic, as I think hon. Members will agree, community pharmacies proved once again that they sit at the centre of our communities. They are a vital first port of call for healthcare advice. The Government want community pharmacy to deliver more patient-focused care. It is therefore right and proper to have a strong governance system to ensure that professionals and staff have clear frameworks within which to deliver the care they give to patients, and are enabled to have the roles, responsibilities and ability to deliver safe patient care.
The draft Pharmacy (Preparation and Dispensing Errors – Hospital and Other Pharmacy Services) Order is the next stage in our work to improve patient safety in pharmacy. About 52 million items a year are dispensed in secondary care, which covers hospitals and other settings. Despite the incredible work of our pharmacy teams, errors happen, but we estimate that only about 5% of the errors in secondary care are reported. In our efforts to create a culture of safety and a duty of candour when mistakes are made, the draft order aims to improve the statistic by reducing fear of prosecution and by incentivising reporting and learning from errors. We want the NHS to be a place of learning, and the order is key to improve patient safety, which should always be our goal.
The purpose of the draft order is to extend the defences already available to pharmacy workers in the community pharmacy setting under the Pharmacy (Preparation and Dispensing Errors – Registered Pharmacies) Order 2018. The draft order will ensure that registered pharmacy professionals who work in hospital and other settings such as prisons and care homes will have the same access to defences that community pharmacists have currently. It will provide them with access in defined circumstances to the defences against criminal offences set out in sections 63 and 64 of the Medicines Act 1968, which concern the standards of medicinal products and the sale of any medicinal product that is not of the nature or quality demanded by the purchaser. The order will make these defences available in defined circumstances and, importantly, will incentivise the reporting of errors when pharmacy professionals make a genuine dispensing errors, and will inform learning to prevent such errors happening again.
One important aspect of the conditions of the defence is that a pharmacy service must have a chief pharmacist, or someone with the duties of that statutory role, who is responsible for the pharmacy services, ensuring that necessary governance is in place to provide assurance to patients. The pharmacy regulator will be given new powers to set the standards for the role of chief pharmacist, mirroring the role of superintendent pharmacist, which I will discuss in the context of the second draft order, so that the hospital and secondary care settings match those of community pharmacy. Last year, a survey by the Community Pharmacy Patients Safety Group found that following the changes, 95% of pharmacists said they now report errors to improve practice and 80% said they now learn from their mistakes. The survey also found that fear of prosecution as a reason not to report an error has dropped from 40% in 2016 to 18% last year. That is largely attributed to the change in the law in 2018. We therefore expect a similar drop in the fear of being prosecuted for pharmacy professionals in the secondary care setting covered by the draft order.
The role of the draft Pharmacy (Responsible Pharmacists, Superintendent Pharmacists etc.) Order 2022 is to define and clarify the core purpose of the responsible pharmacist, who is in charge of a pharmacy of a particular retail outlet on a day-to-day basis, and the superintendent pharmacist, who is the person responsible for setting policies across the whole retail pharmacy business. They are two clearly defined, separate roles. The draft order gives powers to the General Pharmaceutical Council and the Pharmaceutical Society of Northern Ireland to define in professional regulation how the purpose of these roles is fulfilled.
The regulators already have powers to set rules and standards around professional regulation, and it makes sense that pharmacy practice matters sit with the regulator rather than with Ministers, which is how things currently stand. That is already the case for the powers of the regulators of other healthcare professionals. We are putting in place a more flexible regulatory framework and the necessary systems to support and maximise the potential of the community pharmacy teams, and the skill mix within them to deliver more clinical services in the community and support the wider NHS capacity ideals.
The measures will apply across the United Kingdom and have been developed collaboratively with all four Health Departments across all four nations. I would like to draw hon. Members’ attention to two provisions specific to Northern Ireland, designed to better align Northern Ireland with Great Britain. At the request of the Department of Health in Northern Ireland and the Pharmaceutical Society of Northern Ireland, it is proposed to give the Department of Health in Northern Ireland the power to appoint a deputy registrar in respect of duties set out in the Pharmacy (Northern Ireland) Order 1976. The second change would be to extend the requirement that already exists for Great Britain that a superintendent pharmacist must inform the relevant pharmacy regulator when they stop holding the role in a pharmacy business in Northern Ireland. For Northern Ireland, that would be the Pharmaceutical Society of Northern Ireland.
I hope that I have outlined the two draft orders to Members, but I want to be transparent and clear that there was a consultation on them both in which there was general support for them, but also some concerns that I want to address. The first was about distrust of the regulator and giving more power to the regulator. I want to reassure colleagues that although powers are given to the regulator to outline the roles of the responsible pharmacist and superintendent pharmacist, if the regulator wants to make changes to those roles, there would be a statutory consultation and the same negative resolution procedure in Parliament. There would be proper scrutiny and proper debate on any changes made. I want to reassure Members that we are not just handing powers to the regulator; there will be proper scrutiny in place for any changes they want to make.
The second concern was about the impact of the measures on the supervision of the dispensing of medicines in retail pharmacy. I want to emphasise that the draft orders do not affect the legislation that governs the supervision, preparation, sale and supply of prescription-only medicines, including the legal requirement for a pharmacy to supervise the dispensing of prescription-only medicine. That concern came out of the consultation, but I want to reassure Members that that is not the case. Thirdly, there was concern about superintendent pharmacists being in charge of more than one business, but it is and still will be the case that every pharmacy must have a superintendent pharmacist who has a statutory duty in respect of safe and effective running of retail pharmacy businesses. That will not change following the orders. If the regulatory bodies wanted to change that in future, a statutory consultation and full scrutiny from Parliament would take place.
On the final concern about responsible pharmacists being in charge of more than one pharmacy at any one time, as a Minister I can already set out an exception to that in regulations, but that power has never been used to date. Today’s proposal does not change that but simply transfers the exception-making powers from Ministers to pharmacy regulators. Again, a statutory consultation and full parliamentary scrutiny would have to take place in order for pharmacy regulators to change those powers.
I hope the Committee will support these reforms so that we can put in place a strengthened and more flexible framework of organisational governance for registered pharmacies. The order will also support improved patient safety by reinforcing the professional duty of candour, encouraging a culture of candid and fulsome contributions from those involved when things go wrong, and creating an environment where people are not afraid to come forward when they have made a mistake, so that they are able to learn from those mistakes and prevent them from happening again in the future.
Should these orders be approved, I look forward to working with the regulators, setting out their programme of work to support these orders under the powers afforded to them and further scrutiny by both Houses.
Feryal Clark (Enfield North) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma.
It is the first duty of any Government to keep people safe, especially through the safe and secure running of our health service. Pharmacies play a crucial role in our healthcare system across the country, so it is vital that we put measures in place to ensure they are run with the safety of patients front and centre. Any steps that the Government take to do that are to be welcomed and, for that reason, we will be supporting the statutory instrument.
Managing and securing the pharmacy dispensing process is a significant challenge. More than one billion prescriptions were dispensed last year; with numbers like that, it is impossible to completely eradicate all errors. Given the vast numbers of prescriptions being dispensed, the error rate is remarkably low and pharmacists should be applauded for that. However, that does not mean we can sit back and relax, as more can and must be done to ensure patients are protected.
As well as patients, it is right that the statutory instrument looks at the effect on pharmacy staff. Most healthcare professional groups do not face criminal conviction and potential imprisonment for an inadvertent dispensing error, and it would be wrong for pharmacists to be the only group to do so. Therefore, it is welcome that the SI extends legal protections to pharmacists working in a range of locations, such as prisons, hospitals and care homes. Pharmacists working in those settings are often under increased stress, which has been exacerbated by the challenges of the pandemic. The Pharmaceutical Journal recently found there had been an approximate doubling in pharmacists reporting feeling “stressed” compared with previous years.
As they often work in pressured circumstances, it is right that we protect pharmacists, who are often people’s first point of contact with the healthcare system and are too often victims of abuse, from unintended mistakes. Ensuring the right to legal defence against prosecution in cases relating to inadvertent error will undoubtedly remove some of the fears these clinicians feel in admitting errors, helping to prevent and reduce patient harm through taking the wrong medication or dosage.
We welcome the greater clarity that the SI provides about how those legal defences are applied, but we have some concerns. There remain a number of offences that do not have a corresponding statutory defence laid out in the SI. Will the Minister put on record the offences for which no statutory defences are provided and the reasoning behind the decisions about them?
A key facet of the SI is the greater culture of transparency that providing security to pharmacists should hopefully foster, as set out by the Minister. Rather than creating a point-and-blame culture, we need a system that recognises errors in dispensing and preparation of medicines and puts active steps in place to ensure that they are not repeated. It is, however, absolutely right that the SI focuses on inadvertent errors. Where errors are made deliberately through staff acting in a negligent way, they will and must continue to face criminal prosecution—something we fully support.
There are a number of outstanding points that I would appreciate the Minister covering in her reply. There is particular concern about the reporting process for dispensing errors, which at present is at risk of letting too many fall through the gap. Only 5% of dispensing errors made each year are reported, making it very difficult for us to get a proper picture of the potential harm they are causing. Is the Minister therefore concerned that the 2017 legislation designed to increase protections has been largely unsuccessful in encouraging honesty among pharmacy staff? I would be grateful to hear what plans she has to ensure the number of errors being reported increases.
Furthermore, what steps will the Minister take to ensure pharmacists feel safe to come forward if they have made a dispensing error? The people affected by the legislation are often more isolated in their workplaces, without the benefit of a robust and easily accessible professional support network, so I would appreciate it if the Minister outlined how she will ensure that those affected by these changes are properly informed about them.
We are always looking to make further strides in the area of patient safety, and the orders are by no means the end of the road on this issue, but they are a welcome step. I look forward to the Minister announcing further improvements in the area in due course.
Steven Bonnar (Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill) (SNP)
I thank the Minister for tabling these SIs, and for laying out the reasoning behind them in such a detailed manner. We will support both motions. To that end, I only have a few comments that I would like to place on the record.
In relation to the first motion, we in the Scottish National party know that good-quality healthcare is the cornerstone of a decent society, and the Scottish Government will always strive to provide that for Scotland and all of our citizens. We know that the risk to patients is increased if pharmacists are not flagging up simple things such as poor labelling, difficult to read issues, or mistakes that someone else has made. Continuous improvements can be made through increasing the reporting of dispensing errors and learning from them. The SNP encourages a learning culture for those involved when errors happen, so that pharmacists can increase their learning from such errors.
Scotland is far ahead of England and Wales in electronic prescribing, which helps prevent prescribing errors. That system also flags up the dangers of—for example—prescribing penicillin to someone who is allergic, using the wrong doses, or bad interactions previously had by patients. I take this opportunity to again highlight the fantastic approach to these matters taken by Mackie Pharmacy in my constituency, which has a phenomenal track record in dispensing best practice. Also with a focus on safety and the aim of reducing harm in healthcare, the Scottish Patient Safety Alliance was established in 2007 by creating a partnership between the Scottish Government, NHS Scotland, the Royal Colleges and other professional bodies, the Scottish Consumer Council and the Institute for Healthcare Improvement. That is something that the UK Government could probably take on board.
Turning to the second motion, the SNP supports making the best use of the workforce by more fully using the skills and knowledge of community pharmacists. The Scottish Government introduced the Pharmacy First NHS service, backed by £10 million of investment from the Scottish Government, as part of the NHS recovery plan to expand the range of common clinical conditions that can be treated by a community pharmacist, avoiding unnecessary GP and out-of-hours appointments. In Scotland, community pharmacists are playing a fantastic role in ensuring that millions of people have their minor ailment needs addressed quickly without needing to see a GP or go to a hospital. They are a prime example of getting the right care in the right place at the right time.
Maria Caulfield
I thank Opposition Members for their support for both orders. I will touch on a couple of points that the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Enfield North, raised. I want to reassure her that although the orders will make it easier for pharmacy teams to report mistakes in secondary care settings, there will still be offences retained when there is a deliberate disregard for patient safety, but she is right: if we are to improve patient safety, we need to foster a culture of openness, transparency and learning from mistakes. I am happy to write to her with the defences against prosecution. The regulator will take the work forward and we will have that detail shortly once they start work, after we have passed the orders.
I can reassure the hon. Lady that when we changed the law for community pharmacists in 2018, they felt more confident, as I set out in my speech, in reporting mistakes, and we hope that will be replicated in the secondary care setting following these orders. We have also passed separate legislation on the duty of candour across the NHS so that if a mistake is made in in any NHS organisation by a pharmacist, a doctor or a nurse, patients should be notified as soon as the mistake is discovered, told about the implications of it, and then about the process to resolve it. There is a statutory duty of candour across the NHS, and today’s order builds on that.
In answer to the hon. Member for Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill, I am pleased that we have been able to work with all four nations across the United Kingdom, who all support the measures. I hope that passing these orders and giving greater transparency to any mistakes that happen will build on the work that his Ministers in Scotland are doing. I put my hands up—I am a huge fan of the Pharmacy First model. We are working hard to try to replicate some of that in England. The hon. Gentleman is right that the pandemic has highlighted the experience, qualifications and vast wealth of knowledge of our pharmacists. They are held in high regard and I am glad that we are able to support them in the work that they do. Putting politics aside, I absolutely recognise the work on the Pharmacy First model in Scotland.
I am glad we have agreement on both of the orders.
Question put and agreed to.
DRAFT PHARMACY (RESPONSIBLE PHARMACISTS, SUPERINTENDENT PHARMACISTS ETC.) ORDER 2022
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the draft Pharmacy (Responsible Pharmacists, Superintendent Pharmacists etc.) Order 2022.—(Maria Caulfield.)
Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 9) Regulations 2022
The Minister for Europe and North America (James Cleverly)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 9) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022, No. 477).
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mrs Murray. A copy of the regulations was laid before the House on 27 April. They were tabled under the powers provided by the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 and came into effect under the made affirmative procedure. They were considered and not reported by both the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee and were approved by the House of Lords on 26 May.
In lockstep with our allies, we continue to develop the largest and most severe package of economic sanctions that Russia has ever faced. Those measures are already helping to hamper Putin’s war machine by restricting finance access, targeting Putin’s corrupt cronies and cutting them off from the international community, and paralysing the Russian military-industrial complex. The new legislation introduces trade sanctions relating to internet services and online media services. Put simply, it allows us to cut off propagandists and organisations spreading the Russian regime’s vicious lies and disinformation online.
The Russian Government are conducting an aggressive set of online information operations against Ukraine in a transparent and shameful attempt to justify their illegal war. This must be stopped. Ofcom has already removed Russia Today’s broadcast licence on the basis that it is not a fit and proper organisation to hold one. However, until the regulations entered into force, no powers existed in the UK to block access to the same disinformation being spread by way of Russia Today’s website, social media accounts and mobile applications. The statutory instrument will ensure that social media services, internet services and app stores will have to take reasonable steps to prevent UK users encountering content produced or uploaded by a person designated for those purposes. It will be for Ofcom to enforce the new legislation, and it has been given the power to impose fines on those who fail to comply.
ANO TV-Novosti, the parent organisation for Russia Today, and Rossiya Segodnya, the parent organisation for Sputnik, were designated for the purposes of these measures by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary on 4 May 2022. These puppet organisations are demonstrably part of Russia’s global disinformation campaign, as RT’s own editor-in-chief made clear in the past when she called the network an “information weapon” of the Russian state. The organisations are propaganda arms of the Russian state—both as a consequence of their ownership and of Russian law, which prevents the war being reported objectively and truthfully.
Third parties are now required to restrict access to content pumped out by those designated organisations. That will limit their audience and blunt the effect of their Russian state message of aggression towards Ukraine. The ultimate objective is to ensure that Ukraine succeeds. The whole of the UK Government, along with our international allies—and with the support of Opposition parties—are working to ensure Ukraine’s success. Our fight against disinformation and harmful propaganda forms a key component of that. Putin’s war on Ukraine is based on a torrent of lies. Britain has helped lead the world in tackling disinformation, and the new legislation enables us to blunt Putin’s weapons of war and hit the shameless propagandists who push out Putin’s fake news and fake narratives. We will continue our co-ordinated action against Russia in partnership with our allies and encourage more and more countries to act with us. I commend the regulations to the Committee.
Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairpersonship today, Mrs Murray. Before I begin my remarks on this instrument, I want to echo the words of our First Minister in Wales, Mark Drakeford, who said last night that despite our differences on the field—obviously, we congratulate Wales on a remarkable victory and getting to the World cup—Wales stands with Ukraine. It was a testimonial to the strength of spirit from our fans, players and the whole country. We might have differences on the football field, but when it comes to this wicked conflict we stand together.
I thank the Minister and staff at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office for their continued work in developing and implementing sanctions against Russia since the illegal invasion began 100 days ago. I recognise that is not an easy task; it requires constant effort to improve, expand and develop our regime, as set out in the measures today. It is clear that we need to continue to push sanctions forward, and we can go further still in a number of areas.
As I have said many times, the Government can rely on the Labour party to support them to keep pushing further to end Putin’s heinous war of aggression and the wider attempt to undermine our democracies that was mentioned by the Minister. On that, my only point is to ask why we have not done it much earlier? Many of us on all sides, including me when I was in Back-Bench roles, called for action against Russia Today and various online outlets that were spreading disinformation and undermining our own democracy, as well as pushing Putin’s regime’s agenda across the world.
Our actions here in the UK must be commensurate with the bravery, courage and spirit of the Ukrainian people. President Zelensky has repeatedly said his people are fighting not just for Ukraine but for peace and democracy on behalf of all Europeans. We know he is right and we need to continue to work with our allies in lockstep and strength.
It is great to see the measures today, but, as I have asked the Minister in previous Committees, what are we doing about the countries, some of whom we would term as allies, who are not yet implementing such sanctions and measures? It is deeply concerning that some of them have not moved forward. The Minister knows the countries I refer to. We have seen the failure of Serbia to take action. The sanctions implemented by neighbouring countries effectively meant that Sergei Lavrov could not travel to Serbia, which was a good thing, but we want Serbia and other countries to move forward with similar measures and to stand in support of Ukraine. That is even more important as we have seen more erratic, unpredictable and brutal behaviour in the Donbas in recent weeks, with really horrific scenes. We saw President Zelensky bravely visit the front line in the region—a testament to his leadership and courage—but the Ukrainian governor of Luhansk, Serhiy Haidai, announced that the Russian shelling of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk has increased tenfold in recent days. That is why we must continue to raise the pressure with such measures. We know that sanctions are a crucial lever at our disposal that can finally fray Russia’s bonds with the global economy and drastically limit its capacity to continue on in this war.
Before I turn to the detail of the regulations, I want to thank the Minister for his letter to me dated 17 May in response to questions from debates on previous measures. Some of them pertain to this instrument as well, so I want to clarify a couple of points. I am grateful to him for providing information on the size of the sanctions taskforce, which he has now told me numbers 150 members of staff. I hope that that will be kept under review and expanded if necessary. He did not give me details on the number of staff at the Office for Financial Sanctions Implementation and it would be good to have some detail on that because it is crucial that we have the best support for businesses and those wanting to comply with and implement the sanctions regime, including under the instrument we are considering today. We need to know that they are getting the best advice, so I need to understand more fully what is being done at that level as well as in the FCDO itself.
I have some other questions about shipping, which I will come back to the Minister on. I am still not clear why some of the measures announced in that area have not moved forward. The Minister also made clear that the Government are continuing to look at the possibility of confiscating and repurposing frozen assets to provide compensation to victims of the war and support Ukraine, and the US, Canada and the European Union have all developed proposals for that. We have effectively seen that happen with the recent sale of Chelsea, and it is certainly what the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport set out. Will the Minister also confirm what is happening to the assets of Russia Today, Sputnik, or other digital companies that are located in the UK? Are we considering freezing and repurposing any of their staff, their buildings, or other things? What measures are we taking to ensure that these measures not only have an immediate effect in stopping what Russia is doing, but has a beneficial effect for Ukraine and those to whom Russia is doing such wicked and terrible things?
I was also pleased by what the Minister said about compliance across the overseas territories, which has been borne out in my own conversations with officials from the Cayman Islands and Gibraltar who I met recently. I draw attention to my recent declaration of interests on that subject, but I was pleased to hear from them both directly about what they have been doing. Can the Minister say whether the measures will also apply in the Crown dependencies and the overseas territories? Given the very difficult governance situation in the British Virgin Islands as a result of recent concerning developments, which the Minister will be familiar with, can he explain what is happening there? That is really important, because a number of digital and online companies operate through overseas territories and a number of companies have arms there. I do not know what full assessment has been made, but it is important to know where those companies are operating through.
It is encouraging that internet services and online media are on the Government’s radar, given how integral they are to propagating Putin’s lies and misinformation. We saw that happen in the Skripal case, where multiple narratives were seeded across the country and, indeed, the world about what happened in that incident that were complete lies and fabrications. We have to be frank, as well: there have been deep attempts to influence all sides of politics—all political flavours and political parties—not just in this country, but in many others. During some of my recent visits to other European countries and elsewhere, I have heard worrying stories about attempts to undermine political parties, public dialogue, and parliamentary and legislative dialogue about what is happening in Ukraine. That has a direct impact, not only enabling Russia to spread lies and disinformation, but undermining support for Governments who may want to take tough action against Russia but, because of the spread of misinformation and disinformation, might not be able to do so. Russia knows that, and has exploited it ruthlessly.
We in the Labour party have warned time and time again that our digital space has been a wild west for far too long, and social media companies and other online entities have been allowed to mark their own homework from the very beginning. I raised those issues over many years on the Home Affairs Committee—again, on a cross-party basis—repeatedly bringing up with social media companies examples of their failure to remove not only extremist and terrorist content and other unacceptable things online, but clear propaganda that was available for people to watch and was actually being pushed into their feeds. I remember doing some searches of a particular conflict—I will not say which one—and then for the next few weeks having propaganda pumped into my YouTube feed that clearly originated from a state.
I also remember some absolutely horrific information that was pumped out about the tragic destruction of MH17 over Ukraine—destroyed by Russian action there, as we know. The tragedy of all those people who lost their lives should never be forgotten, but misinformation and disinformation was propagated about that event as well, largely through those online channels. We have to act on it.
Lloyd Russell-Moyle (Brighton, Kemptown) (Lab/Co-op)
As my hon. Friend is saying, we of course support these important statutory instruments, but there was a failure to act early when some of those warning signs were raised. That is a pattern of behaviour now. We saw it with some of the issues with economic crimes, with issues of property ownership here in London, with some of those properties being used to launder money, and we have seen it with other forms of economic crime. Now that pattern is being displayed in how the internet has not been properly regulated and has been allowed to run amok. Is not all of that a sign that although the governing party get there in the end, it is often too little, too late, when it comes to preventing some of the damage that has been done?
Stephen Doughty
My hon. Friend makes some important points. The Minister is aware that they are points that Labour Members have made in previous debates. It is disappointing at times that the Government have not moved as quickly as we have wanted; indeed, they have not moved as quickly as cross-party voices have called for. Let us remember that it has been cross-party Committees in this House that have raised concerns about Russian financial interests in the UK and online disinformation. We should also think about other countries that use similar tactics, which are regularly being brought up. We need to open our eyes to the way that warfare is being fought today and how autocratic and kleptocratic regimes are attempting to undermine our democracies and our very liberties, let alone, as in this case of course, specifically prosecuting part of the war against Ukraine and its people online and in cyber-space.
There is a broad consensus across the House that online self-regulation simply has not worked. It is encouraging now to see that measures are moving forward and will be debated to a great extent as we consider the Online Safety Bill. The pushback against Russian belligerence must be fought on many fronts and must expand to our digital spaces.
We very much support the steps that the regulations will take to extend the responsibility being placed on social media and internet service providers to ensure that they comply and further limit those persons and entities that have been designated in terms of their reach online. The incorporation of online application stores, or app stores, into the regulations is critical. The fact that the Government are providing Ofcom with the powers and oversight it needs to issue information requests is also crucial here, as is the ability to issue monetary penalties. However, I say to the Minister again that we have seen such powers introduced before and then we have seen a failure to use them or to use them as extensively as they could be used. I certainly hope that, within the bounds of the separation of roles between Government and regulatory agencies, the Government will make it very clear that the expectation—not only of the Government but of the whole House—is that these measures should be used to their full.
I have three final questions for the Minister. First, can he set out what conversations he has had, or indeed his officials have had, with the social media and internet service providers since these measures came into effect? What is his assessment of how they are operating? Does he need to go any further, because—again—my own interactions with some of the companies have been fairly lacking in the past? Some companies have moved forward, but others quite frankly simply have not. They are very quick to move copyrighted Disney content within 20 minutes of it appearing online, but, for example, took months to remove a notorious extremist far-right channel that was being broadcast on Twitter—in broad daylight, without even attempting to hide what it was. I hope that the Minister is bearing down strongly on these companies and can say what conversations he and his officials have had with them.
Will the Minister tell us what the proceeds of the fines that the regulations propose should be issued to those who fail to comply will be used for? Will they be redirected, for example, to humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in Ukraine and to support those who have fled the country?
Finally, what conversations has the Minister been having with DCMS about the Online Safety Bill? Are there any additional legislative measures that we can introduce during the passage of that Bill to ensure that the regime is as robust as possible and that we have the measures in place to ensure that?
In conclusion, we have just passed the 100-day mark in this brutal, egregious and unconscionable war of aggression, and each day that passes is a lesson to all of us that we need to make this war one that Putin can no longer afford to wage. We should prevent him from waging the war, and inhibiting and constraining the capacity of the use of digital platforms is critical in mitigating or even removing one of the weapons that Putin has in his arsenal and is using. The Government have our support to do so. However, as I close, I will take this opportunity to implore the Minister once again to push on and to continue to expand our sanctions regime at a pace, even when it is difficult—including technically difficult—to do so. If he does that, he will of course have our backing, as we all stand together in this House in support of Ukraine.
Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)
I give my full, unequivocal support to what is being proposed today. I have only two questions, which follow on from what the shadow Minister has just asked about.
The first is about co-ordination with our European allies. The Minister talked about partnership and referred to a lockstep movement, but specifically, what co-ordination will there be? For these measures to be maximally effective, there needs to be as close co-ordination as possible with what our European allies are doing.
My second question follows on from the shadow Minister’s question about the powers that the instrument confers on Ofcom. He asked what would happen to the proceeds from any fines. My question is simply, how much will the fines be? What ability will Ofcom have to levy fines? Will they be small fines or large fines? Is there a sliding scale? How will a judgment be made on what is appropriate? What accountability will there be for those decisions?
Mr Marcus Fysh (Yeovil) (Con)
I support attempts to reduce the amount of propaganda that is experienced, and obviously we do not want what is happening in Russia and Ukraine to continue, but I have a technical question about how this will work operationally.
New regulation 54A(1) talks about the provider of a social media service taking
“reasonable steps to prevent content”
from a “designated person” being experienced by someone in the UK. That is, in essence, what it is about. How does the Minister envisage that a social media provider might, technically, take reasonable steps to ascertain who the people providing content on its service are?
I wonder whether, as can sometimes happen, what is a well-intended type of thing could, in fact, create unintended consequences. For example, would a social media provider, given that it would find it very hard to pinpoint who, specifically, is doing what, just decide to say, “No content from Russia of any kind”? In order to be safe and not be fined by Ofcom, it might just choose not to accept any content or participation from an entire nation.
Might the Minister say a little about how that would operate technically, and whether we are going to be inadvertently requiring KYC—know your customer—or exclusion of data on a wholesale basis in order for a provider to try to comply with these regulations?
The Chair
The question is that the Committee has considered—[Interruption.] I am sorry; I call the Minister.
James Cleverly
Thank you, Mrs Murray. I was all ready to smile and silently allow the Committee to rise.
James Cleverly
Indeed.
Those of us who regard ourselves as veterans of these sanctions-related SI debates—a number of us are in the room—will recognise that the tone of the debate has followed something of a pattern, of which we should all be proud. That tone is one of support, but with some probing and technical questions to ensure that the Government are doing their job properly and professionally. That is absolutely right. As a Minister, I have often said that scrutiny by the House is like a trip to the dentist: we do not necessarily like it, but we know that, ultimately, it is probably for the best.
Unsurprisingly, the questions have been typically thoughtful. Some of them demanded a level of technical knowledge that I have to confess I am not armed with, but I am more than happy to ensure that Committee members are furnished with that technical detail if I fall short in explaining the situation.
The shadow Minister is right that we need to continually ensure that we are building a broad and wide coalition in standing up against Russian disinformation. We need to ensure that the countries that do stand firm are, to an extent, protected from punishment beatings, as it were. We are working internationally to help Governments, particularly those in eastern Europe, defend themselves against the Russian disinformation campaign. As he said, we have seen a pattern of attempts to undermine and destabilise democratic Governments. I have had conversations with a number of eastern European countries and their representatives here in the UK about helping them protect themselves against disinformation. It will be a constant piece of work—this is an area where we can never rest—but I assure him and others who raised the matter that it remains an area of work that we regard as very important. Actually, our work on this carries a great deal of credibility in the international community.
I will have to come back with the detail on the number of people we have in enforcement, but the shadow Minister is absolutely right to highlight that passing these regulations is important but the enforcement is key. We take that seriously. By the nature of the range of sanctions that we have applied, enforcement often falls to a number of different Departments. In this instance, a significant part of the enforcement will be triggered by Ofcom.
The shadow Minister asked what conversations we have had with the companies. DCMS, the lead technical Department on the matter, has had extensive and ongoing engagement with the relevant companies, and Ofcom has similarly been in contact with the companies and other entities since the regulations came into force, to ensure that they are as effective as possible. We want to ensure that we create an environment where the companies themselves are our allies in fighting disinformation. Of course, it is in their interests to do so, just as it is in the interests of those brave people fighting the physical war on the frontline in eastern and southern Ukraine.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth, and the former shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Caerphilly, both asked about proceeds—from these fines and, more generally, from asset seizures. In everything we do—this touches on the point made by the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown—we want to ensure that whatever actions we take are robust. I know that there is a tension between working as quickly as he, and I suspect everyone in this room, would want us to work and ensuring that we do not allow loopholes or inadvertently create a sanctions regime that could be struck down by lawyers paid by some of the richest individuals in the world. I get that that can be frustrating. We are working to have a robust regime operating as quickly as possible.
I am not sure whether the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown was in the last SI Committee that considered such measures, but I know that the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth was: we introduced a number of remedies to deficiencies that he had spotted, because we had been moving quickly. I suspect that we will always be in a situation where Opposition Members and, indeed, some Conservative Members will be snapping at the Government’s heels. As I say, it is not always pleasant, but it is an important part of the process, and we will try to move as quickly as possible wherever we can.
The same is true with regard to ensuring that whatever asset seizure mechanism we put in place is absolutely robust. We have to understand that there is an important difference between sanctions, which typically freeze assets, and what is by its nature a more permanent deprivation of assets, where we absolutely have to ensure we are watertight in everything we do. That is true of property—houses, boats, planes and artwork—and of company assets such as these.
On the Crown dependencies and overseas territories, the UK legislates on behalf of the BVIs through Orders in Council, so we do not require any legislative process on their part. We of course stand ready to support the Crown dependencies and overseas territories in enforcing the sanctions. As I said, they are allies in this, and they want to ensure they are on the right side of history with regard to these things.
My hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil raised an important point, and I have to confess that I am not able to give him the detailed response today that he might require. Rather than give him an erroneous answer, I will ensure that I provide him with updated information, and we will put it in a format that every member of the Committee has access to so they can fully understand how this will work.
The hon. Member for Caerphilly raised collaboration, co-operation and co-ordination with the European Union. I assure him that with both the European Union and the United States, we have regular dialogue at ministerial, senior official and technical levels to ensure that, even when our sanctions responses are not identical, they ultimately seek to reinforce each other. The EU, the UK, the US and others have different legislative processes and mechanisms so it is not always possible to be absolutely on the same page at the same time, but we try to co-ordinate and converge as quickly as we can to prevent sanctioned individuals and entities from shifting and moving their assets to avoid international sanctions. That has been very effective up to this point, and I have no doubt that that will continue to be the case.
Stephen Doughty
This may be a more technical question, and I am happy for the Minister to come back to me on it, but during the response to the covid-19 pandemic, there was a concerted effort around the world, and indeed in this country, to deal with anti-vaxxer information and so on across a range of platforms. Can he give us some assurances that in his or DCMS’s conversations with the social media companies, they are discussing how people can report Russian disinformation if it is not, for example, branded as RT but is clearly spreading lies, and ensure that authorities know about it so that action can be taken? That is where a lot of the stuff comes through quite insidiously.
James Cleverly
The hon. Gentleman raises a very good point, and I will ensure that officials and Ministers at DCMS discuss that with the internet companies. That is probably one of the most effective ways of having the coverage of content—sometimes huge volumes of content—so that everyone is a moderator.
We have already imposed, in co-ordination with our partners, a very effective range of sanctions that will have lasting consequences on the Russian economy, specifically because of Putin’s actions. As I speak, 60% of Russia’s foreign currency reserves, worth an estimated £275 billion, are frozen, and our measures cutting off revenue streams are working. Russia is struggling to find buyers for its seaborne oil, which is threatening major export revenues. Working together, we will continue to have an impact on Putin and his regime and hopefully bring this abhorrent war to a swift conclusion that sees the Ukrainians successful.
I thank hon. Members for their contributions, the questions they have asked and the tone in which we have conducted this debate. I also thank them for their ongoing support not only for the sanctions before the Committee today, but for our sanctions package in general. I commend these measures to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 9) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022, No. 477).