Judicial Review and Courts Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Consideration of Lords amendments
Tuesday 26th April 2022 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (James Cartlidge)]

I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Lords amendment 2, and Government motion to disagree.

Lords amendment 3, and Government motion to disagree.

Lords amendment 5, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendment (a) to the words so restored to the Bill.

Lords amendment 11, and Government motion to disagree.

Lords amendments 4, 6 to 10 and 12 to 22.

[James Cartlidge]

I begin by discussing some of the key changes made to the Bill in the other place as a result of amendments brought forward by the Government and I will then turn to the other Lords amendments. Since we last debated the Bill, further measures have been added by the Government with unanimous support from the other place.

First, Lords amendment 7 seeks to give greater flexibility to the online procedure rule committee when it comes to establishing standards relating to dispute resolution conducted online before court proceedings are initiated. It will enable parties who tried to resolve their dispute online prior to commencing legal proceedings, but who do not resolve some or all of their dispute, to then transfer into the legal process seamlessly.

Secondly, Lords amendment 10 will allow coroners to provide registrars with additional information to help to ensure that deaths do not go unregistered. It will address an anomaly whereby, in a small number of cases, families do not register a death when coroners authorise the disposal of a body before any formal death registration has been completed.

Finally, Lords amendment 12 will allow pro bono cost orders to be made in tribunals in much the same way as they are already available in the civil and family courts. It captures the majority of tribunals in which cost orders might be made, but it also creates a power for the Lord Chancellor to bring additional tribunals within the scope of the power through secondary legislation. I urge hon. Members to support those amendments.

A series of minor and technical amendments were also made to the Bill by the Government. I do not intend to go through them in detail, but if any hon. Member has a question about them, I will endeavour to address it in my response to the debate. [Interruption.] I shall expect a flood!

I now turn to the amendments that the Government did not bring forward in the other place. Lords amendment 4 removed the presumption, which provided that a court would have to use the new quashing order powers if they offered adequate redress and there was no good reason not to do so. Lords amendments 1 to 3 remove prospective quashing orders from the Bill.

The courts have several duties with regards to judicial review. They have a duty to individuals who may have been adversely affected by a decision or action, a duty to Parliament to review whether a decision was taken in accordance with the process and procedures set down by the law, and a duty to respect their own limitations and not review the merit of a policy decision or artificially constrain a decision maker’s discretion. They also have wider duties to justice, fairness and the public interest. On many occasions, these duties align and the best outcome for a case is clear, but on other occasions these duties can conflict with the result that the nuance of the circumstances can be lost in the bluntness of the remedy.

The new powers brought forward in this Bill, as introduced, would allow the courts to respond flexibly. As such, I was disappointed that the other place voted, albeit narrowly, to remove the power for quashing orders to be made with limited or no retrospective effect, and I do not need to speak hypothetically. In Canada, another common law country, prospective remedies have been used for some decades to good effect. They have been used, for example, to help vulnerable people maintain important workplace protections that would have ceased to exist had a quashing order applied retrospectively.

Turning to the presumption, I can be brief. The Government do not accept the argument that the presumption fetters discretion or is in some way dangerous. Its purpose is to precipitate the rapid accumulation of jurisprudence on the use of these new powers. In furthering that purpose, however, we have heard persuasive arguments that it is in fact unnecessary. I am reassured, particularly by the learned former members of the judiciary who contributed to the debates in the other place, that judges will use these powers and consider their use regularly without the need for the presumption. Consistency and predictability for their use are further fostered by the list of factors in clause 1(8). I can therefore confirm that the Government will not be bringing back the presumption.

Lords amendment 5 replaced the ouster clause used to remove so-called Cart judicial reviews with a measure that would only prevent such challenges reaching the Court of Appeal, preserving the route of challenge from the upper tribunal to the High Court. I am very grateful to the other place for bringing forward this suggestion, and while I appreciate the sentiment behind such a compromise position, the Government cannot accept this as a meaningful solution to the problems we have set out. While it would tackle some of the resource question, it does nothing to reduce the burden on the High Court or upper tribunal—approximately 180 judge sitting days per year—which is where the burden mainly falls. It also does not tackle the current anomaly of a further challenge to a permission to appeal decision after that application has been rejected by both a lower and a senior court—what has come to be called in this debate, “three bites at the cherry”. The Government propose to bring back the original ouster clause, along with a technical amendment on the Northern Ireland carve-out, to ensure its terminology is consistent with other provisions.

Finally, Lords amendment 11 seeks to provide legal aid for representation for bereaved people at all inquests where public bodies—for example, the police or an NHS trust—are legally represented. While the Government are sympathetic to the intentions of those in the other place, I am afraid I do have concerns about this amendment. As drafted, this amendment would make access to legal aid in these circumstances automatic, removing the means and merits tests, and leading to significant and open-ended costs to the taxpayer. This would go against the principle of targeting legal aid at those who need it most by allowing funding for those who could comfortably afford the cost themselves.

I am very grateful to the hon. Members for Hammersmith (Andy Slaughter) and for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) for meeting me several times to discuss this issue, including with colleagues in the other place. I have assured them that the Government are continuing to make changes to help ensure that bereaved families are truly placed at the heart of the inquest process. Aside from our recent removal of the means test for successful applications for representation through the exceptional case funding scheme, we are also proposing to remove the means test for legal help in relation to any inquests where there is a potential human rights breach or significant wider public interest as part of the means test review that is currently out for consultation. These changes will genuinely help them navigate the inquest process, where appropriate, and I urge hon. Members to await the outcome of this consultation before pursuing further legislation on this issue.

I am grateful to the Members of this House for all their scrutiny of the Bill so far, and I hope today we can accept the changes proposed by the Government on the amendment paper. Even if there remain some small disagreements between us, I am sure all hon. Members here today would like to see this Bill reach Royal Assent, particularly as it contains a number of important court recovery measures. I therefore urge hon. Members to accept the compromises the Government have made, and allow the Bill to finish its passage through both Houses as quickly as possible.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call the shadow Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Wera Hobhouse]

No; I am conscious of time and Madam Deputy Speaker is anxious that we proceed.

The principle should not be party political but one shared across the House. It is disappointing to see the Government pushing ahead with plans to restrict judicial review by opposing the amendments. Unamended, the Bill is described by the Law Society as “chilling”; clauses 1 and 2 undermine judicial review. Prospective-only quashing orders could be hugely harmful to those seeking justice: they would not only deny redress to someone who had been harmed by a public body’s unlawful action, but actively serve as a disincentive to those seeking justice through judicial review.

Let us imagine a person who had incorrectly been deemed ineligible for carer’s allowance by the Department for Work and Pensions. That person successfully challenges the decision through judicial review. Prospective-only quashing orders would mean that the person did not receive the back payments unlawfully denied to them. Those payments could mean the difference between a person heating their house or going cold, or between eating or going hungry.

To make matters worse, extensive delays in courts mean that decisions could be put off for even longer. Prospective-only quashing orders arbitrarily discriminate between those affected by an unlawful measure before a court judgment and those affected after one. There are numerous examples. In 2017, the High Court ruled that a Home Office policy to deport EU rough sleepers was unlawful and discriminatory. The policy was scrapped. If a prospective-only quashing order had applied, then potentially only those receiving a removal notice would be protected; all those who had already faced removal or had had a removal notice issued against them would still have faced deportation. That would not have been justice.

Important as they are, the damaging effects of prospective-only quashing orders go far beyond individual cases. They damage the basic principle that underpins our democracy: that individuals must have the power to challenge the powerful when the powerful get things wrong. If the Government or public bodies are spared the risk of retrospective legal consequences, the motivation for good decision making is lower. Public bodies will take their chances, particularly in issuing welfare benefits, because the cost of getting things wrong would still be lower than getting them right in the first place. That is bad not only for those seeking redress from the courts but for all of us. It should ring alarm bells for all of us.

The Bill is just another Government programme of constitutional reform that weakens the institutions and rights that hold them to account. We saw that in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, the Nationality and Borders Bill and the Government’s voter ID proposals. We Liberal Democrats will continue to stand against any attempts to weaken the institutions and rights that hold the Government and the powerful to account. I urge Members across the House to do the same and vote in favour of Lords amendments 1, 2 and 3.

[James Cartlidge]

I am grateful to all those who have spoken about the Bill today. I have only a short time, so I will briefly canter over the points raised in this important debate. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Andy Slaughter) for recognising that we have made a significant concession on the presumption; we, in turn, are grateful for having been enabled to bring important reforms to judicial review through clauses 1 and 2.

On the issue of judicial review and prospective-only quashing orders, I thought that my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson) made a good point to the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin) in saying that we cannot have it both ways. The Bill gives new powers and flexibility to judges; we should not at the same time fetter judges and try to predict what they would do in individual cases. That is the key point. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), Chair of the Justice Committee, said, this is about giving judges an extra club in the bag—a golf analogy; I said that it was another tool in the toolbox. Whether we use DIY or sport analogies, we all understand that there is an extra tool for the judiciary—more powers and flexibility.

On the issue of Cart JR, my hon. Friend made a really important point. The resource issue is about High Court judges, particularly in the Queen’s bench division, who after all hear some of the most serious cases around the country, not just in London.

I understand where my hon. Friend is coming from, and concerns from all hon. Members, when it comes to legal aid. I have previously expressed my strong sympathy—particularly for MPs in the north-west, who have had a long experience around Hillsborough. Of course we are looking at that and other matters.

The hon. Member for Hammersmith is aware of the measures that we have already introduced. Even if we agreed on this measure, the Opposition would surely have to accept that it simply would not be possible for such a significant measure to be introduced at such a late hour in the course of a Bill. Were we to continue to go back and forth on this, we would risk undermining the Bill—and we must not forget that it also contains very important measures on criminal procedure, not least changes in magistrates’ sentencing powers. As soon as those new powers come in, they will start to have an impact on our backlog by ensuring that cases that would otherwise be dealt with in the Crown courts can be heard in magistrates courts. I therefore think it important for the Bill to receive Royal Assent.

As I have said, I am pleased to commend the vast majority of the Lords amendments to Members, but I ask them to join me in disagreeing with Lords amendments 1, 2, 3, 5 and 11, and agreeing to the Government’s amendment (a) while disagreeing with Lords amendment 5.

Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.

14:30

Division 262

Ayes: 297

Noes: 56

Lords amendment 1 disagreed to.

--- Later in debate ---

14:46

Division 263

Ayes: 297

Noes: 61

Lords amendment 5 disagreed to.

--- Later in debate ---

14:58

Division 264

Ayes: 299

Noes: 168

Lords amendment 11 disagreed to.