17:21 - Division on Lord McKenzie of Luton’s amendment. - Ayes: 106 / Noes: 140 - Amendment disagreed.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Lord Freud)
My Lords, this Bill will ensure that, following the recent Court of Appeal judgment in the case of Wilson and Reilly versus the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, the Government will not have to repay previous benefit sanctions to claimants who have failed to participate in mandatory back to work programmes. It will also enable the Government to impose benefit sanctions where a sanction decision has been put on hold because of the Wilson and Reilly case.
I shall briefly set out the details of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, but let us first be clear on what this case was not about. The court did not cast any doubt on the policy intention behind any of the schemes. In the words of Sir Stanley Burnton, one of the judges, the case was,
“not about the social, economic, political or other merits of the Employment, Skills and Enterprise Scheme”,
and the court noted that the use of mandation was appropriate in such schemes.
The policy intention of our schemes has been clear to all from the outset. I have said that the Court of Appeal judgment was not about the social or other merits of the employment, skills and enterprise scheme, but the judges were not silent on the broad principle underlying mandatory employment schemes. Lord Justice Pill said:
“A policy of imposing requirements on persons receiving a substantial weekly sum, potentially payable for life, is readily understandable. Equally, the means sought to achieve that end are understandable; claimants should be required to participate in arrangements which may improve their prospects of obtaining remunerative employment”.
Again, I say that the case was not about the policy intent of the schemes, which has been clear from their inception.
So what was the judgment about? The judgment centred on the Jobseeker’s Allowance (Employment, Skills and Enterprise Scheme) Regulations 2011, which for brevity’s sake I will from now on refer to as the ESE regulations. These regulations provide for most of the mandatory back to work schemes, including the Work Programme.
First, the court rejected the claimants’ argument that the ESE regulations were contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights—specifically, Article 4.2 on forced labour. Secondly, it rejected the claimants’ argument that the ESE regulations could not be enforced in the absence of a formal published policy.
However, the court found against DWP on two grounds. It found that the ESE regulations did not describe the programmes that they underpinned in enough detail. It also upheld the High Court’s ruling that letters sent to claimants when they were mandated to an ESE scheme were insufficiently detailed to comply with Regulation 4 of the ESE regulations. We have since laid new regulations and issued revised letters so that we can continue to mandate claimants to our schemes and ensure their continued proper functioning in accordance with the principle of imposing requirements on jobseekers in return for paying them benefit.
Your Lordships will not be shocked to learn that the department fundamentally disagrees with the court’s verdict in respect of the two latter grounds, which is why it has applied for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court the Court of Appeal’s judgment in respect of those two grounds. The arguments that we will make before the Supreme Court, if we are granted permission—
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
If the department was so upset and disagreed with the decision, why did it take it so long to bring legislation before Parliament?
Lord Freud
I will come on to explain that in a little.
The arguments that we will make before the Supreme Court, if we are granted permission, will not be affected by this Bill. However, we need the Bill to provide certainty that the Government are not in a position where we will have to repay previous benefit sanctions, and can impose sanctions where decisions have been stayed, in respect of claimants who have failed to take part in employment programmes without good reason. We have made it clear that we will take steps to ensure that claimants cannot expect a sanction refund as a result of this judgment, and there is a compelling public interest for taking those steps.
The Bill does not overturn previous appeals that have succeeded on the basis of good cause and it does not prevent claimants from appealing a sanction on the basis of good reason. Instead, it ensures that claimants who have failed to participate with no good reason do not obtain an undeserved windfall payment. We estimate that such a windfall could cost the public purse up to £130 million. That is money that would be better spent on people who take their responsibilities seriously, and it is in the public interest that we ensure this.
There is also an important public interest, as the Court of Appeal recognised, in getting people back to work by ensuring that jobseeker’s allowance is paid only to those who are actively seeking employment and who engage with attempts made by the state to achieve that end, and that those who do not do so face the appropriate consequences. The Bill will protect this public interest by ensuring that those who have not engaged with attempts made by the state to return them to work face the appropriate consequences, rather than receiving an undeserved windfall.
The Government respect the general principle that Parliament should not legislate to reverse the effects of the judgments of the court for past cases unless the situation is exceptional. However, it is entirely proper to enact such legislation if there is a compelling reason to do so. There is a compelling reason here on three grounds: first, the cost involved; secondly, the claimants affected do not deserve a windfall payment; and, thirdly, this is an unusual case in social security legislation where a court or tribunal decision has a retrospective effect.
The Bill will provide that any decision to reduce jobseeker’s allowance under the ESE regulations cannot be challenged on the grounds that those regulations were invalid or the notices given under them inadequate. It makes similar provision in relation to the mandatory work activity regulations in respect of notices given under those regulations.
I have said that we fundamentally disagree with the court’s verdict with respect to the lawfulness of the ESE regulations and the notices given under them. We believe that those regulations were correctly drafted. They were drafted to be flexible enough to encompass a wide range of programmes designed to support jobseekers into work. There was no clear and identified need to go further than the ESE regulations in order to lawfully mandate claimants to our schemes.
The Merits of Statutory Instruments Committee, as it was then called, published a report that covered the ESE regulations on 5 May 2011. The Merits Committee had a number of concerns, including the quality of the Explanatory Memorandum. To go off on a tangent, I want to acknowledge that there was a period when we were not servicing the Merits Committee adequately, and I have taken steps since then to improve that position. The Merits Committee had concerns, but the possibility that the ESE regulations were unlawful was not one of them. The committee drew attention to the fact that the regulations,
“interpret the Act very broadly so that future changes to the Scheme could be made administratively without any reference to Parliament”.
However, it did not go on to suggest that they went beyond the primary powers.
The Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments also considered the ESE regulations at its meeting on 15 June 2011. I am sorry to report that no fewer than three instances of defective drafting were identified, which the department acknowledged. However, the committee did not raise even the possibility that the ESE regulations were unlawful. The Social Security Advisory Committee, whose independent and informed advice we value greatly and with which we have a very constructive relationship, also considered the ESE regulations. Among other issues, it made a point about the breadth of the powers, but it did not suggest that they went beyond the primary powers. Similarly, those primary powers in the Welfare Reform Act 2009 received full scrutiny. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee regarded the delegations in the relevant part of the Act and the associated scrutiny procedure as unexceptionable.
We consider that the primary powers do not require that the regulations set out the fine details of the scheme. We believe that it is undesirable to do so, as a wide variety of possible arrangements could be made, depending on the nature of the labour market conditions in particular parts of the country. We also need to be able to respond to changing conditions and challenges quickly and effectively.
We believe that the flexibility that the ESE regulations provided was rational and desirable, and it must be remembered that the High Court ruled that the regulations were lawful. We therefore cannot agree with the Court of Appeal’s judgment. We also believe that the letters issued to claimants provided sufficient information on the consequences of not participating in our schemes. In addition to the information provided in the letter, claimants would have also discussed the precise details of the scheme with their jobcentre adviser, including what was expected of them and the consequences of not upholding their side of the bargain.
Nevertheless, following the High Court judgment, we revised all referral notices to comply with the judgment and sent letters clarifying the position to the then claimants impacted by the decision. That allowed us to continue to operate the schemes as intended—an intention that has been clear to all from the scheme’s inception, based on principles which the effects of the Court of Appeal judgment undermines and which the Bill is intended to protect.
It is right that we are able to operate our schemes as intended, giving jobseekers the opportunity to improve their chances of moving into work, with appropriate consequences for those who fail to take up that opportunity. It is right that government resources are targeted on those claimants who are actively seeking employment and taking all reasonable steps to improve their chances of securing employment and that resources are not wasted on those who have not met their responsibilities.
To pick up the question asked by the noble Lord, as soon as the judgment was handed down, the department explored all the options and avenues available to it to ensure the protection of the public interest. Once the decision to pursue emergency legislation was taken, that required legal advice, the appropriate consent prior to introduction and preparing the Bill products. We also engaged the Opposition, who rightly gave the matter thorough consideration. I am sure that all noble Lords will appreciate the time that that has taken.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
As I understand it, this lay in the department without any suggestion of legislation for more than a month. If the department had been really concerned about it, the legislation could have been dealt with through the normal procedure. Instead, both the other place and your Lordships’ House are faced with emergency legislation, which is entirely unsatisfactory for examining such an important Bill in detail. All the subsequent stages will be dealt with on Monday. That is not adequate scrutiny. Does the noble Lord not feel some guilt or embarrassment at having to deal with it in this way?
Lord Freud
My Lords, obviously, it is never desirable to have emergency legislation where one can avoid it. It would be desirable to run this through a more normal process, but we are caught by time constraints. The point that the noble Lord made about delay is accounted for by the various steps that we have had to take in that period.
In conclusion, the Bill guarantees some fundamental principles, which are about helping us to move people into employment and protecting the public purse. I commend the Bill to the House and I beg to move.
Amendment to the Motion
Baroness Sherlock
My Lords, what a sorry state of affairs we find ourselves in. I almost feel sorry for the Minister, or I would if this shambles were not entirely of the Government’s own making. This debate has made clear the depressing, and I suppose rather shocking, extent of the Government’s failings. It seems as though crucial regulations underpinning the conditionality regime of the Government’s flagship, if utterly useless, Work Programme, as well as various other schemes, have been ruled unlawful by the Court of Appeal, and the Government now want to rectify the problem that they have created by forcing this Bill through Parliament at breakneck speed.
My noble friend Lord McKenzie made the point that the Constitution Committee has said clearly that it disagrees with the Government’s assessment, and we have now heard that, as it were, from the horse’s mouth in an extraordinarily powerful speech from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. This is only the fourth time that I have spoken from the Dispatch Box in your Lordships’ House, but I suspect that if I were spared to do so another 400 times I would never begin to match the power of a speech like that, and I congratulate him. I am glad that it is the Minister, not me, who has to respond to it. The point that the noble Lord made, which I think is very interesting, is that the Government, having decided that the matter could take four weeks to consider from the time when they got the new regulations laid and enforced in this House, suddenly decided that there was a panic. I would like the Minister to return to this in his response.
In response to my noble friend Lord Foulkes, I think the Minister implied that the Government spent those four weeks considering all the various options before deciding on this deeply attractive one out of the collection. Will he explain why the Government did not consider the options before the decision? Presumably there were always two possible outcomes from the judgment, yes or no, so it would have been possible for them to spend time in advance of the ruling considering what they might do if they lost the case. Why did they have to wait for four weeks to consider the options and then come to Parliament to tell us that, having waited for four weeks, we had to rush through this in days? I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say.
The shambles is even more annoying because the Government were warned. The Minister seemed to imply that the Social Security Advisory Committee did not tell them that the regulations were illegal, but perhaps he could help me. I understood that the committee drew attention to the overly wide scope of the regulation that was being used. Was that not one of the points on which the Court of Appeal found against the Government? If not, perhaps he could correct me, and I invite him to do so now if he wishes.
Lord Freud
The point that was being made by the SSAC about the width was that it meant that it was not necessary to come back to Parliament for specific approvals on particular schemes. It was not that this was likely to be against the law. The point was about parliamentary oversight.
Baroness Sherlock
I thank the Minister for explaining that, but of course it was on precisely the fact that parliamentary oversight and scrutiny of the nature of these regulations is important that I understand the Court of Appeal found against the Government. At the very least, this was a pretty heavy hint from the Social Security Advisory Committee, one that the Government managed to ignore completely.
Then there is the issue of retrospection, to which I barely need to turn after the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. As my noble friend Lord Bach noted, the worst aspect of this debacle is the combination of retrospection and fast-tracking. That is a particularly toxic mix, but it is what we are faced with. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s explanation of how the circumstances here make it necessary to bring forward this particular form of retrospection with this astonishingly foreshortened timetable, a point made by the noble Lord, Lord German. If the Minister’s response on that point is not compelling, I look forward to seeing the noble Lord join us in the Division Lobby should my noble friend Lord McKenzie decide to press his deplore Motion to a vote.
Like my noble friend Lord McKenzie, I am grateful to my noble friends Lady Royall of Blaisdon and Lord Bassam for trying to get us a few extra days to consider this matter. At least we now have the weekend to read the papers in more detail. I am also grateful that my right honourable friends Liam Byrne and Stephen Timms in the other place managed to get the Bill changed so that it would at least guarantee appeal rights for those affected by the sanctions process and ensure an independent review of that process.
It now falls to us in this House to do two things. The first is to register that this state of affairs is not right. The amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord McKenzie of Luton simply puts on record what we on these Benches think about the mess that the Government have got themselves into and the way they propose to get themselves out of it. I very much hope that the House will support it. We will then get down to the work that this House does best: doing our best, in the limited time that we have, to scrutinise the Government’s plans to ensure that there are no more disasters lurking in the undergrowth of this fast-tracked Bill.
There is a whole series of issues to which we will have to come back in Committee on Monday. For example, we know that appeal rights are to be safeguarded, but how can those appeals be robust when there is such a long time lag between the alleged breaches and the sanction being applied? As various noble Lords have said, how will the Government ensure fair treatment of a complainant who may have said that they had perfectly good cause not to comply with the requirement of a programme but who will struggle to evidence that months after the event? There is also the question of hardship. What kind of hardship regime will apply? The hardship regime is in the process of changing. How will the Government ensure that appropriate help is given to those who would suffer hardship as a result of sanctions?
Then there is the $64,000 question posed by my noble friend Lord Bach: will the Minister guarantee that anyone wishing to challenge decisions will have the same right to access to legal advice or aid as they would have done at the time the alleged breach took place, under regulations that have been found to be lawful?
There is so much more that I would like to ask, but we will have to wait until the dog end of Monday’s sitting, to which the remaining stages of the Bill have been confined. The message from today is clear: this is a shambles. I am beginning to wonder whether the Government’s entire approach to getting people into work is not itself a shambles. The evidence is clear. The Government are failing the unemployed of this country. They are failing to create jobs. They are failing to help them get back into jobs. Their flagship Work Programme—
Lord Freud
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their valuable and interesting contributions. I need to register some disappointment that the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie of Luton, has tabled this regret Motion on the Second Reading of the Bill. I am saddened by that approach particularly because it contrasts to the very constructive approach of his party in another place. I hope that he does not press the Motion to a vote.
I shall deal directly with the various points raised. The first is the point about government competence. The ESE regulations were drafted to be flexible enough to encompass a wide range of programmes designed to support jobseekers into work. Introducing new regulations for each individual scheme would have been more bureaucratic and expensive. We do not agree that the regulations were ultra vires, and have applied to the Supreme Court for permission to appeal. We believe that the primary legislation does not require that the regulations set out the fine details of each different programme, and, indeed, that was the position taken by the High Court. In fact, we believe that it is undesirable to do so and that this was not Parliament’s intention since a wide variety of possible arrangements could be made depending on the nature of the labour market conditions in particular parts of the country. It is important that we have the flexibility to amend these schemes to reflect the changing labour market conditions on the ground without going through a laborious legislative process which would delay change beneficial to the claimants.
I also want to point out that the ESE regulations were considered by the House of Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and the non-parliamentary Social Security Advisory Committee, as I said in my opening remarks. None of those committees suggested that the regulations were outside the relevant Act’s powers. They raised different issues.
The Motion also makes reference to the High Court and Court of Appeal judgments that the letters provided did not contain sufficient information to claimants about the consequences of not participating in these schemes, a point which the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, made with some vigour. That is not the Government’s view and that is why we have sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Regulation 4(2)(e) of the ESE regulations simply required that the notice specify,
“information about the consequences of failing to participate in the Scheme”.
All our letters before the High Court explained that claimants could lose up to 26 weeks of benefit if they did not comply. That is clearly information about the consequences of failing to participate.
Claimants sanctioned under the ESE regulations knew perfectly well what was required of them. The notices that we sent to them clearly set out that they would face a benefit sanction if they failed to participate, and they have had detailed ongoing discussions with their Jobcentre Plus adviser about these schemes. The idea that these claimants failed to participate in these schemes because they knew that a court might decide that the regulations were ultra vires or the notice defective, particularly before any court case had been brought, is, quite frankly, ridiculous. There is no sensible case of unfairness to the claimants in this case.
As the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, said in 2009 while debating the Welfare Reform Act in this very place:
“Of course there is a very easy way to avoid being sanctioned in the first place, which is to engage with the programme”.—[Official Report, 11/6/09; col. GC 136.]
These claimants failed to do so and must face the consequences of their actions. They are not deserving of a windfall payment as the result of a technical ruling by the Court of Appeal.
Lord Pannick
Will the Minister explain how it can be fair or a question of windfall when these claimants had no lawful obligation at that time to go on these courses? Surely that is the point. The Court of Appeal has so held.
Lord Freud
My Lords, it was clearly laid down in the primary legislation that that was an expectation, and they were informed by their advisers of that expectation. We are looking now at a subsequent finding by the Court of Appeal, on which we have asked for leave to appeal. However, nobody could have anticipated the finding, which is in dispute. There was a lot more information going to clients than was in that letter, because they were in communication with their advisers.
One of the fundamental points at issue here is that we are trying to design a much more flexible welfare system in which we individualise responses. That means that we do not send out loads of generic letters with long lines of prose about what will happen if you do this, that or the other. We are aiming to have a specific conversation with people through a flexible system.
Baroness Hollis of Heigham
My Lords, surely the Minister has accepted his own department’s research that up to two-thirds of those sanctioned did not understand that the failure to do as they were asked or told to do would result in a sanction. They did not know, and his department’s research confirms that.
Lord Freud
My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness on this—the sanctions have not been well designed. We are redesigning the whole regime, as we did in the recent Act, to make sure that people understand what sanctions are about.
Lord Low of Dalston
My Lords, can the Minister help me on one point? I have been listening very carefully to what he said. As I understand it, he is telling us that the claimants fell foul of the legislation in terms of what it was anticipated to mean by the department. However, we all know that the meaning of legislation cannot always be anticipated with certainty when it is contested; it often requires a court decision to clarify what the legislation means. I think that the Minister is telling us that the claimants fell foul of the legislation as the Government wanted it to be interpreted but not, in fact, as it was interpreted. We have to look at what the Court of Appeal held to know what the legislation meant, not what the Minister hoped it might mean.
Lord Freud
As noble Lords know, we are seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court to test that specific matter. I will shortly come on to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about why we have fast-tracked this Bill. However, we have explored all the avenues and have not taken a decision to fast-track lightly. We have looked at other measures to prevent this course of action but none provides a sufficient guarantee. People have been concerned about the four-week period. We have also spent a significant period discussing, through the usual channels, agreement to expedite this legislation.
Let me make clear why the retrospective legislation is necessary. The Government respect the general principle that Parliament should not legislate to reverse the effects of court judgments on past cases unless the situation is exceptional. However, it is entirely proper to enact such legislation if there is a compelling reason to do so. Perhaps I may spell out the three reasons which make this an exceptional case. First, there is significant money involved—£130 million—in very difficult, austere times. Secondly, the money would go to a group of people who neither expect nor deserve to obtain a windfall payment. These claimants knew exactly what was required of them. They failed to participate without good cause and were rightly sanctioned. Thirdly, this case is most unusual in terms of social security legislation.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
The noble Lord is repeating word for word what he said in his introductory speech. Why does he not reply and answer the important questions that have been raised? For example, why did he not ask for his appeal to the Supreme Court to be fast-tracked? Can he not answer the debate instead of repeating what he said at the beginning?
Lord Freud
I am doing my best to explain the reason why this is exceptional. I did not explain it in detail at the outset, so I am really grateful for the opportunity, reinforced by the noble Lord, to explain the exception.
The third reason why this is exceptional is to do with the nature of social security legislation. In almost all cases regarding social security decisions, the decisions of a court or tribunal are only prospective in nature. That is because the most common way in which to challenge a social security decision, including the underlying regulations, is to bring an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. If that happens, the normal route is followed and the decision of the tribunal will not have a retrospective effect because of Section 27 of the Social Security Act 1998. It is only because there is an anomaly in the text of Section 27 that it does not apply to judicial review cases. That is something that I suspect that this Government will come back to, to clear up. It is clear from Section 27 that Parliament recognised that wholesale retrospective disruption of the social security system was not desirable. That is even more true in a case like this, when the beneficiaries of that disruption are not deserving of the windfall that they would otherwise receive. That is why this is exceptional.
I turn to the reason why we need to fast-track the Bill. I want to respond to the rather witty way in which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, put his view that there was no urgency by explaining to him and other noble Lords that we have applied for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. If we are not given that permission to go ahead—and that could come out any day—we immediately become liable to pay back the sanction money of £130 million. That is why there is particular urgency and that is why we are fast-tracking this legislation. We need to provide certainty to taxpayers that we will not spend this money in this way, unnecessarily. The department will endeavour to process the stockpile cases in a robust, transparent and efficient manner. While there is clearly a trade-off between robustness and speed, we will aim to do that as practically as possible.
Lord Pannick
I thank the Minister, who has been very kind. I have one more question for him. He says that it is necessary to have certainty, but why not wait until the Supreme Court rules? If the Government win, as they say they are so confident of doing, there is no problem. If they lose, they can bring emergency legislation before Parliament to clear up the matter in a few days before anyone can complain that they have not been paid out. Why not follow that route?
Lord Freud
The moment that there is a ruling—if there were to be a ruling—against the department, we would be liable from that moment to repay. What would we do? Would we obfuscate, say that we could not pay and were dealing with the paper work while we put through emergency legislation? We would be obliged to make the payments from the moment when the ruling came through. That is what this is about. It is why we are going ahead at this time and at this speed, which is clearly not something that we enjoy doing.
I turn to the review, which we have taken on in response to the Opposition in the other place requesting such a review. It will focus on the sanctions affected by the provisions of the Bill, which amount to roughly 25% of all JSA sanctions issued in the period. I have heard today concern from Peers about how DWP issues sanctions to JSA claimants more generally. I would like to make it clear that the department will discuss with the Opposition the terms of reference of the sanctions review. I assure noble Lords that the stockpile of claimants who are issued with a benefit sanction as a result of the legislation will receive the same information that is received by all claimants who are sanctioned for failing to participate in a scheme; namely, they will be told about their right to appeal, how to appeal and how they can go about claiming for hardship.
I will try to pick up as many of the questions that I have not dealt with as I can. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, appreciates how closely we have studied the Constitution Committee’s report. I can tell him that Miss Reilly will not be affected by the legislation as she complied with the scheme that she was required to attend and was not sanctioned. I say to the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, that we needed to put the regulations out within a day to keep mandating claimants going forward. The retrospective legislation required careful thought and an exploration of all the avenues. We also consulted the Opposition and the whole process took some weeks. I assure the noble Lord that there are absolutely no benchmarks or targets for sanction referrals. Sanctions will involve a temporary loss of benefit. We will not seek lump sums from people in work. We will look to use good cause and, for the more recent sanctions, good reason, but they are in practice the same.
As I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, a little earlier, the information given to claimants was not confined to what was in the letters. The sanction decision notice provides information on how to appeal and access other help. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, was concerned about legal aid. The first stage of the tribunal process is inquisitorial and legal aid is not required. It helps to ensure that everything that is relevant is considered. That is the job of the tribunal. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, that the Bill is compatible with the ECHR and will overturn some of the undesirable consequences of the judgment. That should not be done lightly but it is entirely proper to do so in the circumstances.
A number of noble Lords enjoyed having a go at the Work Programme. However, it has resulted in 200,000 people moving off benefits. The PAC report is somewhat premature in its conclusion about what is happening. I look forward to talking about that programme further in the months to come. I conclude by urging the noble Lord to withdraw—
Baroness Lister of Burtersett
I quite understand that the noble Lord has not been able to answer all the questions that were asked. However, will we get answers to those questions over the weekend?
Lord Freud
I have done my best to answer them. We will have a chance to go through some of these issues again in detail on Monday. I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his regret Motion. I commend the Bill to the House.