Lord Lucas
My Lords, both segments of the amendment are in effect questions that ask my noble friend where he envisages that the limits of the FCA’s powers will lie in dealing with what I perceive to be a couple of current problems. The first part of the amendment is aimed at things such as tropical forestry investment. One finds full-page advertisements in supplements, in particular in the Guardian but doubtless in other places. Presumably, advertisers think that Guardian readers are notable suckers for green investment. The advertisements promise rates of return varying from 18% to 22% per annum over a period of 15 years, and are backed up by a remarkable lack of financial information of any kind—just lots of happy pictures of growing trees and talk about the value of the eventual timber and the many uses for it, about the unspecified rise in the market price of timber, and so on. As far as I can make out, they are complete scams. I investigated one of them in as much detail as I could—which turned out not to be very much, because not much was forthcoming.
The schemes escape FSA regulation because they are not considered to be collective investment schemes. Although they involve a collection of people pursuing a single investment objective—which is the way the scheme manager makes money—they are not collective in the sense that at their root is individual ownership of a separate plot of trees, land in the UK, wine or another similar separable asset. Therefore, the FSA currently is unable to regulate them.
Thanks to my noble friend, I had very helpful conversations on this matter with his department, where officials said that the tack that I was originally pursuing might lead to the FCA having all sorts of jurisdiction over arrangements that were essentially private, such as arrangements between consenting adults to do something that might or might not be to their advantage but which the FCA would have no business regulating. Therefore, I attempted to reapply myself to what must be—from the frequency and scale of the advertisements—a large-scale fraud by now, and attach myself to the concept that if something is widely advertised as a consumer investment it is something to which the FCA should be able to pay attention. That is a reasonable way of separating large-scale public frauds from minor arrangements that should be outwith the ambit of the FCA.
The second part of the amendment deals with the fees or benefits that accrue to managers of investments. I will take as a particular example stock lending fees. Over a long period the FSA has been unable to make managers declare their full benefits from managing funds. The level of fees in this country is far too high anyway. Managers take far too large a proportion of the total return. Noble Lords may have heard the Danes on the radio this morning, threatening to bring low-cost investment management to the UK. Good luck to them; I hope that they will be permitted to do so. However, we ought also to pay attention to our own business, and to making sure that, where a firm says that it charges 1.5%, that is what it will charge, and that it will not indulge in something that is essentially a risky practice and take all the benefit from it without telling its clients that that is what it is doing.
There are a number of ways in which the City has derived benefit from the investment management process. One that particularly gets my goat is high-frequency trading, which is robbery by any other name. People get a preferential supply of information about trades and are able to surf the wave of real investors’ trades. Every penny that they make is at the expense of real investors—in other words, our pensions. The only reason we tolerate it is that they are doing this to foreigners as well, so we are making more money out of it than we are losing. That is not a healthy way to go on. We should have an open and transparent arrangement for saying how money is earned in the City, and it should be clear to people who are investing exactly what bite the managers and others in the City are taking out of a scheme, so that they can make a reasonable judgment on whether this is the right place to invest or whether they should take their money off to somewhere where they will be allowed a higher share of the total return. I beg to move.
The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for bringing up these important matters. As he knows, they are not easily dealt with. I will say a few things about where we are. I will not dwell too much on the specifics of the amendment because, as he said, his intention is to provoke a discussion around some of these topics rather than around the specific drafting.
The difficulty around these unregulated activities and schemes is that a line must be drawn between regulated and unregulated activities. Around the margin, wherever the line is drawn, there will always be incentives for rogues to exploit the boundary. This may well be what people are doing on some of the schemes to which he referred—I do not want to express a view. The first thing that we need to recognise is that a line has to be drawn between regulated and unregulated activities. For example, we would not want to draw the regulatory net so wide that it would capture investments in a family farming business or investments by family and friends in a small start-up business—the sort of activity that as a Government and as a House we very much encourage.
Once one accepts that there will be investment schemes that involve a number of people that we do not want to capture in the regulatory net, there will always be a borderline, and I fear that there will also be people who seek to exploit it. It certainly appears that the schemes that my noble friend referred to were structured specifically to avoid being captured in regulations. That means that the regulator cannot act unless either the schemes fall into the regulatory net, or the promoters of the schemes hold themselves out to be regulated. Some fall into the trap of holding themselves out to be authorised and regulated, and then they can be caught. However, the majority do not. I do not think we can simply or easily change the definition of a collective investment scheme in Section 235 of FiSMA to address the point, because either the boundary will shift somewhere else, or we will capture the sorts of legitimate activity that I have referred to.
What my noble friend Lord Lucas usefully draws attention to is the role of the FSA at present, and that of the FCA in future, which is to think very hard about the preventive consumer education work that is needed to warn the public about the risks of these unauthorised schemes. The fact that my noble friend regularly comes back to them undoubtedly helps to raise that awareness. On the other side, the regulator, whether it is the FSA or the FCA, will also work with the police, trading standards, and the Insolvency Service in this space to do whatever they can. However, I appreciate that unregulated activities will be nigh on impossible to stamp out altogether. I am sorry, but it is no great surprise that I cannot give my noble friend Lord Lucas a complete answer on that.
On fund management fees, the main point is to give my noble friend reassurance that there is a substantial regime in place through the FSA’s rulebook regarding the disclosure of investment management fees. There is a lot of debate and discussion in this area at the moment. The fact that it was discussed on Radio 4 this morning shows that this is becoming an issue which is getting a lot of exposure, which must be a good thing in terms of making investors aware of how much of their capital can disappear through regular compounding of fees. Whether the fee levels in the UK are particularly high or not, compared to other jurisdictions, is clearly not a straightforward matter but is another dimension of this which has been referred to. Ultimately I suggest that these issues are not matters for the Bill beyond the fact that I am sure that the FCA will have all the powers necessary in this area. It is an area in which awareness-raising of the sort which my noble friend is engaged in will focus the regulators to use the powers that they have. I am grateful to him for raising these points, but I ask him to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Lucas
My Lords, of course, I am grateful to my noble friend for his reply, although I do not share his optimism as to the number of people listening. As far as advertisements are concerned I can see I have lost that argument, and we will wait until some crisis arises and events force the Government’s hand. There we are. People should have been more careful with their money; they should have known that 20% compound for 15 years was probably not safe.
So far as investment management is concerned, I think we have been doing some useful things in these last few years in paying real attention to fees, to executive remuneration, and to other ways in which the return to capital is being eroded and the way in which that is costing us all in terms of pensions, support for pensioners and the health of the economy. I hope we continue to make progress. I shall certainly take an interest in the way the FCA asks for disclosure in this area. However, for the moment I thank my noble friend and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Borrie kindly drew the Committee’s attention to my position as chair of the Consumer Credit Counselling Service and I declare my interest again. I would also like to thank him very much for his kind remarks about the work of the charity, which does so much for people who have unmanageable debt.
This is a wide-ranging group of amendments in the sense of issues that have been raised. I will focus on two areas: the claims management area and the debt management space. Claims management companies have increased in number and have come to the attention of the public, and the industries in which they operate, much more in recent years. You have only to turn on the TV or listen to the radio to be bombarded with advertisements from claims management companies. E-mail traffic is also increasing.
There are apparently more than 3,200 authorised firms operating today. Of course, many in the claims management industry act responsibly. The part of the industry that does not adhere to best practice breaches guidelines on cold calling, text messaging and e-mails. Some will take up-front fees and/or fail to disclose properly the amount of compensation that a consumer will pay if their claim is successful. Through high-pressure sales they will sign up people who have no possibility of making a successful claim on the basis that they can get you thousands of pounds in compensation.
That sort of activity is prohibited under existing regulation, but unless it is effectively policed it comes to nothing. However, large numbers of those in the industry do not adhere to best practice and a few could even be described as rogues. In a recent debate on this subject in your Lordships’ House, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said that the Government need to take a long, hard look at the industry, look at existing provisions and make a number of changes to beef-up existing regulation and ensure that existing provisions are used effectively in an industry that needs effective policing.
In those circumstances, it is also fair to pick up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Flight, that the current arrangements with the Ministry of Justice acting as both the sponsoring department and the regulator appear to have broken down. It would be good if the Minister could report on what progress has been made on this list of helpful suggestions.
My noble friend Lord Borrie drew attention to the debt management sector and in particular to the 2007 Act. There are nothing like as many private sector debt management firms in the UK, as much of the debt advice is undertaken by charitable bodies such as Citizens Advice and my own body the CCCS, which offer a free service of high quality. Collectively, commercial firms administer some 200,000 debt management plans and about 50,000 IVAs. The trade body, DEMSA, estimates that this is some 40% of all the debt management plans currently in operation.
DEMSA states that its goal is to promote best practice and protect the interests of clients and the lenders to which they owe money, but in its review of the sector in 2010 already referred to, the OFT found instances of non-compliance among DEMSA member firms, albeit DEMSA members received a clean bill of health compared to the rest of the sector, and action was taken on a number of firms.
On the publication of its report on debt management in March 2012, the chair of the BIS Select Committee, Adrian Bailey MP, said:
“During these difficult economic times, increasing numbers of people up and down the country—not least some of the most vulnerable members of our society—are relying on the provision of consumer debt management services and payday loans to make ends meet. And yet this industry remains opaque and poorly regulated. Despite a Government consultation that ended almost a year ago little has been done to remedy the situation. The Government must take swift and decisive action to prevent firms from abusing the needs of such a vulnerable customer base”.
The committee’s main recommendations are worth repeating. The Government must work to phase out up-front fees: the provision of guidance on this point by the OFT is inadequate. The Government should introduce the necessary regulations to ensure companies publish the cost of their debt advice and their outcomes if an agreement cannot be reached during discussions with the industry. The Government should establish effective auditing of debt management companies’ client accounts. The report concludes that greater transparency in the commercial debt advice market would benefit consumers hugely and that voluntary codes of practice are highly unlikely to achieve this aim. The Government must be prepared to regulate if consumers are to receive the protection and the level of information they require.
It seems clear from all this that we have reached the stage in these two sectors whereby strong and effective regulation is required. We also think it is time that the Government should take advantage of the opportunity of the Financial Services Bill to make the new regulatory bodies responsible for this currently unregulated part of the market which affects so many vulnerable customers.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, this group contains an interesting mix of loosely related amendments, if they are related at all. I shall respond first to the amendments concerning claims management firms.
Amendments 118D and 147K seek to bring claims management companies under the regulation of the FCA. Clearly the regulation of claims management companies must be effective, but there are two reasons why a transfer of CMC regulation to the FCA is not the right course of action. First, the best way to improve regulation of CMCs is to make changes to the current regime, rather than by transferring responsibility for regulation to another body. My noble friend has already questioned whether the transfer of consumer credit responsibilities by April 2014 is achievable. I should say, in parenthesis, that I believe it is achievable, although I appreciate that there is a lot to do. There will be a consultation early in 2013 about how it will operate. However, we are talking here about making another transfer of responsibilities, which I do not believe is necessary or the best way to achieve the objective.
The Ministry of Justice, as we have heard, is the body responsible for regulating the activities of businesses providing claims management services. It carried out a review last year of claims management regulation which concluded that fundamental reform was not needed but identified a number of areas where improvements could be made. A shift in responsibilities now would not address the underlying problems in the conduct of claims management companies and would detract from the concrete steps that the Government are taking to address those problems.
Lord McFall of Alcluith
The Minister said that the Ministry of Justice undertook a review that concluded that fundamental reform was not needed. As I mentioned earlier, two months ago I chaired a meeting between the banks and consumer groups on PPI, where £8 billion is at stake. Both groups were very concerned about some rogue claims management companies and asked for an urgent meeting with the Ministry of Justice. Indeed, I hope that they will get a meeting with Ken Clarke as a result. Therefore, on the ground the situation is much different from the one the Minister describes, with the Ministry of Justice saying that fundamental reform is not needed.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I have said, however, that improvements are needed, as was identified in the review. If any impetus is needed in setting up the meeting which the noble Lord seeks, I shall relay the message to my colleagues in the Ministry of Justice to make sure that it happens if it is not already fixed. Yes, there are problems to fix. They include—very much to the point of the noble Lord, Lord McFall—the establishment by the claims management regulator of a specialist team to handle CMCs that pursue claims for mis-sold PPI. Not for the first time, the noble Lord is one step ahead of me, but that is one of the specific items that need to be addressed to improve the situation.
Since last November, the team has conducted more than 60 audits of claims management companies to identify any evidence of lack of compliance with the rules. That team is working with the Financial Ombudsman Service, the FSA and the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, as well as with major banks, to help identify non-compliant businesses, gather evidence and help improve the claims process for consumers. It is recognised that there is a problem, and the authorities are working in a joined-up way to deal with it. More broadly, the Government have reviewed the conduct rules which all CMCs must comply with as a condition of their licence. The Ministry of Justice will shortly launch a consultation on amending the conduct rules to tighten up on certain practices and provide further clarity. I firmly believe that improvement is needed and that the improvements to regulation of CMCs currently being proposed by the Ministry of Justice are the right course of action. Transferring responsibility for regulation to another body would not be.
Secondly, the FCA will be a conduct-of-business regulator for financial services, but claims management companies do not provide a financial service. It is true that many of those companies are active in the financial services sphere, particularly in relation to matters of PPI, but their business is not limited to claims in relation to financial services. It is therefore not clear why it would be logical for the FCA to take on this responsibility.
I turn to Amendment 108, concerning the regulation of consumer credit. The amendment would require the FCA, in considering what degree of protection is appropriate for consumers, to have regard to,
“where credit is granted to a consumer, a clear statement, in cash terms, of the total cost of such credit”.
I am conscious that, with an amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, and my noble friend Lady Oppenheim-Barnes, I am facing a formidable duo with vastly more experience in these matters than I have. The Government clearly recognise that there are difficulties with APR—which, for the avoidance of doubt, refers to the annual percentage rate—representing the cost of short-term loans such as pay-day loans, but let me explain to the Committee what we are doing.
My colleagues in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills have been working with the short-term loan industry to ensure that borrowers receive clear information about the cost of a loan in cash terms per £100 in addition to its APR. The four main trade associations, which represent over 90% of the short-term loan industry, have agreed to update their codes of practice to reflect this and made other commitments to help consumers, and that will be done by 25 July. I believe that this is very significant progress. Having said that, I would argue that the APR serves a useful purpose in enabling consumers to compare the cost of different credit products, so that will remain in place in addition to the new cash cost number that will be given.
Lord Borrie
The people who will subscribe to the new code are those who are more likely to conform to the requirements of the Government, the ministry or whatever. It is the other companies, which may not subscribe to these requirements, that one is bound to be more worried about. Those are the ones that will not provide the cost of credit in cash terms.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I believe that a step that takes us from no agreement in this area to a situation where over 90% of the industry has agreed through the code of practice to reflect the cash cost, and for that agreement to be in effect from 25 July, is a huge step forward. Of course, because it is done via a code of practice and a voluntary agreement, BIS has been able to do it relatively quickly. I would suggest that having it 90% done, and done quickly—which one hopes will drive fringe players out of the market if they do not buy into the codes of practice—is the right way, and an energetic and effective way, for my colleagues to address the situation. We should wait and see how that operates, but I believe that it will be effective. It is a major advance and is compatible with the difficult constraints of the European directive.
Baroness Oppenheim-Barnes
Could the motive behind the European directive possibly be their desire not to see anything quoted in euros?
Lord Sassoon
I am not going to question the motives of the directive, except to note that in this area, as in others, we are not free agents.
I turn to Amendment 118E, which seeks to insert into the list of “regulated financial services”, referred to in the FCA’s objectives,
“debt management companies or debt adjustment services companies”.
There is no explicit reference to debt management or debt adjusting on the face of the Bill. However, I would like to reassure—I am grasping for whose name is attached to this amendment—the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, but also the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, that Clause 6 enables all consumer credit activities currently regulated by the Office of Fair Trading to be transferred to the FCA, including debt management. So I hope the noble Lord will accept my assurance that no further provision in this area is necessary, because it is indeed picked up by the definition of Clause 6.
I should turn next to Amendment 197ZA, before I address some government amendments in the group. It concerns the question of the statutory debt management scheme and is also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Borrie. It would amend enabling powers in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 for a statutory debt management scheme, if implemented, to apply to commercial as well as not-for-profit organisations.
As I said, the Government are currently working to deliver non-legislative alternatives with the debt management industry, as we have with the fee-charging pay-day loan industry. We want to give sufficient time and focus to that work to develop a voluntary code and to take account of the wider changes to the regulation of the debt management sector enabled by the Bill, which will lead to more proactive and intrusive regulation for the sector, before we look to a statutory scheme. If the Government were to resort to a statutory scheme, that would be the appropriate point to revisit the provisions in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 to ensure that they meet the policy needs, rather than addressing it at this stage through the Bill before we have bottomed out the ability of a non-legislative solution to have effect.
I shall speak briefly to the government amendments in the group, Amendments 142 and 194 to 196. Noble Lords may be aware that the Government brought forward a number of amendments at Report in another place to support the transfer of consumer credit regulation from the OFT to the FCA. Among those amendments was provision enabling local weights and measures authorities—trading standards—to continue to provide services to the national consumer credit regulator and to take action against those who provide credit on an unregulated basis following the transfer to the FCA. The amendments complete the group by creating parallel provisions for the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment in Northern Ireland, which plays the same role in Northern Ireland as does trading standards in England and Wales.
With those various assurances abut this rather disparate group of amendments, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, to consider withdrawing his amendment.
Lord Borrie
Yes, of course I will withdraw my amendment, but I must express disappointment with the disinclination of the Minister to take the one further step that would enable a change to be 100%, rather than whatever percentage of good boys will conform to a code of practice.
Lord Sharkey
I support Amendment 112 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McFall. As the Bill stands, the use of “may” instead of “must”, when listing matters to have regard to in considering the effectiveness of competition in the markets under discussion, seems to have two problems. The first is that it makes the competition objective less strong than the consumer protection objective, in which the FCA is given a list of things that it must have regard to. In the competition objective, the FCA is given a list of things that it may have regard to. Why is this? Why is the consumer protection objective definite about what the FCA must have regard to, while the competition objective is not? Surely it would be more sensible to have these objectives on an equal footing and in both cases supply the FCA with a list of things that it must have regard to.
The second problem is that the use of “may”, regarding what the FCA takes into account in considering the effectiveness of competition, seems to render the whole clause without much force or substantive meaning. Why list the factors that the FCA may have regard to if it actually does not have to do so? Either the factors listed are important to consider or they are not. If they are important, surely the FCA must consider them. If they are not important and can be disregarded by the FCA, as the Bill seems to provide, why are they there at all? I hope that the Minister may see the virtue of “must” and might agree to the noble Lord’s amendment.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I am infinitely flexible; it depends how long we go on this evening but I can see one or two amendments coming up on which I can be more accommodating than I will be on this one.
I shall start with perhaps the easiest part: the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, around Amendment 111A. I am delighted to see the noble Lord joining the fray. We have now had four players on the Front Bench from the Opposition; I wish that we had such depth of reserves on our side. However, I will battle on.
Amendment 111A seeks to bring the activities of market makers into the scope of the FCA’s competition objective. I reassure the noble Lord and the Committee that the activities of market makers are already very much covered by the objective. Put very simply, to operate as a market maker firms will have to obtain permission to deal in investments as principal, and that is a regulated activity. That means that such firms are performing a regulated activity or a regulated service, and noble Lords will see that new Section 1A(1)(e) clearly states that markets for regulated financial services fall within the scope of the FCA’s objective, so the FCA can indeed shine its regulatory light on market makers as on any other part of the sector. For completeness and to clarify, as far as recognised investment exchanges or RIEs are concerned, they can be exempt from the general prohibition under Section 285(2) of FiSMA, but even their activities are brought within the scope of the competition objective by virtue of subsection (1)(b) of new Section 1E in the Bill. I hope that that deals with that.
Turning to Amendment 112, competition can mean many things to many people. To indicate what the Government might want the FCA to look at in deciding how to advance its competition objective, subsection (2) of new Section 1E sets out a number of matters to which the FCA may have regard in assessing the effectiveness of competition in a given market. It is an indicative and, importantly, a non-exhaustive list. The FCA cannot dodge or duck out of its overall competition objective. Had we not put the non-exhaustive list of examples down there we might not be expressing the concern that we have. There would be the simple competition objective and that would be that.
Given the list, let me explain a bit more why there is danger in changing “may” to “must”. That would mean that the FCA would always have to consider all the issues set out in new subsection (2). The FCA should not necessarily have regard to all of that list when looking at particular competition questions. There could be unintended consequences.
If the FCA wishes to take action to promote switching, the consideration of barriers to entry will not be as important as the ease with which consumers can transition between providers and how that is affected by the structures of the market or behaviours of incumbents. To enable the FCA to generate the outcomes that we want under the competition objective it is important that the list is expressed in the terms that it is. This does not make the basic objective of the FCA weaker in this area. It just means that we need to give it a degree of discretion to be able to target the particular issues that they are looking at at any one time.
That addresses the amendments that are being spoken to and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith, will consider not pressing his amendment.
Lord Tunnicliffe
My Lords, I am sorry that the Minister did not rise to my invitation to wax a little lyrical over his commitment to consumer interest, but at this late hour I do not now invite him to. I am sorry too that he was not able to see the attraction of “must”. I have laboured on such ventures and I know the ferocity with which one’s brief has said that one must never move from “may” to “must”. Many of us would have been more satisfied if the Minister had accepted “must”, and we will have to see whether my noble friend Lord McFall brings this back later for further consideration.
I thank the Minister for his straightforward assurances on Amendment 111A and I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, in addressing Amendments 114, 119 and 117B, the Committee has drawn attention to some very topical and important issues. I cannot now remember why Adam Posen of the MPC came in; I think it was Adam Posen who the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith, referred to. This is an area that is rightly being widely discussed. The Government agree that innovative finance models such as peer-to-peer lending are important. Some £100 million of the £1.2 billion that will be invested through the Business Finance Partnership will be invested through other non-traditional lending channels, to reach smaller businesses such as peer-to-peer platforms, so the Government are putting their money in this space.
We agree that if these types of operations are to be regulated, the regulatory approach to be applied should be proportionate. However, the Government do not believe that the case for regulation has yet been made. As I said when I responded at Second Reading, this is a new and growing sector and we do not want to inhibit its growth. Nor do we want to put up barriers to new entry by protecting the incumbents. Furthermore, we would expect the costs of regulation to be passed on to consumers.
I reassure noble Lords that the Treasury is alive to the needs of the sector. My colleague the Financial Secretary has met some key players in this emerging market. While the Government do not think that statutory regulation is appropriate at this point, we will keep this under review. I say advisedly that the Treasury will keep it under review because the decision is for the Treasury and not for the FCA when it comes into operation.
I am happy to confirm to the Committee—this is important in relation to some of my noble friend’s points—that the changes being made as part of the Bill under Clause 6 would make it legally possible to bring direct platforms into scope. I stress again that we have made no decision to regulate and do not believe that we should. However, unlike the position under FiSMA, we now have an enabling provision in new Section 1J whereby we can amend the objectives to bring peer-to-peer platforms, for example, into the scope of regulation. My noble friend is right to draw attention to Clause 6 as an enabling clause.
I turn to Amendment 117B. Where innovative finance models are regulated, the FCA will of course take a proportionate approach, as I made clear when the Committee discussed social investment last week. Where they are not regulated, there is no role for the FCA, and there can also be no role for the FCA to facilitate the work of other government departments. I regret to say to my noble friend that the decisions about tax treatment, for example, will remain a policy matter for the Chancellor, as will the decision about the scope of regulation in this area. Of course, the Chancellor keeps all tax policy matters under review in the context of his Budget.
It is perhaps worth saying that there has never been a generalised income tax relief for losses on investments, which is part of what is being discussed in this area. HMRC has always sought to classify dealings in financial products by individuals as investment rather than trade, and a targeted income tax relief specifically for loans made through p-to-p platforms would be open to particular risk of avoidance, would encourage other, similar investments to request similar tax relief and might prove challengeable under EU state aid rules. Therefore, I do not want to get my noble friend’s hopes up in this area, although he was of course right to draw our attention to the issue.
Finally, I cannot support Amendment 119 because only if and when the Government decide that direct finance platforms are to be regulated will we insert relevant definitions into FiSMA. As I said, the provision is there in new Section 1J to update the definitions. I hope I have provided my noble friend with at least some assurance that the Bill takes forward the legal framework so that if a decision is made to bring p-to-p platforms into the scope of regulation, it could be achieved. Therefore, I ask him to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Lucas
My Lords, is my noble friend agreeing with me that the principal reason why there is no ability to offset tax for peer-to-peer lending activities is that they are not regulated and therefore there is scope for abuse?
Lord Sassoon
No, my Lords, I am not saying that. There are plenty of different tax treatments for all sorts of regulated and unregulated activities. I see the issues as separate. However, I have indicated a couple of areas in which changing the tax treatment would be difficult and would run counter to some of the broader accepted principles by which we run the tax system. But I would not link the two things explicitly together.
Lord Sharkey
There was a question in the debate about the scope of my suggestion. The amendments were drafted deliberately widely so that they create a “may” or a “must” for the FCA when it considers competition so that it looks at new developments in the market that may be in the interest of consumers.
I have been encouraged by a lot of the debate. There is an almost universal consensus that regulation might be important and might be a very good thing. I think I am perhaps a little encouraged by what the Minister has said, but I will read Hansard carefully tomorrow to check that I am still encouraged. There is one issue here that needs stressing, which is the matter of urgency. It takes only one rogue operator to go bang in a very serious and public way to sink this whole area. The Government should perhaps be a little more alive to that particular problem and the risk of that happening. Having said that, and looking at the clock, I beg leave to withdraw.