The Solicitor-General (Mr Edward Garnier)
I begin by congratulating the hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr Wright) on initiating the debate so that we can discuss these important and highly sensitive issues. He has, very properly, brought his constituents’ concerns to the Floor of the House. In responding, I will say something about my role as Solicitor-General with regard to both unduly lenient sentences in general and this case in particular. He should not be in the least concerned about causing me embarrassment. If embarrassment is warranted, it is his right and duty to embarrass me. I am accountable to Parliament and willingly appear to answer for my role as Solicitor-General. He should have no inhibitions in that regard. Indeed, he should be praised for vigorously pursuing the interests of his constituents—mother and son—with such attention.
Before I respond to the points the hon. Gentleman has outlined, let me focus on the horrific crime with which we are concerned. As he said, it was an offence contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which deals with one of the most serious non-fatal offences of violence on the criminal statute book. There is no doubt that the offence committed against Daryl Stevens last April caused great physical and emotional suffering. The victim and his family live with the consequences of the crime day in, day out, and as the hon. Gentleman has said, the impact on their daily lives has been considerable. Nothing I said or wrote earlier in the summer, either to the hon. Gentleman or to his constituent, was intended to underestimate the impact upon Daryl Stevens or his mother. I do not think it did.
On the day of the attack, Daryl Stevens, then aged 17, was doing what many young people do: spending time with friends and having a good time. He was in Chicago’s Pizzeria in Hartlepool about to order some food when he was viciously attacked in public by a drunk who glassed him—he struck him several times in the head and neck with a broken glass bottle. The attack caused a 3-cm laceration to the back of his scalp, a 3-cm laceration to his left cheek and a 2-cm penetrating wound to the back of his neck. A fragment of glass, among many others, was found very close to his spinal cord. The culprit, Cameron Ross, was later caught and, after pleading guilty, sentenced to three years’ detention in a young offenders institution. The sentence took into account the timing of his plea and the mitigation advanced on his behalf, to which I shall return.
Nothing I say today, and nothing I have written to the hon. Gentleman or his constituent, can eradicate the hurt caused by this dreadful offence, but I hope that what I say today will go some way towards clarifying my role in relation to the case and the way the Attorney-General and I exercise our powers on unduly lenient sentences generally. I understand that the senior prosecutor from the Crown Prosecution Service with responsibility for the case met Mrs Stevens in late July to explain the prosecution process and discuss matters further. My impression was that she left that meeting satisfied, but the hon. Gentleman clearly has a different assessment. Unfortunately, neither of us was at that meeting, but none the less there is an issue that we unfortunately cannot resolve. But, the meeting was held, and at least it indicates a willingness on behalf of the Crown Prosecution Service to make sure that victims and families are treated properly following hideous crimes such as this.
Of course, many people may consider the sentence of three years’ detention to be too low, and other judges might have given a longer sentence while others might not, but sentencing is an independent judicial function, carried out by judges and magistrates within a framework set by this House, for which the Justice Secretary has responsibility within the Government. That framework provides for statutory sentencing guidelines to be issued and followed by the courts, and for sentences for certain offences that the Law Officers consider to be “unduly lenient” to be referred to the Court of Appeal to consider whether they should be increased.
The offences within the unduly lenient sentence scheme are limited by statute and, unsurprisingly, are the most serious ones, including grievous bodily harm—commonly called GBH—under section 18 of the 1861 Act. We must also refer cases within 28 days of the sentence. That is the statutory time limit, and if it is to be extended, it will need the Justice Secretary to amend legislation, but, in my experience and that of my officials, Treasury counsel and the Crown Prosecution Service, that period provides plenty of time for the case to be fully thought about, as it was in this particular instance.
The Attorney-General and I referred about 100 cases to the Court of Appeal last year. We appear in court ourselves to argue them on occasion, and indeed we have done so on more occasions than our recent predecessors, such is our interest in the matter that the hon. Gentleman has brought before the House.
It is, however, the Court of Appeal—not we as Law Officers—that decides what constitutes “unduly lenient”, and it has stressed on many occasions that increasing a sentence already passed on an offender is an exceptional remedy. Sentences will not be increased unless they are significantly below what the judge should have passed. In the Attorney-General’s reference No. 4 of 1989, the Court of Appeal said:
“A sentence is unduly lenient, we would hold, where it falls outside the range of sentences which the judge, applying his mind to all the relevant factors, could reasonably consider appropriate”.
As Law Officers, the Attorney-General and I exercise our own discretion in accordance with the way in which the law has been applied by the Court of Appeal. The unduly lenient sentence regime is not simply a general right of appeal against a low sentence or an opportunity for the prosecution to have another bite at the cherry; it is an exceptional remedy for exceptional cases, and when we refer cases to the Court of Appeal, we do so not as political Ministers or politicians, but in our capacity as independent guardians of the public interest.
There is a further aspect to the unduly lenient sentence regime that I should mention. The Court of Appeal will review the sentence imposed only on the basis of the information available to the sentencing judge in the Crown court at the time. It will not take into account material that might be thought now to provide grounds for a sentence to be increased if it was not available to the sentencing judge at the time of the sentence. In accordance with those principles, I considered whether the sentence imposed on Cameron Ross was unduly lenient, and, as the hon. Gentleman knows, I concluded that it was not.
The relevant sentencing guideline—the Sentencing Guidelines Council’s definitive guideline on assault and offences against the person—provides four sentences ranges for this particular offence, reflecting different categories of seriousness. The sentencing judge, along with prosecution and defence counsel, considered that the appropriate sentencing range specified by the guidelines was four to six years’ custody, with a starting point after a contested trial of five years, and I agree that that sentencing range was the appropriate one.
The guidelines state that the types of assault offences that fall within the four to six-year range are as follows:
“Victim suffered a very serious injury or permanent disfigurement; or Pre-meditated wounding or GBH; or Other wounding or GBH involving the use of a weapon that came to hand at the scene.”
The offender in this case, Cameron Ross, had previous convictions and committed the offence while on licence. Those were aggravating factors. That said, he was young, being 18 years old at the time of the offence, and that was a factor that took the sentence towards the lower end of the sentencing range. In addition to detailing his antecedence, the pre-sentence report prepared by the probation service set out the offender’s personal mitigating factors, which the judge took into account. He will also have taken into account defence counsel’s submissions on Ross’s behalf.
As I wrote in my letter to the hon. Gentleman on 16 August, to which he referred,
“I understand from the transcript of the sentencing remarks that the judge did have Daryl’s statement and saw photographs of his injuries. In his statement Daryl reports exactly what he was told by doctors at the James Cook hospital. The judge will have been aware that doctors told him that he was lucky to be alive as glass was only one millimetre away from his spine, that the wound in his cheek was through to the bone and had just missed a nerve which may have left him paralysed on one side of his face, and that he would require a further operation to remove glass from his head.”
I went on to say that I noted from the hon. Gentleman’s letter that Mrs Stevens’ concerns related also to the fact that Cameron Ross had apparently breached his licence before committing the offence against her son, and that she believed that he
“should have been detained as a result of this earlier breach.”
The problem is that that issue is about how offenders suspected of a crime should be dealt with by the bailing court and is not a matter for the Court of Appeal, nor for me, through an unduly lenient reference. As I informed the hon. Gentleman, I also understand that Ross had not been convicted of these matters at the time when the sentence that we are concerned with was handed down, so they could not be taken into account.
Sentencing is an art, not a science. I know that from observing the process as a barrister over the past 35 or 40 years and as a Crown court recorder who, since 1998, has passed a good many sentences. It is the role of the judge to look at the aggravating and mitigating features of the offence and the offender, and to reach a conclusion that reflects the interests of justice in the case as regards the victims, the offender and society generally.
In this case, the sentencing judge considered that the appropriate sentence after a trial would have been four and a half years. The defendant had pleaded guilty at what the judge considered—not what I considered—to be the earliest available opportunity and so was awarded full credit for doing so via a discount of a third off his sentence, bringing the final figure to three years’ imprisonment. There is another debate to be had about what is the proper public policy behind discounts for early pleas, but that is not one that I can enter into today.
It is not my role as Solicitor-General simply to conclude that a higher sentence could have been imposed or that the sentence was lenient and could have been more severe, and that therefore it must be referred to the Court of Appeal. I have to be persuaded that the sentence was unduly lenient—I underline the word “unduly”. In this case, the sentence fell squarely within a proper application of the guidelines and for that reason I did not refer it to the Court of Appeal.
It is not always appropriate for this House to engage in a detailed discussion of the merits of an individual case, although our criminal justice system is of course as open to public criticism as any other area of public interest. As I said, the hon. Gentleman has quite properly advanced his concerns and those of his constituents about this case. I hope that I have explained the approach that I took and that I take, and that that is of some help to him. I appreciate that his constituent, the victim’s mother, was naturally distressed by what happened to her son and wanted quite properly to be assured that justice was done. However, in my view it would not have been fair to take the case to the Court of Appeal and thereby give her and her son false hope, only for them to be disappointed.
On the provision of information to Mrs Stevens, I am sorry that she did not get what the hon. Gentleman feels she should have got as quickly as she wanted. It was certainly not my intention to withhold information that ought to have been, and I hoped had been, candidly given to her. If she is still upset, I repeat my apology.
Towards the end of his remarks, the hon. Gentleman mentioned the point about the breach of licence, and I hope that I have provided an explanation in relation to that.
I conclude by saying that the hon. Gentleman has done his duty to his constituents and to this House, and I thank him for doing it. I hope that he will recognise that I, if perhaps with less enthusiasm than he might be prepared to accept, have done mine.
Question put and agreed to.