Karl Turner (Kingston upon Hull East) (Lab)
I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to increase the maximum sentence for a conviction of dangerous driving from two years to seven years; and for connected purposes.
Before my election to the House, I worked as a criminal barrister. One of the last cases that I was instructed in was defending a dangerous driver. I recall the grim expression on the face of the Crown Court judge when I got into the mitigation, not because I was wrong to ask for leniency, but because the law gave the judge insufficient discretion to mark the offence with an appropriate punishment. The driving was bad, but not the worst the judge had seen. Nevertheless, it was horrendous driving. I was keen to emphasise that it was not the worst of its kind. I finished my address by asking the judge to allow the defendant full credit for his guilty plea, and sat down knowing that I had done my best for my lay client.
Coincidently, one of the first cases that I dealt with as a Member of the House concerned the victim of dangerous driving, Katie Harper. Her case motivated me to push for a change in the law. Dangerous driving requires the prosecution to show that the driving falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver, and that it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving in that way would be dangerous. There is no definition of “far below”, but the danger must be either that of injury to any person or serious damage to property. The offence is not made out where the driving is less than truly dangerous.
The sentences handed down by judges leave victims feeling let down by the justice system when the offender is released from prison after just a few months, by which time the victims have not even started to come to terms with the damage that the offender has caused. Victims of dangerous driving are sometimes left brain damaged, paralysed or with amputations. The perpetrator will of course be punished, but the law does not currently allow the sentencing judge enough discretion to provide anything like the result that victims might expect. However, in the case of a serious assault, such as grievous bodily harm, the sentencing judge has at his disposal the discretion to mark the offence with a sentence that reflects the harm caused to the victim.
My constituency case helped me understand the real effect on victims of dangerous driving where injury results. In 2009, Katie Harper was a healthy 23-year-old English degree student until she was hit by another car overtaking a line of traffic at seriously excessive speed. Her passenger was her mother, Christine. Katie suffered multiple breaks to her pelvis, two broken arms, facial injury and serious nerve damage to her right leg. Her mother has also been left with permanent injuries after the near-fatal incident. The entire family have suffered. Katie’s father, Paul Harper, retired early from his job as a primary school teacher to provide the round-the-clock support that his wife and daughter need. My constituents’ case is by no means the worst.
The House will remember the tragic case of Cerys Edwards, an 11-month-old toddler. The Edwards family were the victims of a dangerous driver in 2006. Cerys has needed round-the-clock care since the collision. The driver was doing 70 mph in a 30 mph zone. He lost control of his mother’s Range Rover while overtaking. Cerys was left severely paralysed, brain damaged and reliant on a ventilator to breathe. The dangerous driver was released from prison after just six months. Cerys’s father, Gareth Edwards, is reported to have said, “It just goes to show we don’t have a justice system in this country”, when he heard that the offender had been released.
Many judges have described in their sentencing remarks their frustration at the inadequacy of the law. In researching my Bill I took the time to seek advice from the Recorder of Hull and East Riding, His Honour Judge Mettyear. Judge Mettyear told me that every judge in the country would, in his view, want to support this proposal. There is a clear anomaly in the law. Dangerous driving carries a maximum sentence of two years, whereas causing death by dangerous driving is worth 14 years.
To highlight the disparity, let us imagine the following situation. Two young men who own powerful cars spend a Saturday afternoon with friends in a park. One suggests to the other that they should have a race. The friends warn them of the danger. One of them is not so keen, but he is heavily encouraged by his girlfriend, who offers to accompany him. He reluctantly takes up the offer and they race through the crowded streets, overtaking each other in the face of oncoming traffic, which has to swerve to avoid collision. They continue at great speed in order to escape the police. As they try to navigate a bend, they lose control. One of them ploughs into a bus stand, causing serious injury. The other manages to swerve to avoid the bus stand but hits a tree. His girlfriend, who is a passenger, is tragically killed. The other driver is lucky and does not cause death, but he leaves his victim paralysed and permanently brain damaged.
The one who causes the death will face up to 14 years’ imprisonment. The one who leaves the innocent victim paralysed and brain damaged will face a maximum of two years’ imprisonment. This sentence must then be reduced by one third, as credit for pleading guilty, and then further because it is not considered the worst such case that the judge has seen. The offender will serve a matter of a few months in prison, but what sentence does his innocent victim face? In this scenario, the culpability of the driver who caused death was in some ways less than the one who was lucky and did not. How is that justice? My motivation is compounded by the forthcoming justice Bill, which proposes to increase the discount for an early guilty plea from one third to 50%, which means that even the worst example of dangerous driving will attract a starting sentence of only 12 months.
I am grateful for the cross-party support I have received for my Bill. Over the past few weeks, I have spoken with right hon. and hon. Members from across the House, and their advice and encouragement has been gratefully received. I am grateful to Louise Casey, the Victims’ Commissioner, for her support and invaluable advice. I have also discussed my proposal with my area chief constable, Tim Hollis, who fully supports my efforts. The charity Brake welcomes the proposals and the AA, Aviva and the RAC have also committed their support.
I know that my proposal is unlikely to find its way on to the statute book in its current form, but I hope that those on the Government Front Bench will take on board the points that you, Mr Speaker, have allowed me to make. The Bill requires a simple amendment to paragraph 9 of schedule 2 to part 1 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. The effect, however, would be substantial. The Bill would allow judges the discretion to redress the balance in favour of the victim. The proposed legislation addresses an anomaly in the law and offers a proper deterrent. I respectfully invite the House to support it.
Question put and agreed to.
Ordered,
That Karl Turner, Anna Soubry, Mr Elfyn Llwyd, Mr John Leech, Julie Hilling, Chris Evans, John Mann and Andrea Leadsom present the Bill.
Karl Turner accordingly presented the Bill.
Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time on Friday 9 September, and to be printed (Bill 190).
localism bill (ways and means)
Resolved,
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Localism Bill, it is expedient to authorise—
(a) the making of provision in relation to income tax, corporation tax, capital gains tax, stamp duty, stamp duty land tax or stamp duty reserve tax in connection with a transfer of property, rights or liabilities by or under the Act; and
(b) the making of provision for a body not to be exempt from corporation tax, income tax or capital gains tax where in pursuance of the exercise of functions of the Greater London Authority the body carries on activities for a commercial purpose.—(Robert Neill.)