The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (John Glen)

- Hansard -

Copy Link

- - Excerpts

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

Many Members will have heard of LIBOR in the context of the manipulation scandals almost 10 years ago. The London interbank offered rate is the rate at which banks lend to each other in wholesale markets. As the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) knows too well, from his experience on the Parliamentary Committee on Banking Standards, a number of changes were made to the administration and governance of LIBOR as a result of that scandal.

Stringent and effective regulation means that LIBOR is now effectively supervised. However, it is no longer robust, as I will explain, and is due to be wound down. The Financial Conduct Authority has confirmed the process to wind down the LIBOR benchmark by the end of this year. Most contracts that reference LIBOR will have transitioned to a different rate before the end of 2021, in line with the guidance of the regulators, but there remain a proportion of contracts that will not have done so.

John Glen

- Hansard -

Copy Link

- - Excerpts

I cannot give the hon. Gentleman a precise figure. However, in my remarks now and further on, I will give an explanation of those that are excluded and therefore necessitate the creation of this synthetic rate. If he would just bear with me, I will get to the point, and he should feel free to intervene subsequently if he is not satisfied.

The Bill builds on the provisions of the Financial Services Act 2021, as I mentioned a moment ago. This provided the FCA with the powers to effectively oversee the cessation of a critical benchmark in a manner that protects consumers and minimises disruption to financial markets. If I may, I would like to take a few minutes to put the Bill into context.

LIBOR seeks to measure the cost that banks pay to borrow from each other in different currencies and over various time periods. It is calculated using data submitted by a panel of large banks to LIBOR’s administrator, which is the ICE Benchmark Administration. It is referenced in approximately $300 trillion of contracts globally. It is used in a huge volume and variety of contracts, including in derivatives markets, mortgages, consumer loans, structured products, money market instruments and fixed income products. For example, a simple loan contract may say that the interest payable is LIBOR plus 2%. In this example, LIBOR represents the cost to the lender of getting access to the money to lend it out, and the 2% represents the additional risk to the lender associated with making the loan.

Back in 2012, it emerged that LIBOR was being manipulated for financial gain. Following the subsequent Wheatley review, LIBOR came under the regulatory jurisdiction of the FCA in 2013. That led to significant improvements to the regulation and governance of LIBOR. However, in 2014 the G20’s Financial Stability Board, known as the FSB—not to be confused with the Federation of Small Businesses—declared that the continued use of such rates, including LIBOR, represented a potentially serious source of systemic risk. The FSB said that financial markets should voluntarily transition towards the use of more robust and sustainable alternatives. It reached that conclusion due to the structural decline in banks borrowing from each other through the unsecured wholesale lending market. That has meant in turn that LIBOR has become more and more reliant on expert judgments, rather than based on real transaction data. In other words, the market that this systemically important benchmark seeks to measure increasingly no longer exists, which underscores the fundamental need to transition away from LIBOR.

Since the FSB’s recommendation, the Government, the FCA and the Bank of England have worked together to support a market-led transition away from use of the LIBOR benchmark. Primarily, they have encouraged contract holders voluntarily to move to robust alternatives, in accordance with guidance from the FCA and the Bank of England, before the end of the year. At the end of the year, LIBOR’s panel banks will stop making the submissions to the administrator on which LIBOR is based. At that point it will therefore become unrepresentative, and the administrator will cease publishing in any setting where the FCA has not required continued publication using the synthetic methodology. The vast majority of contracts are expected to have transitioned away from LIBOR before that happens. For example, it is estimated that 97% of all sterling LIBOR referencing derivatives will have transitioned by the end of the year.

Despite extensive work and progress, there remains a category of contracts that face significant contractual barriers to moving away from LIBOR by the end of the year, and measures in the Financial Services Act 2021 sought to provide a safety net for those so-called tough legacy contracts. Through the Act, the Government granted the FCA powers to designate a critical benchmark as unrepresentative, if it determines that the benchmark is, or is at risk of becoming, unrepresentative—in other words, that it no longer accurately represents what it seeks to measure—and that it is not possible or desirable to restore its representativeness. The Act also provided the FCA with powers to compel the administrator of such a designated benchmark to continue to publish it for a temporary period of up to 10 years, to prohibit new use of the benchmark, and to require the administrator to change how the benchmark is calculated.

John Glen

- Hansard -

Copy Link

- - Excerpts

As ever, my right hon. Friend makes a reasonable point, and I will come on to address the potential divergence, and the implications of the synthetic methodology for the existing rate that we are about to institute and protect in the Bill. In short, there is a lot of volatility in the market, and it is difficult to be fully confident in determining the exact quantum of any difference between where the synthetic rate would get to and the existing outgoing LIBOR rate based on the panel banks. I will address that point more substantively in further stages of the Bill.

In the case of LIBOR, the FCA has indicated that it will designate it using that provision in the Financial Services Act at the end of 2021, when the panel banks will cease making submissions to the administrator. The FCA has announced that it will use its powers to compel the continued publication of certain LIBOR settings, using a revised methodology referred to as “synthetic LIBOR”. The FCA has done that so that tough legacy contracts can continue to function, protecting against the market disruption that would arise were the benchmark to cease permanently at the end of this year with nothing in its place. It is important to emphasise that the synthetic rate is a temporary safety net that will be available for at most 10 years, and only for legacy contracts that have not been able to move away from LIBOR in time for the year end. It is not intended to replace LIBOR in the long-term, and new financial contracts will not be allowed to reference the synthetic rate.

The Bill provides important legal clarity for users of the synthetic LIBOR rate. Clause 1 provides explicitly that LIBOR referencing contracts can rely on synthetic LIBOR. That is covered in proposed new articles 23FA and 23FB which the Bill would insert into the benchmarks regulation. Specifically, where the FCA imposes a change in how the benchmark is calculated, such as a synthetic methodology, the Bill makes clear that references to the benchmark in contracts also include the benchmark in its synthetic form. In the case of LIBOR wind-down, where a contract says “LIBOR”, that should be read as referring to synthetic LIBOR, so that there is effective continuity. That will provide legal certainty for contracts that will continue to refer to LIBOR after the end of 2021.

The Bill also provides a narrow immunity for the administrator of a critical benchmark for action it is required to take by the FCA. That includes where it is required to change how a critical benchmark is calculated, such as a change in the benchmark’s methodology. That will protect the administrator from unmerited and vexatious legal claims. The Government have introduced this in the narrowest way possible. It does not protect the administrator to the extent that it can act with discretion; it protects it only to the extent that it is acting purely on a direction from the FCA. The Bill does not in any way change the ability to challenge the FCA, and its decisions on setting a synthetic methodology are subject to challenge on the usual public law grounds. That means that provision is enabled for legal challenge, but the existence of the synthetic rate as a continuity to LIBOR on the panel bank basis is not grounds for legal challenge.

The UK has one of the most open, innovative and dynamic financial services sectors in the world. The Bill reaffirms the Government’s commitment to protecting and promoting the UK’s financial services sector. As the home of LIBOR, the United Kingdom has a unique and crucial role to play in minimising global financial stability risks and disruption to financial systems from the wind-down of LIBOR. The Bill forms part of a significant programme of work by the Government and regulators to support the global market-led transition away from LIBOR, as indicated by the FSB decision in 2014. It supports the integrity of financial markets, and in doing so underlines our reputation as a custodian of a global financial centre.

The LIBOR transition is the responsibility of the FCA. It is important to remember that LIBOR is primarily the preserve of sophisticated financial operators, not retail investors. The vast majority of LIBOR contracts are derivatives. Those are sophisticated financial products, the vast majority of which will transition away from LIBOR voluntarily. Synthetic LIBOR will be used only by a limited set of contracts and as a last resort. The market-led, voluntary transition of contracts away from LIBOR to robust alternative rates has been ongoing for years, and the success of that transition means that the vast majority of contracts will not need to use the synthetic rate at all. Where synthetic LIBOR is used in contracts, it is appropriate that the FCA takes technical decisions on the methodology. Indeed, our regulatory system often sees independent bodies empowered to produce calculations that reflect and influence economic reality, such as the Bank of England setting base rates.

A question raised on Second Reading from the Opposition Benches in the other place concerned whether the Government would consider giving compensation to consumers who lose out from synthetic LIBOR—that echoes the question from my right hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart). We do not know at this stage what the difference will be between panel bank LIBOR and synthetic LIBOR on the day synthetic comes in, but it is clear that any change will be well within the range of change in the rate that could reasonably be expected, based on what LIBOR has been historically.

The replacement rate is based on a five-year average, so in the medium term consumers should enjoy similar returns, but with less risk of day-to-day changes in how their rate is calculated. It is therefore not at all clear that consumers will lose out from this change, or that there is a case for compensating the subset of consumers affected. The Government would not compensate mortgage holders for a change in the Bank rate, for example.

There are two issues here. There is the difficulty in determining what that quantum of difference could mean, because there is an evolving move off the LIBOR rate even at this stage. We also have the situation where, in essence, such rates and benchmarks are used in different ways. Mortgage holders would have the opportunity to go their provider and ask to move another rate, for example the Bank rate.

I reassure the House that consumer interests have been factored into all decisions relating to LIBOR wind-down. In particular, the FCA has considered how to address concerns that the synthetic methodology may result in a rate which is higher than the current LIBOR rate. The FCA has taken a rigorous and careful approach to making the decision on the synthetic methodology, resulting in a decision that is entirely in line with the global consensus, among both industry and regulators internationally. This has been a careful and deliberate process, and I commend both my officials and the professionals at the FCA for the work they have undertaken.

The FCA’s synthetic rate will seek to provide a reasonable and fair approximation of what LIBOR would have been had it continued to be based on panel bank contributions, while removing a major factor in the volatility of the rate. That is to the benefit of parties to contracts referencing LIBOR, who will no longer be exposed to perceived changes in bank creditworthiness or liquidity conditions in wholesale funding markets. The alternative is having no rate at all, or being put on an unsuitable fall-back rate that may well be designed for a different situation, such as a short-term problem with publishing LIBOR. The Bill supports the wind-down process by ensuring that contracts will remain able to function if they are not able to transition to an alternative rate in time.

The Government have worked at pace to develop this legislation, carefully considering responses to the consultation and the complex range of contracts that reference critical benchmarks. As I have said, the FCA has confirmed the process to put in place a synthetic methodology by the end of this year. The Government will continue to engage with regulators to ensure a smooth transition.

I want to respond to the point made by the hon. Member for Glenrothes (Peter Grant) in his intervention on the number of mortgage holders. There is some speculation over how many mortgage holders will be affected. Some estimates say it could be 200,000, or 1.8% of the mortgages held in the UK, about half of which would be buy-to-let mortgages and the other half residential mortgages. However, the estimates I have received from industry suggest it would be significantly less than that, and a diminishing number. I think that that is the best I can give the hon. Gentleman.

I hope that I have provided the House with the background to the Bill, an explanation of its provisions and an update on the broader work being undertaken by regulators on the LIBOR transition, and that we can debate the provisions in the Bill in a constructive manner and deliver this vital legislation.

I will conclude by recognising that this is an unusually complex and technical Bill. I would not want to be in any way patronising to the House, but I want to be open to questions on it at the next stage. However, I hope I have satisfied the House in explaining the principles and narrative the Government have around this Bill.

John Glen

- View Speech - Hansard -

Copy Link

- - Excerpts

I want to address thoroughly all the points raised by the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) and the hon. Member for Glenrothes (Peter Grant) about legal certainty, the temporary nature of this provision, and concerns about what will happen to the population of mortgage holders.

This is clearly a technical Bill. The Government are taking clear action to ensure that contracts that make reference to LIBOR, and that cannot transition before the end of the year, can continue to function. It is vital that the Government take the necessary steps to make the wind-down of LIBOR as smooth and orderly as possible, given the number of contracts that refer to it.

I was asked why people are on LIBOR mortgages. Customers who hold LIBOR-referencing mortgages are, and should continue to be, encouraged to speak to their lender to switch to an alternative rate. The FCA has been very clear with lenders that they must be able to demonstrate that they have fulfilled their duty to treat customers fairly where they transition them to a replacement rate. The Bill will not do anything to restrict consumers’ ability to bring mis-selling claims if they arise.

Let me address synthetic methodology—a term that refers to the methodology that the FCA would impose on the administrator to provide for the continuity of a LIBOR-setting function for the benefit of these tough legacy contracts. The hon. Member for Glenrothes cited the figure of £472 billion, which was the FCA’s estimate on 29 September. The synthetic methodology will seek to replicate, as far as possible, the economic outcomes that would have been achieved under LIBOR’s panel bank methodology, but without the need for panel bank submissions.

The FCA has always made it clear, however, that the synthetic methodology will not be representative of the underlying economic reality that LIBOR seeks to measure. Parties to contracts and agreements that make reference to the benchmark should seek to transition to suitable alternative reference rates where possible. That process will continue. There is a lot of speculation about the numbers, but it is impossible to verify them at this stage.

Reference has been made to the differences in rate between panel bank LIBOR and synthetic LIBOR. We have given responsibility for the synthetic rate methodology to the FCA in consequence of the Financial Services Act. Its approach will provide a fair and reasonable approximation of what LIBOR would have been if it had continued to be calculated under the previous panel bank methodology, while removing a large factor in the rate’s volatility. That will be to the benefit of those who have contracts that refer to LIBOR.

It is important to note that, even in the past few weeks, the LIBOR rate has been volatile. There have been some days when the synthetic methodology would have produced a lower rate than panel bank LIBOR, and other days when it would have been slightly higher. That illustrates clearly that it is not sensible to speculate about a change in the rate on day one of the change in methodology. It is impossible, really, to create an enduring and certain difference.

Given the interest in how the rate works, let me explain that sterling synthetic LIBOR will be calculated using SONIA—the sterling overnight index average—with the addition of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association five-year median credit spread. ISDA, the trade association, has played an important role in consulting the market to arrive at consensus on key elements of the LIBOR transition.

Let me briefly address the concern about how we got to this point. There was iterative consultation as widely as possible with the industry to develop consensus. As for the question of why the legislation was needed and whether we will need to do it again, this provision was based on legal advice and is intended to address concerns raised by industry about the robustness of the synthetic methodology. The methodology involves a five-year median for the credit spread, which was selected following that industry consultation, to avoid manipulation. It is important to remember that LIBOR is a forward-looking interest rate benchmark, and to replicate its economics the synthetic methodology will be calculated using the SONIA term rate.

The issue of the 12 base points was raised. The synthetic LIBOR will be 12 points higher than SONIA, not LIBOR. The difference between LIBOR and synthetic LIBOR will depend on the LIBOR and SONIA rates on the relevant day. Again, it is impossible to fully verify and quantify the difference, in terms of those that are not rolled off to another rate and the way in which the rates will perform in reality.

The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East referred to what is commonly known as the “safe harbour” provision. Some industry stakeholders have called for an express legal safe harbour like that put in place by the New York legislature. The Bill makes clear that references in contracts to a critical benchmark include the benchmark in its synthetic form. Furthermore, by providing in the Bill that contracts are to be interpreted as having always provided for the synthetic form of the benchmark to be used once the benchmark existed in that form, the Government have sought to address the risk of a party’s arguing that the use of the synthetic benchmark constitutes a material change to a contract, or even that it has frustrated the purpose of the contract.

It is the Government’s view that this Bill comprehensively addresses the risk of legal uncertainty in a proportionate way, while not interfering with other valid claims. We considered approaches taken in other jurisdictions, notably New York, but as a matter of policy the Government do not think it would be appropriate or proportionate to prevent parties’ ability to seek legal redress via the courts for other issues that may arise under affected contracts. A contract could be entered into and there could be a legal dispute over how it had come about, separate from the issue of the LIBOR dependency. We thought that this was the appropriate way to proceed, because the Bill was never about withdrawing the legal rights of individuals.

This is an important Bill. Now that the FCA has confirmed the process to wind down LIBOR by the end of this year, the Government are committed to having this legislation in place to mitigate the residual risk of litigation and disruption resulting from the LIBOR wind-down in the UK. We believe that it is vital to the protection of consumers and the integrity of UK markets.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

John Glen

- View Speech - Hansard -

Copy Link

- - Excerpts

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am grateful to you for being in the Chair at this point.

I realise that a number of these provisions have already been considered on Second Reading, but I am keen to explain the clauses in turn. Owing to their technical nature, I will explain them paragraph by paragraph at times. I hope that the House will bear with me.

As I said on Second Reading, the Bill provides important legal certainty for contracts that will rely on LIBOR after the end of this year. All its provisions deal with how a benchmark is treated in contracts once it has been designated an article 23A benchmark under the benchmarks regulation. The Financial Conduct Authority has power to make this designation when a critical benchmark is unrepresentative, or at risk of becoming unrepresentative, of the market that it seeks to measure. For LIBOR this will happen at the end of this year when the panel banks stop making their contributions. At that point, the FCA will ensure that LIBOR will continue to be published, using the synthetic methodology that we have already discussed.

In describing the purpose and effect of the clauses, I will use LIBOR as an example because it is currently the only benchmark to be designated under article 23A, but the provisions will also apply in future to any critical benchmark designated an article 23A benchmark by the FCA, although none is envisaged at this point.

Clause 1 means that LIBOR referencing contracts can rely on synthetic LIBOR. The clause inserts two new articles, article 23FA and article 23FB, into the benchmarks regulation. They supplement the legislative framework introduced by the Financial Services Act 2021 to provide for the orderly wind-down of a critical benchmark. Article 23FA clarifies how references to an article 23A benchmark should be interpreted in contracts and arrangements. Specifically, it provides that when the FCA designates a benchmark under article 23A and imposes a change in how the benchmark is determined, contractual references to the benchmark should be interpreted as including the benchmark as it exists after the exercise of the FCA’s powers. This is called “contractual continuity”.

For example, where LIBOR settings are designated under article 23A of the benchmarks regulation, this article would provide that contractual references to LIBOR should be interpreted as including synthetic LIBOR.

Article 23FA also sets out how contractual continuity will work in practice. It provides that this interpretation applies to all references to the benchmark in contracts or other arrangements, including references that do not refer to the benchmark by name but rather describe it, for example by reference to the economic or market reality that it intends to measure. It also applies where the parties were treating a reference in a contract as a reference to that benchmark immediately before the article 23A designation. That will ensure that any legal uncertainty is minimised, even when the contract does not explicitly use the name “LIBOR”, or includes a reference to LIBOR that is out of date. Finally, it is formally retrospective, in that it also provides that the contract is to be treated as having always provided for the reference to the benchmark to be interpreted in this way once the synthetic benchmark was introduced.

In the Government’s view, for contracts that continue to refer to LIBOR, these provisions will comprehensively address the risk that parties might successfully dispute the use of synthetic LIBOR to calculate payments after the end of this year. They do so in a proportionate way while not interfering with other valid claims. The clause does not introduce a so-called safe harbour, as has been introduced in New York. The Government considered that approach and, as I said, concluded that it would not be appropriate. However, the clause does not prevent parties’ ability to seek legal redress via the courts for other matters.

I draw the Committee’s attention to paragraphs 6 and 7 of article 23FA, which provides that the Bill does not create a basis for new claims concerning actions by the parties in relation to the formation, variation or operation of the contract prior to the change to a synthetic methodology. That should ensure that if, for example, a misrepresentation claim were brought in relation to statements made before a contract was entered into, the claim is considered according to the reality at the time when the statements were made, not in the light of the Bill’s impact on the contract. It would also not be reasonable or proportionate for the Bill to extinguish existing legal claims. Paragraph 7 therefore ensures that article 23FA does not extinguish existing causes of action. Any claim that could have been brought prior to the article 23A designation of the benchmark can therefore still be brought regardless of the Bill. For example, a mis-selling claim brought on the basis that a lender had misrepresented LIBOR to the customer could still be brought and judged according to the situation at the relevant time.

I turn to article 23FB, which introduces further provisions necessary to provide legal certainty to parties to contracts or arrangements that reference an article 23A benchmark. It is designed to avoid unnecessary interference in contracts where parties to a contract have already agreed what should happen in the event that a benchmark is designated under article 23A. This new article is primarily concerned with how the contractual continuity provision will operate in contracts that already have fall-back provisions—that is, provisions that provide for the contract to operate by reference to something other than LIBOR, or to terminate in particular circumstances.

The new article provides that article 23FA does not apply if the contract expressly disapplies it or expressly provides that the reference to the benchmark is not to include the benchmark in its synthetic form. It also provides that article 23FA does not override the operation of contractual fall-back provisions, many of which are designed to cater for the wind-down of the benchmark. For example, a fall-back in a contract that is triggered by LIBOR becoming unrepresentative will not be affected by the Bill. However, article 23FB is also clear that the designation of the benchmark under article 23A, or the imposition of a synthetic methodology, will not trigger fallbacks designed for the cessation or unavailability of a benchmark. That is because the benchmark continues to exist and be available in its synthetic form, so it has not ceased.

Concern about inappropriate cessation fall-backs that were designed with only a temporary unavailability of LIBOR in mind was one of the drivers of the approach taken in the Financial Services Act 2021. It is one of the key reasons why the Government are allowing for the continuation of LIBOR under a synthetic methodology. Article 23FB also provides the Treasury with three limited powers to make regulations. The powers are intended to future-proof this legislation, allowing the Government to ensure that an appropriate legislative framework is in place to support the orderly wind-down of future critical benchmarks across the wide range of contracts and arrangements that could reference those benchmarks.

The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) referenced concern about timing. As I mentioned, that provision allows for wind-down over a 10-year period. We want to continue to encourage the wind-down over the coming period. We reserve the right to make further legislative interventions, but we envisage that they would be on a smaller and diminishing pool of contracts.

I turn to clause 2. On Second Reading, I spoke to the narrow and targeted immunity that the Bill provides for the administrator of a critical benchmark for action that it is required to take by the FCA. That is the clause’s purpose. It inserts new article 23FC into the benchmarks regulation. The clause, as with clause 1, deals with the circumstance where the FCA has designated a benchmark as an article 23A benchmark. Article 23FC concerns the liability of the administrator of an article 23A benchmark. The administrator will be responsible for administering the change in methodology as directed by the FCA, and as I set out on Second Reading.

Importantly, the clause provides that the administrator of an article 23A benchmark is not liable in damages for action—or inaction—that it is required to take by the FCA under article 23D of the benchmarks regulation, or for publishing the benchmark as it exists as a result of the FCA’s direction under article 23D. In essence, that gives protection to the administrator in terms of liability related to the FCA’s direction of it.

John Glen

- View Speech - Hansard -

Copy Link

- - Excerpts

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Evans.

The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) and the hon. Member for Glenrothes (Peter Grant) have raised a number of questions arising from what I said. The Government are clear that we support this transition away from LIBOR by providing additional legal certainty for contracts relying on LIBOR past the end of this year. The provisions of the Bill are vital to using the synthetic rate in an orderly winding down of LIBOR, and they provide protection to consumers and the integrity of UK markets, but there are four or five elements that I will address now.

The hon. Member for Glenrothes mentioned compensation, and we do not anticipate that being an issue. As with all matters, the Treasury keeps things under review. We will continue to monitor what happens as a consequence of this methodology.

Both the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East and the hon. Member for Glenrothes mentioned legal action, and it is possible that judicial review could be raised against the FCA on the synthetic methodology it is prescribing for ICE. We think that would be extremely unlikely, given that there has been an active exercise of listening to representations on designing a methodology that has broad credibility. That is fundamental to the integrity of the process. There has been no attempt to develop a methodology in isolation or separate from the consultation with the market.

The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East asked about both the future timetable and what will happen with contracts that have fall-back clauses overridden by the effect of this legislation. This Bill provides certainty where a fall-back provision is triggered by a benchmark ceasing to be published or made available. Neither the designation of a benchmark under article 23A of the BMR nor the imposition of a synthetic methodology would trigger the operation of the fall-back provision. Where a contractual arrangement has a fall-back provision that is triggered by other means, this Bill does not affect or override the operation of that clause. For example, it will not override a fall-back triggered by an assessment of unrepresentativeness or a prohibition on the use of the benchmark, provided that the circumstances in which the fall-back was triggered are met.

John Glen

- View Speech - Hansard -

Copy Link

- - Excerpts

What we are saying is that the fall-back provisions, if they are without reference to LIBOR, would still apply. Where LIBOR is the reference, we are trying to ensure this synthetic methodology would not trigger that fall-back provision on the argument that it is distinct from the LIBOR provision in the contract. Essentially, we are trying to establish that the synthetic LIBOR methodology is synonymous with and continuous from the previous LIBOR rate, as set by the panel, but it does not intrude on the contractual issues around the fall-back on another basis. That goes back to our provisions dealing with the continuity of LIBOR rate setting through this new methodology—anything else is not the Government’s intention.

The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East reasonably probes me about the future timetable, and whether the provision of “moral persuasion” from the Financial Conduct Authority and warnings would be sufficient. We will keep these matters under review. What we are anticipating, and what we have seen, is a rapid and increasing move away from reference to LIBOR, and we expect that that will continue right up to the end of the year. We will look at what is required on an ongoing basis, but we think that it is quite likely that there may not be need for further legislative intervention. However, we reserve the right at a future point to legislate as needed. What we would do, as the FCA is doing, is encourage people to transition away from LIBOR.

I was also asked about the rate difference. It is possible that when the methodology of LIBOR changes from relying on panel bank contributions to using this synthetic methodology, there could be a small change in the rate of interest that borrowers with contracts that reference LIBOR will pay. I mentioned on Second Reading that we expect the synthetic LIBOR to replicate the economic outcomes achieved under the panel bank rate. Obviously, that was the intention throughout. It is difficult to say exactly what the synthetic rate will be when it replaces LIBOR. In the medium term, we would expect it to be matched to the existing LIBOR rate, but smoothed to reduce day-to-day changes.

Today’s LIBOR rate is at historic lows, and it is worth noting that the rate can fluctuate significantly. For example, if we look at the three-month LIBOR on GBP, we see that it has varied from 0.28% in September 2017 to 0.92% at the end of December 2019, and it is now 0.11%. We have seen a lot of volatility in the past few weeks because of speculation about what is happening with interest rates. So there have been some days during the past months when the synthetic methodology would have produced a lower rate than panel bank LIBOR and others when it would have produced a slightly higher one. Therefore, it is not possible to fully account for what would actually happen. I hope that that addresses the points that have been raised in Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 2 to 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.

Bill reported, without amendment.

Third Reading

John Glen

- View Speech - Hansard -

Copy Link

- - Excerpts

We have had a considerable debate this afternoon, both on Second Reading and in our scrutiny in Committee. I have made clear on a number of occasions the Government’s intentions in this legislation. I wish to thank the Opposition spokesmen for their contribution and thank my officials, but I do not have anything further to add.