Asked by: John Healey (Labour - Wentworth and Dearne)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 24 October 2022 to Question 65600 on AWACS: Crew, what the composition of the ten mission crew will be for the Wedgetail.
Answered by James Heappey
The planned composition of the ten mission crew is as follows: Mission Commander, System Manager, Information Manager, Electronic Support Measures Operator, a Senior Surveillance and Control Officer, and five Surveillance and Control Officers. The crew positions are agile and can be changed to suit the mission profile.
Asked by: Fabian Hamilton (Labour - Leeds North East)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what discussions he has had with his Mexican counterpart on reports of the use of Pegasus spy software against journalists in that country.
Answered by Jesse Norman
While we do not comment on the use of Pegasus against individuals, it is vital that nation states and cyber actors use capabilities in a way that is legal, responsible and proportionate to ensure cyberspace remains a safe and prosperous place for everyone.
We are committed to ensuring key technologies are not misused in a way that undermines human rights. The UK and Mexico regularly discuss human rights and the protection of journalists and have agreed to hold a bilateral human rights dialogue.
Asked by: Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (Green Party - Life peer)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what plans, if any, they have (1) to ban the deployment of the spyware tool Pegasus, and (2) to set up an inquiry into its impact on the UK.
Answered by Lord True - Leader of the House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal
It is essential that nation states and other cyber actors use capabilities in a way that is legal, responsible and proportionate, and to ensure cyberspace remains free, open, peaceful and secure.
The UK and its allies are committed to ensuring key technologies are not misused in a way that threatens human rights and, as such, it is right that their trade is appropriately controlled. We continue to promote with our international partners the need for tighter export controls to ensure cyber capabilities are used legally and responsibly, and do not threaten or undermine human rights.
Unauthorised access to a computer system to upload spyware, such as Pegasus, would be likely to constitute an offence under the Computer Misuse Act 1990.
Our national security framework is one of the most robust and transparent in Europe. One of the key pieces of legislation is the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 which sets out the regulatory framework for authorising such conduct. Any such conduct requires a warrant, which provides assurance that the conduct/access is authorised, necessary and proportionate.
Asked by: Alyn Smith (Scottish National Party - Stirling)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will publish a list of the systems and technologies that utilised autonomy and/or machine learning during the Contested Urban Environment (CUE) exercise with the five-eye nations in September and October 2021.
Answered by Jeremy Quin
CUE2021 was a multi-national event to test the latest intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance technology capabilities, working with US, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand allies. It comprised a series of experiments that were designed to explore new technologies that could help address some of the challenges faced by military personnel operating in overseas city environments.
The following technologies that attended CUE2021 employed either autonomy or machine learning:
Technologies and advanced sensors to enhance Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability:
Systems to autonomously prioritise information that is presented to the human analyst, using Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning to identify threats:
Robotic and Autonomous Systems to remove human operators from dangerous tasks by supporting logistics re-supply:
Asked by: Baroness Janke (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what plans they have, if any, to follow the lead of the government of the USA by blacklisting Pegasus spyware.
Answered by Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon - Minister of State (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
The UK does not operate a US style "entity list" for commerce blacklisting. It is vital that all cyber actors use capabilities in a way that is legal, responsible and proportionate to ensure cyberspace remains a safe and prosperous place for everyone. The UK works closely with allies around the world to tackle cyber threats and improve our overall global resilience to attacks. The National Cyber Security Strategy, supported by £1.9 billion funding, has transformed the UK's fight against the cyber threat since 2016. We operate a policy of sanctions against organisations and individuals who are a threat to UK national security, including in Cyber.
Asked by: Brendan O'Hara (Scottish National Party - Argyll and Bute)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what assessment he has made of the implications for his policies of reports further to reports that (a) Bahraini people living in exile in London were named in the Pegasus project leak as targets for Israeli NSO Group, including human rights defender Sayed Ahmed Alwadaei and (b) at least two Bahraini activists in London, Moosa Mohammed and Yusuf Al-Jamri had their devices hacked by Pegasus spyware; and what steps he plans to take to prevent cyber attacks on Bahraini people living in the UK.
Answered by James Cleverly - Home Secretary
While we do not comment on the use of Pegasus against individuals, it is vital that all cyber actors use capabilities in a way that is legal, responsible and proportionate to ensure cyberspace remains a safe and prosperous place for everyone. The National Cyber Security Strategy, supported by £1.9 billion funding, has transformed the UK's fight against the cyber threat since 2016.
Asked by: Lord Alton of Liverpool (Crossbench - Life peer)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the reported targeting of human rights activists, journalists and lawyers across the world by governments using hacking software sold by NSO Group; and what steps, if any, they plan to take to protect those affected by such targeting.
Answered by Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon - Minister of State (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
We are aware of these reports. This is a matter for the company and Israeli regulators. The UK works closely with allies around the world to tackle cyber threats and improve our overall global resilience to attacks. It is vital that all cyber actors use capabilities in a way that is legal, responsible and proportionate to ensure cyberspace remains a safe and prosperous place for everyone.
Asked by: Stewart Malcolm McDonald (Scottish National Party - Glasgow South)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the Cabinet Office, what assessment he has made of the extent of the use of Pegasus project spyware in the UK; and whether any UK citizen has been targeted by the software.
Answered by Penny Mordaunt - Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons
I refer the hon. Member to the reply Lord True gave to Lord Clement-Jones on 21 July, Official Report, column 256.
Asked by: Grahame Morris (Labour - Easington)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what steps she plans to take in response to the recent European Court of Human Rights ruling in the case of Big Brother Watch and Others v the UK (application nos. 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24969/15) on the compatibility of the law covering bulk communications data interception and human rights law; and if she will make a statement.
Answered by Kevin Foster
The UK has one of the most robust and transparent oversight regimes for the protection of personal data and privacy anywhere in the world. This unprecedented transparency sets an international benchmark for how the law can protect both privacy and security whilst continuing to respond dynamically to an evolving threat picture.
This challenge concerned The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 which has now been replaced in large part by The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA).
We are pleased the Court recognised bulk interception is a vital tool that may be used by States to counter threats, including those relating to national security.
We are considering the judgment and the implications for the new regime under the IPA, working with stakeholders across government, and will be sending a formal response to the Court later this year.
Asked by: Imran Ahmad Khan (Independent - Wakefield)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what steps he is taking to challenge the spread of technological surveillance in (a) Tibet and (b) Xinjiang.
Answered by Nigel Adams
We regularly raise our deep concerns about the human rights situation in Tibet and Xinjiang bilaterally with the Chinese authorities and at the UN. There is a growing body of evidence of extensive and invasive surveillance targeting minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang. The UK is committed to promoting the ethical development and deployment of technology in the UK and overseas.