Asked by: Liam Byrne (Labour - Birmingham, Hodge Hill)
Question to the Department for Business and Trade:
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, what recent assessment she has made of the effectiveness of export controls on cyber-surveillance tools.
Answered by Alan Mak - Minister of State (Department for Business and Trade) (jointly with the Cabinet Office)
The UK already controls the export of a range of cyber-surveillance tools. Export licence applications for such items are rigorously assessed against the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria taking full account of risks to national security and human rights. The UK Government continues to work through the international export control regimes to ensure these controls remain up-to-date.
In assessing licences involving sensitive communications technology, the Export Control Joint Unit also takes advice from HM Government’s National Cyber Security Centre.
Asked by: Stella Creasy (Labour (Co-op) - Walthamstow)
Question to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs:
To ask the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, pursuant to the Answer of 19 March 2024 to Question 18133 on Import Controls, what standards goods will be required to demonstrate they meet via an export health certificate in order to be eligible for import into the UK.
Answered by Mark Spencer - Minister of State (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs)
Specific requirements will vary by commodity, with details available on the Gov.uk pages for certification Import goods into the UK: step by step - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)
The BTOM will operate a sophisticated approach to risk categorisation, with the intensity of controls calibrated to the level of risk presented by each commodity.
For high-risk and medium-risk goods, we will retain health certification and BCP inspection, albeit with frequently lower inspection rates than under the EU model. Documentary-only checks will be performed remotely instead of all regulated goods having to present documents at a BCP.
For low-risk animal products as a matter of routine we will only require electronic pre-notification, which is already in place. Low-risk plant produce (fruit and vegetables with no known specific disease or pest risk associated) will be removed from import health control requirements altogether. There will no longer be any requirements for pre-notification, with enhanced inland monitoring and surveillance in place to ensure it is compliant with the UK's high food safety and standards and to keep track of any issues. We will simplify Export Health Certificates and make health certificates digital wherever possible.
For medium-risk goods, we will extend the well-established concept of trusted trader into the SPS sphere, by working with industry to pilot new trusted trader authorisations for SPS goods.
Asked by: Maria Eagle (Labour - Garston and Halewood)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how much his Department has spent on (a) electronic warfare, (b) chemical, (c) biological, (d) radiological and (e) nuclear integrated battlespace in each financial year since 2019-20.
Answered by James Cartlidge - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
The Joint Electronic Surveillance (JES), Force Protection Electronic Counter Measures, (FPECM), and Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN) delivery teams’ total spend on equipment by financial year is as follows:
FY | Total spend £million |
2019-20 | £128.171m |
2020-21 | £146.601m |
2021-22 | £120.897m |
2022-23 | £168.069m |
The Joint Electronic Surveillance (JES), Force Protection Electronic Counter Measures, (FPECM), and Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN) delivery teams’ total spend on operating costs by financial year is as follows:
FY | Total spend £million |
2019-20 | £11.648m |
2020-21 | £12.644m |
2021-22 | £12.602m |
2022-23 | £14.107m |
The Joint Electronic Surveillance (JES), Force Protection Electronic Counter Measures, (FPECM), and Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN) delivery teams are specific project teams in DE&S and the figures above represent the total spend of those teams. The figures do not represent the total spend on all electronic warfare or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear projects across Defence which would not be held centrally and would not be answerable without a disproportionate cost.
Asked by: Alyn Smith (Scottish National Party - Stirling)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment his Department has made of the potential merits of participating in the EU’s Electronic Warfare Capability and Interoperability Programme for Future Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Permanent Structured Cooperation project.
Answered by James Heappey
Our priority is to finalise entry into the PESCO Military Mobility project before considering involvement in other projects. However we continue to assess that the EU's existing 'third country' terms of participation for PESCO projects, involving capability development or procurement, place significant restraints on UK involvement in other PESCO projects.
We continue to constructively engage with the EU to ensure its initiatives are complementary to NATO and supportive of meaningful third country participation.
Asked by: John Healey (Labour - Wentworth and Dearne)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, which major projects in his Departments do not have a full time senior responsible officer.
Answered by James Cartlidge - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
Infrastructure and Projects Authority guidance requires all of our major programmes to have a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) who allocates at least 50% of their time to leading their programme.
The allocation of time is based on the scope, scale, complexity and maturity of the programme and is agreed by the Chief Executive of the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, the Accounting Officer(s) and the Senior Responsible Owner.
As a result, major programmes that have been agreed as needing only a part time SRO are:
A400M | Maritime Electronic Warfare |
Armour Main Battle Tank | Martlet |
Ballistic Missile Defence Radar | Mechanised Infantry Vehicle |
Brimstone 3 | Mensa |
Chinook Capability Sustainment | Meteor |
Collective Training Transformation | Mine Hunting Capability |
Core Production | Naval Support Integrated Global Network |
Crowsnest | New Medium Helicopter |
Defence Estates Optimisation | New Style of IT (Deployed) |
E-7 Wedgetail | Project Bramley |
European Common Radar System | Protector |
Fleet Solid Support | Sea Venom |
Future Combat Air | Skynet 6 |
Future Cruise Anti Ship | Spear Cap 3 |
Future Defence Infrastructure | Spearfish Upgrade |
Future Materials Campus | Submarine Waterfront Infrastructure |
Ground Based Air Defence | Submersible Ship Nuclear (AUKUS) |
Joint Crypt Key | Teutates |
Land Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance | Type 26 |
Lightning | Type 31 |
Asked by: Daniel Zeichner (Labour - Cambridge)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what assessment he has made of the potential impact of Project Pegasus on the right to (a) privacy and (b) data protection.
Answered by Chris Philp - Minister of State (Home Office)
Pegasus is a unique private-public partnership that will radically improve the way retailers are able to share intelligence with policing, to better understand the tactics used by organised retail crime gangs and identify more offenders. This will include development of a new information sharing platform and training for retailers.
Pegasus is spearheaded by Katy Bourne, the Business Crime lead for the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) and is backed by the Home Office, 14 retailers and the National Business Crime Solution.
Pegasus will be funding the creation of a dedicated team of specialist analysts and intelligence officers to work within OPAL, the national policing team that oversees intelligence on serious organised acquisitive crime.
OPAL is responsible for the management of data and intelligence, as well as information sharing agreements set up with members of Pegasus.
Asked by: John Howell (Conservative - Henley)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what assessment she has made of the implications for her policies of the debate on the report entitled Pegasus and similar spyware and secret state surveillance, which was held at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 11 October 2023.
Answered by Tom Tugendhat - Minister of State (Home Office) (Security)
The UK’s National Cyber Strategy commits the UK to countering the proliferation of high-end cyber capabilities and reducing the opportunity for states and organised crime groups to access them via commercial and criminal marketplaces, as well as tackling forums that enable, facilitate, or glamorise cyber criminality.
With respect to spyware specifically, it is vital that all cyber capabilities are used in ways that are legal, responsible, and proportionate to ensure cyberspace remains a safe and prosperous place for everyone. In March 2023, the United Kingdom signed the Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware alongside 10 other like-minded countries, including the United States. As part of this, the UK and other signatories recognised the threat posed by the misuse of commercial spyware, such as Pegasus, and the need to strictly control its proliferation at both a domestic and international level.
The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 provides a legal framework for the use of investigatory powers by UK law enforcement and the intelligence community where it is necessary and proportionate to do so. The Act also contains strong safeguards, including a ‘double lock’, which requires warrants for the most intrusive powers to be authorised by a Secretary of State (or Chief Constable in case of Law Enforcement) and approved by a Judicial Commissioner, as well as rigorous independent oversight of their use by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
Asked by: John Healey (Labour - Wentworth and Dearne)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many contracts have been placed through round (a) one and (b) two of the International Fund for Ukraine; and how much funding has been awarded in total.
Answered by James Cartlidge - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
As part of Urgent Bidding Round 1 of the International Fund for Ukraine, we have placed six contracts, with a total value of c.£64 million, for a range of systems which will provide Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Unmanned Aerial Systems, and Electronic Counter-Measures capabilities for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. No contracts have yet been placed as part of Urgent Bidding Round 2.
Asked by: Andrew Rosindell (Conservative - Romford)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, whether he is taking steps to provide support to help border forces in Turks & Caicos Police and Border to reduce illegal immigration.
Answered by David Rutley - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
We are committed to supporting Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI) with their efforts to protect their borders and tackle illegal migration and human trafficking. The UK Government is procuring a maritime surveillance aircraft to help them bolster their border security and funding work to introduce electronic borders. The UK Government is also working closely with international partners including the Haitian authorities to build a coordinated response that addresses the root causes of irregular migration from Haiti to TCI.
Asked by: David Lammy (Labour - Tottenham)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for Commonwealth, Foreign and Development Affairs, what estimate he has made of how many (a) surveillance devices, (b) CCTV cameras and (c) other security devices used by his Department were manufactured in the People's Republic of China.
Answered by David Rutley - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)
As has been the case under successive administrations, it is not government policy to comment on the security arrangements of government buildings. Specific details regarding the make and model of security systems are withheld on national security grounds.
The UK Government has taken robust action to build our domestic resilience and safeguard our national security. We have put in place a range of measures to protect our infrastructure and supply chains, including the National Security and Investment Act. On 24 November, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster laid a Written Ministerial Statement setting out the steps we are taking to cease the deployment of Chinese visual surveillance systems onto sensitive government sites. We will not hesitate to take further action if necessary.