Asked by: Ben Obese-Jecty (Conservative - Huntingdon)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the answer of 16 October 2026 to question 35675 on Russia: Shipping, whether his department made an assessment of the need to interdict the sanctioned Russian shadow fleet oil tanker, Leruo, off the coast of Shetland in late-October 2026 en route to North America.
Answered by Louise Sandher-Jones - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
The Royal Navy with the Joint Maritime Security Centre keeps maritime activity in UK waters under constant review. Any enforcement action is considered on a case‑by‑case basis, in accordance with international law and domestic legislation.
We will not provide a running commentary or get into details of our decision-making process as this could compromise our ability to successfully take action against sanctioned ships, only benefitting our adversaries.
Asked by: Ben Obese-Jecty (Conservative - Huntingdon)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of the potential impact of the US passing General Licence 135 on the security of wider UK waters.
Answered by Louise Sandher-Jones - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
The security of UK waters is critical to the security of the UK. The UK is in regular discussion with our allies to ensure we are ready and able to take action against Russia's use of its shadow fleet to fund its illegal war in Ukraine. Any enforcement action is considered on a case‑by‑case basis, in accordance with international law and domestic legislation.
US sanctions are a matter for the US administration. The Prime Minister has made it clear that we will continue to strengthen our sanctions on Russia and to take further action to constrain the Russian war machine.
Asked by: David Reed (Conservative - Exmouth and Exeter East)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, whether he has assessed the potential merits of designating Kyrgyz officials who have facilitated the evasion of sanctions against Russia.
Answered by Uma Kumaran - Assistant Whip
The UK is committed to tackling Russian sanctions circumvention, including through Kyrgyzstan. The UK was the first G7 country to sanction the Kremlin-backed A7 network, which Russia uses to circumvent international sanctions on its financial sector. We have since sanctioned further Kyrgyz banks and entities with links to A7, most recently on 8 October 2026.
Following engagement by the UK and international partners, on 27 October the Kyrgyz President's Special Representative on Sanctions Policy publicly stated that Kyrgyzstan's territory, jurisdiction and banking and payment infrastructure must not be used to circumvent sanctions, explicitly naming the A7 network. We welcome this statement and will continue to work with Kyrgyzstan and international partners on the implementation of further actions to tackle sanctions circumvention to ensure it is backed by action. We do not speculate on future designations, as doing so could reduce their impact.
We engage with countries across Central Asia to encourage them to introduce the necessary controls to prevent the re-export of UK-origin Common High Priority goods to Russia, and such controls have been introduced by a range of countries including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
Asked by: David Reed (Conservative - Exmouth and Exeter East)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what estimate he has made of the value of common high-priority battlefield items re-exported to Russia via Central Asian states in 2026.
Answered by Uma Kumaran - Assistant Whip
The UK is committed to tackling Russian sanctions circumvention, including through Kyrgyzstan. The UK was the first G7 country to sanction the Kremlin-backed A7 network, which Russia uses to circumvent international sanctions on its financial sector. We have since sanctioned further Kyrgyz banks and entities with links to A7, most recently on 8 October 2026.
Following engagement by the UK and international partners, on 27 October the Kyrgyz President's Special Representative on Sanctions Policy publicly stated that Kyrgyzstan's territory, jurisdiction and banking and payment infrastructure must not be used to circumvent sanctions, explicitly naming the A7 network. We welcome this statement and will continue to work with Kyrgyzstan and international partners on the implementation of further actions to tackle sanctions circumvention to ensure it is backed by action. We do not speculate on future designations, as doing so could reduce their impact.
We engage with countries across Central Asia to encourage them to introduce the necessary controls to prevent the re-export of UK-origin Common High Priority goods to Russia, and such controls have been introduced by a range of countries including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
Asked by: David Reed (Conservative - Exmouth and Exeter East)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what assessment he has made of the effectiveness of UK sanctions against entities in Kyrgyzstan involved in the evasion of sanctions against Russia.
Answered by Uma Kumaran - Assistant Whip
The UK is committed to tackling Russian sanctions circumvention, including through Kyrgyzstan. The UK was the first G7 country to sanction the Kremlin-backed A7 network, which Russia uses to circumvent international sanctions on its financial sector. We have since sanctioned further Kyrgyz banks and entities with links to A7, most recently on 8 October 2026.
Following engagement by the UK and international partners, on 27 October the Kyrgyz President's Special Representative on Sanctions Policy publicly stated that Kyrgyzstan's territory, jurisdiction and banking and payment infrastructure must not be used to circumvent sanctions, explicitly naming the A7 network. We welcome this statement and will continue to work with Kyrgyzstan and international partners on the implementation of further actions to tackle sanctions circumvention to ensure it is backed by action. We do not speculate on future designations, as doing so could reduce their impact.
We engage with countries across Central Asia to encourage them to introduce the necessary controls to prevent the re-export of UK-origin Common High Priority goods to Russia, and such controls have been introduced by a range of countries including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
Asked by: David Reed (Conservative - Exmouth and Exeter East)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what discussions he has had with the EU on coordinating anti-circumvention measures relating to Kyrgyzstan.
Answered by Uma Kumaran - Assistant Whip
The UK is committed to tackling Russian sanctions circumvention, including through Kyrgyzstan. The UK was the first G7 country to sanction the Kremlin-backed A7 network, which Russia uses to circumvent international sanctions on its financial sector. We have since sanctioned further Kyrgyz banks and entities with links to A7, most recently on 8 October 2026.
Following engagement by the UK and international partners, on 27 October the Kyrgyz President's Special Representative on Sanctions Policy publicly stated that Kyrgyzstan's territory, jurisdiction and banking and payment infrastructure must not be used to circumvent sanctions, explicitly naming the A7 network. We welcome this statement and will continue to work with Kyrgyzstan and international partners on the implementation of further actions to tackle sanctions circumvention to ensure it is backed by action. We do not speculate on future designations, as doing so could reduce their impact.
We engage with countries across Central Asia to encourage them to introduce the necessary controls to prevent the re-export of UK-origin Common High Priority goods to Russia, and such controls have been introduced by a range of countries including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
Asked by: Julian Lewis (Conservative - New Forest East)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what recent comparative assessment his Department has made of the levels of Russian military threat to UK interests (a) during 1979 to 1989 and (b) currently.
Answered by Louise Sandher-Jones - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
Defence continuously reviews and assesses the threat from Russia to the UK, including both its military capability and intent.
The threat now is most clearly demonstrated through Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its clear willingness to use military force in support of its objectives. Russia also poses a threat beyond Ukraine, including its continued development of military capabilities that can threaten the UK and our Allies, through to persistent hybrid activity including espionage, sabotage, cyber and information operations.
Asked by: Ben Obese-Jecty (Conservative - Huntingdon)
Question to the Department for Transport:
To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, what she intends to do with MV SMYRTOS.
Answered by Keir Mather - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Transport)
I will not make specific comment on operational decisions, as to do so would only benefit Russia.
By disrupting, interdicting and detaining shadow fleet vessels, such as the SMYRTOS, the UK is directly bearing down on the resources sustaining Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and reducing its capacity to threaten security across Europe and beyond.
Asked by: Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (Green Party - Life peer)
Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:
To ask His Majesty's Government what assurances they have received from Russia regarding the death of a laboratory worker at the Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute of Siberia from reported pneumonic plague.
Answered by Baroness Merron - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)
Under the World Health Organization's International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), countries are required to report and verify events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern.
The World Health Organisation (WHO) reported that Russian authorities had provided information through those channels and that subsequently the WHO had identified no evidence of ongoing transmission associated with the event.
The Government has well-established arrangements to detect, assess, and respond to infectious disease threats, including close coordination with international partners and ongoing surveillance of emerging health risks.
Asked by: Tim Farron (Liberal Democrat - Westmorland and Lonsdale)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many Russian naval, research and civilian-flagged vessels have been detected loitering near UK subsea cables, gas pipelines and interconnectors in each of the last five years; and assessment his Department has made of whether those vessels are mapping critical infrastructure.
Answered by Louise Sandher-Jones - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Defence) (Minister for the Armed Forces)
For reasons of national security, I cannot provide detailed information on detections, intelligence assessments or the extent and timing of surveys of the United Kingdom’s critical undersea infrastructure.
The Ministry of Defence, working with partners across Government and our Allies, closely monitors maritime activity in and around UK waters. The Government’s £330 million investment over four years will strengthen the protection of the UK’s critical undersea infrastructure, enhancing our ability to detect, monitor, deter and respond to any potential threat.