Asked by: Ben Obese-Jecty (Conservative - Huntingdon)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, how many times the National Security Council Sub-Committee (Resilience) has met since July 2024.
Answered by Dan Jarvis - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
It is a long-established precedent that information about Cabinet and its Committees, including the discussions that have taken place, how often they have met and attendance, is not normally shared publicly.
Asked by: Mike Wood (Conservative - Kingswinford and South Staffordshire)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, with reference to the the State Council of the People's Republic of China's press release entitled, China's top diplomat holds talks with British prime minister's national security adviser, published on 15 July 2025, whether Jonathan Powell discussed the Chagos Islands with the Chinese Government at this meeting.
Answered by Dan Jarvis - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
The National Security Adviser meets with a range of individuals and organisations as part of his role providing advice to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet on national security matters. Such meetings are often sensitive in nature, and the Government does not routinely comment on them or their content.
Asked by: Ben Obese-Jecty (Conservative - Huntingdon)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, how many times the National Security Council Sub-Committee (Nuclear) has met since July 2024.
Answered by Dan Jarvis - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
It is a long-established precedent that information about the discussions that have taken place in Cabinet and its committees, including how often they have met, is not normally shared publicly.
Asked by: Ben Obese-Jecty (Conservative - Huntingdon)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether she has taken steps to prevent the use of Chinese software connected vehicles by (a) police forces and (b) the security services.
Answered by Dan Jarvis - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
As noted in Question 121206 the Government prioritises national security and does not routinely provide details on operational matters or specific threats.
The Home Office works closely with the National Technical Authorities, Police Digital Service, National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC), alongside other Government Departments, to fully understand and address cyber vulnerabilities, proportional to the threat. This collaborative effort covers all connected vehicles, including those using Chinese software
The government will continue to promote good practice in cybersecurity, support transparency on data collection and usage, and coordinate with the transport sector to strengthen the security of vehicles.
NPCC have shared guidance to all Chief Constables on understanding and effectively managing risks from Connected Vehicles. We will continue to work with partners to ensure the guidance remains up to date and that forces follow guidance appropriately.
Asked by: Ben Obese-Jecty (Conservative - Huntingdon)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, pursuant to the Answer of 24 March 2026 to Question 121206 on Police: Vehicles, what guidance has been provided to Chief Constables by the NPCC on understanding and effectively managing risks from connected vehicles.
Answered by Dan Jarvis - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
The Government prioritises national security and does not routinely provide details on operational matters or specific threats.
The Home Office works closely with the National Technical Authorities, Police Digital Service, National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC), alongside other Government Departments, to fully understand and address cyber vulnerabilities, proportional to the threat.
Guidance provided covered proportionate risk-based measures on the in-life management, data handling, and disposal of Connected Vehicles. We will continue to work with partners to ensure the guidance remains up to date and that forces follow guidance appropriately.
Asked by: Baroness Curran (Labour - Life peer)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government what discussions they have had with international partners concerning the ongoing conflict in Myanmar.
Answered by Baroness Chapman of Darlington - Minister of State (Development)
I refer the Noble Baroness to the answers I provided on 5 February in responses to Questions HL13820 and HL13821. A copy of each response has been provided below for ease:
HL13820: We continue to support the aspirations of the people of Myanmar for a peaceful, democratic future. However, there is little sign that the recent elections will achieve an end to violence, advance dialogue, or address the urgent requirements to allow access for humanitarian assistance and bring an end to human rights violations.
In December 2025, the UK convened the UN Security Council to discuss the Myanmar elections, emphasising ongoing human rights concerns and the humanitarian situation:
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/elections-under-the-current-circumstances-in-myanmar-risk-provoking-further-violence-uk-statement-on-myanmar
We have also continued to signal concern over the election conditions, including at the UN Third Committee on Human Rights in November 2025:
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-is-concerned-by-the-ongoing-violence-in-myanmar-including-escalating-human-rights-violations-and-increasing-reports-of-sexual-andgender-based
We continue to support ASEAN's leadership on the crisis, including the work of the Special Envoy and the need for full implementation of the Five Point Consensus. In addition, we will continue to use our penholder role to spotlight the Myanmar crisis and raise our concerns with international allies within the UN Security Council and other international fora.
HL13821: Since the coup in Myanmar in February 2021, the UK has provided more than £190 million in life-saving humanitarian assistance, emergency healthcare and education support, and work to support civil society and local communities. In the past year, the UK has supported 1.4 million people with humanitarian assistance and provided essential health services to 1.3 million people. The UK works with local civil society organisations and national NGOs in Myanmar, which can overcome humanitarian access restrictions to reach vulnerable people in conflict-affected areas.
Asked by: Ben Obese-Jecty (Conservative - Huntingdon)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the answer of 18 March 2026 to question 118993 on NATO: HMS Dragon, will the access to the special reserve, granted by the Chancellor to the Ministry of Defence, also be available to deploy capabilities to the High North on Operation Firecrest.
Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
All National Security Council endorsed operations are funded from the special reserve. We do not comment on the eligibility of special reserve funding for live operations.
Asked by: James Cartlidge (Conservative - South Suffolk)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the oral statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer of 9 March 2026 on Middle East: Economic Update, Official Report, columns 43-45, whether the money allocated to his Department through the special reserve can only fund operations in the Middle East.
Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
Funding from the Special Reserve is not limited to any single region. The Reserve exists to meet the net additional costs of National Security Council (NSC)‑approved operations, subject to HM Treasury agreement.
Asked by: Chi Onwurah (Labour - Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what assessment he has made of the UK’s level of dependence on foreign manufactured Common Information Models (CIMs); and what steps his Department is taking to ensure the resilience and sovereignty of UK infrastructure that depends on CIM‑enabled connectivity.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
Common Information Models are used across a range of UK CNI sectors. This includes telecommunications, where CIMs enable interoperability between different network management and operational systems. They support efficient operation and automation in complex, multivendor networks, but do not themselves control telecommunications networks.
The Government keeps under review the resilience and security of the UK’s telecommunications infrastructure, including potential dependencies on overseas technologies and suppliers.
As the government set out in its response to the Telecommunications Supply Chain Diversification (TSCD) Advisory Council report, security and resilience risks can arise when critical network functions may rely on a limited range of suppliers or technologies, including software based systems used for network monitoring, configuration and management.
The Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 and the National Security and Investment Act 2021 provide frameworks through which the Government can assess and address national security risks in the telecommunications sector, including risks associated with hostile state interference. The government response to the TSCD Advisory Council report also sets out the steps the government is taking to manage the risks associated with vendor concentration in UK telecoms networks.
The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill will strengthen the resilience of the UK's critical infrastructure, including by strengthening duties on operators of essential services to manage risks in their supply chains. The Bill will also provide the Secretary of State with a power of direction, enabling the government to act where necessary and proportionate to address national security risks to regulated entities.
The government works closely with the National Cyber Security Centre to assess and manage risks to UK critical national infrastructure, including those arising from dependence on foreign-manufactured technologies
The Government seeks to build sovereign capability in critical technologies, as set out in the June 2025 Modern Industrial Strategy and the accompanying Digital and Technologies Sector Plan.
More broadly, on the development of global digital standards, the UK supports an open, inclusive, multistakeholder approach and is actively engaged to ensure our interests and values are well-accounted for. DSIT, NCSC and other government departments and agencies engage directly in standards development where the UK has critical interests to seek to ensure that UK needs are met.
Asked by: Mike Wood (Conservative - Kingswinford and South Staffordshire)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, if the Prime Minister will initiate a leak inquiry into the media reports of 12 March 2025 on the discussions in the National Security Council of 27 February, including who was responsible for the media briefings regarding the Air Chief Marshal.
Answered by Dan Jarvis - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
The Government Security Group is conducting an inquiry into the unauthorised disclosure of proceedings of the National Security Council, drawing on the full range of powers at their disposal. In line with normal practice, the Government does not comment on a live inquiry.