Asked by: Ben Obese-Jecty (Conservative - Huntingdon)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether she has taken steps to prevent the use of Chinese software connected vehicles by (a) police forces and (b) the security services.
Answered by Dan Jarvis - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
As noted in Question 121206 the Government prioritises national security and does not routinely provide details on operational matters or specific threats.
The Home Office works closely with the National Technical Authorities, Police Digital Service, National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC), alongside other Government Departments, to fully understand and address cyber vulnerabilities, proportional to the threat. This collaborative effort covers all connected vehicles, including those using Chinese software
The government will continue to promote good practice in cybersecurity, support transparency on data collection and usage, and coordinate with the transport sector to strengthen the security of vehicles.
NPCC have shared guidance to all Chief Constables on understanding and effectively managing risks from Connected Vehicles. We will continue to work with partners to ensure the guidance remains up to date and that forces follow guidance appropriately.
Asked by: Baroness Curran (Labour - Life peer)
Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government what discussions they have had with international partners concerning the ongoing conflict in Myanmar.
Answered by Baroness Chapman of Darlington - Minister of State (Development)
I refer the Noble Baroness to the answers I provided on 5 February in responses to Questions HL13820 and HL13821. A copy of each response has been provided below for ease:
HL13820: We continue to support the aspirations of the people of Myanmar for a peaceful, democratic future. However, there is little sign that the recent elections will achieve an end to violence, advance dialogue, or address the urgent requirements to allow access for humanitarian assistance and bring an end to human rights violations.
In December 2025, the UK convened the UN Security Council to discuss the Myanmar elections, emphasising ongoing human rights concerns and the humanitarian situation:
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/elections-under-the-current-circumstances-in-myanmar-risk-provoking-further-violence-uk-statement-on-myanmar
We have also continued to signal concern over the election conditions, including at the UN Third Committee on Human Rights in November 2025:
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-is-concerned-by-the-ongoing-violence-in-myanmar-including-escalating-human-rights-violations-and-increasing-reports-of-sexual-andgender-based
We continue to support ASEAN's leadership on the crisis, including the work of the Special Envoy and the need for full implementation of the Five Point Consensus. In addition, we will continue to use our penholder role to spotlight the Myanmar crisis and raise our concerns with international allies within the UN Security Council and other international fora.
HL13821: Since the coup in Myanmar in February 2021, the UK has provided more than £190 million in life-saving humanitarian assistance, emergency healthcare and education support, and work to support civil society and local communities. In the past year, the UK has supported 1.4 million people with humanitarian assistance and provided essential health services to 1.3 million people. The UK works with local civil society organisations and national NGOs in Myanmar, which can overcome humanitarian access restrictions to reach vulnerable people in conflict-affected areas.
Asked by: Ben Obese-Jecty (Conservative - Huntingdon)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the answer of 18 March 2026 to question 118993 on NATO: HMS Dragon, will the access to the special reserve, granted by the Chancellor to the Ministry of Defence, also be available to deploy capabilities to the High North on Operation Firecrest.
Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
All National Security Council endorsed operations are funded from the special reserve. We do not comment on the eligibility of special reserve funding for live operations.
Asked by: James Cartlidge (Conservative - South Suffolk)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the oral statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer of 9 March 2026 on Middle East: Economic Update, Official Report, columns 43-45, whether the money allocated to his Department through the special reserve can only fund operations in the Middle East.
Answered by Luke Pollard - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
Funding from the Special Reserve is not limited to any single region. The Reserve exists to meet the net additional costs of National Security Council (NSC)‑approved operations, subject to HM Treasury agreement.
Asked by: Chi Onwurah (Labour - Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what assessment he has made of the UK’s level of dependence on foreign manufactured Common Information Models (CIMs); and what steps his Department is taking to ensure the resilience and sovereignty of UK infrastructure that depends on CIM‑enabled connectivity.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
Common Information Models are used across a range of UK CNI sectors. This includes telecommunications, where CIMs enable interoperability between different network management and operational systems. They support efficient operation and automation in complex, multivendor networks, but do not themselves control telecommunications networks.
The Government keeps under review the resilience and security of the UK’s telecommunications infrastructure, including potential dependencies on overseas technologies and suppliers.
As the government set out in its response to the Telecommunications Supply Chain Diversification (TSCD) Advisory Council report, security and resilience risks can arise when critical network functions may rely on a limited range of suppliers or technologies, including software based systems used for network monitoring, configuration and management.
The Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 and the National Security and Investment Act 2021 provide frameworks through which the Government can assess and address national security risks in the telecommunications sector, including risks associated with hostile state interference. The government response to the TSCD Advisory Council report also sets out the steps the government is taking to manage the risks associated with vendor concentration in UK telecoms networks.
The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill will strengthen the resilience of the UK's critical infrastructure, including by strengthening duties on operators of essential services to manage risks in their supply chains. The Bill will also provide the Secretary of State with a power of direction, enabling the government to act where necessary and proportionate to address national security risks to regulated entities.
The government works closely with the National Cyber Security Centre to assess and manage risks to UK critical national infrastructure, including those arising from dependence on foreign-manufactured technologies
The Government seeks to build sovereign capability in critical technologies, as set out in the June 2025 Modern Industrial Strategy and the accompanying Digital and Technologies Sector Plan.
More broadly, on the development of global digital standards, the UK supports an open, inclusive, multistakeholder approach and is actively engaged to ensure our interests and values are well-accounted for. DSIT, NCSC and other government departments and agencies engage directly in standards development where the UK has critical interests to seek to ensure that UK needs are met.
Asked by: Mike Wood (Conservative - Kingswinford and South Staffordshire)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, if the Prime Minister will initiate a leak inquiry into the media reports of 12 March 2025 on the discussions in the National Security Council of 27 February, including who was responsible for the media briefings regarding the Air Chief Marshal.
Answered by Dan Jarvis - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
The Government Security Group is conducting an inquiry into the unauthorised disclosure of proceedings of the National Security Council, drawing on the full range of powers at their disposal. In line with normal practice, the Government does not comment on a live inquiry.
Asked by: Mike Wood (Conservative - Kingswinford and South Staffordshire)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, if he will initiate a leak inquiry into the reported leaking of the discussions of the National Security Council on British military action in the Middle East.
Answered by Dan Jarvis - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
The Government Security Group is conducting an inquiry into this unauthorised disclosure, drawing on the full range of powers at their disposal. In line with normal practice, the Government does not comment on a live inquiry.
Asked by: Ben Obese-Jecty (Conservative - Huntingdon)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what assessment has she made of the potential security threat posed to police forces in England and Wales by the use of Chinese software connected vehicles.
Answered by Dan Jarvis - Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
The Government prioritises national security and does not routinely provide details on operational matters or specific threats.
The Home Office works closely with the National Technical Authorities, Police Digital Service, National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC), alongside other Government Departments, to fully understand and address cyber vulnerabilities, proportional to the perceived threat. This collaborative effort covers all connected vehicles, including those using Chinese software
The government will continue to promote good practice in cybersecurity, support transparency on data collection and usage, and coordinate with the transport sector to strengthen the security of vehicles.
NPCC have shared guidance to all Chief Constables on understanding and effectively managing risks from Connected Vehicles. We will continue to work with partners to ensure the guidance remains up to date and that forces follow guidance appropriately.
Asked by: Lord Berkeley (Labour - Life peer)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask His Majesty's Government what steps they are taking to support ocean sciences and the growth of the blue economy.
Answered by Lord Vallance of Balham - Minister of State (Department for Energy Security and Net Zero)
The government has a strong track record of supporting marine science, including through the £10 million ‘Biological influence on future ocean storage of carbon’ (BIO-Carbon) programme, funded by UK Research and Innovation’s (UKRI) Natural Environment Research Council (NERC), which aims to better understand the role of ocean life in climate sequestration. NERC also supports and partners with the National Oceanography Centre and other marine delivery partners to underpin the UK’s marine science capabilities.
More widely, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) supports the Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science, supporting global efforts to tackle the challenges of climate change, biodiversity loss and food security. DEFRA also works to foster international ocean science co-operation on ocean sustainability issues, and is working closely with our fishing and seafood sectors to ensure they are profitable and sustainable. In addition, the investment provided by the £360 million Fishing and Coastal Growth Fund, which will support the next generation of fishermen and coastal communities over the next 12 years.
Asked by: Ben Obese-Jecty (Conservative - Huntingdon)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what assessment she has made of the potential impact of the terror threat posed by the forthcoming Universal Studios theme park on (a) traffic, (b) firearms and (c) neighbourhood policing in the tri-force area of Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and Hertfordshire.
Answered by Sarah Jones - Minister of State (Home Office)
The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act 2025, also known as Martyn’s Law, will require certain public premises and events to be prepared and ready to keep the public safe in a terrorist attack. The Act applies to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland and establishes a minimum legal security standard of protective security at larger premises and events for the first time.
Decisions around the types and numbers of officers deployed, including traffic, firearms and neighbourhood police officers, are operational decisions for Chief Officers to determine in line with their strategic assessment of threat and risk.
In line with the British model of policing by consent, the use of firearms by the police should always be a last resort, however, where an operational need arises, specialist armed officers are available to be deployed. National capability is kept under constant review by the National Police Chiefs’ Council.
Forces in England and Wales regularly review their Neighbourhood Policing resources based on the current and planned risks and threats in their local policing area.