Nuclear Safeguards
(asked on 5th June 2014) - View Source
Question
To ask the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, how many withdrawals of nuclear materials from safeguards applied under the tripartite UK-Euratom-IAEA Voluntary Safeguards Agreement there have been since May 2010; and how many such withdrawals were permanent.
Information on nuclear material withdrawn from safeguards is available on the Office for Nuclear Regulation website at www.onr.org.uk/safeguards/withdrawals.htm, in the same format as provided to Parliament on 28 July 2000 (Official Report, column 1094W) and in the written answer to Parliament on 1 March 2001 (Official Report, column 732-733W). The website provides annual reports on withdrawals from 2001 to 2013. As indicated in footnote 3 to each table, the advance notifications of withdrawal of depleted uranium shielded containers were temporary. All other withdrawals were permanent.
In 2014, the notifications received to date are as follows:
Table: Summary of Notifications of Withdrawals from Safeguards (2014, year to date)
Number of withdrawal notifications (by type of nuclear material involved)1 | Reason for withdrawal |
One notification involving plutonium (Pu), µg quantities. | One notification for use in analysis/analytical purposes (e.g. samples, standards/tracers and/or in instrument calibration) from organisations that provides standards/tracers and/or nuclear material for instrument calibration2 One notification also involved mg quantities of natural uranium2. |
Two notification involving high enriched uranium (HEU), total ~ 0.4 g. | Two notifications for material contained in radiation detectors2 (from a company that manufactures radiation detectors). |
Nine notifications involving depleted uranium (DU), total ~348 kg. | Nine notifications for depleted uranium as shielding containers3. |
Notes
1. Tabulated information covers advance notifications of withdrawal approved by ONR - Safeguards.
2. There are no facilities outside safeguards that have material in such quantities and forms, and defence establishment requirements for these specialist materials have therefore been met by supply from civil organisations.
3. The advance notifications of withdrawal for depleted uranium shielded containers were for temporary withdrawals, the containers being used during the replacement of spent radioactive sources at UK defence establishments.