Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between William Cash and Geoffrey Cox

2nd reading
Tuesday 12th December 2023 Commons Chamber

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I cannot give way; I do not have time.

Let me move to the third and most important question, which relates to the exclusion of access to courts. This Bill carefully preserves the right of individuals to come to court in extreme cases of individual justice. I listened, impressed, to my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), and I submit to those who think the Bill goes far enough that we cannot sacrifice the principle of access to a court. If we eliminated it entirely, not only would the Bill collapse because it would be interminably impeded in the House of Lords, but it would probably lead to the Rwandan Government withdrawing; and it is conceivable that the courts could entertain, for the first time, a complex challenge about the right of this Parliament to do away with fundamental constitutional principles such as access to a court. The supremacy of this House does not necessarily mean that it does not operate within a complex system of constitutional institutions, each of which has its own place as a component part in that system.

[Sir William Cash]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

No, I cannot give way; I simply do not have time.

Constitutional principles compete in creative tension. Parliamentary sovereignty is the most important of them, but there are others that are fundamental and one of them is access to a court in extreme cases. That is what this Bill preserves. I say to my right hon. Friends that I understand their frustration and their deep, intense dissatisfaction with the current situation; I share it. I think that there is tightening that we could do, particularly on rule 39. But on the preservation of the right to go to court in an extreme case, I say that is part of the British constitution that our fathers and our party have supported, and for which they have fought, for generations, and it would be wrong of us to compromise on that—

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between William Cash and Geoffrey Cox

Committee stage
Wednesday 13th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I will be quick. I have listened with fascination to the contributions and speeches made this afternoon. If I thought that the Bill would produce a durable and permanent solution, I would support it, but I do not believe it will produce a durable and permanent solution. The fact is that we cannot impose on Northern Ireland, or on any other party to a treaty that we signed, unilaterally a political solution. A political solution has to be reached politically; it cannot be imposed by this House through legislation. The EU—like it or not—and the Irish Government are a party to these negotiations. Unless we are able to achieve assent to the arrangements that we propose, they will not last. It will have to be resolved ultimately by agreement. It is much the same as the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill—another attempt by the Government to impose a political solution on Northern Ireland, without first having reached the solution and then produced the legislation that works out and implements that solution. I do not believe that this legislation will produce a permanent solution.

We come to the question of necessity. I am not prepared to say that there is an impossibility that the basis of necessity could not justify the actions that the Government are taking. I have the gravest of misgivings about it, and the deepest of scepticism about whether or not it affords a proper legal basis as a matter of international law, but we have not seen the evidence. It is possible that the Government and my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General have seen some evidence that we have not seen that could crystallise at least the plausible case that this action needs to be taken.

I support the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), but the fact of the matter is that even necessity is not a legal basis for a permanent solution. The doctrine of necessity in international law requires the measures that have been implemented as a necessity to answer the urgent and imminent peril to be removed as soon as the basis for taking action on the grounds of necessity has gone. Indeed, necessity does not even remove the breach; one is still in breach of the agreement. Necessity simply removes the wrongfulness, which further emphasises the fact that necessity cannot produce a permanent solution as a matter of international law. Only agreement—only the reaching of a political solution—can do so.

Nobody need tell me about the politically tone deaf intransigence of the European Union in negotiation. I recall vividly in my visits to Brussels in the early months of 2019, saying to Michel Barnier, “But do you not see, Michel, that this produces an anomalous situation? If a farmer in Northern Ireland wants to take up the issue of cattle tagging, to whom does he go? When the law is imposed by the European Union, the only place he can go is either to Brussels itself or to Dublin, and how will that feel for one whole section of the community of Northern Ireland?” I must tell the Committee that the European Union representatives reacted as if they had been stung by wasps. We have to understand that those at the European Union believe the protocol to be the very zenith of creative diplomacy. They cherish and prize it, as if it were their own child. But that does not mean that we do not need to engage in the patient effort—maybe it will take months, maybe years—gradually to make them see that this is an unsustainable situation.

What we should not do is reach immediately for a solution, over which there are the gravest doubts as to its efficacy as a matter of international law, over which there are the gravest doubts about the sincerity and good faith of the Government—for I take it that the Government have advanced their case on the basis of necessity sincerely. I assume that they must mean, and genuinely mean, that they genuinely believe that there is a respectable case on the basis of necessity. If they do, why should we not at least be told the evidence—the evidence! We can gist it, we can summarise it if it is security sensitive, but at least let this House acquit itself of the doubt that exists over its legal efficacy as a matter of international law. It is no light thing for this House to take a step—

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

No, I will not give way. Too many need to speak.

It is no light matter for this House to take a step that is in contravention of its international obligations. The dignity of this nation rests upon its word being seen to be implemented once it is given. Therefore, I think it a small thing—a reasonable thing—that my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst has asked.

My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary talked about Members as patriots. I do not believe that there is a person in this House who is not a patriot, not a person in this House who does not believe—[Interruption.] There may be some exceptions on the Opposition Benches, but I certainly do not believe that of those on the Labour Benches. The fact is that I want to give credit and the benefit of the doubt to everybody, but patriotism can also be the belief that we should stand by our word and that we depart from it only if there is a proper legal basis for doing so.

There is plenty of precedent for the Attorney General coming to the House—I should know, I did it—to answer questions about the international law compatibility of a measure in this House. Indeed, it goes way back, I think, to either the Wilson Government or the Heath Government. Attorneys General would come to the House to answer questions on the compatibility of statutes with international law. I invite the Minister, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton North (Michael Ellis), to invite the Attorney General to come and answer those questions, because, in my judgment, it is an obligation to the House. The Attorney General has a residual duty to advise the House on matters such as this.

I say to my right hon. and learned Friend that I will not be able to support this Bill—that comes as no surprise—but I sympathise with the plight in which the Government find themselves. We should all be a lot better if we united in this House to besiege the European Union with requests so that it sees that it must effect real change in this protocol. That is why I asked the hon. Member for Hove (Peter Kyle) what is his solution to the democratic deficit of which my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) has properly and accurately spoken.

These are really intransigent, intractable problems. It is no use sitting, as the hon. Member for Hove does, attacking those of us on the Government Benches for not having solutions if he just talks more and does not propose constructive, new replacement agreements that might fulfil the legitimate wish of the Unionist community to feel that they are not separated and segregated from the rest of the kingdom, while doing justice to the European Union’s desire to protect its single market.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between William Cash and Geoffrey Cox

Thursday 11th April 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney General]

I find myself in total agreement with what the hon. Lady has said. I will share them with my colleagues. We are not in any way going to permit our departure from the EU to detract from our firm and unshakeable commitment to human rights in this country and to the rule of law.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

In that context, and given the December resolution of the House regarding publication of the Law Officers’ opinions, will my right hon. and learned Friend be good enough to tell the House whether his advice was sought on these vital matters of time extensions before critical decisions were taken, as required by the ministerial code? Will he publish that advice?

[The Attorney General]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the question. He knows that I am acutely conscious of his desire to have the maximum transparency upon the legal advice I give to the Government. He also knows that I am bound by a long-standing convention relating to Law Officers’ advice to disclose neither the fact nor the content of it. Within those constraints, I consider constantly to what extent I can make available to the House all the information it needs to take the important decisions that theses times require.

United Kingdom’s Withdrawal from the European Union

Debate between William Cash and Geoffrey Cox

Friday 29th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney General]

Plainly, that would be open to the House to do. The problem is that we would have lost the legal right to the extension, so we would apply to the discretion of the Union for it to be granted.

Let me come back to the political declaration, because it is important that I should say a few more words about it. The process that is—

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. I am seeking to catch the attention of the Attorney General, and wondered whether he might have a loss of hearing or something.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney General]

We would have accepted the hon. Gentleman’s amendments. Clearly, in terms of the detailed working out of those amendments, in discussion—[Hon. Members: “Ah!”]. No, no, no—hon. Members can table an amendment. If it requires amendment to that legislation, we would obviously consider the detail carefully, but we would be minded to accept such.

[Sir William Cash]

I am most grateful to the Attorney General for giving way. He has referred on a number of occasions to the withdrawal and implementation Bill. He knows, as do the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the Prime Minister and others, that the European Scrutiny Committee has asked repeatedly over the past month for a draft or a copy of the withdrawal and implementation Bill. He has just said that if the withdrawal agreement goes through, the withdrawal and implementation Bill will follow. If the withdrawal agreement is not approved today, will the withdrawal and implementation Bill come to this House and be introduced in any event?

[The Attorney General]

What I can say to my hon. Friend is that we would certainly give it very careful consideration. We have taken the view up till now that, before the withdrawal agreement is approved, it is premature to publish the Bill. There are certain elements of it that still remain to be finalised. However, as I have said to my hon. Friend privately, the moment we are in a position to publish it, he, as Chairman of the Committee, will be among the first to see it.

Withdrawal Agreement: Legal Opinion

Debate between William Cash and Geoffrey Cox

1st reading: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney General]

Of course I can confirm all those things, which are self-evident in the agreement. May I just point out to the right hon. Gentleman that although I am sure it is a clever forensic point, the circumstance in which a point of European Union law would arise in connection with the best endeavours and bad faith clauses is difficult to envisage? The reality is that it is a straightforward question of fact: is the European Union moving with the urgency and pace, to the procedural timetables and according to the procedural steps that this agreement now enforces?

The right hon. Gentleman is an honest politician, and he cannot look these things in the face and say that they mean nothing. These are important amplifications and clarifications of the duty of best endeavours. I quite agree with him, as I very much doubt we would ever get to an arbitral tribunal, because what these duties, new clarifications and amplifications do is set the framework for people’s conduct within the negotiation. It is about the impact on their behaviour and conduct. Very rare is the case in which one would get to an arbitral tribunal. What matters is the framework of obligations and responsibilities, and those have materially tightened on the European Union.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for his opinion, which is not only for the Government, I would stress, but for Parliament and for the voters. The substance of the backstop issue to which he has just referred is the legal, constitutional and, therefore, political status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, which cannot be put at risk.

My right hon. and learned Friend refers to a reduced risk of the UK being “indefinitely” detained in the protocol, but he adds that, ultimately, there is

“no internationally lawful means of exiting”

unless both the EU and the UK agree. Does he therefore appreciate, on his own terms, that this fundamental legal impediment trumps political considerations and that, therefore, there would be insufficient protection for Northern Ireland to continue as part of the United Kingdom?

[The Attorney General]

I do not agree. My hon. Friend knows we have a difference of opinion, and I hope that he will move towards my position. I still hope that might be so, and I say that because one has to look at the mutual incentives and disincentives for both parties to stay in the arrangement. I made this point in December and, for the reasons I advanced in December and in my November opinion, the incentives or disincentives for the European Union are as profound, if not greater, to get us out of the backstop than to keep us in it. That is what I firmly believe. He may disagree, but that is what I believe.

That is why I have taken the political judgment that this withdrawal agreement needs to be supported but, in saying that, these improvements do make a difference. In the last line of my advice, I say there can be no lawful exit unless there is a fundamental change of circumstance. It is extremely important to remember that there is always a right to terminate a treaty unilaterally if circumstances fundamentally change. There is no question but that we have a right to exit if those circumstances apply.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between William Cash and Geoffrey Cox

Thursday 7th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney General]

The plans for next week are not mine to decide, but what I can tell the hon. Gentleman is this: we are discussing detailed, coherent, careful proposals, and we are discussing text with the European Union. I am surprised to hear the comments that have emerged over the last 48 hours that the proposals are not clear; they are as clear as day, and we are continuing to discuss them.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give Parliament 48 hours’ notice or, at any rate, properly full notice of the outcome of his discussions with the EU? Will he provide to Parliament a draft of the withdrawal and implementation Bill, so that my European Scrutiny Committee, and others in Parliament and others outside, can assess how the withdrawal agreement will be enacted in domestic law, as obliged by article 4 of the withdrawal agreement; how the Bill would ensure the statutory manner in which the express repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 will be dealt with; and how the question of disapplication by the courts—by the Supreme Court—will be handled under that enactment?

[The Attorney General]

We will endeavour to give as much notice as we possibly can. Of course those discussions are running. They will resume very shortly and continue almost certainly through the weekend. We will endeavour to give the House notice as early as we can, if and when we have something to report. My hon. Friend made a second point about the Bill. That is not for me to decide, although I will certainly discuss the matter with those who will make that decision. We will endeavour to give the European Scrutiny Committee, and my hon. Friend, the earliest possible notice.

Withdrawal Agreement: Legal Position

Debate between William Cash and Geoffrey Cox

Monday 3rd December 2018 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney General]

The right hon. Gentleman has thrown down the gauntlet in asking me to re-examine my support for the agreement. I do not mind confessing to him that I have wrestled with this question, because I am a Unionist and dislike any divergence between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom; but I have had also to take into account first that this is an arrangement that we can avoid, and secondly that if we were in it, it would be as much an instrument of pain to the European Union as it would be to the United Kingdom.

I ask the right hon. Gentleman to think of what the European Union is now accepting. It accepts that Northern Ireland can have free circulation of its goods not only into the single market, but to Great Britain. No other single market trader will have that advantage. Hundreds of single market traders throughout the European Union are going to resent the fact that the goods of a Northern Ireland business situated one mile north of the border can flow smoothly into the single market and smoothly into Great Britain, while theirs cannot. So there are real reasons, which the right hon. Gentleman and I can discuss at greater length, why I do not believe that this will become a permanent solution.

Let us suppose, however, that those negotiations broke down or took an unreasonable length of time. All around the European Union there will be single market traders seeing the benefits that Northern Ireland can have, who will be induced by those benefits to ask, “Should we go on putting up with this uncompetitive arrangement?” And what are they likely to do? Why, they are likely to beat a path to the door of the Commission and the Court, and there to say, “Didn’t you say that article 50 is not a sound legal foundation for this arrangement?” And I tell you frankly, Mr Speaker, they are likely to win.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

On the issue of precedents, there are five—[Interruption.]

[Sir William Cash]

Thank you, Mr Speaker.

There are five precedents over the past 40 years of full disclosure being made of an Attorney General’s advice for compelling and exceptional reasons in the public interest. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that he can—as in my view he should—consent on his own independent account as Attorney General under the ministerial code to the full publication of his legal advice given that, as cited in the Queen’s bench division in July 2009, the then Attorney General’s advice on the seminal Factortame case was disclosed, which dealt with the incompatibility of the European Communities Act 1972 with an Act of Parliament, the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, which was then struck down in the courts, analogous to the legal status of the withdrawal treaty in relation to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act passed by this House in 2018, and with which that treaty is incompatible?

[The Attorney General]

This is not a question of the lawfulness of the Government’s action, as it was in the publication of Lord Goldsmith’s advice; this is simply a view on the legal effects of a particular agreement. There are hundreds of lawyers throughout the United Kingdom, I am delighted to say, who could offer a perfectly competent view on this agreement. I cannot see why there is anything exceptional about the current circumstances and about my advice. But let us suppose there were something exceptional about my advice; well, I am here to be asked any question that the Government have also asked, so all that right hon. and hon. Opposition Members have to do is ask and I will give them a frank answer.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between William Cash and Geoffrey Cox

Committee: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Cox]

The point is that these broad and general rights are ripe with value judgments. Quite often, they are not appropriately dealt with by six or seven elderly white judges in a Supreme Court; they are better resolved on the Floor of this House and by a democratic vote in this Parliament.

[Sir William Cash]

Will my hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Cox]

If my hon. Friend will forgive me for a moment, I need to develop an argument, because I want to move on.

Let us accept for the moment that there is a second and perfectly legitimate way, which international law accepts. International law does not require subscribing nations of the United Nations to adopt a Bill of Rights, and neither does the European Court of Human Rights—it never did require us to do so. It looked at the substantive and practical effect and how those rights were substantively protected in the jurisdiction. If we accept that for a moment, why should we not proceed by means of the Government’s proposed policy of examining specific statutory remedies and specific rules of common law, and considering whether the right is satisfactorily protected?

Some of us believe that the courts are not always the right place in which to deal with these matters. For example, article 20 of the charter of fundamental rights simply contains a right to equality before the law. That right has been enshrined in the common law in this country for centuries. Why should we have it in the charter of fundamental rights? Some say that there will be a problem between the two charters—

Draft EU Budget 2011

Debate between William Cash and Geoffrey Cox

Wednesday 13th October 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Cash]

It will, indeed. I shall make no response to that absurd intervention.

We must achieve our objectives, which are not only to prevent any increase in the budget, but to reduce it. I say that to my hon. Friends as one who, I think, can undoubtedly claim to have fought these battles relentlessly, persistently and consistently for the best part of 25 years—and, if I may say so, with some degree of success in establishing the parameters within which we are now able to address the European issue. In a moment I shall mention what happened at the European Scrutiny Committee this afternoon, merely to illustrate the progress that we have already made in the few weeks that I have had the honour of being the Committee’s Chairman. The whole process has to be conducted in an effective and orderly manner. Otherwise, it plays into the hands of those such as the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane), who want to pretend that somehow there is no justification for our adopting the position that we need to adopt. Tortuous and tedious as it is, the most important thing is to get it right. We have to get the blocking minority if we want to move from wanting to stop the increase to achieving the reduction that follows from it. Let us be responsible about this.

I do not have the slightest objection to the sentiments that lie behind the other amendment. It bothers me, however, that we have two amendments that appear to compete with one another, but in fact convey the same ideas, yet one is orderly while the other is disorderly. I leave it at that; it is for my hon. Friends to judge.

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend accept that Mr Speaker has already said that the amendment in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Clacton (Mr Carswell) is in order; that there is nothing inherently unlawful about it; that there is no reason, based on either law or principle, why Members of this House should not vote for it; and that it is therefore perfectly in order?

[Mr Cash]

When I say that the amendment is disorderly, I mean that it would, in my judgment, make it more difficult for us to achieve our objectives. I was not referring to it as being disorderly within the framework of the procedures of the House. I make that distinction very clear.

Our net contribution to the European Union is rising from £6.4 billion this year to £8.3 billion in 2011-12 and £10.3 billion in 2015, and our gross contribution is rising from £14 billion to £19 billion. The Budgets Committee is placing a demand on member states to open negotiations on new own resources; the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart) says that that is a

“full part of the overall agreement on the 2011 budget”.

It is reported in the Financial Times that MEPs are even considering an amendment to

“open the way to establish a European tax, making the institutions less reliant on contributions from national governments.”

On top of the budget, the European Parliament is shortly expected to vote on proposals to extend maternity rights to 20 weeks at full pay, which will cost the British Government an extra £2.5 billion a year.

It will be well understood in the House that I am gravely concerned about the developments in this direction. I merely want to be sure that the Government, as well as being able to negotiate this particular, rather difficult round, are able to get stuck into reducing not only the budget itself but the functions that lead to that budget, because the two run together—it is like Parkinson’s law.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between William Cash and Geoffrey Cox

Monday 13th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Cox]

I will in a moment, if I may.

So again I say to the House, it is not simply a done deal. It is not an open-and-shut argument that fixed-term Parliaments are a good thing. The flexibility of our constitution, the ability of the Prime Minister to seek a Dissolution, is not always a bad thing; it can be a good thing. True it is that in recent times Prime Ministers have tended to abuse it. True it is that in recent experience they have perhaps lessened the dignity of their office by declaring elections in schools and by dithering over the timing of a general election. But that does not mean that we ought not to consider carefully a fundamental change to a fixed-term parliament. My plea today is that we do not regard this as simply a subordinate consideration. The way in which this has been introduced and the lightness with which the House is being expected to deal with this critical question troubles me.

In my submission, the existence of the Queen’s right to dissolve is in some circumstances very important. That may be why in Canada the prerogative of the Queen was preserved. Although they introduced a fixed-term parliament, the Canadians decided to retain the prerogative of the Queen to dissolve Parliament. We should think long and hard before we make a change of this kind. The role of the monarch is an important one and it is not one that we should simply discard.

I have a number of other observations about the Bill. I am troubled about the length—five years. That means that it postpones for five years, in perpetuity hereafter, the ability of the people of this country to pass their opinion upon the performance of a Government. That is potentially too long. The people of this country, who have had no opportunity to be consulted on this issue, are entitled to be consulted in greater depth than we have done hitherto, through the processes that this House has for the taking of evidence and through the ordinary channels of political communication.

I am troubled about the imprecision in what is intended in clause 2 as regards a motion of no confidence. Perhaps this can be tackled in Committee. The provisions seem to give rise to the realistic prospect that the courts may be tempted to invade on these matters. Let me say a few words about privilege. I agree with the right hon. Member for Blackburn that it is probably unlikely that the courts would wish to intrude on a matter so pivotal to the workings of Parliament as the Speaker certifying that there was a requisite majority under clause 2, but we cannot rule it out. As the Clerk of the Parliament has said, once we inscribe in statute, the courts are automatically engaged. It is their constitutional function to interpret a statute, and I cannot think of a single instance where the courts have declined to entertain an arguable interpretation in an arguable case.

It is true that the courts may say, after deliberation, and after appeal upon appeal, eventually in the Supreme Court, that they have declined to consider whether the certificate issued by the Speaker is indeed a valid certificate. However, this House has tried, on many occasions, to devise so-called ouster clauses seeking to foreclose the jurisdiction of the court on a judicial review, and I cannot think of a single case in which those clauses have prevented the court from saying, “Okay, we will get involved only in certain limited circumstances, but where it is, for example, a question of the precondition for the exercise of the discretion, we will get involved.” The Clerk gave a very good example when he pointed out that although clause 2 says that a certificate shall be “conclusive for all purposes”, that does not, in theory, prevent the court from inquiring into whether it is a certificate at all.

The courts have adopted precisely that analysis in the case of two or three statutes where the House has sought to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts and they have said, “No, it is our duty to scrutinise and to interpret the meaning of a statute, and where it is a question of whether the essential, fundamental preconditions are met for the exercise of a discretion, we will see whether they have been met.” It would be an act of voluntary self-restraint by the courts to deny themselves the jurisdiction to examine the statute to see whether the Speaker had complied. It is likely that they would exercise that voluntary self-restraint, but one cannot exclude the possibility that as time goes on—

[Mr Cash]

I am following my hon. and learned Friend’s arguments with great interest. In the Parliament Acts, the expression about whether the provision is conclusive for all purposes is reinforced by the words,

“and shall not be questioned in any court of law”.

It is curious that those words are omitted from this Bill given that would provide an additional safeguard and put the courts even more on notice that Parliament had instructed them not to question any provision in any court of law.

[Mr Cox]

I take my hon. Friend’s point. However, in my experience of judicial review proceedings, no form of language has been completely successful in ousting the court’s examination of a statute. This is a well-known phenomenon in administrative law. The House has, on several occasions, tried its very best, through expressions of the character that he mentions, to oust the jurisdiction of the courts, but the courts have said no. In this case, the Bill says that a certificate shall be “conclusive for all purposes”, but the courts would be likely to say, “That means ‘a valid certificate will be conclusive for all purposes’, and we are entitled to consider whether this is a valid certificate.” It would be an act of purely voluntary self-restraint if the court said, “In these circumstances we will treat this statute as non-justiciable.” I can think of no examples of where the courts have yet done that. Certainly, they have held certain things to be non-justiciable, but usually because the duty is vague and the expression of the statute is more aspirational than definitive. In this case, it is clear what conditions are set out for the Speaker to pass a valid certificate for the purposes of an early election.

In my judgment, it is not possible to rule out the courts’ involvement. If that is right, we should pause. I say this to the Minister: please let us think long and hard about further consideration of this Bill, because it smacks of undue and undignified haste. I have spoken about the duration of the Parliament, and the monarch’s integral and pivotal role in deciding on either declining a Dissolution, agreeing to a Dissolution or insisting on a Dissolution is vital. The Bill’s imprecision on the nature of a no-confidence motion is vital. Why should we not pause in relation to fixed-term Parliaments? Why do we have to make law for the long-term future? It is regrettable, and I have great trouble with this Bill, as I did with last week’s Bill about the alternative vote referendum.

As an Opposition, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives frequently criticised the then Administration for piecemeal, incoherent and fragmentary reform in constitutional affairs. Why are we repeating that error? We should be taking a long-term, coherent view of our constitution. How can it be right that we decide the electoral cycle of this House not in conjunction with a consideration of what a reformed Second Chamber would look like? How can it be right that we decide the electoral system of this House not in conjunction with the electoral system that we shall use for the Second Chamber? That would be joined-up, mature and wise constitutional law-making; this looks like something very different. I say to my hon. Friend the Minister that it is embarrassing to be on these Benches having to listen to a Bill of this kind being put forward in such a way. I had hoped for better from this Government.