Repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011

Debate between William Cash and Andrew Turner

Thursday 23rd October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I opposed the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill before it was enacted at every conceivable point during the procedure for simple reasons. First, I regarded it as fundamentally undemocratic, but I also believed that it will not stand the test of time. The reasons for that have been ably explained by my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) and others. My hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Mr Syms) was a little more circumspect, but he indicated none the less that he is not very happy with the idea of fixed-term Parliaments. I stand by everything I said in 2010, and I believe that those of us who took a stand against the Bill before it was enacted, including in the House of Lords, have been proved right. The Act needs not only to be reviewed, as provided for in section 7, but it ought also to be repealed, and that is why I am speaking in this debate.

The Act was also conceived in very dodgy circumstances. It arose without pre-legislative scrutiny and there was no consultation whatsoever. It was not in our manifesto, but it has profound constitutional implications that I will try to touch on in a moment. It was designed to give succour and support to the coalition. Indeed, it is embedded in the whole concept of the coalition—in a moment I will explain some of the remarks made by the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr Laws) about that, and the bearing that it has not only on this debate but on the whole of this unfortunate episode and this unfortunate Act of Parliament.

I wrote to my right hon. Friend, the Prime Minister, on 10 May 2010, before the coalition was entered into. I urged him in the strongest possible terms not to enter into a formal coalition with the Liberal Democrats, although I explained that if there were to be an informal understanding—perhaps Supply maintenance or whatever —that would be another thing. Hon. Members have already mentioned this, but had we had a minority Government at that time, which I urged on my right hon. Friend, I think we would have won a general election quite soon afterwards, because nobody would have voted for the Labour party under any circumstances. We would have demonstrated that we had a good case by pursuing Conservative policies at that time, and that would, of course, have included not having a fixed-term Parliament.

In a letter in today’s Daily Telegraph I suggest that the time has come for the coalition on the basis that the Liberal Democrats are using their power of votes to frustrate the 304 Conservative Members of Parliament and their Prime Minister on a whole range of important matters of not only constitutional but also political significance. I understand that the referendum is still under discussion, but the Liberal Democrats have clearly indicated that they do not want one. The same applies to the question of boundary changes—the list is long. I do not mean to elaborate on those issues, but I have no faith in the coalition, and the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 is a vehicle by which it has been given a constitutional support mechanism that, in my judgment, is completely unjustified by subsequent events.

[Mr Andrew Turner]

My hon. Friend says he is concerned about what the Liberals are doing in standing in the way of this Government and Parliament, and particularly of Conservative Members, but the Conservatives are also not allowed to agree with the Labour party on anything. The Government cannot introduce a Bill with the support of the Labour party because the Liberals may veto it.

[Sir William Cash]

That is an important point, and I endorse very much what my hon. Friend has said.

The arrangements in the Act are effectively a stitch-up, just as they were when we first considered the Bill back in 2010. I am glad to note that section 7 contains a requirement for the Prime Minister to hold a review, and only MPs can sit on the Committee that will review this Act. The fact that the Lords had to insist on that provision demonstrates that the Government would not have got the Bill through had they not made that arrangement. The whole thing is effectively in suspension anyway, and it is therefore a natural consequence of the limbo that this unfortunate and unacceptable enactment has put in place that the Act is up for repeal, subject to what is decided in 2020. I believe that it should be reviewed much sooner than that, and I am speaking in this debate because I very much endorse the proposals of my hon. Friends the Members for Gainsborough and for South Dorset (Richard Drax).

On 24 November 2010 I said—and I stand by this:

“What does such innovation say about the coalition? It certainly demonstrates its determination to stack the cards firmly in favour of the coalition and the Whips.”

I said the Act was

“not modernising, but is a reactionary measure. It is not progress, but a step backwards, along the primrose path, undermining the constitutional principles that have governed our conventions and been tested over many centuries. The proposal has been conjured out of thin air, for the ruthless purpose of maintaining power irrespective of the consequences…we are supposed to be “Working together in the national interest—”

that was the theme of the moment—

“I fear that on this Bill, on this matter, we are working together against the national interest.”—[Official Report, 24 November 2010; Vol. 519, c. 318-9.]

What are the consequences of what we are now considering? The Fixed-term Parliaments Act is still in place and it should be repealed. Clearly it will not be repealed before the end of this fixed term, but I wish to dwell on a number of points that have been raised. I freely acknowledge that some of these arguments, which have not been given general circulation, were put forward by Lord Norton of Louth. I mentioned him in an intervention on the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen), Chair of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee. I hope that his Committee asked Lord Norton for his views, with which I entirely agree, and I will encapsulate them.

Lord Norton makes the point that there are real problems with the 2011 Act, and that fixed-term Parliaments limit rather than enhance voter choice. That is the real problem. I tabled an amendment on the confidence motion and the 14 days—I do not need to go into that now because it was not accepted although the vote was quite close with only about 50 in it. I tabled an amendment to the arrangements that were being proposed at the time, and it certainly evoked an interesting and lively debate. My concern was that the whole parade that would take place within the 14 days, including the confidence motion and its arrangements, would be very much governed by powerful whipping to ensure that people fell into line with what the Government wanted. I was concerned that there would be a constant stream of people walking up and down Whitehall, just as we saw on television screens when the coalition was being put in place, and that the people who would make the final decision on the final wording about the holding of a confidence motion—including an affirmation after 14 days that the House had confidence in the Government—would not only be driven by the Whips, but would exclude the voters. Surely that is the real point. Why are we here? Who elects us? It is not our House of Parliament or our Government: it is the voters’. If things have gone completely awry and there is a case for an early election, as prescribed by the Act, the simple principle is that we should go back to the voters. We should not have a stitch-up within the Government, with the Whips making certain that people vote accordingly.

Fixed-term Parliaments limit rather than enhance voter choice. The outcome of one election cannot be undone until the end of the stipulated term. One Government could collapse and inter-party bargaining could produce another. In those circumstances, voters would be denied the opportunity to endorse what amounts to a new Government. That is a fatal position for us to have adopted. It is so undemocratic. Indeed, an unstable and ineffective Government may stagger on without achieving anything—we heard remarks to that effect from the hon. Member for Great Grimsby (Austin Mitchell).

In 1991, the then Leader of the House of Lords, Lord Waddington put it thus:

“Is it better for a government unable to govern to go to the country to try to obtain a new mandate or for the same government to spend their time fixing up deals in which the unfortunate electorate has no say whatsoever? The people not the parties should decide who governs.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 22 May 1991; Vol. 529, c. 260.]

What wise words. In essence, fixed-term Parliaments rob the system of our hallowed flexibility and limit voter choice. That choice is limited by this Act.

Although the policy of the Liberal Democrats was for four-year Parliaments—I concede that—agreement was reached quickly in May 2010 for a five-year term, and the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr Laws), who has written about that period, indicated that the object of the Act was to allow time to implement plans before worrying about the timing of the electoral cycle. But five-year terms mean that the voters have fewer opportunities than before to go to the polls, and most post-war Parliaments have not gone their maximum length—now a five-year term is an absolute requirement.

Credit Institutions and Investment Firms

Debate between William Cash and Andrew Turner

Tuesday 8th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Cash]

I very much agree with the hon. Gentleman. The more I have heard from him over the past few years, the more I have admired his determination to speak the truth. That is the position. This is not a party game; this is serious and it is deadly. This move is determined and deliberate. That is what people need to know.

Roland Vaubel, the famous economist from Mannheim university, talks about the use of the qualified majority voting system in the Council of Ministers as a form of “regulatory collusion”, and mentions the strategy of deliberately raising rivals’ costs. Particular groups of countries—there are no prizes for guessing which—enter into arrangements behind the scenes, and vote accordingly. Both France and Germany use that system to their advantage, and as I said in the Financial Times the other day, we are being outmanoeuvred.

Despite all the time, money and effort being put into the Vickers report, there are, as the shadow Minister made clear, serious worries that Vickers may yet be undermined by the very proposals that we are discussing. The problem goes much further, but I do not need to enlarge upon all that any more.

Some people tend to sneer at the idea, which I occasionally put forward, that our sovereignty is the most important issue of all. I say that for one reason and one reason alone—it is only by exercising the sovereignty of this House on behalf of the British people that we have any chance of being able to return and repatriate powers if the other member states are not prepared to negotiate.

I am prepared to listen to the Prime Minister telling me that he will fight hard, or whatever answer he gave me yesterday, but I remain totally unconvinced. We are at risk as a result of proposals such as these, so it is absolutely essential that we get things right. When I wrote a pamphlet for him—in fact, for the general public—called “It’s the EU, Stupid”, I set all that out, so I do not need to enlarge on it any further.

I have got out of the way the general points that I believe are necessary to put the whole matter in context. I see the Foreign Secretary laughing a little. I do not hold that against him, but I have to say that this is no laughing matter; it is a very serious question. We are reduced to having to argue about reasoned opinions and subsidiarity. Important though those are, as I have said, there is a dagger pointing at the City of London. Not just this particular draft regulation but an accumulated vast array of weaponry is being aimed at the heart of our economic system.

[Mr Andrew Turner (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

Could my hon. Friend help by reminding me how much is owed to the City of London as a proportion of national income?

[Mr Cash]

It has been declining, and that is another reason for concern, but the latest figure is something of the order of 15% to 20% of our gross domestic product. Take that away, and where would we be? The draft regulation is a deliberate attempt to do that, and it is only one document of many.

The aim of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is to

“enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision worldwide.”

I hope that it succeeds. However, the various directives in question relate to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and to capital adequacy, and they are collectively known as the capital requirement directive or CRD. They introduce a supervisory framework within the EU, designed, it is stated, to

“ensure the financial soundness of credit institutions (banks and building societies) and certain investment firms.”

I take a slight interest in that, because my family founded the Abbey National building society back in the 19th century and the National Provident Institution in 1835. Those institutions were run on sound grounds and lasted until very recently, but have unfortunately now been mopped up as a result of some of the international goings-on in the financial sphere.

In 2011, the European Commission proposed a draft regulation—the document referred to in the motion—and a draft directive, known together as CRD IV. They would incorporate the Basel III agreement on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms into EU law. How often have I said that the danger is that when a matter is transferred to EU jurisdiction, we lose control? Because of section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972, we cease to be able to control it. We hand over control of the drafting, method and interpretation of the law, and its effect on our own institutions, our own initiative and our own ability to be innovative and succeed.

The proposals are still before the European Scrutiny Committee, pending the receipt of further information from the Government. Meanwhile, the Committee has recommended that the House submit a reasoned opinion on the draft regulation to the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. A draft is annexed to the Committee’s report. I mention that because if enough member states issue a reasoned opinion, we will be able to stop the proposals. I strongly urge the Government to get as many member states as possible together, and I am sure they are doing that, if only to retrieve the situation as best they can.

Of course, as we all know, other member states will know what we are up to, and they will not enter into an arrangement to submit a reasoned opinion. We have seen that in the past—we do not get the requisite number of member states, and the proposal goes through. This is a test not just of the Government but of the integrity of the system. If a reasoned opinion is required because the Commission has exceeded its powers in relation to subsidiarity, nothing should prevent that from going ahead on an objective basis. I am not trying to pre-empt the decision, but I am anxious, on the grounds that I am about to mention, for other member states to understand that a reasoned opinion is necessary. It is in their hands to prevent the proposals from going through.

I turn now to the argument about the objectivity of a reasoned opinion. When the Commission makes a proposal for legislation, it is now required under the European treaties to produce a “detailed statement” that makes it possible to appraise the proposal’s compliance with the principles of subsidiarity. I do not for a minute demur from what I said during the Maastricht debates—that subsidiarity was a con trick intended to establish hierarchies, not true subsidiarity. We shall see.

That detailed statement is not just a bureaucratic procedure for its own sake, although one might be forgiven for thinking that some in Brussels think it is. It is the principal means left whereby national Parliaments and electorates can assess the basis on which the Commission considers legislation to be necessary at supranational rather than national level. The presumption underpinning subsidiarity is that decisions are best taken as close to the citizen as possible. Amen to that, providing that it happens.

It is not sufficient to underline the importance of those detailed statements. I remind, or inform, the House that no piece of European legislation has ever successfully been challenged in the Court of Justice of the EU on the grounds that it breached subsidiarity. Not one. That sends a very powerful message. There is not a little suspicion, therefore, that subsidiarity is just something to which lip service is paid. It strikes the democratic gong, but is not followed by any lunch. One of the jobs of national Parliaments—that is us here in the Chamber—is to try to change that position.