Iran: Nuclear Issues

William Cash Excerpts

Tuesday 24th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Ellwood]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. If I may, I will come on to the developments in the region and the wider E3+3 context later.

Crucially, we remain on track for successful implementation. The deal was adopted as planned on 18 October. Adoption day was an important landmark. It means that the deal is now in force and Iran is beginning to take the required steps to limit its nuclear programme. We are therefore on track towards implementation day.

Let us be in no doubt about the significance of successful implementation. An Iranian nuclear weapons capability would constitute a major threat to national, regional and global security. Full implementation of the agreement will remove that threat. Iran will grant the International Atomic Energy Agency unprecedented access so that it can verify compliance with the strict limits placed on Iran’s nuclear programme. Those limits mean that Iran’s break-out time to acquiring sufficient fissile material for a weapon will be at least one year for at least 10 years.

The UK, along with its E3+3 partners, played a crucial role in more than a decade of negotiations to resolve this most challenging of issues. The UK is committed to playing its part in ensuring that a nuclear weapon will remain beyond Iran’s reach. I hope that the Government continue to enjoy support from both sides of the House in our efforts.

In recommending that this debate be held, the European Scrutiny Committee referred a number of different documents to the House. Given the time constraints, I hope that hon. Members will forgive me if I give only a general description of them. Broadly speaking, they fall into three different categories. I will give an overview of each in turn.

When, in November 2014, the E3+3 and Iran agreed to continue negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme, the interim agreement—the joint comprehensive plan of action—was extended until 30 June 2015. This provided for the continuation of voluntary measures by Iran to freeze the most concerning aspects of its nuclear programme in exchange for limited US and EU sanctions relief. As the negotiations reached the end game, all parties felt that an agreement was indeed within reach, but was unlikely to be secured by the 30 June deadline. As such, the first group of documents extended the suspension of EU sanctions for a few days at a time, as the negotiations edged towards the key date of 14 July. I cannot stress enough how sensitive the negotiations were at that stage. Had the limited sanctions relief lapsed, the prospects for keeping Iran at the negotiating table would have diminished, if not disappeared completely.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

Did the sensitivity of the circumstances that the Minister describes lead to the delay in debating this matter, given that so much time has since passed?

[Mr Ellwood]

There were of course delays, but, as I have articulated, had we not taken the measures, and introduced and pursued the documents we are now discussing, we would not have kept Iran at the negotiating table, which it was important to do to get the result we now have.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Ellwood]

The hon. Gentleman is right. There were extensive negotiations in America and concerns were raised, as they were in this House, but I understand that the Senate has now confirmed American support for this deal.

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Mr Ellwood]

In conclusion, the IAEA will have unprecedented access to verify that Iran continues to honour its obligations. The Government were grateful for support that they received from across the House throughout the negotiation process. As our attention turns towards a robust interpretation of this historic agreement, we look forward to enjoying similar support as we ensure that the threat of an Iranian nuclear bomb never materialises.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I am sorry the Minister thought it unnecessary to give way to me towards the end of his speech. I always take these things in good part, but I did want to ask him a question.

There is an enormous crisis in the middle east, with ISIS/Daesh and the other factors at play—not to mention the Russians—and the interaction between all that and the peace and stability we all earnestly wish for. The reality is that this kind of document—in fact, it is not just one document; I have counted them and I think there are 14 in all—and the deal being done must have some bearing on the current situation. It would be unthinkable that there would not be such interaction at a diplomatic level, given the importance of Iran in the whole middle east crisis we are experiencing at the moment—all the documents, the involvement of the United Nations Security Council, which endorsed it on 20 July, and the interaction with not only our own Prime Minister but the President of France and Chancellor Merkel, who put out a statement in September 2015. That is not unimportant to say the least in relation to the events taking place at this time.

My main message is this: given the importance of the diplomatic interaction, and bearing in mind the fact the matter relates to nuclear issues and potential nuclear threats and their relationship to Israel, not to debate this subject at the right time really did not give the House of Commons an opportunity to discuss it when it really should have been discussed. That is the main point I want to make. I am so grateful that the Minister has now decided to come to the Dispatch Box.

[Mr Ellwood]

I thank my hon. Friend for his courtesy in allowing me to intervene, despite my being discourteous to him, for which I apologise—I thought we were going to go round in circles on the issue of the date. On his first point, as soon as the deal was made, the Foreign Secretary made a statement to the House, but given Government business, this was the first date we were given for coming to the House. On the second point, I am pleased that Iran is now participating in the Vienna talks. He is absolutely right that this is the first indication of what I hope will be a more responsible attitude from Iran towards regional security.

[Sir William Cash]

I do not intend to go into the complexities of the foreign policy implications, because that would warrant a much longer debate and involve not only the Minister for Europe but the Foreign Secretary —with respect to this Minister’s pay grade. This is vital to our security. One needed only to witness the discussions as they unfolded in Switzerland, at which the Foreign Secretary was present, the to-ing and fro-ing and the analysis that was brought to bear to realise the importance of this issue. That was the point I wanted to make about the timing. It is important, when we say a European document is of legal or political importance, that the matter is debated on the Floor of the House in the appropriate manner and at the right time. The UN Security Council voted to adopt resolution 2231 on 20 July, and these documents have been pouring out ever since. There is a more recent document, dated 18 October, which is getting nearer to now, but we are at the end of November. But I have made my point clearly enough.

[Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)]

I know that the hon. Gentleman, in his capacity as Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee, agrees that all major European matters, even those which we might eventually agree or give a cautious welcome to, deserve the full scrutiny of the House. As he points out, these documents were considered on 9 September, and the Committee recommended that they be brought to the Floor of the House as soon as possible after the October recess. It is seven weeks later. Has he had an explanation from the Government about why it took so long, and has he been given cause to believe that the remaining 21 scrutiny documents will be brought forward for debate, either here or in Committee, within a reasonable timeframe?

[Sir William Cash]

This is the first opportunity we have had to put the point about the timing to the Minister. It is because we recommended it for debate that we can raise the question in this context. On the logjam of documents, to which the hon. Gentleman, who sits on my Committee, rightly refers, it is the constant and persistent determination of the Committee to get issues debated as early as possible, as he knows. I will not go down that route now—it is for another occasion—but I take very seriously what he says.

Because this is such a controversial matter, others have made observations on it, and I would like to quote what Roger Boyes, the diplomatic editor of The Times, said on 15 July. The Minister might think that circumstances have improved since then in terms of bringing Iran and Russia nearer to the negotiations and getting a better result in respect of ISIS/Daesh, but I will quote what he said anyway, because it is of some interest. He says:

“There is nothing game-changing about teaming up with a wobbly Iran. The accord with Tehran can then only be judged narrowly as to whether it is a success as a piece of arms control statecraft—and whether the release of sanctioned funds makes Iran more or less menacing. Consider what would happen without a nuclear deal, President Obama said yesterday: no limits on the nuclear programme, on centrifuges, on the plutonium reactor. But the president has to consider this too: how does one maintain leverage on Iran once the sanctions have been lifted? Denied access to a suspicious nuclear site, inspectors will be able to appeal to a joint commission that includes delegates from Iran, Russia and China. Delays are thus built into the verification system and the idea that sanctions can come crashing quickly down again is over-optimistic. Parts of the deal read like a cheater’s charter; there is too much wriggle room.”

I put that forward not in my own name, but because I think it important for the House to hear the views of an experienced diplomatic editor such as Roger Boyes. He continues:

“What happens in ten to 15 years when the deal has run its course, restraints are lifted and a wealthy Iran which has retained its nuclear expertise, which has grown in zealous confidence, decides to remind a small Gulf state who is boss? The deal is an open invitation to Sunni princelings to invest in their own nuclear deterrent. In the meantime Tehran will have the money to throw into the subversion of its neighbours and expand its arms exporting business.”

On the other hand, to illustrate the controversy and importance of all this, Sir Richard Dalton, a former British ambassador to Tehran who obviously knows a lot about it, argued that there were good reasons to believe that it will stick, including

“the ‘snap-back’ provisions to restore sanctions in the event of violations”

and the fact that

“Iran will not want to risk a military attack, which would grow more likely if the deal fell through; no viable better agreement available and no international support for more sanctions if the US were seen to have vetoed the deal”.

Then there would be an Iran, he says, that

“is tired of being punished for something that it has not intended to do since the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s ban on nuclear weapons, which dates from 2003, the year Saddam Hussein was toppled.”

He goes on to say that Iran

“has recognised that it cannot develop sustainably as a nation without allaying international concerns.”

It also “values its reputation”, and

“reneging on its commitment not to build nuclear weapons, or withdrawing its agreement to the utmost transparency, either during or after the agreed 15-year limits on its enrichment activities”

would

“demolish that reputation, with no appreciable gain to its security because of the retaliation and regional arms race that would follow.”

That just gives an indication and a flavour of the complexity and controversy that lies behind all this.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I am glad my hon. Friend has brought this sort of politics into the debate. All this reminds me very much of the darkest days of the cold war, a policy of containment and the fact that the then Soviet Union had different factions—modernisers and hardliners. Can we not hope that a policy of containment in the case of Iran might lead eventually to the emergence of a modernisers’ victory, albeit slowly and perhaps over decades?

[Sir William Cash]

One must indeed hope so. In the extremely complex and dangerous world that we now inhabit, we must also hope that some sensible diplomatic and useful solution—I would not call it a compromise—can be found.

To conclude my remarks, in September 2015, our own Prime Minister, the President of France and the Chancellor of Germany were saying:

“Iran will have strong incentives not to cheat”—

the opposite, I think, of what Roger Boyes was saying—

“The near certainty of getting caught and the consequences that would follow would make this a losing option.”

The first moment of truth is due to come at the end of this year, which I think the Minister understands very well, when the International Atomic Energy Agency is due to report on whether Iran has fulfilled the commitments that will enable international and thus EU sanctions to be substantially lifted, which is not the same as the fact, as many people seem to think, that they have been lifted already. This is a process, and this is what will transpire towards the end of the year.

[Mr Ellwood]

rose—

[Sir William Cash]

I think the Minister will confirm that.

[Mr Ellwood]

I can confirm that, but let me add that we shall have another yardstick to examine in February, when elections will be held for the Majlis, the Iranian Parliament. The type of candidate who will be allowed to stand will give the world the first indication of whether Iran is moving in a new direction. We hope that moderate candidates will step forward and will be allowed to stand, given that they have been denied that opportunity in the past.

[Sir William Cash]

I remind the House of what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg). We need to deal with the substance, and that is what the European Scrutiny Committee is there to do. It is there to go beyond the purely textual confusion that can arise from our having to debate a number of different documents—14 of which have not been fully set out—within a fairly limited time span. We need to get to the heart of what this is all about.

I am glad that the Minister said what he said just now. We want to be positive, but we also want to hold him and the Government to account. This is a hugely serious matter, and it is essential for it to be debated in good time. We could have debated it earlier, and, while we understand the position, we regret and deeply deplore the fact that it has not been debated until now.

Given what the Minister has said, I have nothing further to add, other than to express the hope that the Foreign Affairs Committee will note the significance of what is going on here—I know that my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), the Chairman of the Defence Committee, already does—so we can start to have a proper discussion that it is properly timed, not only in the context of the IAEA and the end of the year, but in the context of the February discussions in Iran to which the Minister referred.