Scottish Separation

Debate between William Bain and Graeme Morrice

Tuesday 10th July 2012 Westminster Hall

[Graeme Morrice]

I certainly agree that Scotland is capable of sustaining a renewable energy industry, but we will do better together within the United Kingdom.

I now want to move on to the share of the UK public debt burden that should be assumed by a separate Scotland. That a breakaway Scotland would have to shoulder some of the UK’s public debt is beyond question. What is certainly open to debate, however, is how the debt to be assumed should be calculated and what factors would contribute to those calculations, including the share of the debt accrued through the bank bail-out. Members are aware of a number of recent studies to have explored this critical question.

February’s National Institute of Economic and Social Research report on the economy of a separate Scotland explored the difference between apportioning debt per capita or pro rata, concluding that there is only marginal difference between the two. The report stated:

“With a pro rata transfer of existing UK public debt, Scotland would enter independence heavily indebted with no insurance from fiscal risk sharing or fiscal transfer mechanism with the rest of the UK.”

The Institute of Economic Affairs report published just last month suggested that a separate Scotland could be saddled with an eye-watering £110 billion national debt. The report highlighted that, with the UK’s debt having recently topped £1 trillion and the expectation that it will rise even further by 2015, Scotland’s share could be even greater than £110 billion. The report’s author, Dr Richard Wellings, suggested that that high debt, which would be comparable to Portugal’s at present, coupled with decreasing oil revenues, as already referenced, would almost certainly require urgent cuts to public spending. Even calculating the public debt on the basis of population size, a proposal described as reasonable by a spokesperson for the First Minister, the report made Scotland’s share of the debt around £93 billion—still a significant burden for a small nation—and around three times greater that the Scottish Government’s current budget.

[Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is making a compelling argument for Scotland staying part of the United Kingdom. Does he think that it is unbelievable arrogance by those who want Scotland to leave the United Kingdom that they have not yet devised a debt target for a separate state? How on earth can the public be informed in a referendum if they deny people that information?

[Graeme Morrice]

My hon. Friend makes a valid point. The SNP’s argument seems to be predicated on contesting the robust figures provided by the experts in support of Scotland remaining part of the UK. Despite the differences in some of the figures that have been suggested, there is absolutely no doubt that, as the David Hume Institute report that was published in March indicated, the figures reached

“will be determined as much, if not more, by politics as by statistics”.

The undeniable point is that a separate Scotland would have to take on considerable and currently unknown public debt. Regardless of what the exact figure might be in the hypothetical scenario of a yes vote—clearly, we would not know that until negotiations on Scotland’s secession from the UK were complete—that debt, coupled with a relatively volatile tax revenue base, is likely to have a significant effect on future public expenditure, so why take the risk in the first place? Furthermore, a whole raft of additional costs that a separate Scotland would incur in setting up embassies, collecting taxes, creating new institutions to replace those broken up by separation and establishing a welfare system and armed forces, and so on, would add further to that uncertainly.

The currency to be adopted by a separate Scotland is arguably the question on which the SNP and those who advocate separation have undergone most contortions in recent times, and that is saying something. Until recently, most nationalists were strongly in favour of joining the euro, and lukewarm, at best, about the pound. As the influential SNP MEP Alyn Smith said at the party’s 2009 conference:

“We are a Nordic, European country, currently part of a debt-laden sub-prime toxic assent currency…we don’t want to be part of and which is not serving our interests well.”

At the same conference, the Scottish Government Finance Minister, John Swinney, declared that he was in favour of joining the euro, but that the final decision to join should be determined by a referendum. In January 2009, Alex Salmond said:

“I think there is a strong argument for the euro, and I think as sterling declines even further that argument is being made very strongly.”

Now, even they have realised that that is not such a sensible idea, and they have become converts to retaining sterling, although without bothering to have any discussion whatever with the UK Government. That is an astonishingly cavalier approach to such a vital question.

Between the SNP’s enthusiasm for the euro and its recent conversion to keeping the pound, it has debated options for introducing an entirely separate Scots currency. Veteran nationalist, Jim Sillars—a former key ally of Alex Salmond—even proposed last year that a separate Scotland should adopt a Scottish dollar, although I understand that no one from the Scottish Government has written to Barack Obama about it yet.

It is widely accepted that a separate Scottish currency would be a serious disadvantage to business. Although the commitment to a separate Scotland retaining sterling may sound more credible, as the recent article on the high price of separation in The Economist highlighted, it would be a monetary union without fiscal union, which has proved disastrous for the eurozone. It would, of course, be fraught with well documented problems, especially on fiscal responsibility and the lender of last resort, which were highlighted in the Library’s standard note on Scotland’s economy, which I referred to earlier.

Under formal monetary union with the UK, as has been widely highlighted, the Bank of England would continue to form monetary policy for both the remaining UK and the separate Scotland, so removing a key aspect of economic independence from the tools available to a Scotland operating outside the UK. Even if no formal monetary policy was agreed, the Library note states that

“in such a scenario, Scotland’s monetary policy would be determined by the Bank of England which would only be considering the interests of the rest of the UK.”

[Mr Bain]

My hon. Friend is being generous in giving way. Is the situation not even worse? The economic madness of separating fiscal and monetary policy would be detrimental to Scotland’s economy, and a democratic deficit would be created. As Members of Parliament, we can scrutinise what the Chancellor does on defining financial stability and regulating the banking sector. Which of Scotland’s parliamentarians would have democratic accountability in the proposals that Alex Salmond has come up with?

[Graeme Morrice]

None of them. That is clearly a problem, and a step backwards.