European Union (Approvals) Bill [Lords]

Debate between Wayne David and Martin Horwood

Monday 4th February 2013 Commons Chamber

[Martin Horwood]

Only yesterday the hon. Gentleman was declaring on Radio 4 that he was taking his lead from the Catholic hierarchy. Now he tells the House that he is taking a lead from the German Parliament. At this rate he might get a reputation for being a Europhile, which might not do his reputation within the Conservative party too much good.

[Wayne David]

Does the hon. Gentleman think the generous allocation of time by the Government has anything to do with the lack of any other Government business?

[Martin Horwood]

It is above my pay grade to judge, but I am sure that is not true.

The substance of the Bill relates to three measures, two of which are completely uncontentious—the e-publication of the Journal and the business plan, effectively, of the Fundamental Rights Agency. Other hon. Members are right that the third measure is worth more substantial debate, as it adjusts a mechanism that was supposed to limit the size and endless growth of the Commission. There are a number of issues that that growth has raised. It was not simply the practicality of having an ever-increasing number of commissioners. Without being unkind to some of the smaller member states, we know that there is a bit of a capacity issue in terms of their ability to produce candidates of sufficient calibre for a portfolio that affects the entire continent. Moreover, in terms of public perception, it slightly muddies the whole idea of the Commission. The Commission should be, in essence, the equivalent of our civil service. It should be the servant of the Council of Ministers, the various European ministerial councils and the European Parliament, and not pretend to be a representative body.

European Union (Approval of Treaty Amendment Decision) Bill [Lords]

Debate between Wayne David and Martin Horwood

Monday 10th September 2012 Commons Chamber

[Wayne David]

I can see that the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) is straining at the leash to intervene on me. I will give way to him, so that he can give my hon. Friend a comprehensive answer. She has made an astute point.

[Martin Horwood]

I would like to put on the record, on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, my belief that this House should indeed carry out much more scrutiny of European affairs. I also agree with the hon. Gentleman that that should be done on a broader basis, and that the departmental Select Committees should be involved. Indeed, we have suggested as much in our submission to the current discussions on European scrutiny. I am not sure, however, that we need ever more reports being discussed in addition to all the legislation and everything else that we debate, interminably, on the Floor of the House. He cannot possibly argue that we do not spend enough time debating Europe in this Chamber, as we are doing now.

[Wayne David]

I do not want to labour this point. I welcome the Liberal Democrats’ desire for more transparency and scrutiny, but experience shows that, all too often, those words come to nothing unless there is a focus on something. The importance of the new clauses is that they would provide that “something” for the debate to focus on. Nothing concentrates the mind better than a report that has a distinct niche in the parliamentary calendar to enable that debate to take place.

European Union Bill

Debate between Wayne David and Martin Horwood

Monday 24th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr David]

What I am saying is that if some of the questions implied by the Bill were put, no reasonable human being, including Members in this House, would understand what on earth the debate was all about. Nobody would. Debating how many angels can stand on the head of a pin might be okay for the middle ages, but it is unlikely to enthuse people in 21st century Britain.

[Martin Horwood (Cheltenham) (LD)]

I may well be more in sympathy with the hon. Gentleman’s position than some of my colleagues on the Government side, but is he not aware—I appreciate, as he said, that he might have some difficulty understanding all of the Bill—of the “significance” provision in clause 3(4)(b)? Surely that is designed to guard precisely against the possibility of having referendums on minutiae.

[Mr David]

It is interesting to hear the hon. Gentleman refer to the exceptional clause in that way. I will come on to the very interesting point that he has raised, which I am sure would not be shared by many Conservative Back Benchers.

Let me pursue my argument. These two factors—the lack of proper debate that having a referendum on a small technical issue would mean, and the low turnout—might lead to a questioning of any referendum result. For example, I cite Professor Hix again in his evidence to the European Scrutiny Committee, when he referred to the example of Texas. I heard a Government Member earlier making a sedentary comment about the USA, so let us look at this example from Texas. It has referendums in local communities on whether smoking or drinking should be banned. I am sure that everybody understands the questions, but they have a referendum on the same issue every year. Why? It is because people keep on questioning the validity of every year’s result because the turnout is so low.

The Bill implies that this Parliament can bind future Parliaments, but we all know that this cannot be done constitutionally. It is an interesting point, as the Government have made it clear that they do not intend to test the legislation. Perhaps one of their amendments might do so, but generally speaking, they do not intend to use this legislation—it is intended for something in the future. I would argue very strongly that there is a constitutional question mark over that.

I also believe that the Bill weakens the role of Parliament because it obliges Parliament to pass on much of its decision-making capacity. Yes, it is true that the Bill gives additional responsibilities to Parliament in some areas, which we will debate at a later stage. The Bill’s most important impact, however, will be to weaken the role of Parliament. I would even suggest that the Bill’s whole approach is crudely populist and fraught with practical problems and constitutional risks.

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[Mr David]

No, I have made my decision.

I have referred to the significance provision but, as if that were not enough, the Bill also contains the exemption condition. If the significance provision is the smoke, the exemption condition is surely the mirrors. With a striking lack of clarity, clause 4(4) refers to “the codification of practice”—one hon. Member mentioned that earlier. That could lead to a significant extension of competences by European Union institutions, yet the Bill does not provide for a referendum on such matters.

Clause 4(4) then stipulates that changes that apply

“to member States other than the United Kingdom”

should not attract a referendum. That may appear reasonable but, given that this country is an integral part of a single European market, it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty that anything happening in the rest of the European Union would not have an important impact on this country.

In addition to all that is the most amazing exemption. In a Bill that claims to be about giving the electorate the ability to make decisions on important changes affecting this country, the

“accession of a new member State”

is expressly excluded in that regard; accession will not trigger a referendum. Where is the logic in saying that we can have a referendum on whether or not a voting system should be changed for the appointment of judges, but not on whether Turkey joins the European Union? Does the Minister seriously suggest that Turkey joining the European Union would be of no consequence? Does he seriously believe that the membership of Turkey, a country of more than 70 million people, will not affect the United Kingdom’s vote in the Council of Ministers? The Minister is a nice chap, but surely he cannot honestly believe that Turkey’s membership will not have a significant impact on Britain’s role in the European Union?

[Martin Horwood]

I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is making, but surely the issue under discussion is the transfer of power to Europe and that transfer triggering a referendum. What powers does he think would be transferred from the British to the European level in the event of Turkey joining the European Union?

[Mr David]

The ultimate decision-making body in the European Union is the Council of Ministers, where, broadly speaking, votes are exercised according to the size of a country relative to other countries. I am suggesting that if a large country such as Turkey joins the European Union, the influence of the United Kingdom will inevitably diminish—that is absolutely simple and straightforward. Given the logic of the Government’s argument for this Bill, I find it incredible that that circumstance is painfully excluded.

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[Mr David]

I do not think that it is.

Members have asked about our rationale in tabling the amendment. I believe that we have explained it logically and systematically, but I ask the Minister: what is the Government’s rationale in specifically excluding a referendum on accession? Will the Government respond to that? What is the rationale? This is a debate but there is silence from Government Front Benchers—I can only conclude that there is no rationale. There is not, is there?

The situation is quite simple. The Government want Turkey to join the European Union. They consider that to be of tremendous foreign policy importance and they will not allow a referendum to get in the way. That is the truth and they should accept it.

[Martin Horwood]

First, I apologise for saying that I was in sympathy with the drift of the hon. Gentleman’s argument. I am certainly not now. I am very puzzled. A minute ago, he was arguing that we should be wary of having too many referendums. He now seems to be arguing for another one. Does he want more or fewer referendums?

[Mr David]

Once again, the hon. Gentleman is not following the debate very closely. What we are saying is that these issues should be considered—watch my lips—carefully by a special committee drawn of both Houses. What we are against is a predetermined conclusion that, irrespective of the circumstances, there should not be a referendum on Turkish accession. Although I challenged the Minister to explain the rationale, he declined to do so. I am sure the Committee will draw its own conclusion.

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[Martin Horwood]

The hon. Gentleman might want to listen to the rest of my speech, because there is some risk of what he describes, and that is the thrust behind our amendments.

Amendments 67 and 68 may look drastic to some of our Conservative colleagues, because they seem to remove a swathe of the referendum provisions from the Bill. However, they seek to tease out the rationale for the referendum lock in the case of amendments to the treaty on the functioning of the European Union using the simplified revision procedure. The amendments do not relate to referendums on changes to the treaty on European Union or even to referendums on changes to the treaty on the functioning of the European Union that do not use the SRP. So the amendments do not seek to remove referendums altogether from this Bill; they ask whether referendums on treaty changes under article 48(6) of the treaty on European Union—the simplified revision procedure—which, after all, was created for relatively uncontentious and insignificant changes in the functioning of the European Union, are really justified.

As a small aside, may I ask the Minister to explain why “transfer” of power or competence “to” the EU is used in the explanatory notes and in some of the language associated with the Bill, rather than “pooling” or “sharing” powers and competences “with” the European Union, which has been the established language until now? To those of us who are fairly relaxed about pooling sovereignty and powers with the European Union when it is right to do so, “transfer” sounds a slightly more pejorative term and its use an example of linguistic drift.

[Mr David]

The use of the language is important, because the rhetoric has changed and the Opposition contend that the substance has not.

[Martin Horwood]

That stretches credibility somewhat. The hon. Gentleman has heard in many eloquent speeches from Members on the Government Benches how important the Bill is to our relationship with the European Union and how it offers the possibility of reconnecting the British public with the decision-making processes in the European Union. It is beyond doubt that the Bill will be a significant piece of legislation.

European Union Bill

Debate between Wayne David and Martin Horwood

Tuesday 11th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr David]

The hon. Gentleman might well have a point. This is something that has to be looked at carefully. I am mindful of the fact that although we are in Committee today, this is not the end of the process. I am sure that we will return to the issue on Report.

It appears that the Government hold the view that parliamentary supremacy is a construct of common law. However, if that is the case, it could be argued that parliamentary sovereignty could be qualified by the courts and that this would not be opposed by the Government. Professor Tomkins, who has been referred to already, is the distinguished chair of public law at the university of Glasgow. He submitted extremely important written evidence before the European Scrutiny Committee and gave extremely significant oral evidence. Let me be clear: Professor Tomkins is not anti-European. He specifically said in his written evidence that he considered that

“it is in the United Kingdom’s clear interest to remain a committed member of the EU.”

However, he expressed his concerns to the European Scrutiny Committee about the supremacy of Parliament and common law as follows. Referring to the Jackson case, Professor Tomkins said:

“one of the things that that case most sharply and, to my mind, alarmingly indicates is that even our highest court, as was, is not sure what to do with parliamentary sovereignty. It isn’t sure what the legal basis for parliamentary sovereignty is. It isn’t sure how much parliamentary sovereignty is under challenge. It isn’t sure how much parliamentary sovereignty continues to represent the group ‘norm’ or the ‘bedrock’ or the ‘keystone’ of the constitution—all of those words are used.

The reason why the Jackson and the Attorney-General case is so long…is that so many of the judges who decided that case…wanted to use the case as a vehicle for the expression of a bewildering variety of different views about the past, present and future state of parliamentary sovereignty. The case, I think, is authority for not much, but it is authority for the proposition that we have the right to be concerned about what is going to happen to parliamentary sovereignty in the hands of the courts.”

That is a powerful statement, and all of us who believe in the importance and the supremacy of Parliament should take note.

As I have tried to argue, the Opposition believe that clause 18 is otiose and unnecessary. It is purely declaratory and merely reaffirms what is widely understood to be the legal and constitutional position regarding the application of EU law in the United Kingdom.

[Martin Horwood]

I am rather confused about the Labour Front-Bench position. Having apparently endorsed the fear that there is judicial mission creep, the hon. Gentleman now seems to be rejecting a clause that seeks to resolve that issue. What exactly is the Labour party suggesting? Would it propose an alternative clause, or would it prefer that the Bill did not exist? What is the Labour position?

[Mr David]

I am just coming to the amendment that we are proposing, which would allow an opportunity for the issues raised by the hon. Member for Stone and others to be considered in a rational and thoughtful way. In the spirit of generosity, we accept that others may have genuine doubts. That is why we tabled amendment 52, which would ensure that the Secretary of State made an annual report—[Interruption.] The Deputy Leader of the House has read our amendment. Well done. Amendment 52 would ensure that the Secretary of State made an annual report to indicate whether parliamentary sovereignty had been challenged or questioned in the British courts or the European Court of Justice. Our amendment spells out in clear terms the duality principle, whereby the law of the European Union is totally dependent on the European Communities Act 1972. We see such a report being presented to Parliament and being voted on annually.

[Martin Horwood]

With all due respect to the hon. Gentleman, I shall have to restate my question. I was not asking whether he was proposing a report to find out the Secretary of State’s position; I was asking him what the Labour party’s position would be. What would he want in that report? What would he expect?

[Mr David]

We would want an accurate reflection of what has been happening in the British courts and the European Court of Justice. I want to see the objective evidence presented to us. It is interesting that we have not heard from the Government in this debate as to whether there is more justification than what they have so far presented to us. I suspect that there is none, but there are many Conservative Back Benchers who believe that there is ample evidence. What I am saying is that there is certainly an indication that there are more things to be considered.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr David]

I am not sure what the “mission creep” that the hon. Gentleman is talking about really is. We have been talking about the sovereignty of the British Parliament, and we are pretty clear that the European Union exercises its powers through European law in this country by virtue of an Act of this Parliament. That is undeniable, and it is an important principle on which I hope every Member of the House would agree.

I fully appreciate that many Members of the House have sincerely held concerns. Although we would argue that some of those concerns are exaggerated, we should nevertheless have an annual review—an annual report, an annual debate and, yes, an annual vote. If it can be shown that the sovereignty of Parliament is being questioned or challenged in the courts, either at home or abroad, we will have a strong basis on which to act.

[Martin Horwood]

I am hoping that my persistence will pay off. The hon. Gentleman appears to be saying that on the one hand, clause 18 is otiose and, according to all the eminent sources to whom he has referred, that there is no particular threat to parliamentary sovereignty. However, he also seems to be conceding that there is some generalised concern, because he is calling for an annual debate and an annual report on the subject. Let me once again ask: what would the Labour party do? Would it also suggest such a clause? Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that we should restate parliamentary sovereignty in statute or not?

[Mr David]

The hon. Gentleman is making hard work of this—or perhaps he is not listening as carefully as he might. Our starting point is that we would not have this Bill in the first place. We would be talking about the issues that really matter to the people of this country and the people of Europe. Nevertheless, we recognise that we are in the here and now. The Government have introduced the Bill, dedicating much parliamentary time to it, and, as a good Opposition, we are determined to make the best of it. We are simply saying that, on the face of it, there is no case for clause 18. However, we have respect for the concerns that have been expressed, both here and elsewhere. We are saying that we should be careful to take into account all the points that are expressed, clearly and effectively. However, let us not dwell on them on a one-off basis and make a definitive decision here and now; let us instead have an ongoing process, with an annual review and an annual report. Let us ensure that the Government are fully accountable to the House of Commons. That is a straightforward position.