Scotland Bill

Wayne David Excerpts

Monday 6th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Chris Stephens]

I declare my membership of Unison and my trade union activity over the past 20 years. It was disappointing to hear the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David) shout across to SNP Members that we do not care for workers and working people—I hope he will reflect on that because a number of SNP Members have been involved in trade union activity in the past.

[Wayne David]

If the hon. Gentleman was concerned about workers throughout the United Kingdom, he would certainly accept Labour’s amendment to consider all the pros and cons of a case for the fragmentation of the national minimum wage.

[Chris Stephens]

I care about workers across the world, and I will be quoting from the Scottish Trades Union Congress and stating how it views the situation.

In speaking to new clause 47, I will not only outline why we believe it to be necessary, but produce supporting evidence from independent organisations in Scotland that have stated the clear benefits they see from devolving employment law. We believe that having such powers at Holyrood is essential to driving forward fairer pay and better working conditions in Scotland. Our priority is empowering Scotland to tackle inequality, for which we have a clear mandate from the voters. If the route out of poverty is work, it follows that we must argue for real powers to deliver it.

A coherent and integrated Scottish employment policy would address inequality and poverty by helping to get people into work, sustain employment and tackle low pay. That is why we seek the devolving of the national minimum wage to Scotland as a priority, as that would enable the Scottish Parliament to do more to address low pay and in-work poverty.

Our 2015 general election manifesto set out plans to raise the minimum wage to £8.70 by 2020, which is equivalent to the average national minimum wage growth between 1999 and 2007, and would go some way to reversing the below-inflation increases that took place between 2007 and 2014. Putting that power firmly in Scotland’s hands would allow us to legislate for further increases to match the living wage over time. Devolution would also allow the Scottish Government to integrate national minimum wage policy into the devolved income tax and welfare systems to ensure a targeted and joined-up approach to addressing in-work poverty.

Why do we need employment law to be devolved? The recent report by Citizens Advice Scotland, “Fair Enough?”, sets out in detail the problems with the current employment law system. Last year, the service dealt with 46,540 cases of unfair treatment in the workplace, and fully expects that number to rise. Those cases include dismissal for unfair reasons such as sickness, attempting to take holiday or even pregnancy. Some workers were even informed of their dismissal by text message. That backs up my own experiences before arriving in this place, where—even in local government—employers engaged in behaviour that they thought they could legally get away with rather than adhere to best practice.

There is widespread anger in Scotland at the attacks on employment rights, equalities and trade union rights from the coalition, and now from the majority Tory Government. Their approach is leading to an economy in which work is less well paid, less secure and less permanent. Local economies suffer in a low-wage, low-reward economy. A better way is required. For example, devolution of this issue would enable us to end the unfair and exploitative zero-hours contracts that create unacceptable levels of uncertainty and financial insecurity for low-paid workers.

Our policy approach to employment law and workplace issues is evidence-based. In February 2014, the Scottish Government commissioned the “Working Together” independent review of progressive workplace policies and practices in the public and private sectors in Scotland. The review group was convinced that the economic and social challenges and opportunities facing Scotland were more likely to be addressed successfully in an environment where trade unions played their full part.

Following the review, the Fair Work Convention was established to develop a fair employment and workplace framework based on national and international research and leading-edge practice for Scotland, and to deliver a practical blueprint for implementation by 2016. It will provide independent advice to the Scottish Government on all matters relating to fair work, and it could play a bigger role in future years. For instance, the Fair Work Convention could work with ACAS, trade unions and other stakeholders, such as Citizens Advice Scotland, to promote awareness of basic rights at work and how to assert them for employees and employers alike. The convention could also take on a role overseeing enforcement of employment law under Scots law. In other words, we have thought through how this would work in practice.

There is a strong economic argument that devolving employment law would bring opportunities for innovation that would enhance productivity, workplace development, labour market security and resilience. We observe a lack of coherence in the Government’s proposals because they would devolve the administration of tribunals, but not the substantive laws they administer, including employment law. Far from settling the issue, that keeps the pot boiling: a lack of clarity and purpose in legislation means that the only guarantee is that it will be revisited at some point. This is an opportunity to do it right the first time.

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[Andrea Leadsom]

Thank you, Sir David.

Clauses 46 and 47 deliver the Smith commission agreement and provide Scottish Ministers with greater influence over the strategic direction of the Commissioners of Northern Lighthouses and of MG Alba. They achieve that by enabling Scottish Ministers to appoint a member of the Northern Lighthouse Board and by giving Scottish Ministers the power to approve Ofcom appointments to MG Alba.

Clause 48 provides that the Secretary of State will be required to consult Scottish Ministers when setting the strategic priorities in relation to the exercise of functions in Scotland regarding the activities of Her Majesty’s Coastguard and the safety standards of ships. These functions are exercisable by the Secretary of State for Transport, but are in practice carried out in the UK by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, an Executive agency of the Department for Transport.

The Smith commission agreement was explicit in the devolution of the power to allow public sector operators to bid for rail franchises funded and specified by Scottish Ministers, and clause 49 achieves that.

Clauses 50, 51 and 52 implement the Smith commission agreement and devolve design and implementation powers relating to energy efficiency and fuel poverty to Scottish Ministers, while reserving responsibility for the overarching aspects that affect all consumers in Great Britain, such as scale, costs and apportionment of obligations, as well as the obligated parties. The clauses contain safeguards to give effect to the Smith commission agreement that the devolution of these powers

“be implemented in a way that is not to the detriment of the rest of the UK or to the UK’s international obligations and commitments on energy efficiency and climate change.”

It is the Government’s position that such provisions are necessary. Specifically, we believe that it would be in the interests of UK and Scottish Ministers that the benefits provided to consumers in one part of Great Britain should be proportionate to the costs on consumers in that part of Great Britain.

Scottish Ministers should be able to design supplier obligations for Scotland, but costs should be proportionate across regions, removing the possibility of competitive distortions and cross-subsidy by consumers across Great Britain. We will look at ways of making the costs of obligations clear and equitable between Scotland and the rest of Great Britain.

Clause 53 creates a formal consultative role for Scottish Ministers in the design of renewable electricity incentive schemes that will apply in Scotland. Clause 54 will enable Scottish Ministers to take decisions on safety zones for renewable energy installations in Scottish waters by making Scottish Ministers the appropriate Ministers, and it will enable them to take responsibility for ensuring that offshore renewable energy installations are removed or decommissioned at the end of their useful life. It ensures that consent to and decommissioning of offshore renewable energy installations and the management of Crown Estate assets in relation to such installations are the responsibility of Scottish Ministers, rather than being divided between Scottish Ministers and the Secretary of State.

Clause 55 delivers the Smith commission agreement by devolving to Scottish Ministers, when acting jointly with the Secretary of State, the power to require the Competition and Markets Authority to carry out a market investigation reference when they suspect that features of a market are preventing, restricting or distorting competition. Clause 56 requires Scottish Ministers to lay Ofgem’s annual report and accounts before the Scottish Parliament. To enable that, it ensures that copies will be provided to Scottish Ministers.

Clause 57 gives effect to two key elements of paragraph 38 of the Smith commission agreement relating to Ofcom. It gives Scottish Ministers the power to appoint one member to the Ofcom board to represent the interests of Scotland, and it requires Ofcom’s annual report and accounts to be laid before the Scottish Parliament. Clause 58 gives effect to paragraphs 39, 40 and 41 of the Smith commission agreement relating to the appearance of the Northern Lighthouse Board, Ofcom and Ofgem before the Scottish Parliament on matters relating to Scotland.

Finally, part 7 contains standard technical clauses, including general provisions associated with the Bill, such as transitional provisions, commencement arrangements and the short title.

[Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

Before speaking to amendments 157 and 158 to clause 49, I would like to comment on clauses 50 and 51, which relate to fuel poverty support schemes and energy company obligations. I would like the Minister to explain—indeed, to justify—why those clauses are constructed as they are. They amend existing primary legislation, but they are far from clear.

Our starting point must be paragraph 68 of the Smith commission’s report, which states:

“Powers to determine how supplier obligations in relation to energy efficiency and fuel poverty… will be devolved. Responsibility for setting the way the money is raised… will remain reserved.”

Importantly, it then states:

“This provision will be implemented in a way that is not to the detriment of the rest of the UK or to the UK’s international obligations and commitments on energy efficiency and climate change.”

Indeed, paragraph 68 is one of the more prescriptive in the report.

Clauses 50 and 51 also state clearly that any action proposed by Scottish Ministers should not be to the detriment of the United Kingdom as a whole. I want to press the Minister on the criteria to be used by the Secretary of State to determine whether a course of action proposed by Scottish Ministers would be to the detriment of the UK. That is clearly stated in clause 50, and at several points in clause 51. Specifically, proposed new section 14A(8)(b) in clause 50 refers to schemes likely to

“cause detriment to the United Kingdom”.

However, it does not state how detriment in all cases may be judged to have occurred. Proposed new section 14A(9) states that

“considerations that the Secretary of State may take into account include the costs imposed on suppliers by virtue of schemes made, or to be made, by the Secretary of State and the Scottish Ministers under section 9.”

That is section 9 of the Energy Act 2010.

In clause 51, proposed new section 33BCA(7) and others make similar references to “detriment” and to “costs”. Here, too, the phrase “may take into account” is used, which strongly implies that the Secretary of State will not be obliged to take costs into account. It seems that he will also be able to take other, non-specified factors into account. The same can be said of other amendments to existing legislation proposed in clause 51.

What I find worrying about the proposed new sections in clauses 50 and 51 is the lack of specificity and the significant discretion placed in the hands of the Secretary of State. Apart from the politics of this, there is a question of the lack of clarity and, with it, the possibility of any course of action being justiciable. I am not a lawyer—I am an ordinary person—but my experiences over the past decade or so tell me that if there is a lack of clarity in legislation, all too often it is the judges who end up providing that clarity.

I am thinking of the action taken two years ago by the UK Government against the Welsh Government. The Welsh Government wanted to protect Welsh agricultural workers after the UK Government abolished the Agricultural Wages Board, and the UK Government lost the case in the Supreme Court. That is simply an example that springs to mind of what can happen when legislative imprecision leads to legal problems. I would welcome the Minister’s response to the points I have made.

Let me turn to clause 49—Rail: franchising of passenger services. It amends section 25 of the Railways Act 1993 to remove the prohibition on public sector operators bidding for a franchise in relation to a Scottish franchise agreement. The Smith commission’s report stated clearly, in paragraph 65:

“The power will be devolved to the Scottish Government to allow public sector operators to bid for rail franchises funded and specified by Scottish Ministers.”

Labour’s amendment 157 would take a small but significant step further, but in a way that is in keeping with the spirit of the Smith commission’s report. In proposing to allow not-for-profit operators, it echoes the proposal by Gordon Brown prior to the referendum.

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[Dr Philippa Whitford]

In fact, the Scottish Government did not have the power to choose to give that franchise to a public service within Scotland, so to criticise them for giving it somewhere else seems a little perverse.

[Wayne David]

I will come to that, because it is an entirely predictable response from the SNP.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the decision was indeed somewhat perverse. I say that because the Scottish Government could have delayed the tendering process in the full knowledge that they would soon have the power to award a franchise to a public or not-for-profit operator that could reinvest any profits back into Scotland’s railways, but they chose not to delay. They knew the legislation was coming and pre-empted it.

[Dr Whitford]

The Scottish Government have put a break in the franchise so that if we are lucky enough to have this power in the Scottish Parliament by 2020, we can give the franchise to our own public sector.

[Wayne David]

I am glad that the SNP accepts the point I am making.

It would have been better if, instead of putting nationalist sentiment first, the SNP considered harsh economic reality and the wellbeing of the Scottish people, but no—it decided to press ahead. As SNP Members are well aware, rail passengers are suffering badly as ScotRail has adopted an approach to industrial relations that the Scottish TUC’s Graeme Smith has described as “nothing short of shambolic”. Few would disagree with that comment.

Yesterday, ScotRail cancelled a third of its usual Sunday services after pay talks with train drivers’ union ASLEF stalled. Abellio ScotRail has written to staff to offer voluntary redundancy, even though the franchise was supposed to guarantee that that would not happen. In the light of these developments, it is important for us to say clearly that Abellio’s workforce planning and industrial relations are shambolic—and that is an understatement.

Why on earth is what is happening on the Scottish railways being allowed to happen? Surely what is needed is in-depth scrutiny and a review of the previous tendering arrangements. In tabling amendment 158, our desire is not merely to put the spotlight on the foolish behaviour of the SNP Government in Scotland, but to ensure that they learn the lessons so that their mistakes cannot be made again. I hope that Members on both sides of the Committee will feel able to support our amendment on that basis.

[Mr Graham Allen (Nottingham North) (Lab)]

Before I deal with the amendments and new clauses in my name, I should like to address a few words, through you, Sir David, to the other place. The way in which we are considering this Bill means that a large group of new clauses that try to give real life to the Smith commission proposals will not even be discussed this evening. They would give Scottish local authorities the general power of competence already enjoyed by English local authorities. They also refer to subsidiarity and to devolving power genuinely not just to the Scottish Parliament—of which I am one of the biggest supporters—but to Scottish local government. The new clauses would actually allow local government in Scotland to be constitutionally defined so that no one, either in this place or in the Scottish Parliament, could ever take away the rights and liberties of Scottish local government.

It is a flaw in our legislative process when we are not even allowed to debate those very important issues in our own Parliament. They have not even been dismissed. I very much hope that colleagues in the other place will note that those issues have not had a hearing. I think that many people—democrats from all parties—who were excited about the possibilities of what arose from the referendum and the Smith process will feel that this House has cheated them out of a proper debate on some of the wider issues of devolution.

This is going to happen again on another day, when the English version of devolution will be debased and devalued by a mere rearranging of the EVEL deckchairs in the House of Commons. I think people will live to regret that day, too.

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[Mr Allen]

Yes, but I think 6% of the United Kingdom electorate voted for the SNP, so if we get into statistical battles—[Interruption.] We are in the federal Parliament now. Those who get annoyed must understand that this is not Holyrood and MPs are not entitled to do to local government in nations outside Scotland what has been done to local government inside Scotland. That writ, where what the SNP says goes and we must do, does not extend to the federal Parliament. So I would say to the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey that in the rough and tumble of debate on the Union, there is a fundamental question. Some people wish to have devolution and some people wish to separate—I regard that not as pejorative but as accurate—and those debates must be heard here, even if the electoral system has handed a large number of seats to one particular party. It is a matter of respecting the views of everyone else. If that is done, that party might be able to claim that it represents the people of Scotland. But it cannot claim to be the exclusive voice of Scotland when so many people did not vote for that party and, of course, a large majority rejected the fundamental platform on which the SNP stands—separation from the Union.

[Wayne David]

We have heard a great deal about the fact there are 56 SNP Members. We are debating the Scotland Bill, so where are they? There are fewer than a dozen SNP Members in the Chamber. So much for being the voice of Scotland! [Interruption.]

[The Temporary Chair (Sir David Amess)]

Order. Before the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen) responds to that intervention, may I remind the Committee that the knife falls at 10 pm, and other hon. Members wish to speak? I have been very lax in allowing Members to drift on to the third group, which is not for discussion. I would ask the hon. Gentleman to draw his remarks much more closely to the amendments.