European Union (Amendment) Act 2008

Wayne David Excerpts

Wednesday 16th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I hope that I can give my hon. Friend the reassurance he seeks. First, I will make a bit of progress and describe how the provisions in the European Union Bill will bite on this measure and any future measures that are modelled on it.

[Mr Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

A very important question has just been asked by a Back Bencher and the Minister has made no attempt to respond to it. Would it not be technically possible to have the new procedures introduced by the European Union Bill as well as the current procedures? One is post and the other is pre.

[Mr Lidington]

I had better invite the hon. Gentleman to read the Hansard record of the debates on the European Union Bill in which he took part—both in Committee and on Report. If he does read them, he will see that the Government introduced an amendment precisely to make explicit the requirement for this proposed treaty change to be subject to more rigorous parliamentary scrutiny than would have been permitted if the current statutory procedures under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 had been allowed to stand and to suffice. I hope that he was not asleep when we debated that amendment. If he examines Hansard, he will find that we have covered that point in some detail.

The previous Government left the country with a system of control that was grossly inadequate. Section 6 of the European Union (Amendment) Act 2008 requires that when a draft decision under the simplified revision procedure—under article 48(6) of the treaty on European Union—is proposed, a Minister must introduce a motion and have it passed by both Houses without amendment before the Prime Minister can signal his agreement to its adoption at a subsequent European Council. That is the point in the decision-making process that we have reached tonight.

There is an option, under the 2008 Act, for the Government of the day to insert a disapplication provision into this type of motion. Such a provision would enable the Government to agree to subsequent amendments to the draft decision to amend the treaty without having to come back to the House for approval. The options were put before me by my officials and I was absolutely clear from the moment I read the papers that to introduce a disapplication provision of that kind would be completely unacceptable and would give Parliament absurdly little control over such an important matter. For that reason, there is no such provision in the motion.

Let me make it clear: if the House approves the motion, it is authorising the Prime Minister to agree to this draft decision—this text alone—at the European Council. Should there be any suggestion of amending the draft decision at the European Council—there is no such suggestion from any quarter at present—the Prime Minister could not legally agree to it at the European Council without first coming back to this House and the other place for additional approval after a further debate. The draft decision that is referred to in the motion will be the version that is agreed at the Council and there can be no other version of the treaty change without the further approval of the House in a debate such as this.

The European Scrutiny Committee has rightly assessed the draft decision as politically important and has recommended it for debate on the Floor of the House. We are scrutinising the draft decision, as the Committee has requested, and debating whether the Prime Minister may signal his support for its adoption at the Council on 24 and 25 March.

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[Mr Lidington]

We inherited from our predecessors a legislative measure that was brought in under an existing competence and treaty base and that was, from that time, legally binding. My hon. Friend will understand that I am not going to be drawn into speculating about the position of other individual member states. My understanding, on the basis of the most recent information that I have, is that no other member state has been asking the EU authorities for additional financial help.

As the Prime Minister has made clear many times in this House, securing a tight and disciplined budget for the future is the highest priority for the European Union. At the last European Council meeting, Britain led an alliance of member states to unprecedented success in limiting the 2011 EU budget increase to 2.91%—a very marked improvement on our predecessors’ performance in the previous year. Crucially, in moving forwards, working alongside key partners such as France, Germany, Netherlands and Finland, we are committed to a real-terms freeze in the EU budget in the new perspective, which we expect to run from 2014 to 2020, and we have written collectively to the President of the European Commission setting out our position.

[Mr David]

The Minister claims that a great victory was achieved by our Prime Minister with regard to the 2.91% increase. Will he confirm to the House, however, that just a few months earlier he was opposing that?

[Mr Lidington]

That is no secret. It is a matter of public record that we would have preferred a complete freeze on the 2011 budget, and we voted for that in the Council of Ministers. I regret that we were one country short of achieving the blocking minority. [Interruption.] That kind of protest from the shadow Minister is rank double standards. The Labour Government not only conceded increases in the annual budget that went way ahead of anything like 2.91% but, even more significantly, negotiated an agreement on the current multi-annual financial framework in which they agreed to give up a significant slice of this country’s hard-won rebate from the EU budget in return for no more than a half-promise of a review of agricultural policy, and they did not even manage to get that at the end of the day. We know that they were dysfunctional. According to the memoirs of the then Prime Minister’s chief of staff, the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer could so little stand the sight of one another that they refused even to share the figures that they were using in parallel negotiations about an EU budget, the settlement of which was absolutely central to the interests of the United Kingdom. Having let down this country so badly in the past, it ill behoves the Labour spokesman to come and lecture us this evening.

Should this House not approve the motion unamended, I have to say to my hon. Friends that the consequences could be serious and damaging for Britain. The Prime Minster would not be able to signal support for the draft decision in March, and since the decision cannot be adopted without unanimity, it would fall. That would mean, for example, that this country would remain, for the indefinite future, indirectly liable for eurozone bail-outs through the EFSM since there would be no ESM to replace it.

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[Mr Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

There is no doubt that it is in Britain’s national interest to do everything we can to ensure that the eurozone is stable and prosperous. It was therefore right for the European financial stabilisation mechanism, the EFSM, and the European financial stabilisation facility, the EFSF, to be created last May. In those extraordinary and dangerous circumstances, it was necessary to take swift action. More than 40% of Britain’s exports go to the eurozone. If this country is to secure a strong economic recovery, exports to the eurozone must play a vital role.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

I thank the shadow Minister for giving way. I wonder if he is correct. The history of economic crises shows that the countries that devalue and default first are often the first to recover. By sticking with the euro, Europe has therefore made a mistake and lengthened the period of distress for Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the other economies.

[Mr David]

It is for other European Union member states to decide whether they wish to be part of the eurozone, and there is no doubting their commitment to it.

When the dust had settled after the fraught days in May 2010, moves were made to establish a more permanent stabilisation mechanism, facilitated by a treaty change to provide a stronger legal base. That mechanism will come into force after 2013 and will replace the EFSM and the EFSF.

I find the procedure before us rather strange, to say the least. When or if the European Union Bill, which is currently in the other place, reaches the statute book, there will be a change to the relevant constitutional procedure, as the Minister explained, and the procedure that we are using this evening will no longer apply. Instead, we will have what is essentially a post-decision procedure. Treaty changes will require a statement to be laid before Parliament on whether the decision falls within clause 4 of that Bill. I understand that the treaty change to establish the European stabilisation mechanism would not fall within clause 4, so would not trigger a referendum. However, it would require an Act of Parliament. The Government have said on at least three occasions, and have confirmed this evening, that they would seek the support of the House, using the procedures of the European Union Bill, by introducing primary legislation. As the Financial Secretary to the Treasury said:

“The mechanism is not a transfer of power from Westminster to Brussels, so it does not require a referendum, but it will require primary legislation, which will be introduced in due course.”—[Official Report, European Committee B, 1 February 2011; c. 12.]

Given that commitment, I wondered why the Government were putting forward this motion at this time. The reason, of course, lies in section 6 of the European Union (Amendment) Act 2008, which requires that when a decision under article 48(6) of the treaty on European Union is proposed, a Minister must introduce a motion and have it passed by both Houses of Parliament without amendment. That must happen before the Prime Minister can give his agreement to the adoption of a draft decision at the European Council. In other words, for the Prime Minister to be able to give Britain’s support to this draft proposal at the European Council meeting at the end of next week, it is necessary to secure the approval of Parliament.

I want to make a point about procedure. I welcome what the Minister said earlier on this matter, and I hope that the Prime Minister will adhere to that if there is even the smallest change to the proposed amendment. I hope that that is truly a cast-iron commitment.

[Mr Jenkin]

Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the European Union Bill will set aside the procedure set out in the 2008 Act, and that there will no longer be a requirement to bring draft Council decisions before this House before they are made? I think that he should invite the Minister to intervene on him to clarify whether that is the case.

[Mr David]

I would indeed welcome clarification on that subject. Indeed, I intervened on the Minister earlier and received no clarification. It is my understanding that the new procedure will supersede the procedure that we are using this evening, and that the procedure will be post-decision rather than pre-decision. I invite the Minister to clarify that.

[Mr Lidington]

I am happy to provide clarification. The present decision is unique, in that it is being handled under the 2008 arrangements but will also become subject to the arrangements in the European Union Bill—assuming that it becomes law. The Bill, which we debated for seven days, will extinguish the 2008 arrangements, but it will ensure that after the adoption of the decision, in order for ratification to take place, the text agreed by Heads of State and Government at their final adoption meeting must go through all stages of primary legislation in both Houses.

[Mr David]

I thank the Minister for that clarification, but although there might be extensive post-decision debate, after the implementation of the Bill we will no longer be in a position effectively to give the Prime Minister a mandate. That is a step backwards and a negation of democracy.

[Matthew Hancock (West Suffolk) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman has just said that he believes it is an error not to have a mandate, but did the previous Government have a mandate when they signed up to the EFSM after losing an election?

[Mr David]

I have already referred to that point. The former Chancellor and Government were facing exceptional circumstances, and my guess is that if the current Government had taken over the reins at that point, they would have done exactly the same thing.

[Mr Lidington]

The idea that the new system that will be introduced in the Bill is somehow weaker than the current one is laughable. An Act of Parliament is a much tougher form of scrutiny and accountability than a single vote before the initial decision is taken. Under the 2008 Act there would be no need for primary legislation before ratification took place. Furthermore, in extinguishing the 2008 provisions the Bill will extinguish the possibility of a disapplication procedure, which exists under the 2008 Act and would allow the Government of the day, by means of a motion such as the one before us this evening, to decide that its Head of Government could agree a change to a text without ever coming back to Parliament to give it a further opportunity to comment.

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[Mr David]

I hear what the Minister says, but it does not alter the fact that we will no longer be in a position effectively to give the Prime Minister a mandate. Effectively, he will be able to do what he wants and have it retrospectively approved.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I thank the shadow Minister for giving way a second time. It is very generous of him.

Tonight’s debate came about initially because of a suggestion by the European Scrutiny Committee, which could continue to recommend draft decisions for debate in the House before the Prime Minister went off to negotiate, and then we could have a Bill later. I do not really think we have lost anything.

[Mr David]

I think that statement was really made for the Minister’s benefit, and it would be useful to have his response to it.

[Mr Lidington]

What my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) said is absolutely true.

[Mr David]

I am glad that for once there is unanimity on the Conservative Benches.

I have two concerns that I should like to dwell upon related to the broader situation in which we find ourselves. The first is the fact that the countries of the eurozone have apparently established a new decision-making structure. The reasons they have done that are perfectly understandable, but it is worrying that the Government do not acknowledge that decisions taken by the eurozone countries could have profound implications for the UK. Take, for example, the issue of the single market. The development and completion of the market is of critical importance to Britain, but we have to be aware that there could be a temptation for the eurozone countries to see the single market in eurozone terms only.

In fairness, the conclusions of the Heads of State and Government of the euro area summit last week state that the new pact for competitiveness and convergence will respect the integrity of the single market in the euro area and the EU as a whole, and the involvement of the European Commission in the work of the euro area group should be a safeguard.

[Mr Peter Lilley (Hitchin and Harpenden) (Con)]

Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that eurozone members propose to break up the single market, which is established by treaty of all member states, and to impose borders, restrictions or differences between the rules that apply in eurozone countries and those that apply in the rest of the single market? If he is not, his point falls.

[Mr David]

I am not making that point at all, and with respect, the right hon. Gentleman has not listened carefully to what I said. The statement issued by eurozone countries makes it clear that they will acknowledge, respect and uphold the integrity of the single market. I am simply making the point that the development of the single European market is a key issue. It should be one of Britain’s priorities—it would be, if we had a proactive Government—to ensure that the single market continues to develop. My concern is that in future the eurozone countries, which are perhaps more tight-knit than the rest of the EU, could be tempted to extend the single market provision among themselves rather than applying it to other member states.

[Matthew Hancock]

Is the hon. Gentleman therefore suggesting that the Labour party position is that the UK should be a part of the European stability mechanism, and therefore tied into bailing out eurozone countries, or does he agree with the Government’s proposal that the European stability mechanism should be for eurozone countries only?

[Mr David]

If the hon. Gentleman bears with me, I will tell him what I propose.

One sure way to prevent the single market from developing in a way that does not work to Britain’s advantage is for Britain to be involved in the current discussions. It is important for us to have an appropriate involvement in eurozone summits. I understand that countries such as Poland and Sweden, and even the Czech Republic, which has absolutely no intention of ever joining the single currency, have already indicated that they wish to be involved in those discussions. In contrast, Britain has made it clear—so I am told—that it does not want to be involved in any way whatever. I suggest that that is potentially harmful to Britain’s national interest, and therefore urge the Government not to close the door on our eurozone partners.

The second issue is another important and profound one. I have reservations about the economic and political assumptions that underpin this treaty change and the ESM. Let me be clear that the eurozone countries are correct in agreeing a permanent crisis mechanism. To that extent the treaty change is understandable, but my concern is that the ESM is part of a wider economic approach that is completely insufficient to address Europe’s deep-seated economic problems. Austerity, rapid economic retrenchment policies and fiscal consolidation will not of themselves create the kind of growth that the eurozone desperately needs. If all EU countries cut back at the same time, growth is likely to be sluggish at best. The hardest hit countries could find themselves facing stagnation, or even another recession. The risk is low economic growth and high long-term unemployment, with the poorest member states being hit hardest.

Of course, Europe has a 2020 strategy, which is supposed to be a 10-year strategy for jobs and

“smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”.

The stated aim of the strategy is to help Europe to deliver structural reforms and to recover from the crisis. However, although it is full of good intentions, the strategy plays second fiddle to Council and the Commission plans for deep economic retrenchment. It is clear that throughout most of Europe economic recovery is far from strong, and there is little evidence that private sector job growth will be fast enough to compensate for the huge number of jobs lost in the public sector. My concern is that the political and economic philosophy underpinning the treaty change and the ESM will make economic recovery in the eurozone both fragile and uncertain. As I said at the beginning of my speech, that is not in Britain’s best national interests.

These are important and serious reservations, and I hope that our concerns will be listened to carefully. Europe, including Britain, needs a coherent, well-thought-out growth strategy. Without that, the treaty change will fail to deliver the stability and prosperity that we all want.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—